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Asia, the continent just across the Pacific Ocean from the US, has been 
pushed into unchartered waters with the election of Donald Trump to the 
presidency of the US.  The challenge of navigating this “new normal” 
comes just as Asia’s own economies and politics are more vulnerable and 
fragile than they have been for a very long time.
How well prepared is Asia for this new phase in its renaissance follow-
ing almost two centuries in an economic and political abyss? What are the 
major challenges that Asia faces? In short, what next for the Asian Century?
US RebootS PoSt-waR aSia
In the aftermath of World War 2 and the Korean War, the US planted the 
seeds for an “Asian Century” being realized in the twenty-first century. It 
remade its arch-enemy Japan into a democracy with a pacifist constitution. 
It offered security alliances and partnerships to Japan, Korea, the 
Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand and Singapore. It provided financial assis-
tance to rebuild war-torn economies. America’s open markets enabled 
these countries to pursue export-driven development. And the post-war 
liberal international order led by the US, which includes the United 
Nations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and 
The original version of this chapter was revised. An erratum to this chapter can 
be found at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7182-9_12
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the World Trade Organization (WTO), formerly the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade, underpinned an open and secure international sys-
tem which facilitated Asia’s development.
To be sure, sound domestic policies and strong leadership in many 
Asian countries played an important role. But the contribution of the US 
was crucial.
There were of course periods of tension. By the 1970s and 1980s, the US 
and other Western countries pushed Japan to open its highly protected mar-
kets and to invest in their own economies. It was time for Asia’s export giant 
to allow more imports. And the US even felt under threat as Japan seemed 
to be taking over its mantle as the world’s leading economy. This apparent 
threat faded from view with Japan’s subsequent financial crisis in the 1990s.
When China began opening its economy from 1978, the US was also 
there to welcome Chinese exports, students, migrants and more recently 
Chinese investors. China’s economy would experience a dramatic wave of 
economic growth following its membership of the WTO in 2001, which 
was supported by the US Clinton administration and business community. 
True, the US and other Western countries benefited handsomely from 
growing economic linkages with China and other Asian countries, even if 
they have been partly responsible for widening income inequality. And it 
has been hoped that closer economic relations would promote peace and 
security through the mutual interdependence that they create.
FRom aSian RenaiSSance to aSian centURy HyPe
Speculation that the twenty-first century could belong to Asia reached a 
crescendo around the period 2010–2012. The US had been flattened by 
its Wall Street crisis. Europe was knocked out by its sovereign debt crisis 
and the side effects of America’s financial crisis.
At the same time, China became the growth center for the world econ-
omy, thanks to a mega stimulus package from the Chinese government. 
This boosted economic growth worldwide, especially for China’s Asian 
trading partners and for commodity exporters like Australia, Brazil and 
Indonesia, along with many African and other Latin American countries.
Many saw an Asian Century as a foregone conclusion. Certainly, the 
Chinese leadership adopted an air of triumphalism, and a period of assertive 
Chinese foreign policy began with the main targets being Japan and the US.
Singaporean intellectual Kishore Mahbubani set the tone for Asian 
Century “hype” when he announced that “the last two centuries of Western 
domination of world history have been a major historical  aberration. From 
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the years 1 to 1820, the two largest economies of the world were those of 
China and India … All historical aberrations come to a natural end. 
Therefore the Asian Century is irresistible and unstoppable.”1
Some of the many signposts of Asian Century hype were:
• US President Barack Obama’s comments in 2011 when he announced 
his administration’s “pivot” (or “rebalance”) to Asia—“As the 
world’s fastest growing region—and home to more than half the 
global economy—the Asia Pacific is critical to achieving my highest 
priority, and that’s creating jobs and opportunity for the American 
people … as a Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger and 
long term role in shaping this region and its future.”2
• Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard’s declaration at the launch of 
her government’s 2012 White Paper on the Asian Century—
“Whatever this century brings, it will bring Asia’s return to global 
leadership, Asia’s rise. This is not only unstoppable, it is gathering 
pace … Asia will become home to most of the world’s middle class 
by as early as 2025. Not only becoming the world’s largest producer 
of goods and services; becoming the world’s largest consumer of 
them.”3
• After being blackballed by China for meeting with the Dalai Lama in 
2012, British Prime Minister David Cameron committed one of the 
biggest kowtows in modern history, when he announced in 2015 
that the UK would join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank, in defiance of the wishes of the US. White House spokesmen 
could only bemoan the UK’s “constant accommodation” of the 
Chinese government. Around the same time, Cameron declared that 
the UK is “China’s best partner in the West”, while at the same time 
it had seemingly abandoned its responsibilities to Hong Kong, its 
former colony, which is suffering from Beijing’s abuses of the “One 
Country, Two Systems” regime.
• Chinese President Xi Jinping’s press article, on the occasion of a 
2014 visit to India, in which he wrote—“I am confident that as long 
as China and India work together, the Asian century of prosperity 
and renewal will surely arrive at an early date.”4
• A 2006 speech by Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, in 
which he said—“The most important development, I believe, of the 
twenty-first century will be the rise of Asia. China has already trebled 
its share of world GDP over the past two decades and India has 
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doubled it. Both these giant economies of Asia are bound to gain a 
considerable part of their share of world GDP that they had lost dur-
ing the two centuries of European colonialism.”5
• In 2011, the Asian Development Bank projected, under an “Asian 
Century” scenario, that Asia could account for over half the world 
economy by 2050, and an additional 3 billion Asians could enjoy 
living standards similar to those in Europe today.6
FRom aSian centURy HyPe to DonalD J. tRUmP
As with most bubbles of hype, things have since come back down to earth, 
and the mood has fundamentally changed. The US economy has 
rebounded and become the strongest point of a weak global economy. 
China is struggling under the weight of its massive debt, large capital out-
flows, rapidly aging population and other challenges. And many other 
Asian countries have lost their economic mojo, in no small part due to the 
slowdown of world trade and concerns about “deglobalization”. In other 
words, the likelihood that the twenty-first century might belong to Asia 
has greatly diminished.
Despite the return to economic growth, full employment and financial 
stability under the Obama presidency, a wave of popular discontent saw 
the election of Donald Trump to the US presidency, rather than Hillary 
Clinton, Obama’s anointed successor. While there were many factors 
behind Trump’s success, his anti-Asia and especially anti-China rhetoric 
was a key element of his “Make America Great Again” mantra.
Indeed, during the election campaign and before his inauguration, 
Donald Trump had much to say about Asia. He accused China of raping 
the US. He threatened to label China a currency manipulator, to levy an 
import tariff of 45% on American imports from China, to implement a 
“border-adjustment tax” on all imports and to penalize companies that 
locate manufacturing investments in China rather than the US. He called 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) a “disaster” and a “rape” of the 
American people.
Trump criticized China for its island-building program and militariza-
tion in the South China Sea, and for not helping control North Korea. He 
argued that “the concept of global warming was created by and for the 
Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive.” He 
threatened to withdraw the US from the Paris Climate Change Agreement, 
which was forged through US–China leadership. Trump also threatened 
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to make Japan and Korea pay more for the US military troops and assets 
that are defending them and suggested that they could acquire nuclear 
weapons. Trump also questioned the “One-China Policy” and spoke by 
telephone with Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen.
tRUmP aDminiStRation moveS into action
The Trump administration moved quickly into action on the Asian front. 
To the dismay of the US business community, Trump withdrew the US 
from the TPP. This was after all a trade agreement designed by US busi-
ness, for the benefit of US business, pushed onto allies and partners, and 
then rejected by a businessman president. Above all, the TPP was a mani-
festation of US leadership to establish modern rules of the game for trade 
and investment in the Asia Pacific. China was not a signatory, as it could 
never have signed up for the agreement’s conditions for state-owned 
enterprises, intellectual property and labor rights. (Under Japanese leader-
ship, the remaining 11 TPP signatories are discussing the possibility of 
pursuing with the TPP without the US.)
Trump’s rhetoric on trade policy has been evolving and softening from 
the defiant protectionist messages during the election campaign and in his 
inaugural speech. Trump is now emphasizing his support for both free and 
fair trade. According to the president’s 2017 Trade Policy Agenda,7 
America has not benefited from its trade deals over the past couple of 
decades due to the lack of reciprocity in trading relations. Trump would 
now like US trade policy to focus on bilateral, rather than multilateral, 
deals, to secure better market access. He plainly has China, Japan and 
Korea in his sights.
While the US Treasury has backed off from Trump’s claims of Chinese 
currency manipulation, it has established a “Monitoring List” of major 
trading partners that merit close attention to their currency practices, 
which includes four Asian economies, namely China, Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan.8 Despite some softening in Trump’s trade rhetoric, there remains 
a strongly protectionist undercurrent, as Trump’s overriding trade policy 
goals are reducing the US’ bilateral trade deficits (notably with China, 
Japan and Korea) and bringing manufacturing jobs back to America. 
Trump has also threatened to disregard WTO dispute settlement rulings. 
While Trump is promising to shake up trade relations with Asia, China is 




Trump had a successful first summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping 
in April 2017 and seemed to have enlisted his support to help control 
North Korea. However, it only took a couple of months for Trump to 
realize that China is reluctant to seriously tackle North Korea for fear of 
destabilizing the regime. The Xi–Trump honeymoon was then over, as 
quickly as it started, when the Trump administration announced sanctions 
on Chinese entities for their dealings with North Korea, also announced 
actions against China’s alleged dumping of steel exports, gave a green 
light for a $1 billion arms sale to Taiwan and sailed a US destroyer through 
the Chinese-occupied South China Sea. And Trump’s launching in August 
2017 of an investigation into China’s alleged theft of US intellectual prop-
erty has deeply troubled the Chinese government and raised the specter of 
a possible trade war between China and the US.
To the great disappointment of China and the rest of the international 
community, President Trump has also withdrawn the US from the Paris 
Climate Change Agreement and rolled back Obama-era clean energy reg-
ulations. China and the European Union are now positioning themselves 
as global leaders in the fight against climate change, despite China’s appall-
ing domestic environment and the bad environmental performance of 
Chinese investors in Africa and Latin America.
Trump officials reaffirmed the US commitment to its alliances with 
Japan and Korea, while Trump himself indicated his support for the 
 “One- China Policy” in a telephone conversation with Chinese President 
Xi Jinping. This is seen to have been a big back down for Trump, as Xi 
reportedly refused to talk with him until Trump honored the One-China 
Policy.
It also seems that Donald Trump’s administration is planning to defy 
Winston Churchill’s advice that “to jaw-jaw is always better than to war- 
war”. His 2017 budget proposal involves increasing funding to the US 
military by 9%, while cutting the State Department’s diplomacy and for-
eign aid by a combined 28%, and also the Environment Protection Agency 
by 31%. “There is no question that this is a hard-power budget; it is not a 
soft-power budget,” said Mick Mulvaney, the director of the Office of 
Management and Budget. While the US Congress is seeking to restore 
funding for these agencies, Trump’s budget proposals certainly set the 
tone for his administration’s approach to international relations.
Trump’s hard-power approach to international relations was soon evi-
dent in its approach to North Korea. Administration leaders were quick to 
dismiss the Obama administration’s “strategic patience” approach and 
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announce that all options, including military options, were now on the 
table. Various administration comments have gyrated between advocating 
military intervention and regime change, and dialogue and diplomacy. It 
is hardly surprising that the paranoid North Korean regime, which is con-
vinced that the US wants to remove it, should accelerate its missile and 
nuclear weapon development. As Trump’s foreign policy becomes mired 
in a series of mixed messages, and the administration becomes increasingly 
chaotic in Washington, China appears a much steadier hand on the inter-
national stage.
Overall, Asia is now faced with a likely deterioration in key factors that 
have driven its development—an open US market, a relatively benign 
security environment and a stable global economic system. It is not sur-
prising that the US credibility and standing in the region are now taking a 
beating. For example, in an interview before the US elections, Singapore’s 
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said that a failure to ratify the TPP 
“would be a very big setback for America.” Former Washington Post 
reporter, Paul Blustein, has remarked that “this administration has no 
respect for international institutions.”9 And Australia’s former foreign 
minister Gareth Evans has said that Donald Trump is “manifestly the most 
ill-informed, under-prepared, ethically challenged and psychologically ill- 
equipped president in US history” and that Australia should reduce its 
dependence on the US alliance and accept China as a legitimate “global 
rule maker”.
This sea change across the Pacific is colliding with a raft of major chal-
lenges, as virtually all Asian countries have moved into middle-income 
status. The evidence shows that graduation from low-income to middle- 
income status can be relatively easy. By getting just a few things right, 
countries can achieve rapid economic growth, as even Bangladesh has 
shown. But transitioning through the middle-income group and graduat-
ing to high-income status requires a vastly more sophisticated set of poli-
cies and dealing with a complex range of challenges, notably the seven 
highlighted in this book. Countries can fall into a “middle-income trap”, 
meaning that they are unlikely to graduate from middle-income to high- 
income status, unless they tackle such challenges.
The arrival of “Trumpism” only highlights the need for a dispassionate 
and realistic assessment of where we are in terms of realizing an Asian 
Century and what are the main challenges facing Asian economies if they 
are to realize their immense potential. This is the mission of this book. In 
the first section, we take stock of Asia’s economic and social development. 
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In the following section, we analyze seven challenges for an Asian Century, 
before speculating about what’s next for the Asian Century.
taking Stock oF aSia’S economic anD Social 
DeveloPment
Most Asian countries have achieved stunning economic growth over the 
past half century or more, starting with Japan, followed by the four Asian 
tigers of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, and then the 
Southeast Asian economies of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, and 
China, India and Vietnam. But despite the hype of Asia’s economic mira-
cle, the harsh reality of our assessment in Chap. 1 is that Asia is suffering 
from stunted economic development. No major Asian economy has 
caught up with global leaders like the US and Germany in terms of GDP 
per capita and living standards, and there is little likelihood of such catch-
 up occurring over the foreseeable future. The city-states of Hong Kong 
and Singapore stand out for having the highest GDP per capita in Asia. 
But when they are compared with cities like London, New York or Zurich, 
their performance is much less remarkable.
What is the cause of Asia’s stunted development? What is holding it 
back? While Asia’s dynamic economies are a diverse bunch, they are all 
similar in the sense that, apart from Hong Kong and Singapore, none of 
them could be considered open market economies. The heavy hands of 
government and business elites played an important role in their economic 
development, but all too often they are now the main factor holding them 
back today. There are many other more specific challenges facing Asia, 
seven of which are examined in Chaps. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10.
Size does matter, however. And countries like China, India and 
Indonesia, thanks in large part to their enormous populations, have some 
of the world’s biggest economies. Today, China has the world’s biggest 
economy in purchasing power parity terms, ahead of the second-placed 
US and third-placed India. Japan is the fourth placed, while Indonesia is 
eighth, just ahead of the UK and France. China, India and Indonesia have 
been able to transform economic weight into economic, political and mili-
tary power, even though their GDP per capita, and their levels of eco-
nomic, business and technological sophistication are modest (China’s 
GDP per capita is only one quarter of that of the US). Without further 
economic, social and political development, these countries will remain 
J. WEST
 9
fragile superpowers. It is no coincidence that China’s increasing repression 
at home, and aggressive attitude toward its neighbors, has come at a time 
of fragility in its domestic economy.
The importance of size among Asian economies will be highlighted 
during the second half of this century, when India’s total GDP could over-
take China’s. Factors driving this transition will be population, with India’s 
projected to be some 50% higher than China’s by 2100, and economic 
growth, if India can maintain its edge on China thanks to more ambitious 
reforms. Needless to say, such a transition could have great geopolitical 
implications in Asia.
The hype about Asia’s dramatic economic rise has only been matched 
by similar hype about the emergence of Asia’s middle class. And while it is 
true that Asian lives have improved immeasurably in tandem with eco-
nomic development, only a small share of Asian citizens could be described 
as middle class, and the middle class is receding in Japan and Korea along 
with rising inequality and poverty. Today, half of Asia’s population is 
stranded between poverty and the middle class, living in a zone of 
 vulnerability and precarity, based on their income and consumption pos-
sibilities. And there are factors other than raw money which are also hold-
ing Asians back from joining the middle class, as we examine in Chap. 2: 
the vulnerability and precarity of informal/non-regular employment; 
deprivations like the lack of clean drinking water, inadequate health facili-
ties and sanitation (i.e., clean, safe and hygienic toilets); the impact of 
Asia’s all-too- frequent natural disasters; poor access to education and the 
Internet; and above all, Asia’s appalling human rights.
The realization of a middle-class Asia would be a commendable achieve-
ment. But while economic growth may have been the most important 
driver of better Asian lives, the future will require a more active contribu-
tion of government, which has not been very effective in providing their 
citizens with the basic social services, rights and freedoms. And given the 
flawed politics of most Asian countries, civil society and trade unions will 
need to become much more assertive to ensure that governments are 
working for all citizens, not just entrenched elites.
Seven cHallengeS FoR an aSian centURy
Asia faces an enormous array of challenges in its quest to catch up to world 
leaders in terms of GDP per capita, and economic, business and techno-
logical sophistication, and in creating true middle-class societies for its 
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 citizens. In Chaps. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10, we examine seven of these 
challenges.
Global value chains (GVCs) have provided Asia’s emerging economies 
with a fast track to development, as we discuss in Chap. 4. Perhaps the 
most well-known GVC is that of Apple’s iPhone which is designed, mar-
keted and branded in California, uses high-tech components from Japan, 
Korea, Taiwan and elsewhere, and is assembled in China by Foxconn, 
Taiwanese company. But despite the immense benefits of participating in 
GVCs, most Asian countries are still capturing very little value from GVCs. 
Much greater efforts are required to get better value by opening markets, 
and strengthening human capital, and technological and innovative capac-
ities. President Trump’s decision to withdraw the US from the TPP, his 
rejection of multilateral trade and investment deals, and his protectionism 
will undermine the further development of Asia’s GVCs. There is no sign 
that any Chinese efforts, such as through the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership, would be an effective replacement for the TPP. 
Labor rights abuses have also been frequent in many GVCs. Asian 
 governments need to more actively promote socially responsible GVCs in 
order to foster decent middle-class societies.
The movement of Asians from the countryside to towns and cities 
(urbanization), and from low-productivity jobs in the rural sector to 
higher-productivity jobs in factories for GVCs and the urban service sec-
tor, has also been a key driver of Asia’s economic development, as we 
examine in Chap. 5. But Asia’s model of urbanization is flawed in many 
respects. In China, migrants from rural areas are denied access to social 
services. In all emerging Asian economies, too many people leave rural 
poverty only to live in urban slums with poor infrastructure, while most of 
Asia’s cities are environmental disasters. President Trump’s withdrawal of 
the US from the Paris Climate Change Agreement will only exacerbate the 
vulnerability of Asian cities to the impact of global warming. In the case of 
Asia’s advanced countries, very few cities offer an “ecosystem” which fos-
ters innovation-driven development. Asian governments face a raft of chal-
lenges to make the most of urbanization’s immense potential.
Economies and societies will realize their full potential only when all citi-
zens are given a chance to participate. But discrimination, prejudice and 
persecution are rife in Asia, as our review shows in Chap. 6 which high-
lights the cases of: the LGBT community; Japanese women; South Asian 
women who suffer gendercide, forced child marriages and honor killing; 
Asia’s indigenous peoples like West Papuans, Tibetans and China’s Uighurs; 
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Sri Lanka’s Tamil community; and India’s lower castes. President Trump’s 
proposed slashing of the budgets of the State Department and USAID will 
likely affect the US leadership in the promotion of the rights of the LGBT 
community, women and other minority rights in Asia and elsewhere.
Most Asian countries face intractable demographic dilemmas, as we 
analyze in Chap. 7. In much of East Asia, fertility has plummeted below 
replacement rates, populations are aging, workforces declining, and in 
Japan the population has begun falling. And yet governments are slow to 
react. At the same time, in South Asia, Indonesia and the Philippines, a 
youth bulge is bursting into the workforce, but much of this youth is not 
well educated and there are not enough jobs on offer. A potential demo-
graphic dividend could easily morph into an explosion of social frustra-
tion. Connecting these two demographic realities is the potential for 
mutually beneficial migration, and yet ethnocentric Asia is barely open to 
migration. Asia’s skilled emigrants go to Australia, Canada, New Zealand 
and the US, while many of Asia’s lower skilled migrants go off to the 
Middle East to suffer. Countries like China, India and the Philippines 
which rely heavily on migrants’ remittances could suffer from President 
Trump’s tightening of migration policies. These three countries account 
for almost all of America’s 1.5 million illegal migrants coming from Asia, 
and 13% of all illegal migrants. And India has been the main beneficiary of 
the US H1-B temporary visa program.
Asia is crying out for democracy and better governance to improve the 
foundations for stronger economies and decent middle-class societies. 
And yet, according to some measures, there would not be even one mature 
democracy in Asia, as we explore in Chap. 8. Contrary to the hopes of 
political scientists, economic development has fostered too few democra-
cies in Asia. Asia’s political landscape is deeply flawed with: oligarchic 
democracies in Japan and Korea; pro-business soft dictatorships in Hong 
Kong, Malaysia and Singapore; Chinese client states in Cambodia and 
Laos; weak and fragile democracies in India, Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal; military-dominated govern-
ments in Thailand, Pakistan and Myanmar; and staunchly authoritarian 
states in China, North Korea and Vietnam. Asia will never have decent 
middle-class societies and innovative economies while repression, propa-
ganda, censorship and human rights abuses occur in too many of its coun-
tries. And President Trump is not helping as he cozies up to some of Asia’s 
authoritarian leaders, and has made it clear that promotion of democracy 
and human rights is not a priority of his administration.
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One of the many consequences of these flawed politics is that, as Asia 
has moved toward the center of the global economy, it has also moved to 
the center of the global criminal economy, as we examine in Chap. 9. Asia 
is a major player in many aspects of economic crime like counterfeiting 
and piracy, illegal drug production and trafficking, environmental crimes, 
human trafficking and smuggling, corruption and money laundering, and 
cybercrime. And while flawed politics is one of the causes, this criminality 
is eating away at the integrity of the state, as state actors are very often 
criminals themselves or are colluding with criminals.
While many factors have underpinned Asia’s renaissance over the past 
half century or more, the relative peace that the region has enjoyed has 
been perhaps the most important. And cooperation between Asian coun-
tries has also made a positive contribution, especially through the 
Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN), which has become a fulcrum 
for broader Asian cooperation. Looking ahead, as we analyze in Chap. 10, 
the ability of Asia to continue to live together in peace and harmony will 
perhaps be the most important determinant of a successful Asian Century.
But today, the relative stability of post-war Asia, led by the US, is being 
shaken by the rise of China, as China is now engaged in a bitter power 
struggle with the US and its Asian allies for the political leadership of Asia. 
There is much debate about whether this will lead to military conflict 
between China and the US. In any event, the US seems to be losing its 
hold over Asia, something which will likely accelerate under the Trump 
administration. This means that it will become ever more necessary for 
Asian countries to cooperate better together. But this will be a great chal-
lenge in light of the tensions involving China, North Korea, Japan, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, South Korea and India.
wHat next FoR tHe aSian centURy?
The prospects for Asia overcoming stunted economic and social develop-
ment, and realizing an Asian Century with advanced economies and 
middle- class societies, depend on how Asia responds to the seven chal-
lenges identified in this book. Unfortunately, there is too little evidence of 
Asia’s major countries seizing the moment. Indeed, the cases of Japan, and 
more recently Korea and China, are salutary, where governments have 
avoided and postponed difficult reforms.
Trump’s America will also shape the contours of a possible Asian 
Century. As argued, we will likely see a deterioration in key factors that 
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have driven Asia development—an open US market, a relatively benign 
security environment and a stable global economic system. This is a trag-
edy for Asia, as China, the US’ competitor, is not a promoter of open 
markets, good governance and the international rule of law.
Many observers speculate that Trump will not survive a year or two or 
beyond his first term. This is far from certain. His rise to the presidency 
was equally improbable. Even post-Trump, we should not assume a return 
to the US as a promoter of open markets and globalization, and a friend 
of democratic partners and the liberal international system. America has 
been struck by a wave of populism, and in particular nationalism (make 
America great again), nativism (secure our borders) and protectionism 
(protect American workers),10 which is unlikely to go away anytime soon.
But if Asia continues to muddle through, in some decades time, the 
region could account for over half the world economy, far outstripping the 
West in total economic size. In these circumstances, no major Asian econ-
omy would have approached world leaders like the US and Germany in 
terms of GDP per capita, or economic, business and technological sophis-
tication. Moreover, Asia could remain a democratic desert, with not one 
full democracy, and with continuing widespread human rights abuses and 
restrictions on personal freedoms. In other words, Asia would have the 
world’s greatest economic weight, and be a leading economic and political 
power, but would remain a pygmy in terms of economic, social and politi-
cal development. Asia’s main power comes from its enormous population, 
currently about 55% of the world’s total, compared with only 18% for the 
West.
Needless to say, the incongruities of such a scenario could generate 
even greater geopolitical tensions than we see today.
These incongruities would test the capacity of the international com-
munity to cooperate on issues like open trade and investment, democracy 
and human rights, the global environment, protection of intellectual 
property rights, economic crime, international rule of law, law of the sea 
and natural disasters. Why? Because forging consensus and working 
together requires shared interest and values, and a culture of cooperation 
and trust.
Beyond these incongruities, there are endless possibilities of economic, 
social, political and military crises in Asia—mostly due to the likely failure 
to deal with our seven challenges for an Asian Century.
Economic crisis is stalking several Asian countries, most notably Japan and 
China with their massive debt problems. And anti-globalization  populism 
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could break one of the most important drivers of Asia’s rapid development, 
namely open trade and investment. Social crisis could be on the cards for 
India, Indonesia and the Philippines with their bulging youth populations, if 
they are unable to find decent jobs. Multi-ethnic countries like India and 
Indonesia could easily descend into violence as groups suffering from dis-
crimination, prejudice and persecution mobilize themselves against domi-
nant elites. And as natural disasters and environmental problems increasingly 
hit Asia’s overcrowded and badly planned cities, social crises will also 
accelerate.
Continued authoritarian politics and social repression in China, North 
Korea and Vietnam could provoke political crises as citizens demand 
cleaner government and democratic government. Social unrest is already 
rampant in China, and North Korea has thousands of regime opponents 
locked away in secret gulags. The corruption crisis that engulfed the South 
Korean President Park Geun-hye and Samsung shows how fragile even 
Asia’s most advanced countries can be.
The future of peace in Asia could be threatened by the great power 
struggle between China and the US. The US and China are unlikely to 
engage in a traditional military conflict, although the naval collisions 
involving the US Navy in 2017 show how easily accidents can occur, and 
possibly spiral out of control. They seem destined to remain “frenemies”, 
that is both friends and rivals, with conflicts taking place in the areas of 
trade, intellectual property, international rule of law and cyber, rather than 
on the battlefield.
As China progressively displaces the US as Asia’s hegemon, it will 
become ever more necessary for Asian countries to cooperate better 
together. In a region which is bristling with tensions involving China, 
North Korea, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, the South China 
Sea, ASEAN and India, this will be a great challenge. And while China’s 
rise has been shaking Asia, the prospect of India’s economy overtaking 
China’s in the second half of the twenty-first century will require further 
adjustments by all. Any conflicts between Asian countries could do much 
to derail the prospects for an Asian Century. And the great risk for the US 
is being dragged into these conflicts between Asian countries, more than 
a straight head-on conflict with China.
Today, Asia is sitting on a knife edge. The potential of the region to gen-
erate good and happy lives for its citizens is enormous. But the requirements 
of success and the risks of failure are equally enormous. We cannot be sure 
of “what’s next for the Asian Century”. Indeed, anything could happen, and 
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CHAPTER 2
Asia’s Stunted Economic Development
“Yes, China is slowing down, but compared to the West, its GDP growth 
is enviable,” once said Jon Copestake of the Economist Intelligence Unit.1 
This is a familiar refrain in media reports, international conferences and 
business discussions.
But all economies which are behind world leaders (like the US and 
Germany) have great potential for rapid, catch up growth. And the further 
they are behind, the faster they can grow, just by absorbing knowledge and 
technology from world leaders. This is the “benefit of backwardness”.
It is thus not surprising that China should still be growing so quickly. 
Its GDP per capita is still only one-quarter of that of the US. It would be 
much more surprising if China were not growing so quickly. The real dis-
appointment is that so many other countries cannot get their act together 
to achieve fast, catch up growth.
The main question facing China today is whether it can stay the course 
in catching up to world leaders, because other Asian economies like Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan have not managed to do so.
Indeed, the post-war waves of high-growth Asian economies, beginning 
with Japan, have been arrested. Asia’s major economies now face the 
 prospect of permanently stunted development. There is now very little 
prospect of full catch up to the world’s leading economies in terms of GDP 
per capita, and economic, business and technological sophistication.
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Japan’s very rapid recovery from the ashes of World War 2 took the 
world by surprise. Many economists were then pessimistic about the pros-
pects for Asia, which suffered greatly from the War. The continent had few 
natural resources and an enormous population compared with Africa and 
South America. But as Japan’s growth continued, many then believed that 
Japan would overtake the US, in much the same way that the US overtook 
the UK in the nineteenth century.
Japan’s economic dynamism inspired the four Asian Newly 
Industrializing Economies—Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan—
on a similar path of rapid development. This gave rise to talk of an “Asian 
miracle” by the World Bank2 and others, and the group was labeled the 
Asian tigers.
Much ink has been spilt in analyzing the rise of these Asian economies. 
The main factors were their export-orientation, good education, macro-
economic stability and strong government leadership. But as Ian Buchanan 
has argued,3 geopolitics also played an important role in the context of the 
Cold War, as the US offered official assistance and open markets to its 
friends in Asia. And all of these successful economies were motivated to 
become strong in the face of their threatening neighborhoods, as they 
faced Mao’s China, North Korea and the USSR.
But the shortcomings of the Japanese model became all-too-apparent 
following a financial crisis in the early 1990s. Japan (and Korea and 
Taiwan) has since failed to both reform its economy and deal with demo-
graphic decline. The prospect of these economies catching up to world 
leaders now seems remote.
Singapore and Hong Kong are rare birds in Asia, in that they have 
caught up to the US and Germany, and in Singapore’s case well overtaken 
them. There are some very simple reasons. Both are Asia’s only two genu-
ine open market economies, with large immigrant populations, in contrast 
to Japan, Korea and Taiwan. They are also financial centers and tax havens, 
which allow Asia’s super rich to hide their (often ill-gotten) wealth from 
the taxman. When these city economies are compared with other financial 
centers like London, New  York or Switzerland’s Zurich, their success 
seems much less surprising.
The next group of Asian economies to take off in the region’s “flying 
geese” pattern4 of development included Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. 
Their rapid development was mainly driven by a wave of investment from 
Asia’s advanced countries, which offshored lower-value-added activities as 
they climbed the development ladder. But the education and technologi-
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cal capacities of these countries are relatively weak, and their economic 
catch up to date remains modest. These countries would seem to be 
caught in a “middle-income trap”, meaning that they are unlikely to grad-
uate from middle-income to high-income status.
China stunned the world with three decades of 10% growth rates, fol-
lowing its opening up, which began in 1978 (more recently, Vietnam 
launched a similar opening to the world economy). Today, the future of 
the Chinese economy is problematic, as the government seems almost 
paralyzed by the social and political risks of undertaking reform. China 
may well have the world’s biggest economy, but it remains a relatively 
poor country, with an enormous population. It also faces a grave risk of 
getting stuck in a middle-income trap.
India is the other Asian giant, with an enormous population. It began 
its reform in the early 1990s and has since achieved good economic 
growth. While there is a lot of positive momentum in the Indian system, 
it also faces immense challenges.
What Is the OutlOOk fOr asIa’s CatCh 
up eCOnOmIes?
All things considered, most Asian economies have been losing some of 
their economic mojo, as the Asian Development Bank has argued.5 
Emerging Asia’s “potential economic growth rate” has fallen by almost 2 
percentage points in less than a decade. The region can now only grow by 
about 6½%, not the 8½% of yesteryear. And looking into the future, the 
downward slide will only continue. How could this happen?
You only have to look back to the transitory nature of some of the fac-
tors driving emerging Asia’s high-growth period to glean some insights. 
As populations are aging in East Asia, there will be less energetic, youthful 
populations to drive growth. Now that many countries are already highly 
urbanized, there will be less new movements of people from the country 
to the city. Over time, the benefits of backwardness also fade as countries 
have copied the easy lessons from world leaders. The slowdown in China, 
the most important trading partner for virtually all other Asian economies, 
is also dragging down the economic growth potential of everyone. And 
the arrival of Donald Trump at the leadership of the US will likely result 
in a deterioration of some of the key factors that have driven Asia’s devel-
opment—an open US market, a relatively benign security environment 
and a stable global economic system.
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How to revive Asia’s growth potential? There are many obvious sugges-
tions to make like investing in human capital, technology and infrastruc-
ture; providing more opportunity to all Asians; responding effectively to 
Asia’s poor demographics; and fully opening economies to domestic and 
international competition.
But digging behind the mechanical story of economic growth is a 
deeper story of institutions and politics. What is required for successful 
economic development are “inclusive economic institutions”, as argued 
by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. Such institutions “allow and 
encourage participation by the great mass of people in economic activities 
that make best use of their talents and skills and that enable individuals to 
make the choices they wish”. They “require secure property rights and 
economic opportunities not just for the elite, but for a broad cross-section 
of society”.6 And behind inclusive economic institutions are inclusive 
political institutions.
The enemy of economic development is “extractive political institu-
tions” which “concentrate power in the hands of a narrow elite and place 
few constraints on the exercise of this power”. This elite then usually 
structures economic institutions in order to extract resources from the rest 
of society.
The analysis of Acemoglu and Robinson provides many insights into 
Asia’s changing political economy. In the early post-war period, Asia’s suc-
cess stories (Japan, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) all had a 
great incentive to build strong economies through inclusive economic 
institutions. They faced threatening neighborhoods surrounded by com-
munist regimes in China, North Korea and the USSR, and instability in 
Southeast Asia. They were also dependent on imports to supply their 
energy and other natural resources—this meant that export-oriented 
growth was necessary to finance imports.
In more recent decades, there has been a waning of these geopolitical 
threat factors. And many of the winners of economic development—big 
business, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and banks—have been able to 
exert a strong influence over Asia’s politics to keep the cards stacked in 
their favor.
The classic example is that of Japan where corporate and government 
elites, and gerrymandering of politics in rural areas, have kept the econ-
omy closed from international competition. This is a key factor behind 
Japan’s weak productivity and failure to fully catch up to the US. Regrettably, 
some 70  years after Japan began its post-war recovery, democracy and 
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inclusive politics still have very shallow roots. New players have great dif-
ficulty breaking through.
Similarly, Korea’s enormous conglomerates (“chaebol”) like Samsung 
and LG have a stranglehold over the nation’s economy and politics, and 
are now holding the economy back. In China, Communist Party elites fear 
the creative destruction that would result from deep reform of China’s 
grossly inefficient SOE and banking sectors. At this stage, there is little 
sign of reforms to ensure that market will play a “decisive” role in allocat-
ing resources, as promised in the Third Plenum in 2013.
In short, the permanence of inclusive economic institutions cannot be 
taken for granted. As Acemoglu and Robinson argue, “fear of creative 
destruction is often at the root of the opposition to inclusive economic 
and political institutions.” One of the most visible signs of this problem is 
the income gap between the rich and the poor, which continues to widen 
in Asia.7
In conclusion, a successful Asian century will require civil society, trade 
unions and youth becoming much more assertive to ensure that govern-
ments are working for all citizens, not just entrenched elites. In some 
cases, this may require democratization and even political revolutions. In 
other cases, enlightened elites may respond positively to fears for their 
political survival. Whatever the case, without important political change, 
Asia will not realize its full economic and human potential, and its eco-
nomic development will remain stunted.
sIze matters, But nOt 100%
Despite Asia’s stunted economic development, it has enormous economic 
size. With 55% of the world’s population, Asia’s rapid economic growth 
has enabled it to grow its share of the world economy from 13% in 1960 
to 31% in 2015 (the West, represented by the OECD member countries, 
accounts for only 18% of the world’s population, and has seen its share of 
world GDP decline commensurately). And there are a plethora of projec-
tions from organizations like the Asian Development Bank, the OECD 
and PWC which predict that in the coming decades, Asia will account for 
more than half of the world economy.8
China is already the world’s biggest economy in purchasing power par-
ity terms, even though on a per capita basis America’s GDP is still four 
times higher than China’s. India has the world’s third biggest economy, 
but America’s GDP per capita is nine times higher than India’s. One 
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recent set of projections by PWC shows that by 2050, China’s total GDP 
could be 70% higher than America’s, while India’s could be 30% higher. 
At the same time America’s GDP per capita could still be double that of 
China and triple that of India.
This shift in economic weight from the West to Asia has led many ana-
lysts to argue that there has also been a shift in economic and political 
power, even if Asia lags behind in terms of productivity and living stan-
dards, and economic, business and technological sophistication. It is true 
that their enormous economic size gives countries like China, India and 
Indonesia “market power” which attracts Western and other businessmen. 
China has large pools of investible funds that can be used for both eco-
nomic and political purposes like establishing the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank, and the Belt and Road Initiative. Large economic 
resources can also finance militaries which can project power and intimi-
date smaller neighbors, as reflected in the arms race presently underway in 
Asia. China, India, Japan and Korea all figure among the world’s top ten 
for military expenditure.9
But equating economic weight with economic and political power is 
also too simplistic. Many Asian elites still prefer to send their children to 
Western universities, to migrate to Western countries in search of freedom 
and clean air, to buy Western companies because of their technological 
superiority and to invest in Western markets because of their better gover-
nance. A diminishing West still has great power, especially soft power, 
meaning the attractiveness of its values and culture. Without further eco-
nomic, social and political development, Asia’s largest economies will 
remain partial and fragile superpowers. It is no coincidence that China’s 
increasing repression at home, and aggressive attitude toward its neigh-
bors, has come at a time of fragility in its domestic economy.
An illustrative comparison of relative power in Asia is that of Indonesia 
and Singapore. Indonesia’s total GDP is some six times bigger than 
Singapore’s, even though on a per capita basis Singapore’s GDP is some 
eight times bigger than Indonesia’s. But the relative power of Singapore 
should not be underestimated. Indeed, it is not underestimated by 
Indonesian elites themselves who prefer to invest their savings in 
Singapore’s vastly superior financial system, who send their children to 
study in Singapore’s excellent schools and universities and who run to 
Singapore’s hospitals whenever they are sick. Poorer Indonesian citizens 
are very happy to migrate to Singapore in search of work. And Singapore 
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is strategically located at a vital access point for maritime trade routes con-
necting East Asia with South Asia, the Middle East, Europe and Africa.
Perhaps the greatest limit on Asia’s power comes from the poor rela-
tions between very many Asian countries—for example, China–Japan, 
Japan–South Korea, Vietnam–China, India–Pakistan, India–China, and 
North Korea and very many countries. Asian countries may together 
account for half of the world economy in a few decades time, but they are 
unable to join forces in a way that they can become a dominant force. The 
very low trust among Asian countries means that they have difficulty 
cooperating together to such a point that it is questionable whether Asia 
even exists. Asia’s power equation will also be tested over the course of the 
twenty-first century, with the rise of India relative to China. India’s popu-
lation will overtake China’s in 2022, and could be some 50% higher by 
2100. And if current trends continue, India’s total GDP could be bigger 
than China’s before century’s end.
After this brief diversion into what economic size means for power, in 
the following six sections, we will examine in greater detail the cases of 
Japan, Korea, China, India, Indonesia and Vietnam, Asia’s most successful 
big economies.
Japan almOst made It!
Japan was Asia’s original miracle economy. It rose dramatically from the 
ashes of military defeat in 1945. In the 1950s and 1960s, Japan’s annual 
economic growth rate was around 10%, the same as China in the first three 
decades of its reform period. In the 1970s and 1980s, Japan’s annual 
growth rate slipped down to the still respectable 4%.
Already in 1964, less than two decades after the war, Tokyo hosted the 
Olympic Games and showed off to the world its high-speed train from 
Tokyo to Osaka (the shinkansen). Today, more than half a century later, 
countries like the US, Canada and Australia can still only dream of having 
such impressive transportation infrastructure.
Japan’s high-growth, catch-up period was engineered by partnership 
between business, bureaucrats and politicians, the “iron triangle”10 (the 
“developmental state”). Infant industries were protected from imports 
and inward foreign investment, and given preferential access to finance, to 
give the export-oriented manufacturing sector the breathing space for 
industrial upgrading.
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Japanese companies conquered world markets, especially for motor 
vehicles and electronics. Companies like Toyota and Sony were the envy of 
the world, as were Japanese business practices like “kaizen” (continuous 
improvement), lean manufacturing and just-in-time inventory manage-
ment. By 1990, Japan’s GDP per capita had risen to 80% of the US level.
But in the late 1980s, a real estate and stock market bubble took hold, 
fueled by easy money policies in response to a rising yen. The bubble was 
also driven by hubris and irrational exuberance. Many believed that Japan 
was becoming the leading global power, and that the US was set for 
decline. Japanese companies went on an international spending spree, as 
Mitsubishi bought the Rockefeller Center in Manhattan and Sony bought 
Columbia Pictures. And during the height of the property bubble, Tokyo’s 
imperial palace grounds were believed by some to be worth more than all 
the real estate in California.
But then the bubble burst, and real estate and stock prices came crash-
ing down again. Many banks, companies and citizens were thus saddled 
with large debts. The government responded sluggishly, in part due to 
disbelief. But the iron triangle also sought to protect enterprises and banks 
from the consequences of their follies. The Japanese economy would stag-
ger through the 1990s, burdened by “zombie” or loss-making enterprises 
and banks that were kept afloat to ease the pain of the crisis. But in reality 
they only weakened the economic fundamentals by wasting finance that 
could have been used by new dynamic startups.
The early 1990s proved to be a major turning point in Japan’s his-
tory—something which was not fully appreciated at the time, as Japan was 
preoccupied by the aftermath of its bubble economy. Several tectonic 
plates underlying Japan were shifting. Strategic, systemic adaptation was 
required for many reasons.
Japan’s developmental state model resulted in lopsided development. 
While its manufacturing sector was a world leader, Japan’s services and 
agricultural sectors were highly inefficient. Even today, productivity in 
Japan’s services sector is only half that of the manufacturing sector. When 
it comes to services like finance, education, health and tourism, Singapore 
and Hong Kong are Asia’s leaders.
Japan desperately needed fresh competition from trade and investment 
liberalization and deregulation to stimulate productivity in these ineffi-
cient sectors. But the very success of the iron triangle, and the constella-
tion of interests that coalesced around it, made subsequent reform difficult, 
as Mark Beeson has argued.11 This includes corporate–government 
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 collusion through the parachuting of retired officials into high-level cor-
porate positions, known as amakudari. And corporate governance charac-
terized by cozy relationships fostered numerous financial scandals, most 
notably at Olympus and Toshiba.
Another tectonic shift was the offshoring of much of Japan’s labor- 
intensive manufacturing to other Asian countries like China, Thailand, 
Singapore and Indonesia, in response to the higher value of the yen, and 
new opportunities in these countries.12 But while the manufacturing sec-
tor was being “hollowed out”, Japan remained closed to inward foreign 
direct investment (FDI), which even today remains at only 4% of GDP, 
even lower than North Korea’s inward investment. This has robbed the 
economy of lots of opportunities to improve productivity and create 
decent, high-paying jobs.
Today, Japan is not a closed market for inward FDI, according to the 
OECD.13 And the current government has an ambitious target for dou-
bling FDI.14 But there are very many “social practice” hurdles for foreign 
investors, especially constraints on labor mobility, an insular and consen-
sual business culture which resists mergers and acquisitions, a lack of inde-
pendent directors on many company boards, and cultural and linguistic 
barriers.15
The corporate landscape of East Asia has also changed radically. Japanese 
companies were once undisputed leaders in Asia, but they gradually began 
to struggle in the face of stiff regional competition. For example, Korea’s 
Samsung and Taiwan’s contract manufacturer Foxconn have become lead-
ers in mobile technology, while China’s Huawei and Xiaomi occupy a 
large slice of the low end of the market. Fortunately, Japan has developed 
a niche in high-tech components for many industries like mobile tele-
phony and airplanes.
In the automobile field, Hyundai has become a challenger for Toyota, 
while the Chinese automobile industry is now the world’s largest and is 
developing rapidly. Strangely, Japan does not seem to be a major player in 
the rapidly emerging driverless car sector. And Japanese banks are no lon-
ger globally powerful. True, Japanese companies like Softbank, Uniqlo, 
Muji, Nintendo and Rakuten are making their mark. But Japanese compa-
nies no longer dominate, as they once did. And this country that once 
boasted some great entrepreneurs is now one of the weakest performers in 
the OECD group when it comes to entrepreneurship.
Japan’s unfolding demographic drama is perhaps the country’s most 
important shifting tectonic plate. Japan’s fertility rate has been below the 
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replacement rate of 2.1 children per woman since 1975. Thus, Japan’s 
long-awaited decline in its workforce began in 1995, while its population 
began its inevitable decline around 2010. This has a direct hit on the 
potential GDP growth rate. Indeed, the OECD reports that the economy 
is now only capable of growing at half a percent a year over the medium 
term.16 Needless to say, Japan’s aging population is also giving a big hit to 
the government’s budget deficit. And while Japan’s demographic drama 
has been looming for decades, the government’s response in terms of 
facilitating greater economic participation by women and admitting more 
migrants has been woefully inadequate. To this day, Japan remains sadly 
xenophobic and sexist, notwithstanding Prime Minister Abe’s impressive 
chanting of “womenomics”.
Japan’s education system also desperately needs reinvention. It was very 
effective at promoting the literacy and numeracy of its population, things 
that were certainly very important when Japan was catching up to world 
leaders. But Japan’s education system still emphasizes rote-learning, mem-
orization and passing tests, rather than critical thinking and creativity—at 
a time when Japan needs to become more innovation-driven.
And while globalization has been the dominant feature of the past few 
decades, the Japanese are very poor at the world’s global language, English. 
According to one survey, Japan’s English-language proficiency is only 
“average”, and behind Asian neighbors like Singapore, Malaysia, India, 
Korea and Vietnam, and only on par with Taiwan and Indonesia.17 This 
has many consequences from making life difficult for visiting tourists to 
isolating Japanese scholars from global networks and preventing Japan’s 
multinational companies from becoming globally integrated enterprises.18
Japanese Nobel Prize winning scientist Susumu Tonegawa19 had some 
insightful comments on Japan’s education: “Having spent a half century 
abroad since I went to the United States to study, I now regard Japan as a 
society rather dictated by rules. Within a fixed framework, the Japanese are 
able to produce things with extreme precision.” In making a comparison 
with the US, Tonegawa argues that “A climate that respects individualistic 
thinking—thinking not bound by conventional wisdom—will produce 
revolutionary discoveries that shatter the framework. Unlike the Japanese, 
Americans put their own ideas first, and what others think of them is sec-
ondary. It is essential to have education that respects individual abilities 
and preferences.”
These tectonic shifts have haunted Japan for over two and a half 
decades. Economic growth has been very sluggish, averaging only about 
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1% a year. Reforms to open the economy to more domestic and interna-
tional competition have been proposed and discussed, but their imple-
mentation has never been serious. Japan’s economy and society have been 
dragged down as a consequence.
Japan’s GDP per capita, at $41,470 in 2016, has fallen back to only 
72% of that of the US. Further, the country’s once egalitarian society is 
now fracturing, as the share of people living in relative poverty has leapt 
from 12% in 1985 to 16% in 2012, putting it just behind the US, with the 
second highest poverty of the advanced OECD countries, while income 
inequality is above the OECD average.20 When it comes to child poverty, 
Japan now has a higher rate than the US, and 50% of single parent house-
holds live in poverty. At the same time, corporate profits are riding high at 
record levels.
Many visitors to Japan are shocked to hear of stories of Japanese pov-
erty, because you do not see any beggars and street crime is virtually non-
existent. But much poverty is hidden, as it can be a subject of public shame 
and discrimination. And many urban homeless live in tents in public parks 
or on river banks.
Japan’s public debt has reached world record levels at 220% of GDP, as 
government spending has been continuously used to keep the economy 
afloat. This has kept the government’s friends in the construction industry 
happy, but also led to much wasteful spending and white elephants. Social 
spending on Japan’s rapidly aging population has been the other factor 
driving debt.
As desperate as the public debt situation might seem, the government 
has no meaningful plan to bring it under control. Proposals to increase the 
consumption tax keep being postponed. The OECD has projected that it 
could well skyrocket to over 600% of GDP by 2060, in the absence of 
decisive action.21 But before that date, markets will surely lose confidence 
in Japan, leading to a sharp increase in interest rates, a surge in capital 
flight and a crash in the yen. Japan has also suffered from deflation for 
much of the past two decades. Such falling prices weaken the economy, 
but it also exacerbates the debt problem, as the value of debt does not 
change, while the value of incomes and GDP are falling.
In short, Japan is caught in a “stagnation trap”. But it is not too late for 
Japan to get its act together. After all, in recent history it has performed 
two miracles—one following the Meiji Restoration in the nineteenth cen-
tury and the other following World War 2. But “Abenomics”, the pro-
gram of economic revitalization of the current government led by Prime 
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Minister Shinzo Abe, is a case of too little, too late. Its monetary and fiscal 
stimulus arrows have achieved little. After more than four years of easy 
money, the goal of lifting inflation to 2% remains out of reach. Japan is 
now suffering from a “deflationary mindset”.
The structural reform “arrow” of Abenomics, the key to improving 
productivity, is still sitting in the quiver. In the words of the polite and 
diplomatic IMF, “structural reform remains the lagging element of 
Abenomics.”22 Its most courageous initiative was to sign up to the Trans 
Pacific Partnership (TPP), but this has since been shot down by US 
President Donald Trump. Japan is now leading the charge to keep the 
TPP alive with its 11 remaining members. But it is unclear if this will hap-
pen. And the TPP without the giant US economy would be a much less 
important deal.
Abe and Trump have since agreed to establish a new framework for 
economic dialog, which could lead to a bilateral free trade agreement. But 
despite the chummy relations between Abe and Trump, Japan is also sub-
ject of Trump’s wrath in light of its large trade surplus with the US. It is 
now one of four Asian countries to be put on a “Monitoring List” of 
major trading partners “that merit close attention to their currency 
practices”.
One very bright spot that holds promise for Japan and indeed the inter-
national trading system is the 2017 free trade deal between Japan and the 
European Union which will open up Japan’s agricultural sector to 
European farmers, and improve access to the European market for 
Japanese motor vehicle manufacturers. But much more bold reform will 
be necessary to revitalize the Japanese economy.
In conclusion, it is difficult to see anything other than a real open crisis, 
rather than continually creeping decline, moving this cautious and conser-
vative country into action.
kOrea: the ChaeBOl repuBlIC
Heather Cho, vice-president of Korea Air, provoked a storm of contro-
versy when she delayed the takeoff of a Korean Air flight in December 
2014, over her dissatisfaction with the service of macadamia nuts. This 
ridiculous incident reminded the whole world that Korea is not a people’s 
republic. It is still a “chaebol republic”.
Today, the dominant role of Korea’s chaebol (large and sprawling, 
family- controlled conglomerates) in the nation’s politics, economy and 
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society is seriously questioned by many—and not just because of the “nut-
gate” incident. But it is still without question that the chaebol played a 
crucial role in Korea’s rags-to-riches development miracle.
The “miracle on the Han River” was perhaps the most unlikely of all 
the Asian economic miracles.23 The three-year Korean War, which ended 
in 1953, killed 2 1/2 million of the combined population of North and 
South Korea of 30 million. The peninsula’s infrastructure of roads, build-
ings, bridges and so on was almost completely destroyed. And one-third 
of the population was left homeless.
At the end of the 1950s, Korea’s situation still remained bleak. Then, in 
the space of two decades, the 1960s and 1970s, President Park Chung- hee 
laid the foundations for the comprehensive transformation of the Korean 
economy, society and politics through his “guided capitalism” (he was the 
father of President Park Geun-hye who was impeached in March 2017).
President Park was no believer in free markets or democracy. On the 
contrary, he was a ruthless dictator who came to power in 1961 following 
a military coup. He corralled the nation’s leading businessmen into his 
economic development project. They were offered access to cheap finance 
and foreign technology, protection from imports and foreign investment, 
export subsidies, tax breaks, cheap labor and other favors, if they would 
develop industries like fertilizers, cement, chemicals, oil refining and tex-
tiles. Anticompetitive behavior like cartels, collusion and price-fixing was 
also tolerated. And corruption was widespread, as it still is today. Korea 
ranks 52nd on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions 
Index (out of 176 countries), way below Japan’s 20th place.24
Those who live by the sword all too often die by the sword, and 
President Park was assassinated in 1979. But his ruthless economic nation-
alism put the country on an irreversible path to prosperity and democracy, 
and ultimately membership of the OECD, the “rich man’s club”, in 1996. 
Within a year, Korea would be a victim of the 1997 “Asian financial crisis”. 
The chaebol had gone an international borrowing spree, ignoring the risks 
of short-term, dollar-denominated debt. When international lenders then 
lost confidence in the Asian-miracle hype of the time, and withdrew their 
capital, Korea was left in financial crisis.
Korea recovered very quickly. Reforms imposed by the IMF, notably 
for corporate governance, opening to FDI and deregulation laid the foun-
dation for a return to strong economic growth. But once the crisis passed, 
the chaebol vested interests regrouped and reasserted their influence over 
national policymaking.
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Electronics giant Samsung has been the star chaebol, and is now ranked 
the world’s 10th most valuable brand by Forbes magazine,25 on a list 
headed by its nemesis, Apple. But Samsung is not the only one. Automobile 
company Hyundai is ranked 68th.
The chaebol completely dominate the Korean economy, with Samsung 
accounting for one-fifth of Korea’s exports, and the 30 biggest chaebol for 
over four-fifths of exports. The chaebol’s penchant for empire-building is 
symbolized by Samsung’s 70 subsidiaries, which cover a vast array of unre-
lated industries like electronics, insurance, shipbuilding and petrochemi-
cals. But they have been successful in upgrading the Korean economy 
from a producer of low-end manufactures to high-tech electronics and 
automobiles.
Overall, Korea was able to defy both history and its resource-poor 
geography to become the world’s 14th largest economy and 7th biggest 
exporter. Its GDP per capita leapt from $8276  in 1990 to $35,751  in 
2016. But it still has a long way to go in its economic catch up, as GDP 
per capita is only 62% of that of the US. Like Japan, Korea has a lopsided 
economy, where service sector productivity is less than half that of the 
manufacturing sector, and small enterprises are much less productive than 
larger ones.
The OECD estimates that Korea’s potential economic growth rate has 
fallen from over 9% in 1990 to only 3% today, and since 2011 Korea’s 
economy has been trundling along at only 2¾% annually. In other words, 
Korea faces a raft of challenges to lift its potential economic growth rate, 
and complete its catch up to world leaders like the US and Germany—and 
also to prepare the country for the possibility of having to suddenly absorb 
North Korea.
For one, Korea has the fastest aging population among the advanced 
OECD countries, as the fertility rate has plummeted from over six chil-
dren per woman in 1960 to 1.2 today. This will impose an enormous drag 
on the economy as Korea’s workforce started declining in 2016, and over-
all population decline could set in from 2035. In contrast to Japan, Korea 
has at least had the wisdom to open up significantly to immigration.
One area where Korea performs even worse than Japan is in its treat-
ment of women.26 This is indeed a great tragedy, as providing greater 
opportunity to women could help Korea cope with population aging. 
Anyone who doubts the ability of Korean women need only look at the 




Korea also needs to transform itself from a copycat nation to a creative 
and innovative economy to climb further up the development ladder. 
Korea has indeed great potential to become an innovation nation. It leads 
the world in R&D spending as a share of GDP. It has invested greatly in 
information technology, and is now ranked top of the world in terms of 
ICT development, way ahead of 10th placed Japan.28 Koreans also have a 
great passion for studying English, the language of the global economy. 
And the “Korean wave” of K-pop, television drama and cinema that has 
conquered East Asia, is evidence of a very creative culture.
But Korean companies are facing stiff competition from Chinese and 
other emerging economy companies, as well as from advanced countries. 
As the OECD highlights, Korea needs to strengthen international collab-
oration, the role of universities, venture capital, and openness to domestic 
and international competition to improve the foundations for innovation. 
And like Japan, school and university students are too focused on 
 rote- learning, memorization and passing exams, rather than critical think-
ing, creativity and analytical skills.
At the heart of many of Korea’s challenges is the dominant position and 
continued favored treatment of the chaebol, which are squeezing out the 
emergence of new players, which could rejuvenate the economy for new 
wave of productivity growth.29 The chaebol often use their market power 
to make it difficult for new entrants to gain a foothold. And even when 
new entrants do succeed, they are often acquired in takeovers by chaebol.
There is much that should be done to expose the chaebol to more 
healthy international and domestic competition by eliminating trade and 
investment barriers. Korea’s market restrictions are some of the worst 
among the OECD group of countries, and even worse than Japan’s.30
The US State Department has also highlighted Korea’s weakness in the 
area of competition policy in noting that “the practical impact of Korea’s 
laws and policies regulating monopolistic practices and unfair competi-
tion, however, has been limited by the long-standing economic strength 
of the chaebol … Chaebol-government relations can also sometimes influ-
ence the business-government dialogue, to the detriment of foreign and 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).”31
Despite the reforms following the Asian financial crisis, Korea’s corpo-
rate governance is still among the weakest in Asia, with complex webs of 
cross-shareholdings and pyramidal chaebol shareholdings, which enable 
owner families to exert control, but inhibit its economic efficiency and 
innovation performance. The Asian Corporate Governance Association 
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(ACGA) ranks Korea only 8th on its list of 11 Asian countries, behind 
Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia and India, and 
ahead of only China, the Philippines and Indonesia.32
Over the years, there has been a series of chaebol scandals related to 
various financial crimes. Seven of the leaders of Korea’s ten largest chaebol 
have been convicted of crimes such as breach of trust, corruption, embez-
zlement and large-scale accounting fraud. While prosecutions and court 
cases follow, they invariably lead to official pardons, thanks to the corrupt 
and cozy ties between the chaebol and government. The most recent cor-
ruption scandal involved Samsung chief Lee Jae-yong, who was sentenced 
to five years in prison in August 2017.
Overall, it is widely acknowledged that the Korean economy needs a 
more level-playing field, and that the chaebol should be brought to heel. 
Various governments have made some efforts to do so under the banner 
of economic democratization, but to little effect. Given their economic 
dominance, it is easy for the chaebol to scaremonger about the possible 
adverse effects of any reforms.
In May 2017, Mr Moon Jae-in was elected president to replace 
President Park Geun-hye who was impeached because of corruption and 
abuse of power. President Moon faces an enormous set of challenges, in 
addition to those outlined above. First, it is necessary to restore stability 
and order to a deeply polarized nation which was wracked by scandal for 
over six months. Second, he needs to deal with the North Korean crisis on 
his doorstep.
The new Korean administration also faces geopolitical fallout from its 
high dependence on the US and Chinese export markets. In light of 
Korea’s large trade surplus with America, Donald Trump’s US Treasury 
has put Korea on a “Monitoring List” of major trading partners that merit 
close attention to their currency practices. The US has also informed the 
Korean government that it wants to renegotiate their free trade agreement 
to remove more barriers to US business. But as the Asian Development 
Bank has argued, given the opposition on both sides, there is a serious risk 
that the free trade agreement could be annulled, despite the undeniable 
benefits that both sides have enjoyed.33 Meanwhile, China imposed eco-
nomic sanctions on Korea as an expression of its displeasure regarding 
Korea’s agreement with the US for the installation of Terminal High 
Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system. The THAAD is designed to 
help protect South Korea from North Korean missiles, but China fears 
that it will enable the US to spy on its military.
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This vast list of challenges may seem daunting, and indeed they are. But 
unless the President Moon and his administration tackle them head-on, 
the “hermit kingdom” will become another Asian country that achieves 
moderate success, but is unable to realize its full potential by catching up 
to world leaders.
ChIna’s COnundrums
The Chinese economy of today is riddled with a collection of conundrums.
The Chinese Communist government would like to open up the econ-
omy to more market forces, but at the first sign of inevitable volatility, its 
knee-jerk reaction is to impose anti-market controls. It would also like 
innovation to become the new driver of economic growth, but repression 
of voices of dissent, who are often the most innovative, has only been 
ramped up under President Xi Jinping. It is proud of having a strong and 
effective state, but cannot manage seemingly basic issues like food safety. 
And very few other countries have benefited as much from the post-war 
system of multilateral cooperation, and yet China is now regularly flouting 
and challenging this system.
China’s conundrums are the inevitable consequence of its particular 
development model. The Chinese Communist government gradually 
opened up its state-owned and centrally planned economy from 1978. 
The main elements were opening up to foreign investment and trade, 
permitting private enterprise and privatizing many SOEs. China thus 
stunned the world with three decades of 10% growth rates.
At the same time, the government kept an important stable of SOEs, 
especially in the energy, telecommunications and banking sectors. These 
SOEs benefit from government protection and assistance, some of which 
is designed to help China improve its technological capacity. These SOEs 
also act as agents of the Chinese state through their foreign investment 
activities, and through helping manage the domestic economy (“state 
capitalism”).
There has been much debate over the role of these SOEs, especially 
how independent that might be of government control. Their relative 
share in the economy has declined in tandem with the development of the 
private sector, and they lag the private sector in terms of productivity and 
efficiency. But their importance and links to the Chinese government have 
only grown under President Xi Jinping’s leadership. Indeed, the close link 
between SOEs and politics is evident by the fact that the Communist Party 
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appoints senior SOE executives, whose career paths usually involve time in 
the government administration.
Overall, China is not at all an open market economy, as evident by the 
OECD’s research which highlights stringent state controls on the econ-
omy and barriers to trade and investment, which have only been getting 
worse.34 While private entrepreneurship is vibrant in China, especially in 
the technology space, when firms become large and successful, they are 
usually coopted into the government’s sphere of influence and punished if 
they fall out of favor with the Party. The Chinese Communist Party does 
not relish the development of other sources of power. Indeed, the Party 
keeps firm control over the private sector and foreign enterprises through 
“Communist Party committees” which are embedded in their manage-
ment structures.
One important instrument of industry protection through much of 
China’s development was exchange rate manipulation. The value of the 
Renminbi (RMB) was kept artificially low to help exports and discourage 
imports. This generated balance of payments surpluses and resulted in a 
massive accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. This reserve accumula-
tion was very costly to Chinese citizens who were deprived of access to 
imports. It also meant that there was less pressure on the Chinese industry 
to become more competitive and productive. But these reserves, which 
today are still around $3 trillion, provide the Chinese government with 
financial firepower for international diplomacy (like the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank and the Belt and Road Initiative) and foreign investment.
US President Donald Trump has called China a currency manipulator, 
because he believes that it is still artificially undervaluing the exchange 
rate. In fact, Trump is several years late in his accusation. In recent times, 
China has been intervening to prevent its exchange rate from falling for 
fear of the instability that might cause. This has not stopped Trump’s US 
Treasury placing China on a “Monitoring List” of major trading partners 
that merit close attention to their currency practices.
As early as 2007, Premier Wen Jiabao warned that the Chinese econ-
omy may have looked extremely strong, but was increasingly “unbalanced, 
unstable, uncoordinated, and unsustainable” (the “four uns”). In particu-
lar, the environmental cost of China’s development has been massive. 
According to the World Bank, “The costs of environmental degradation 
and resource depletion in China are estimated to approach 10 percent of 
GDP, of which air pollution accounts for 6.5 percent, water pollution 2.1 
percent, and soil degradation 1.1 percent.”35 The OECD estimates that 
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there were 670 premature deaths per million people in China from expo-
sure to particulate matter and ozone concentrations in 2010.36
When the US was struck down by the financial crisis in 2008, triumpha-
lism was the reaction of Chinese leaders. They interpreted this as a sign of 
the decline of the US, and the ascendancy of Asia. This period also saw the 
beginning of a new Chinese assertiveness in international relations and 
against America and Japan, in particular.
But the Chinese government also panicked. The Chinese economy had 
long been dependent on exports to the US and other Western markets, 
and there was fear of the adverse impact on the economy. So the Chinese 
government launched a massive stimulus package, by pushing state-owned 
banks to lend money to SOEs and local governments. And all the stric-
tures of state-owned bank dominated financial system paved the way for a 
boom in China’s risky shadow banking sector.
As a result, China’s total public and private debt rose from 150% of 
GDP in 2008 to over 250% in 2016.37 China’s rapid debt buildup is about 
double than that in the US before the global financial crisis or in Korea 
before the Asian financial crisis. The IMF has remarked that “such large 
increases have internationally been associated with sharp growth slow-
downs and often financial crises.”38
Much of China’s debt is in the SOE sector, with corporate debt repre-
senting 125% of GDP.  Many of China’s SOEs are zombie companies 
which are de facto bankrupt. China’s government debt of 55% of GDP 
could jump quickly if the government were obliged to bailout SOEs or to 
recapitalize financial institutions. Many local government infrastructure 
projects are not capable of generating financial returns to enable debt 
repayment. And nearly half of China’s total debt is directly or indirectly 
related to the volatile real estate sector. According to Chinese real estate 
magnate, Wang Jianlin, China’s real estate market was the “biggest bubble 
in history”.
Another consequence of the stimulus package is industrial overcapacity 
which has reached astronomical proportions across a wide range of indus-
tries like steel, aluminum, cement, chemicals, refining, flat glass, 
 shipbuilding, and paper and paperboard. For example, China’s steel pro-
duction “has become completely untethered from real market demand, 
and is now more than double the combined production of the four next 
leading producers: Japan, India, the US and Russia”.39
The Third Plenum of November 2013 announced a new phase of wide-
spread reforms, with market forces set to play a “decisive role” in the econ-
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omy. The goal was to wean the Chinese economy off its investment- and 
export-led growth model toward one based on domestic consumption and 
services. With little meaningful efforts toward these ambitious goals, “sup-
ply-side structural reform” (SSSR) was adopted as the new economic pol-
icy framework in December 2015. The ambitions are cutting excess 
industrial capacity, destocking property inventory, corporate deleveraging, 
lowering corporate costs and improving innovation capacities. But there 
are too few signs of decisive action in pursuit of these lofty ambitions. As 
the Economist Intelligence Unit has argued, SSSR could be more effective 
if the government would only let market forces drive structural reform, 
rather than being a “top-down, government-driven process”.40
Today, the Chinese economy has reached a major turning point, as 
reflected in its current slowdown. According to the country’s dodgy statis-
tics, the economy is still growing in the 6–7% range, although the reality is 
probably much weaker. And this growth is being heavily doped by govern-
ment spending, rather than any inherent dynamism. Exports, a key driver 
of China’s high-growth period, have been sluggish for a few years now.
China may have the world’s biggest GDP in purchasing power parity 
terms, but its GDP per capita is only one-quarter of that of the US. While 
poverty has been slashed from 89% of the population in 1990 to 27% in 
2010 (based on a poverty line of $3.10 a day), only 20% of the population 
live on more than $10 a day. And China only has one company, Huawei, 
on Forbes’ list of “The World’s Most Valuable Brands”, while its nemesis, 
Japan, has five.41
The only way that China can continue to climb the development ladder 
and global value chain (GVC) and become an advanced economy is by 
reigniting its productivity genie. But since 2007, China’s productivity 
growth has been on a sharp downward trend, after having been a key 
driver of economic growth during much of the reform period. This is all 
the more worrying now that China’s labor force has also been falling these 
past few years, the result of the sharp decline in the country’s fertility rate. 
With less and less workers, China must lift its productivity. China’s labor 
productivity is only 15–30% of the level in OECD countries.42
To meet its productivity challenge, China must remove more of the 
shackles of central planning and communism, and become an open market 
economy, which it is not at all today. It’s high time for the Chinese gov-
ernment to let market forces play a decisive role in the economy.
As the European Chamber of Commerce has argued “China is not yet 
an open and domestic market, but rather a patchwork of regional markets, 
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each with its own unique trade and investment barriers.” Indeed, local 
protectionism is widespread. Local governments promote favored firms. 
SOEs have access to subsidized credit, energy and other inputs. They are 
often tasked with political objectives like maintaining employment. 
Corporate bankruptcies are avoided by banks rolling over company loans 
and using local subsidies.
The World Economic Forum has highlighted the structural weaknesses 
of China’s financial sector.43 This is dominated by large state-owned banks, 
which lend mostly to SOEs or large corporations with connections. It is 
not surprising that they have accumulated many nonperforming loans. 
Small and medium enterprises which could provide new dynamism to the 
economy struggle to obtain finance.
China’s lack of capacity to innovate has also become a growing concern 
in recent years. Evolving from a manufacturing-based economy to an 
innovation powerhouse requires a holistic approach to the innovation eco-
system, including nurturing talent and technological readiness. It is a lot 
more than spending money on R&D, as China has been doing. It also 
requires an open society with freedom of speech and academic freedom, 
which is less and less the case in China today.
Despite the manifest need to give market forces a “decisive role” in the 
economy and to reignite the productivity genie, at this stage the Chinese 
government lacks the courage to do so. Little real reform has actually 
occurred, apart from stuttering reforms to financial markets. The greatest 
efforts have been employed on prestige projects, like having the RMB 
included in the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights, rather than substantial 
projects.
What is holding China back?
Clearly the government is concerned about social stability risks due to 
job losses that might result from reform in light of growing labor and 
other social unrest. It is also struggling with local government and SOE 
vested interests which might lose from reform. Many SOE managers are 
also members of the Communist Party’s Central Committee.
It also seems that the Chinese Communist Party is still in the midst of 
a power struggle on the reform agenda and other issues. Moreover, sur-
rendering control of the economy to market forces is anathema to the 
“control-freak” nature of the Chinese Communist Party.
There is also a political agenda which is overriding economic impera-
tives. To preserve his political authority in the lead-up to the 19th National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China, held in the autumn of 2017, 
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President Xi could not risk an economic slowdown. The government is 
also attached to its goal of “building a moderately prosperous society in all 
respects and double the 2010 GDP and per capita personal income by 
2020”, and is already eyeing the 2021 celebrations of the centenary of the 
founding of the Communist Party. All of this means that the Chinese gov-
ernment is chasing economic growth at all costs by employing monetary 
and fiscal stimulus, and adding further to debt, rather than implementing 
much needed structural reform.
In addition to managing the complexity of Chinese politics, Xi Jinping 
is having to cope with the unpredictability of Donald Trump’s politics. 
During the election campaign and before his inauguration, Donald Trump 
had much to say about China when it comes to trade, exchange rates, 
South China Sea, North Korea, climate change and so on. But the Chinese 
know very well that American presidents say one thing during election 
campaigns and other things once they are in office. While Xi Jinping has 
been working very hard to maintain stable relations, his honeymoon with 
Donald Trump was quickly over, as Trump became quickly frustrated at 
China’s token efforts to control North Korea’s nuclear and missile pro-
grams and launched an investigation into China’s alleged theft of US 
intellectual property.
Despite China’s economic (and political) travails, its enormous eco-
nomic size does matter. As we have argued earlier, China is able to exert 
its market, financial and military power in many ways. For example, the 
magnet of China’s large market makes many foreign enterprises and gov-
ernments cave into many Chinese demands. Apple has removed apps from 
its China store that helped Internet users evade censorship, and has agreed 
to open a data center in China which may give Beijing access to troves of 
personal and industry secrets. And now that China is the leading trading 
partner of most Asian countries, the Chinese government routinely 
employs trade sanctions to express its displeasure at the actions of other 
Asian governments, as countries like Japan, Korea and the Philippines 
have experienced. China also froze political relations with Norway and 
blocked many business ties and joint research and academic relationships 
after the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo 
in 2010. It took six years of quiet diplomacy in order to renormalize 
China–Norway ties.
Western governments now routinely “go soft” on criticizing China’s 
human rights, out of fear of upsetting Beijing. China regularly uses its 
enormous foreign exchange reserves to buy subservience from Southeast 
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Asian countries concerning the South China Sea dispute. Beijing is also 
openly buying political influence in countries like Australia and the US. It 
has also been using its growing military strength to intimidate its Southeast 
Asian neighbors and to threaten India.
While it has been able to transform economic weight into economic, 
political and military power, China remains a fragile superpower which 
seems externally strong, but is internally weak.44 The CCP’s grip on power 
is dependent on its capacity to deliver a strong economy, at a time when 
the risks of financial crisis and stagnation are only rising. And rather than 
accelerating economic reform, Xi Jinping’s administration is only ramping 
up repression and controls on freedom. China is also very weak in terms 
of soft power. No country aspires to the Chinese economic or political 
model. And China has extremely few friends, in contrast to its emerging 
rival, India.
IndIa: a slOW Burner
India has never managed to achieve three decades of 10% annual eco-
nomic growth rates like China has. But in all its long history India has 
never had a centralized, authoritarian regime like China has had for over 
2000 years, which could provide strong political leadership.45 India is an 
immensely diverse country, which is essentially a creation of the British Raj 
and the Indian railway system that it built. “No one person could change 
this country with 320 languages”, once said Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew.46 
This diversity makes governance in India more complex than in China. 
But the Indian economy has performed very well these past 25 years, and 
the prospects for continued development may well be very good.
India is indeed a country with a great deal of potential. For example, 
Indians who have migrated to the US, and their descendants, earn on 
average $88,000 a year, compared with $66,000 for all Asian Americans, 
and $50,000 for Americans overall.47 Indian success stories in the US 
include the CEOs of Microsoft (Satya Nadella), Google (Sundar Pichai) 
and Pepsi (Indra Nooyi). Indian companies like Infosys, Mahindra, 
Mittal, Reliance and Tata succeed famously on world markets. The Indian 
movie industry produces more films than any other country. And the 
Indian Premier League is the world’s most lucrative and popular cricket 
tournament.
And yet, the Indian economy was for many years a chronic underper-
former. During India’s first four decades of independence, the economy 
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chugged along at the “Hindu rate of growth”48 of about 3.5% (or 1.3% in 
per capita terms) from the 1950s to the 1980s. Despite a vibrant democ-
racy, India’s economic policies drew more inspiration from the socialism 
of the USSR than the capitalism of East Asia or the West. This was typical 
of many countries at the time, which sought to achieve economic indepen-
dence through inward-looking policies, once they had achieved political 
independence.
A financial crisis in the early 1990s triggered a wave of economic liber-
alization and reform. During the following 25 years, the Indian economy 
has averaged 6½% annual growth and is currently the world’s fastest grow-
ing large economy with growth of around 7½%. India’s GDP per capita 
more than tripled over this period, with the information technology sector 
playing a leading role.
Thanks to India’s positive economic developments, the share of the 
population living in extreme poverty (less than $1.90 a day) has more than 
halved over the past decade to around 20%.49 But this amounts to some 
270 million people who are still suffering in “Incredible India”. And 
despite this impressive achievement, almost 40% of the Indian population 
is caught between $1.90 and $3.10 a day in a situation of near poverty. 
India suffers from hunger more than most every other Asian country, even 
North Korea and Bangladesh.50 The Indian government desperately needs 
to raise more taxes to provide basic services to its citizens—the OECD 
reports that less than 6% of Indians pay personal income taxes.51
India’s GDP per capita remains less than half that of China, and about 
one-tenth of America’s. India’s ranking as the world’s third biggest econ-
omy, as well as its status as an emerging power, is highly dependent on its 
enormous population. And like most countries which aspire to great 
power status, India is spending heavily on its military and space program. 
On the occasion of the launch of a rocket carrying satellites, Prime Minister 
Modi reportedly said it marked a “moment of immense joy and pride for 
India”.
India has suffered from rising inequality like most Asian countries.52 
This has tempted Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen to observe that India looks 
“more and more like islands of California in a sea of sub-Saharan Africa”.53 
And it is true that beyond the glitter of high-tech Bangalore, Bollywood 
and Indian cricket, India remains a rural country, with two-thirds of its 
population living in the countryside. But it is also undeniable that India 
has made immense progress. As someone who has visited the country in 
1975, 1992 and 2014, I must say that India’s progress is palpable.
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In the 2014 national elections, the deeply corrupt and incompetent 
National Congress Party, the party of Nehru and Indira Gandhi, was 
soundly beaten by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), under the leadership 
of Narendra Modi. This was the world’s biggest exercise in electoral 
democracy and was widely applauded for its transparent, impartial and 
correct implementation. What is more, the transition of power from one 
party to the other went very smoothly. Indian governance may have its 
problems, notably widespread corruption, but its elections do work well. 
India’s politics may seem chaotic compared with China’s. But over the 
longer term, China’s institutions may be more brittle and fragile, relying 
as they do on repression, censorship and propaganda.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been now leading the country for 
over four years. He promises so much, based on his successful pro- business 
leadership as chief minister of Gujarat state for over a decade. However, 
despite Modi’s impressive reforms to date, India would still be a very dif-
ficult country in which to do business, according to the World Bank which 
ranks it 130th out 189 countries surveyed.54 The OECD judges Indian 
policies to not be “competition friendly”; however, it does note a positive 
trend for barriers to entrepreneurship, and trade and investment.55 There 
has been another positive trend in the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Report where, after five years of decline, India has 
bounced back over the past two years to 39th place out of 138.56 This is 
due to significant improvements initiated by Prime Minister Modi, whose 
pro-business, pro-growth and anti-corruption stance has improved the 
business community’s sentiment toward the government.
India’s human capital development is also hampered by one of the very 
worst education systems in Asia. By some estimates, half of the Indian 
population would be functionally illiterate. Even at the elite level, not one 
Indian university figures in the world top 200.57 India spends next to 
nothing on public health. Improving human capital will be critical for tak-
ing advantage of the half a billion young Indians who will enter the labor 
force over the next decade. Already more than 30% of Indian youths aged 
15–29 are not in employment, education or training, highlighting the 
immense challenges of reaping the demographic dividend of its youth 
bulge. Social discrimination is also rife in India, with a long list of victims 
like lower castes, religious minorities like Muslims and Christians, indige-
nous and tribal groups, and women.
A major element that has been lacking in India compared with East Asia 
has been the development of a strong manufacturing sector. India’s manu-
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facturing sector has been stuck at around 15% of GDP. The services sector, 
especially business process outsourcing and tourism, has been a key driver 
of the economy.
The East Asian model of urbanization and industrialization can be very 
effective for countries with large pools of lower-skilled labor. The model 
involves a structural transformation of the economy as low-productivity 
rural labor moves to urban areas to work in export-oriented factories. 
Today, industrialization could play an important role in India’s develop-
ment, since it faces the challenge of creating jobs for masses of semi-skilled 
young people entering the labor market, and transforming this demo-
graphic bulge into a dividend.
Fortunately, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government is making 
efforts to develop its manufacturing sector. Major investments are being 
made in improving the country’s logistics in areas like coastal shipping, 
highways and railways, which would help move products around. Inspired 
by the government’s “Look East” policy, these efforts are being concen-
trated on the eastern side of the country, which is close to fast-growing 
Bangladesh and Southeast Asia. Special economic zones and economic 
corridors are also being developed.
The timing is right for India to become an industrial power, as China 
is now suffering from increasing wages, and investors like Japan are look-
ing for new low-cost locations. This is where Prime Minister Modi’s 
business- friendly policies are helpful. For example, the implementation of 
a national goods and services tax will help transform fragmented India 
into a common market. The government has also liberalized some poli-
cies for FDI, including through a “Make in India” initiative, with the 
result that flows of FDI surged to well over $30 billion in each of 2015 
and 2016. Leading companies like Foxconn, Softbank, Microsoft and 
Huawei are all now investing in India. Korean companies in particular are 
very successful in India. “A growing share of this FDI comes from the 
Indian diaspora of over 30 million, the largest in the world, who Prime 
Minister Modi has been courting,” said Kingsley Aikins, CEO of 
DiasporaMatters. “Looking ahead, India’s ‘diaspora capital’ in terms of 
people, knowledge and finance will likely become a driving force for the 
Indian economy.”
Overall, there are strong grounds to be optimistic about India’s future, 
even if it remains an extremely long way behind the world’s leading econ-
omies in terms of GDP per capita, and economic, business and techno-
logical sophistication. In particular, Narendra Modi and his BJP party 
J. WEST
 45
remain very popular and could stay in power for some time, which should 
enable India to make serious progress in its ambitious reform program.
Over the course of the twenty-first century, India could well emerge as 
Asia’s leading power. Already, India’s economy is growing faster than 
China’s, a trend which could continue, unless China gets serious about 
economic reform. Further, India’s population will overtake China’s in 
2022 and could be some 50% higher by 2100, according to the UN.58 
And moreover, India has more friends among other Asian countries than 
does China.
In short, India is a slow burner compared with China, but it is moving 
decisively ahead.
IndOnesIa’s OlIgarChy
When the corrupt, authoritarian regime of President Suharto crumbled 
under the weight of the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis, Indonesia’s 
future looked problematic. But it is now a democracy, which has achieved 
a solid economic performance, and which rapidly implemented a bold 
decentralization of government. However, the next phase of Indonesia’s 
economic development could be rather challenging.
Indonesia’s economy recovered quickly from the Asian financial crisis, 
thanks in part to reforms imposed by the International Monetary Fund. It 
then hitched its wings to the 2001–2010 commodity price boom, driven 
by rapid growth in China and India.59 Indonesia is a commodity-rich 
country, and it benefited greatly from the threefold increase in prices for 
coal, crude palm oil and rubber, all of which it has in abundance.
Indonesia’s economic growth rate has been in the 5–6% range since 
2000.60 It now has the world’s eighth largest economy in purchasing 
power parity terms, thanks in large part to its population of 260 million, 
the world’s fourth largest. Indonesia has achieved an impressive reduction 
in poverty, with the share of the population living under $3.10 a day fall-
ing from 85% in 1990 to 42% in 2012. But the middle class is miniscule 
with only 5% living on more than $10 a day. In 2013, some 36% of all 
children under the age of five (8.4  million) were stunted, a condition 
which delays motor development, impairs cognitive function, and results 
in lower IQ and poor school performance.61 Inequality grew sharply dur-
ing the commodity boom, as high-income households benefited much 
more than did low-income households. And GDP per capita remains only 
one-fifth of that of the US.
 ASIA’S STUNTED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
46 
The Indonesian government squandered the sharp rise in public reve-
nues during this boom period, with much of the windfall being consumed 
via fuel subsidies which benefited higher-income families disproportion-
ately. At the same time, public investment in infrastructure lagged eco-
nomic growth, with the result that Indonesia’s terrible infrastructure 
deficit is now worse than ever, thereby cutting the potential for growing 
productivity.62
Overreliance on commodity exports, which account for over two-thirds 
of total, has also harmed Indonesia’s longer-term development prospects. 
Manufactured exports have slipped back in importance, and Indonesia has 
experienced deindustrialization. Commodity-driven growth was also 
accompanied by further environmental degradation and rapid deforesta-
tion, along with illegal logging and fishing.
The Indonesian economy now stands at a critical juncture, as commod-
ity prices have fallen back again since 2011, and its oil and gas production 
is in long-term structural decline. Indonesia has also been hit by China’s 
economic slowdown.
The 2014 election victory of Indonesia’s new president, Joko Widido 
(“Jokowi”), over ex-general Prabowo Subianto, and the smooth transition 
of power, was a testimony to the growing maturity of Indonesia’s democ-
racy.63 But Jokowi faces a daunting agenda to keep the Indonesian econ-
omy on a path of solid growth.
Like India, Indonesia is a difficult country in which to do business, 
being ranked only 91st out of 190 countries surveyed by the World Bank, 
much worse than its neighbors Malaysia (23rd) and Thailand (46th).64 Its 
policies toward inward FDI are very restrictive,65 especially in the mining 
sector, and corruption is endemic. Symptoms of Indonesia’s poor infra-
structure are Jakarta’s reputation for having the worst traffic in the world, 
and logistics bottlenecks which are preventing better integration into 
Asia’s GVCs.
If only Indonesia could improve its business and investment climate, it 
has great opportunity to unleash the productive potential of the economy, 
and become an industrial power, especially in light of China’s declining 
attractiveness as an investment destination. And also like India, Indonesia 
has a large youthful population entering the workforce over the coming 
years, who requires employment opportunities.
But to convert Indonesia’s youth bulge into a demographic dividend 
will require a massive improvement in its education. Some 70% of 
Indonesian manufacturers indicate that it is very difficult to fill skilled 
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positions. In this context, Indonesia was ranked near the bottom of the 72 
countries surveyed in the OECD PISA education survey of 15-year-old 
students. Regrettably, Indonesia Corruption Watch reports that one-third 
of Indonesia’s education budget is misappropriated, and some 20% of 
Indonesian teachers are absent from the classrooms every day.
President “Jokowi” made an impressive start to his presidency since he 
took office in October 2014. His decision to abolish most fuel subsidies 
was courageous, even if it was facilitated by the sharp fall in world oil 
prices. He is pushing hard to improve infrastructure. And he has launched 
a multitude of reform programs, though implementation is lagging greatly. 
But Jokowi faces very difficult political opposition in the parliament to 
advance his reform agenda.
However, Jokowi’s greatest opponents are Indonesia’s oligarchs, the 
vested interests of rich business and military elites. Indonesia is perhaps 
the classic case of an oligarchy—government of the “few”, by the few 
and for the few, the very antithesis of the ideals of Abraham Lincoln. 
Indonesia’s government has always been dominated by a small group 
who seek to distort government decision-making to favor or protect 
their financial and other interests—at the expense of the general popula-
tion. I am reliably informed that nothing less than murder often occurs 
when an oligarch’s privileged business position is threatened by an 
outsider.
Indonesia’s oligarchy is reflected in the very high concentration of 
material wealth power, according to Jeffrey Winters.66 The total wealth of 
Indonesia’s 40 wealthiest citizens, $71.3 billion, is very much higher than 
those of Malaysia ($51.3 billion), Singapore ($45.7 billion) or Thailand 
($36.5 billion), even though the GDPs per capita of these latter countries 
are much higher. Indeed, the combined wealth of this handful of 
Indonesian oligarchs equals some 10% of GDP. A majority of Indonesia’s 
oligarchs live semi-permanently in Singapore, where much of their wealth 
is also stashed away.
Most of today’s Indonesian oligarchs grew up under President 
Suharto, through the corruption, licenses and privileges of his regime. 
As a practitioner of “sultanistic oligarchy”, Suharto limited their influ-
ence and kept his oligarchy under control. But with the demise of the 
Suharto regime in 1997, Indonesia’s oligarchs proceeded to buy up the 
political system.
Indonesia’s oligarchs now finance all the major political parties, and 
have large influence over all decision-making. Both candidates in 
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Indonesia’s 2014 presidential elections had their election campaigns bank-
rolled by oligarchs, with the winner incurring immense post-election 
political debts. America’s emerging oligarchy pales into insignificance with 
Indonesia’s.
Indonesia has an immense policy agenda for it to continue a path of 
strong economic growth and poverty reduction, and to exploit the oppor-
tunities of the ASEAN Economic Community. Investments in infrastruc-
ture, education, health and social security all require public revenues for 
financing. But government spending represents a paltry 15% of GDP, and 
must be increased by raising more government revenues. But oligarchs 
and many others are reluctant to pay their taxes.
The Indonesian government’s tax amnesty program to encourage 
Indonesians to bring back money stashed overseas is a promising initiative 
to cure the country of its tax cheats. But the results so far are a mere drop 
in the bucket of this massive problem.
Looking ahead, another factor which will likely weigh on Indonesia is 
the prospective Islamization of the nation’s politics. The April 2017 
election for the position of Jakarta governor pitted Basuki Tjahaja 
Purnama (known as “Ahok”), a Chinese Christian, against Anies 
Baswedan, a Muslim who won the election. The turbulent campaign 
featured mass rallies led by a hardline Islamist movement, which has 
strengthened in recent years in a country which had been long domi-
nated by a moderate form of Islam (more than 80% of Indonesia’s popu-
lation professes Islam).
In a clear sign that religious pluralism and tolerance is now under 
threat in Indonesia, in May 2017 Ahok was sentenced to two years in 
prison for blasphemy. His crime was to say that Muslim clerics had used 
a Koranic verse to mislead voters by telling them that Muslims were not 
allowed to vote for a Christian. This mood will likely spill over to national 
politics, as the Jakarta governor election traditionally sets the tone for 
the country. Jokowi, Indonesia’s President, was previously Jakarta’s 
Governor. And politics in Indonesia and its neighbor the Philippines are 
now being destabilized by a growing presence of the Islamic State group 
(ISIS).
Indonesia has great potential to succeed in its development challenge. 
But for a country burdened by an oligarchic democracy, and many other 





Vietnam began its transition from central planning toward a market econ-
omy in the mid-1980s with reforms known as “Doi Moi” or “Renovation”.67 
This was not a philosophical choice. With famines ravaging the country, 
and the loss of Cold War support from the former USSR, the government 
had to do something to get the country moving.
A long series of policy changes have included opening the economy to 
international trade and investment, and allowing private property rights 
and private enterprise. Reform is an ongoing process, with important 
milestones being a free trade agreement with the US in 2000, and mem-
bership of ASEAN in 2004, the World Trade Organization in 2007 and 
the TPP in 2015.
Vietnam also has an education system that delivers impressive results. 
The performance of 15-year-old Vietnamese students in mathematics, 
reading and science in the OECD’s PISA study ranks 8th of the 70 
 countries covered, ahead of Australia (14th), the US (25th), and well 
ahead of its Southeast Asian neighbors of Thailand, Malaysia and 
Indonesia.68
Vietnam has thus been able to attract large flows of FDI. Vietnam’s 
stock of FDI surged from $14 billion in 2000 to $103 billion in 2015,69 
representing some 53% of GDP. Investors have been attracted by Vietnam’s 
strategic location near GVCs, its lower cost structure than China, and its 
political and economic stability. Japan, Singapore, Korea, China and Russia 
have been the leading investors in Vietnam.
These inflows of FDI have enabled Vietnam to join GVCs for products 
like garments, shoes and electronics. The FDI sector contributed 62% to 
exports in 2014, up from 47% in 2000, and some 18% of GDP in 2014, 
an increase from 13% over the same period. Trade has doubled to 160% of 
GDP over the past two decades, reflecting the active trade in parts and 
components that characterize GVCs.70 But despite this excellent perfor-
mance, Vietnam’s exports are dominated by unsophisticated products 
with low domestic value added, and limited technological spillover from 
foreign to domestic enterprises.
These important developments have enabled Vietnam’s economy to 
expand impressively, averaging 6–7% growth since the 1990s, with GDP 
per capita increasing fourfold to $6424. While this may still be only 40% 
of China’s GDP per capita, it is a very impressive achievement from a late 
starter in Asia’s development.
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Vietnam’s strong economic growth has resulted in a massive reduction 
in poverty. The share of its population living on less than $3.10 a day has 
fallen from 77% in 1992 to 14% in 2012. Vietnam’s poverty reduction 
record was second only to that of China over this period. Vietnam’s pov-
erty is now highly concentrated among ethnic minorities, which account 
for 15% of the population and half of the nation’s poor.
Like all middle-income countries, Vietnam now faces the challenge of 
taking its economy to the next level. This will require deeper and more 
challenging policy reforms. Vietnam is still ranked below Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand when it comes to competitive-
ness,71 rule of law72 and corruption.73
Vietnam was to be perhaps the greatest beneficiary of the TPP. 
According to the World Bank, the TPP could have added as much as 8% 
to Vietnam’s GDP, 17% to its real exports, and 12% to its capital stock.74 
Perhaps more importantly, the Vietnam implementation plan included 
commitments on the part of Vietnam to allow workers the autonomy to 
form and operate trade unions of their own choosing. Currently, all unions 
must be affiliated with the government-connected trade union confedera-
tion. It can only be hoped that the efforts currently underway to save the 
TPP by remaining 11 signatories will achieve success. But the TPP, with-
out the US, would be a much less attractive proposition.
Corruption is reportedly rampant, starting at the top with the prime 
minister and his cronies, and is getting worse. One creative trick is buying 
jobs that provide opportunities for corruption. For example, a corporate 
board position can reportedly be had for $100,000; a national parks job 
brings in bribes when the incumbent turns a blind eye to illegal logging; 
and a job as a steward with Vietnam Airlines is said to cost about $25,000, 
but provide excellent opportunities for smuggling, including smuggling 
money outside the country for the elite.
More serious efforts are also required to reform the SOE sector. While 
their role has declined, they still account for one-third of GDP, half of 
exports and over a quarter of domestic government revenue. And as they 
benefit from access to cheap capital, close connections to government 
regulators and policymakers, weak corporate governance, and limited 
competition, they are much less efficient than the private sector.
SOEs control key industries of the economy, including electricity, 
petroleum and gas, mining and quarrying, the water supply, and banking. 
Reform has become urgent because a number of SOEs are showing signs 
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of financial distress, while state-owned banks are accumulating significant 
amounts of nonperforming loans. But the government likes SOEs because 
they can implement the government’s policies. And many SOE bosses like 
them in light of the opportunities for corruption.
In short, Vietnam is still very much in transition from a centrally 
planned to a market-based economy. And a much greater sense of urgency 
and leadership will be necessary for Vietnam to continue its very rapid 
economic development.
Despite the country’s impressive economic development, its political 
development is still frozen. Vietnam remains a communist dictatorship, with 
the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) ruling the country since 1975.75 It 
suppresses all forms of political dissent, using a broad array of repressive 
measures. The criminal justice system is controlled by the CPV. Freedom of 
expression, association and assembly are tightly controlled.
Like most authoritarian regimes in Asia, the CPV faces increasing chal-
lenges to maintain its grip on power. With prosperity and education, there 
are growing calls for democracy and greater freedoms, and also protests 
against corruption, especially by the younger generation in this very young 
country. The Internet and various forms of social media provide an effec-
tive vehicle for expression and protest. The government’s reaction is to 
fight back with repression, including restrictions on Internet freedom, and 
punishment of dissident bloggers.
This political system not only has great costs in terms of political and 
human freedoms. Such restrictions on freedom also limit the capacity for 
innovation and productivity to become new drivers of economic growth, 
as do restrictions on academic freedom.
Overall, Vietnam’s trajectory has many parallels with that of China. But 
with a population which is only 7% of China’s, Vietnam could only ever be 
compared with a Chinese province like Guangdong. Vietnam does have 
the potential to match China’s GDP per capita one day. Its people are 
well-educated, diligent and aspirational. Indeed, as former Singapore 
leader Lee Kuan Yew once remarked, “Vietnam is the most dynamic of all 
the ASEAN countries.”
But a new wave of high economic growth of Chinese proportions 
would require leadership like that of Deng Xiaoping to open up and 
reform the economy more seriously, and leadership like that of Xi Jinping 
to root out the systemic corruption that is dragging the country down. 
Most regrettably, such leadership is not on the horizon.
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COnCludIng COmments
Asia’s rapid economic development starting with Japan, continuing with 
Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, followed by Southeast Asia, 
China and India, has been stunning. Yet no large Asian economy has caught 
up with world leaders like the US and Germany in terms of GDP per capita, 
and economic, business or technological sophistication. And there is no 
likelihood of that happening in the foreseeable future. Asia is suffering from 
stunted development. Asia’s economic and political power derives from its 
very large population, rather than its level of economic development.
It is not surprising that Asia’s stunning economic development should 
result in an equally stunning improvement in the lives of Asia’s citizens. 
But while Asia has achieved a dramatic reduction in poverty, the region is 
a long way short from having a middle-class society, as we examine in the 
next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
Asia’s Mythical Middle-Class Society
“The explosion of Asia’s middle class is stunning … The world has never 
seen anything like this before; it’s probably one of the biggest seismic 
shifts in history,” wrote Singapore’s Kishore Mahbubani.1
It is true that Asian lives have improved enormously these past few 
decades. And yet, notwithstanding such hype, Asia’s human and social 
development is just as stunted as the continent’s economic development. 
Despite Asia’s impressive poverty reduction, over one-third of Asian citi-
zens still live in poverty, while only 15% have made it into the middle class. 
Fully one-half of Asians are living in an intermediate zone between pov-
erty and the middle class, a zone of vulnerability and precarity.
And there are factors other than raw money which are also holding 
Asians back from joining the middle class: the vulnerability and precarity 
of informal or non-regular employment; deprivations like the lack of clean 
drinking water, inadequate health facilities and sanitation (i.e., clean, safe 
and hygienic toilets); the impact of Asia’s all-too-frequent natural disas-
ters; poor access to education and the Internet; and above all Asia’s appall-
ing human rights.
The arrival of a middle-class society would be a great achievement in 
terms of realizing an Asian Century. But at this stage, middle-class Asia is 
still a myth. Only a handful of Asian countries could reasonably claim to 
have middle-class societies. And as economic growth prospects for Asia 
have faded in recent years, the impending arrival of a middle-class society 
is also fading into the distance.
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In this chapter, we examine the evidence for the rise of Asia’s middle 
class. And we will conclude with a short section on Asia’s super rich, a 
small group which is doing very well through Asia’s rise, but is now suf-
fering from some rich country problems like obesity and diabetes.
AsiA’s stunted Middle ClAss
There is no universal agreement on what middle class means. Economists 
think in terms of how much someone consumes or earns in income. 
Sociologists tend to reason in terms of education, occupation in a white- 
collar job or other social status.
In 2010, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) published a report which 
defined the middle class as those living in the range of $2–$20 a day.2 The 
ADB concluded that the majority of Asia’s middle class lived on $2–4 day, 
and were part of the “lower middle class”. Many Chinese just laughed. 
No-one could live on $2 or even $4 day today in a Chinese city. Shanghai 
and Beijing are among the world’s most expensive cities.
In another report, the OECD proposed a more realistic measure for the 
“global middle class”, being consumption or income of $10–100 a day.3 
This is of course a much more meaningful measure of the middle class, 
and $10 a day is now increasingly accepted as the beginning of the middle 
class in emerging economies. At the same time, income or consumption of 
$10 a day would not be considered middle class in any advanced Western 
country. In other words, middle class has become a fuzzy concept, and 
must be interpreted with caution.
Using the $10 a day benchmark, some 650 million Asians could today 
be considered middle class. This sounds like a big number by any score. 
And it certainly sounds like a good market for businessmen wishing to 
hawk their wares. But this represents at best some 15% of Asia’s popula-
tion, based on World Bank statistics.4 In short, it is far-fetched to talk 
about a middle-class Asia when only 15% of Asians could be considered 
middle class. As the Pew Centre has highlighted, a global middle class is 
still more a promise than reality.5
China, the country most talked about for its emerging middle class, 
only has 20% of its population living on more than $10 a day. And India 
and Indonesia, Asia’s other two emerging giants, are even further away 
from having middle-class societies, with only 3% and 5%, respectively, of 
the population live on more than $10 a day. When you visit these coun-
tries you can experience the reality of middle-class life when you go 
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 shopping. For example, international companies are producing second-
grade versions of their products, like clothes washing powder, to keep 
prices low for Chinese customers. Of course, this washing powder won’t 
clean your clothes like you do back home. That’s why friends of mine who 
live in Beijing carry back first-grade products from their European and 
American homes just so they can wash their clothes properly.
And while emerging Asian countries are struggling to achieve middle- 
class societies, advanced Asian countries like Japan and Korea are seeing 
their middle classes recede, as they are stalked by the new rich country 
problems of inequality and poverty. For example, Korea has seen its mid-
dle class decline from 75% of the population in 1990 to 67% in 2013 (with 
the middle class defined as those earning 50–150% of the median national 
disposable income, an appropriate measure for advanced countries).6
Middle ClAss in MAnilA
The life of my friend Edwardo gives us some insights into the lives of those 
on the cusp of the middle class in the Philippines. Edwardo is a taxi driver, 
who earns about $14 a day, while his wife earns small amounts by selling 
Tupperware and Avon products.
Edwardo has just become a grandfather at the age of 33. His 14-year- 
old daughter recently gave birth to a baby boy, fathered by her 16-year- 
old boyfriend, a fellow high school student. This is not an exceptional 
case. The Philippines has the highest rate of adolescent births in East Asia. 
The strong influence of the Catholic Church means that there is insuffi-
cient sex education and access to contraceptives.
The family of Edwardo shares a small apartment of one bedroom and 
one living room, which gets flooded out in the rainy season. Life is a con-
stant struggle. Edwardo must provide for his family on a constant, daily 
basis. But his taxi earnings are not regular. Some days he earns more than 
$14, some days he earns less and some days he earns nothing at all after 
waiting for hours.
Financial management is thus key to Edwardo’s survival. He is well 
trained for that thanks to his college degree in business studies (like many 
in developing Asia, he is vastly overqualified for his job). But at the 
moment, he is two months behind on paying his rent and three months 
behind on his electricity bills.
Edwardo is now contemplating emigration, the lifeblood of the Philippine 
economy and society. He has been exploring possibilities with migration 
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agencies, but their fees are expensive, at least $2500. Then they sometimes 
rip off poor, naive migrants. And on top of the agency fees, there is the cost 
of the air ticket and pocket money to get started in a new country.
Edwardo is deeply worried. He doesn’t know how he and his family can 
survive. Like many Filipinos, he hopes that God might help him.
esCAping extreMe poverty
While Asia has only made limited progress in achieving a middle-class soci-
ety, it is certainly true that strong economic growth has enabled millions 
of Asians to escape the clutches of extreme poverty. Today, according to 
the World Bank, if you are living on less than $1.90 a day, you are living in 
“extreme poverty”.7 This means that you don’t have enough income to 
cover the minimum costs of life’s basic needs.
On this basis, extreme poverty fell from some 61% of the total popula-
tion of East Asia and the Pacific (where China is by far the biggest econ-
omy) in 1990 to only 7% in 2012, and may have even fallen further to 4% 
by 2015, or 83 million persons. South Asia, dominated by India, saw a fall 
in extreme poverty from 51% of the total population in 1990 to 19% in 
2012, and possibly further to 14% in 2015, or 231 million persons.
The World Bank, United Nations and others like to celebrate this 
extraordinary achievement. They feel that they are succeeding in the great-
est challenge facing mankind, the “war against poverty”. And while great 
progress has certainly been achieved, the $1.90 extreme poverty line is of 
very little relevance to Asia’s developing and emerging economies. It was 
calculated by taking the average of the national poverty lines of the world’s 
15 poorest, mainly African, countries.8 Only two Asian countries are 
included, Nepal and Tajikistan, while the great homes to Asian poverty, 
namely China, India and Indonesia, were not taken into account.
The World Bank has another, less well publicized, poverty line of $3.10 
a day, which is much more relevant to most Asian developing countries. 
Some refer to this as a “moderate”, rather than extreme, poverty line. On 
this basis, Asia’s progress in poverty reduction is much less impressive. 
Indeed, some 22% of East Asians were living on less than $3.10 a day in 
2012, triple the 7% based on $1.90 a day, while China’s poverty rate jumps 
to 27% from 11%. And some 55% of South Asians were living on less than 
$3.10 a day, almost triple 19% based on $1.90 a day, as India’s poverty rate 
rises to 58% from 21%. This means that in reality some 36% or 1.4 billion 
Asians are living in poverty.
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This still represents very impressive progress in poverty reduction, but 
very much less than on the basis of $1.90. In either case, it is only the very 
beginning of living a decent life. If you are earning $1.90 or $3.10 a day, 
it simply means that you are unlikely to die from starvation from one day 
to the next. But it does not mean much more.
Indeed, the reality of Asian life is that most Asians who have escaped 
poverty are now caught between poverty and middle class (based on $10 
day). Fully one-half of Asians are still living in a very vulnerable and pre-
carious situation between $3.10 and $10 a day. At such low levels of 
income, people are at risk of falling back into poverty in the event of an 
earthquake, flood or other natural disaster, a sudden hike in food prices, 
or a personal/family problem like unemployment, or health problem.
inequAlity Holds BACk AsiA’s poverty reduCtion
The impressive reduction in Asian poverty could have been much greater 
had it not been for the rise in income inequality since 1990 in most of 
Asia, especially in Asia’s population centers of China, Indonesia and India. 
This increasing inequality was a turnaround from the period before 1990 
when economies like Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan 
were able to achieve “growth with equity”. Income inequality, as mea-
sured by the “Gini coefficient”, is now higher in Asia than in the rest of 
the world.
What has caused the increase in inequality? According to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), rapid technological change which 
requires high-skilled workers and displaces lower-skilled workers has been 
an important factor.9 Rapid economic development has also favored urban 
areas rather than rural areas, giving rise to “spatial inequality”. Unequal 
access to education has been another factor as richer towns offer better 
education than poorer towns do, and richer families can afford a better 
education for their children than poorer ones do.
But there are also other factors driving Asia’s yawning inequality, most 
notably corruption. While petty corruption is widespread on the streets of 
many Asian countries, it is grand corruption that enables Asia’s elites to fill 
their pockets at the expense of the general public. We will come back to 
this issue in greater detail in Chap. 9. And as Christopher Ng, Regional 
Secretary at UNI Global Union Asia Pacific, argues the proliferation of 
precarious, informal and irregular work is also a key driver of income 
inequality. We explore this later in this chapter.
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There is much that governments can do to improve income inequality 
through government spending and redistribution. Moreover, it is impor-
tant to improve the “equality of opportunity” to education, health and 
financial services which weigh on future inequality. And many govern-
ments, notably in China, are making the rights noises. But too little effort 
is actually being deployed. This is important, not only for enhancing the 
fight against poverty. Inequality can lower future investments in education 
and health, thereby compromising future economic prospects. It can also 
foster populism and weaken the support for pro-growth policies, as well as 
lead to social and political instability.
AsiA’s preCAriAt
Asians living on $1.90 or $3.10 a day don’t just suffer from a lack of 
money. They are also exposed to vulnerability and precarity because they 
are typically working in the “informal sector”. The informal sector of the 
economy is composed of enterprises which are neither registered nor reg-
ulated, and whose workers have no contract or rights.10 Minimum wage 
laws, collective bargaining, and health and safety standards are unheard of 
in the informal economy. Globalization can foster the informal economy, 
as multinational enterprises, notably in the garments industry, can out-
source production to micro- and home-based operations to keep costs and 
prices low.
Some two-thirds of Asians have such low-quality jobs in the informal 
sector, a figure which has barely budged over the past two decades or 
more11 (in comparison informal workers only account for about one-third 
of total in Latin America). The share of informal employment ranges from 
over 80% in Bangladesh and India, to 50–70% in countries like the 
Philippines, Thailand, China, Pakistan and Indonesia, and down to around 
10% for Hong Kong and Singapore.
Workers in Asia’s vast precarious, informal economy have been called 
the “precariat” by political scientist Guy Standing.12 The precariat covers 
work in small factories, backyard mechanics, home-based producers, 
domestic servants, most agricultural workers, ambulant peddlers, street 
vendors and hawkers, casual construction workers and so on. “There are 
success stories about economic empowerment and entrepreneurship 
among the informals,” writes Rene Ofreneo. “However, these are 
 overwhelmed by the numerous sad stories about abuses, hardships and 
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difficulties of worker survival in the harsh and unprotected world of the 
informals.”
Migrants are also part of Asia’s precariat. While most Asian low-skilled 
migrants travel outside the region, especially to the Middle East, there are 
large numbers of undocumented workers crossing Asia’s porous borders, 
like the following corridors India–Bangladesh–Pakistan, China–Hong 
Kong, China–Indochina, Thailand–Myanmar, Indonesia–Malaysia and 
Malaysia–Singapore.
Most of these migrants cross borders without any legal papers or docu-
ments, and end up not only as unregistered, but also as highly vulnerable 
workers in the countries of destination. For example, stories abound of 
how migrants from Myanmar’s Rohingya tribes are abused in Thailand 
and Bangladesh, and how Indonesian plantation workers suffer in Malaysia. 
Another group of the precariat is the large floating populations of internal 
migrants, especially in large economies like China and India. They flock to 
the industrial areas from the rural areas, picking up odd and casual jobs at 
pitifully low wages.
Most tragically, Asia accounts for 56% of the world’s 21 million people 
who are made to work against their free will (“forced labor”), coerced by 
their recruiter or employer, for example, through violence or threats of 
violence, or by more subtle means such as accumulated debt, retention of 
identity papers or threats of denunciation to immigration authorities. Asia 
is also home to more working children than any other region in the world. 
An estimated 122 million Asian children aged 5–14 years are compelled to 
work for their survival. Millions are not enrolled in school at all. Although 
there has been progress in reducing child labor in many countries in the 
region, the problem persists.
It would be nice to think that economic development will lead to a 
reduction in Asia’s precariat. But the reality is, as mentioned before, that 
there has been virtually no decline in emerging Asia’s precariat population 
over these past two decades. Moreover, Japan has seen its widely admired 
system of life-time employment fritter away, and be gradually replaced by 
non-regular work contracts. Another disturbing trend is that each succes-
sive financial crisis, from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis to the 2008 
Global Financial Crisis, has seen a rise in precarious employment in Asia, 
and also in the US and other Western countries. Workers with regular jobs 
get laid off when crisis strikes, and are re-hired on irregular contracts when 
the economy recovers.
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surviving on tHe tHresHold of poverty 
in BAnglAdesH
What is life like if you are surviving on $1.90 or even $3.10 a day in one 
of Asia’s developing countries? Life involves a complex process of financial 
management, according to the authors of “Portfolios of the Poor”.13
When you are living on such a low income, you spend most of your 
money on the basics, especially food. There is one big problem, though. 
Like the case of Edwardo, you are very unlikely to receive a steady check 
or payment from your boss. Since you are surely casually or part-time or 
self-employed in the informal sector, you make more on some days, less on 
others, and often get no income at all.
The government offers you very limited help, and when it does, the 
quality of assistance is apt to be low. Your greatest source of support is 
your family and community, though most often you’ll have to rely on your 
own devices!
So how do the poor budget? In particular, how do they make sure that 
there is something to eat and drink each day? How do they deal with 
emergencies? How can they be sure that they can pay for the doctor and 
drugs when their children fall sick? How do they put together the funds 
for big ticket items like a home and furniture, education and marriage for 
their children, and some income for themselves when they are too old to 
work?
The evidence shows that for the poor, financial management is a funda-
mental and well-understood part of everyday life as they cope with incomes 
which are small, and often highly irregular and unpredictable. Indeed, 
even those living on less than 1 dollar a day per person rarely consume 
every penny of income as soon as it is earned.
Money management by the poor involves: storing savings at home, with 
others, and with banking institutions; joining savings clubs, savings- and- 
loan clubs and insurance clubs; and borrowing from neighbors, relatives, 
employers, moneylenders or financial institutions. At any one time, the 
average poor household has a fistful of financial relationships on the go.
The case of Hamid and Khadeja, a poor couple living in a Bangladeshi 
village, provides a window on financial management by the poor. When 
their first child was born, they moved to Dhaka, nation’s capital, where 
they settled in a slum. After spells as a cycle-rickshaw driver and construc-
tion laborer and many days of unemployment, Hamid whose health was 
not good was taken on as a reserve driver of a motorized rickshaw. Khadeja 
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stayed at home, earning a little from taking in sewing work. Home was 
one of a strip of small rooms with cement block walls and a tin roof, built 
by their landlord on illegally occupied land, with a toilet and kitchen space 
shared by the eight families that lived there.
They earned on average $70 a month, almost all by Hamid. One-fifth 
of the $70 was spent on rent (not always paid on time), and much of the 
rest went toward the most basic necessities of life—food and the means to 
prepare it. This put them among the poor people of Bangladesh, but not 
the very poorest.
Hamid and Khadeja are an unremarkable poor household. But they are 
very active money managers. They had built up reserves in six different 
instruments, ranging from $2 kept at home for minor day-to-day short-
falls to $30 sent for safe-keeping to Hamid’s parents, $40 lent out to a 
relative, and $76  in a life insurance savings policy. In addition, Hamid 
always made sure he had $2 in his pocket to deal with anything that might 
befall him on the road.
Hamid and Khadeja are also borrowers, with a debt of $153 to a micro-
finance institution and interest-free private debts to family, neighbors, and 
Hamid’s employer totaling $24. They owed money to the local grocery 
store and to their landlord. Khadeja was even acting as an informal banker, 
or “money-guard”, holding $20 at home that belonged to two neighbors 
seeking a way to keep their money safe from their more spendthrift hus-
bands and sons. Hamid himself also used a money-guard, storing $8 with 
his employer while waiting for an opportunity to send it down to the fam-
ily home.
In addition to saving, borrowing and repaying money, Hamid and 
Khadeja, like nearly all poor and some not-so-poor households, also saved, 
borrowed and repaid in kind. Khadeja, sharing a crude kitchen with seven 
other wives, would often swap small amounts of rice or lentils or salt with 
her neighbors. She would keep a note of the quantities in her head, and so 
would her partners in these exchanges, to ensure that their transactions 
were fair over the long haul.
The case of Hamid and Khadeja shows that people with low and irregu-
lar incomes can, with some difficulty, cope and survive on $1.90 or $3.10 
a day. But their financial management is a hazardous process which 
depends on the reliability, kindness, goodwill and norms of mutual obliga-
tion of their network of friends, family and colleagues. Fortunately, some 
microfinance institutions are now stepping into this space to provide 
financial services to the poor.
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poverty in tHe Midst of prosperity: tHe CAse 
of singApore
Any visitor to dazzling Singapore might be shocked to learn that a quarter 
of Singaporeans live in poverty, even though GDP per capita in the city 
state is the highest in Asia, and one of the highest in the world. And the 
poverty rate would be much higher if the situation of low-skilled migrants 
were included in analysis of the issue.
The life of Patricia, a Singaporean nurse, and her unemployed partner, 
Sham, illustrate the challenges of a life of poverty. Patricia works as a full- 
time nurse in a governmental hospital, and earns just S$1400 a month. 
She pays S$850 a month to rent a non-air-conditioned room in an apart-
ment at Admiralty, in the north of Singapore, a 90-minute commute by 
public transport to her workplace.
Patricia’s monthly rental does not entitle her to the use of her land-
lord’s kitchen, so she and Sham must eat out for all their meals, often at 
McDonald’s. Unfortunately, she cannot afford a small, two- bedroom 
condominium unit in the city center which would cost S$5000 or more. 
Life can be hard in the world’s most expensive city.14
Singapore’s poor can also be found selling packets of tissues outside 
food centers. Or spending the night on benches near their jobs to save the 
transport fare home—they are known as “sleepers”. Or collecting empty 
soft drink cans out of trash bins.
Kishore Mahbubani, dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School at the National 
University of Singapore, wrote in 2001: “There are no homeless, destitute 
or starving people in Singapore. Poverty has been eradicated, not through 
an entitlements programme (there are virtually none) but through a 
unique partnership between the government, corporate citizens, self-help 
groups and voluntary initiatives”.15
This comment is plainly misleading.
Inequality and poverty have indeed been deteriorating in Singapore, 
according to a study by the Lien Centre for Social Innovation and the 
Singapore Management University. The bottom 20% of Singapore resi-
dents saw their real median incomes fall by 8% from 1998 to 2010, while 
those in the top 20% increased by 27%. Singapore does not have a 
 minimum wage. Thus the rate of inequality has risen dramatically, and is 




The consequence for Singapore’s poverty situation is dramatic. Some 
10–15% of Singapore’s population are unable to meet their basic needs of 
food, clothing, shelter and other essential expenditures, with their monthly 
income below S$1250–1500. Most of these people include “working 
poor”, unemployed poor households and poor retirees.
If the notion of basic needs is expanded to include in-school education, 
improving skills, and the purchase of goods like computers, Internet con-
nection or mobile phones, about 25% of Singapore’s population is living 
in poverty, below S$2500–3000 a month, sharply up over the previous 
decade. These expenditures are necessary to invest in human capital and 
create the possibility of social mobility or a life beyond continued basic 
subsistence for adults or children of the next generation.
It is hard to escape the conclusion that Singapore’s poor, as well as its 
lower-skilled migrants, are there to suffer and serve Singapore’s elite, 
which now counts 188,000 millionaires and 20 billionaires. Singapore has 
the highest concentration of millionaires per capita in the world.
Another sad reality is that most Singaporeans are not aware of the scale 
and depth of poverty in Singapore. And the Singapore government pro-
vides very much less assistance to the poor than do governments in other 
advanced countries. Thankfully, there are many civil society anti-poverty 
initiatives like “Singaporeans Against Poverty”, launched by the Catholic 
group, Caritas.
JApAn’s two-trACk JoB MArket And vulnerABility
It is not only Asia’s poorer countries which are afflicted with vulnera-
bility and low-quality jobs. Advanced countries like Japan and Korea 
are also suffering from similar problems. In Japan, the share of non-
regular workers in the economy has almost doubled from 20% in 1994 
to 38% in 2016.16 The category of irregular workers includes fixed-
term, part-time and dispatched workers, the latter being persons 
employed by temporary worker agencies who are sent to firms on a 
fixed-term basis. Over 50% of temporary and dispatch workers would 
prefer a regular job.
In the hypercompetitive world economy, companies are now resorting 
more and more to irregular workers who are easy-to-hire and easy-to-fire. 
The traditional Japanese system of life-time employment, seniority-based 
wages, firm-based training and regular job rotation, which served Japan so 
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well during its high-growth period, is increasingly seen as inappropriate in 
the world of today.
Non-regular employees typically bear the brunt of the cyclical ups and 
downs in the economy. Japan’s women are the biggest victims of non- 
regular employment, reflecting the discrimination from which women suf-
fer in Japanese life. More than half of female employees have non-regular 
jobs, which means that they account for two-thirds of total non-regular 
employees. Non-regular work is frequent among youth and older workers; 
the latter are often re-employed at lower wages after they reach the occu-
pational retirement age (typically 60) and until they reach the public pen-
sion age (65).
While non-regular employment may have much naive appeal to Japan’s 
enterprises, it comes with great costs to the country’s economy and soci-
ety. Non-regular employees benefit much less from firm-based training, 
and once you are a non-regular employee, chances are you will be a non- 
regular employee for life. Non-regular employment is not a stepping stone 
to regular employment. In other words, the phenomenon of non-regular 
employment is creating an economic underclass, which is undermining 
the nation’s long-term prosperity.
Non-regular employees systematically earn much lower incomes, 
about 40% less for equivalent jobs, and have much less access to social 
welfare like unemployment and health insurance even though they have 
precarious jobs. This is a key factor fracturing Japan’s society, as its rela-
tive income poverty and inequality are now among the highest of the 
advanced OECD countries.17 The lower income of non-regular workers 
is also discouraging marriage and hence reducing Japan’s chronically low 
fertility rate, the main factor behind its dramatically aging population. It 
is not surprising that surveys have found that well-being and happiness 
level reported by non-regular workers is below that of regular workers 
and the self-employed.
Over the years, there have been many proposals to break down this 
dualism in the Japanese labor market (and society), such as by increasing 
social insurance coverage and upgrading training programs for non- 
regular workers and reducing effective protection for regular workers. 
But as with many of Japan’s intractable policy debates, it’s another case of 
all talk and little action. This rise in non-regular employment means that, 




A deeper look At poverty reduCtion And AsiA’s 
toilet Crisis
There is a lot more to poverty, vulnerability and the middle class than 
whether you are earning $1.90, $3.10 or $10 a day. Many Asians who earn 
such incomes may also suffer from other deprivations like no access to 
clean drinking water, clean and safe toilets, education for their children, 
basic healthcare facilities or personal security. Large countries like India, 
Indonesia and Pakistan have some of the worst records in these respects.
Can the citizens of these countries be happy with $1.90 a day or more 
in their pockets, if their wives die in childbirth, if their children die before 
they reach five years or if their children suffer from malnutrition?
The lesson is that Asia’s rapid economic growth has been very effective 
at putting money in people’s pockets. But Asian governments have been 
much less effective in providing their citizens with the basic social services 
that they need and deserve.
Perhaps one of the most egregious deprivations from which many 
Asians suffer is the lack of “improved sanitation” or, in plain English, 
clean, safe and hygienic toilets. Today, some 1.7 billion or 42% of the 
region’s population still lack access to improved sanitation, according to 
the ADB.18
And while the region’s toilet deficit was mainly a rural phenomenon, 
this problem is now becoming increasingly acute in urban areas, with tens 
of millions of people now migrating every year into slums and other 
infrastructure- poor urban areas.
Close to half of Asia’s “toilet-poor” population lives in India. This 
country has nothing short of a “toilet crisis”. In fact, many more Indians 
have access to a cell phone than to a toilet!
This emerging economic giant reportedly has the world’s longest toilet 
queue, with some 775 million people without access to clean, safe and 
hygienic toilets.19 China comes in runner up with 330 million people 
without toilets, while Indonesia is fourth-place (100 million), Pakistan 
sixth place (69 million) and Bangladesh seventh place (63 million).
If these 775 million Indians without toilets, more than 60% of the 
nation’s population, were lined up in a queue, it would stretch from the 
earth to the moon and beyond. In percentage terms, the toilet situation in 
India is much worse than in virtually all other Asian countries. For exam-
ple, in Cambodia 58% of the population is without toilets, in Nepal 54%, 
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in Bangladesh and Indonesia 39%, the Philippines 26%, China 24% and 
Vietnam 22%.
Among those Indians that do have toilets, there are many millions who 
use homemade toilets, on a raised platform inside the house, which are not 
connected to a sewerage network or pit. So this human waste is then 
cleaned by poor Dalit women (“untouchables”) who face horrific discrim-
ination. India also wins the world prize for the most number of people 
practicing open defecation, with 173 million people relieving themselves 
behind bushes, in fields, by roadsides, or at some other unsavory and 
unsafe place in this beautiful country.
Lack of access to clean, safe and hygienic toilets is a big problem for 
many reasons. It can have dramatic effects on people’s health through pol-
lution of water supplies, which renders them unfit for drinking, irrigation 
and other purposes. About 80% of untreated sewage in India reportedly 
flows into rivers, lakes and ponds, and then often seeps underground 
thereby polluting drinking water sourced from groundwater.
Diarrhea is one major problem, which is caused by poor sanitation and 
hygiene practices and unsafe drinking water. It is a major cause of child 
malnutrition, disease and death. Nearly half of India’s under-five children 
are stunted (too short for their age), with poor sanitation being a major 
underlying cause. More than 140,000 children younger than five years die 
each year in India from diarrhea. India also has high rates of maternal and 
newborn mortality linked to sepsis.
Open defecation also puts the safety of women and girls at risk. They 
are often subject to sexual harassment, physical assault and rape on the way 
to and from their defecation site.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced in October 2014 his 
Swachh Bharat (Clean India) Mission. The objective is to deliver a toilet 
to every household and end open defecation by 2019, the 150th anniver-
sary of Mahatma Gandhi’s birth, and to educate people about the long- 
term health and economic benefits of using a toilet.
Some progress is being made, but the government’s toilet construction 
is way behind schedule, and may take an extra ten years. But building toi-
lets is the easy part. The waste management system across large parts of 
the country is a stinking mess. Most villages have no systems for disposal 
of drainage water, and urban areas cannot manage their waste.
But what is more disturbing is that, according to many reports, the new 
toilets are frequently not used. Many people consider toilets to be unclean, 
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and prefer open defecation. They have been demolishing the new toilets 
or using them for other purposes.
Hindu tradition encourages defecation in the open, far from home, to 
avoid ritual impurity. So many people, notably in the Hindu-dominated 
Gangetic plains, today still show a preference for going in the open—even 
if they have latrines at home. Some Indians argue that open defecation is 
more wholesome, healthy and virtuous life. It is pleasurable, comfortable 
and convenient!
In short, the government must also tackle the cultural reasons for 
India’s toilet crisis. Simply building the toilets won’t be enough. Tackling 
India’s toilet crisis requires a multifaceted strategy, with strong leadership. 
It requires an effective public education campaign, investment in sewerage 
systems as well as toilets, and cooperation between different levels of gov-
ernment in this vast country.
A deeper look At poverty reduCtion And tHe iMpACt 
of nAturAl disAsters
Now what happens if you have your $1.90, $3.10 or even $10 a day in 
your pocket, but every couple of years it gets washed away in a flood, 
blown away in a typhoon or lost in an earthquake. Or what about if you 
have to use those few dollars to rebuild your life after a natural disaster 
because you have very few other assets to fall back on, no insurance, or 
because you receive insufficient help from your government or interna-
tional donors.
Fortunately, the ADB has estimated for us the impact on Asian poverty 
from natural calamities like floods, landslides, tsunamis, earthquakes, 
droughts and storms.20 When the vulnerability to such natural calamities is 
taken into account, over 400 million extra people were estimated to live in 
poverty in 2010, with more than half of them being in China, a country 
which is highly exposed to flooding. And since natural calamities are a 
growing phenomenon in Asia, this estimate of 400 million would only 
have increased since 2010. In short, natural disasters are yet another 
untold side of Asia’s poverty.
It is hardly surprising that natural disasters should have such an impact 
on Asia’s poverty and middle-class aspirations. The Asian continent is the 
most disaster prone in the world.21 Indeed, after the US, China, India, the 
Philippines and Indonesia are the countries the most hit by natural 
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 disasters.22 Active tectonic plate movements in the Pacific and Indian 
Oceans are a source of major earthquakes and tsunamis, while Indian and 
Pacific Oceans also regularly generate tropical cyclones and typhoons.
Over 2 million Asian people died from natural disasters between 1970 
and 2014, some 57% of the global fatalities, with earthquakes and tsuna-
mis being the main cause of deaths, according to the UN. The following 
mega disasters accounted for most natural disaster fatalities in recent years: 
the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami (more than 200,000 deaths), Myanmar’s 
2008 Cyclone Nargis (140,000 deaths), Bangladesh’s Cyclone Gorky in 
1991 (140,000 deaths), China’s 2008 earthquake (90,000 deaths), 
Pakistan’s 2005 earthquake (75,000 deaths) and Japan’s 2011 earth-
quake/tsunami (20,000 deaths).
What’s more, some 6 million people from the region were affected by 
disasters over the same period, with floods and drought affecting the high-
est number of people. The economic cost from natural disasters over this 
45-year period was over $1.15 trillion, with earthquakes, tsunamis, floods 
and storms being responsible for the lion’s share. Indeed, the economic 
losses from natural disasters have been surging in recent years. And with 
climate change contributing increasingly to weather instability, the fre-
quency of natural disasters will only increase.
Many organizations have flooded the world with recommendations for 
dealing with natural disasters. For example, the ADB recommends reduc-
ing population exposure to natural disasters, exploiting early warnings and 
strengthening resilience.23 This is indeed wise advice. But it is much easier 
said than done.
In particular, the 2016 floods in China show how far behind the curve 
this emerging superpower is when comes to dealing with natural disasters 
at home. Hundreds were killed, more were missing and tens of millions 
affected, while vast areas of agricultural crops were destroyed. Chinese 
citizens complained of inadequate early warnings, illegal building in 
exposed areas, poor or non-existent drainage systems, government incom-
petence and cover-ups, and censorship of their social media reports.
While some officials have been fired, and the national government 
expressed sympathy, it is unclear whether serious efforts are being made to 
improve China’s natural disaster risk management. Obfuscation and cover-
 up is the Chinese government natural response to any disaster. One of the 
most notorious cover-ups was regarding the 5335 students who died in 
the 2008 Sichuan earthquake due to the substandard construction that 




A well-educated population is key to a middle-class society. And on this 
score, a good number of East Asian countries seem to have strong founda-
tions for a middle-class society, based on OECD’s latest Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA) survey, which evaluates the 
knowledge and skills of the world’s 15-year-olds. But many questions are 
being asked about the real quality of these apparently successful Asian 
education systems. After all, Asia’s elite are proud to see their kids to 
school in North America, Australia and the UK. And at the same time, 
there are just as many other Asian countries which have poor education 
systems.
PISA 2015 tested students in 72 countries on science, maths and read-
ing. Students from Singapore came top in science, the principal focus of 
PISA 2015. The OECD reports that one in five Singaporean students 
masters the most advanced scientific problems and demonstrates that they 
can think like scientists. Six other Asian economies—Japan, Taiwan, 
Macao, Vietnam, Hong Kong and China (based on Beijing, Shanghai, 
Jiangsu and Guangdong)—make it into the top ten, along with Estonia, 
Finland and Canada, the only Western countries to do so.
Disturbingly, the OECD reports that only in Canada, Estonia, Finland, 
Hong Kong, Japan, Macao, Singapore and Vietnam do at least nine out of 
ten 15-year-old students master the basics that every student should know 
before leaving school. Germany and the US, which have two of the world’s 
leading economies, are only ranked 16th and 25th, respectively. When it 
comes to mathematics, Singapore, Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and Japan 
were the five highest performers in PISA 2015, while Singapore, Hong 
Kong, Canada, Finland and Ireland topped reading.
How did these Asian countries do so well? According to the OECD, 
top performers, notably in Asia, place great emphasis on selecting and 
training teachers and prioritizing investment in teacher quality, not class-
room sizes. They also set clear targets and give teachers autonomy in the 
classroom to achieve them. Children whose parents have high expecta-
tions perform better: they tend to try harder, have more confidence in 
their own ability and are more motivated to learn.
Others contend that the success of these Asian economies just reflects 
rote learning, memorization and immense drilling for tests. It is certainly 
true that students from these high-performing Asian countries are often 
sent to night school, a source of great psychological pressure.
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The strong performance of China in three consecutive editions of PISA, 
together with the relatively poor US scores, has opened a lively debate on 
the relative merits of the two education systems. It is after all curious that 
Chinese families should be sending over 300,000 students to US schools. 
Even Chinese President Xi Jinping reportedly sent his daughter to 
Harvard.
Some Chinese leaders have made some relevant comments. Liu Jinghai, 
principal at a Shanghai Middle School, reportedly admitted that the much- 
feared college entrance exam—known as the gaokao—is all simply about 
memorization and rote learning. And at a conference in Beijing,24 Cheng 
Siwei, Former Vice Chair, Standing Committee, Chinese National People’s 
Congress, said that Chinese students are good at passing tests, but much 
less good at critical thinking and creativity. He argued that China has 
much to learn from the West in that regard.
However, the greatest problem in Chinese education may be the role of 
propaganda, censorship and ideology—things which do not affect the 
OECD study which does not focus on the social sciences and liberal arts. 
For example, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution and the 
Tiananmen Square incident have been strictly taboo in studies of Chinese 
history. And since the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, “patriotic educa-
tion”, which emphasizes China’s victimhood at the hands of Western and 
Japanese colonial powers and the “century of humiliation” from the 
Opium Wars to the end of World War 2, has been a key element of Chinese 
education. The Chinese government has always considered education as 
an important means of ideological control.
Under the current leadership of President Xi Jinping, there has been a 
toughening in education policies as part of the government’s efforts to 
stamp out dissent. The education minister Yuan Guiren has called for the 
banning of all foreign textbooks that promote Western values. President 
Xi has called on universities to improve their Marxist ideological and polit-
ical work.
The relative academic freedom that most Chinese universities enjoyed 
is now under threat, as topics like press freedom, civil society, human 
rights and multi-party democracy constitutionalism are now “no speaks”. 
Some Chinese professors who have criticized the Communist government 
have been fired or even jailed. Predictably, there has been a surge in 
Chinese applications to study at foreign universities.
Following the 2014 “Umbrella” protest movement, Chinese 
Communist Party control has now reached the Hong Kong education 
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system, which had always enjoyed academic freedom. Professors who have 
been critical of the Beijing and Hong Kong governments are now being 
disciplined, and academic freedom is now also being eroded.
Turning back to the OECD’s PISA study of 72 countries, you will find 
another group of Asian countries, namely Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia 
well down in the bottom half of the list. These countries have a great deal 
of work to do before human capital can become a key driver of economic 
development and middle-class societies. As the OECD said in other 
reports, “half of Thai students in school are not acquiring the basic skills 
required for their own success and the country’s continued develop-
ment,”25 and “Over 50% of Indonesian fifteen year olds do not master 
basic skills in reading and mathematics.”26
Moreover, the absence of India in PISA 2015 is striking. In fact, two 
Indian states—Tamil Nadu and Himachal Pradesh—participated in PISA 
2009. Although they are among the best-performing states in India, they 
were ranked in the bottom three participants, along with Kyrgyzstan, for 
all three criteria. But rather than using the PISA exercise as a useful tool 
for measuring, and tracking over time, the nation’s education, the Indian 
government decided to blame the PISA test, which it considers to be 
unfair because it does not take account of India’s sociocultural milieu.
Despite the government’s reaction, these very low scores square with 
all other indicators which suggest that India has an appalling education 
system. An ADB 2010 study showed that Indian children had the lowest 
number of years schooling out of 12 leading countries from developing 
Asia. India’s average number of years schooling (for the population aged 
15 years and above) was 5.13 years in 2010.27 This is well below the aver-
age for “Emerging Asia” (7.05 years), and even much further below the 
11.0  years of developed countries. The results of this important ADB 
study would be even more damning if the ADB could have measured the 
quality of education, as well as the quantity.
AsiA’s digitAl divide
Access to the Internet is increasingly seen as a human right and a mark of 
middle-class status. But less than half of Asians use the Internet.
The Internet is indeed the fundamental technology for modern life. It 
can provide citizens with education, entertainment, social connections, 
e-government services, awareness of world and local events, and transpar-
ency about the activities of government, business and society.
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Thanks to the Internet, consumers can enjoy variety, and time and cost 
savings. And business benefits greatly from the Internet for global opera-
tions management, customer management, and analyzing and accessing 
new markets. Government can deliver and manage public services through 
the Internet, which can also facilitate policy analysis and implementation.
In short, the Internet is transforming the very nature of our econo-
mies and society, with profound impacts on GDP growth. But as with 
education, there are two distinct Asias when it comes to access to the 
Internet.
One Asia is that of the tech-savvy young population of Internauts who 
are developing and moving faster than the rest of the world, especially in 
Japan and Korea which have Internet penetration rates between 84% and 
86%, like the US and Germany. But the overall reality is that more than 
half of Asia’s 4 billion citizens still do not use the Internet, according to a 
McKinsey&Company.28
Some 85% of India’s population of 1.3 billion do not use the Internet, 
despite all the hype of high-tech India. In China, the much vaunted 
emerging great power, 54% of the population of 1.4 billion are not online. 
And in Southeast Asia’s leading country of Indonesia, 84% of its popula-
tion are also not online. The situation is fairly similar in other populous 
Asian countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Myanmar, 
Vietnam and Thailand.
Not surprisingly, the offline population is disproportionately rural, low 
income, elderly, illiterate and female. And most tragically, in most coun-
tries religious and ethnic minorities are virtually excluded from the 
Internet—these groups are also not surprisingly virtually excluded from 
their country’s political processes. Of Nepal’s Madhesi group, only 1% are 
connected to the Internet, for China’s Yi group the figure is 2%, Nepal’s 
Muslims 2%, China’s Bouyei 4%, India’s Kashmiri Muslims 4%, the 
Philippines’ Moro 5% and Indonesia’s Papuans 9%.29
There is much more that governments could do to improve access to 
the Internet, like improving affordability, education, infrastructure, nota-
bly for mobile Internet coverage or network access, and electricity. For 
example, in India, nearly 1 billion people still cannot afford the cheapest 
mobile data plans. And literacy rates are particularly low in Bangladesh, 
India and Pakistan, especially for women.
Electrification is poor in many Asian countries. About 70% of the 
mobile connections in India and China are on 2G networks, with poten-
tially limited mobile Internet capabilities. Any visitor to China can tell you 
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how hellishly slow Internet speeds are, and that it is impossible to access 
Gmail in China.
With the exception of China, the majority of Internet content and ser-
vices consumed in Asia’s developing countries originates from outside the 
country. This means that foreign language capability, rare in many coun-
tries, is necessary to use the Internet.
While deep digital divide now exists between Asia and the advanced 
world, and between Asian countries, too many of Asia’s non-democratic 
governments are imposing restrictions on freedom of the Internet. Only 
two Asian countries, Japan and the Philippines, are classified as having 
Internet freedom, out of the 15 Asian countries covered in a Freedom 
House report.30 China was the worst abuser of Internet freedom in this 
report that surveyed 65 countries globally, representing 88% of the world’s 
Internet user population. Other notorious cases in Asia were Vietnam, 
Pakistan, Thailand and Myanmar.
“Cyber sovereignty” is one of the high priorities of Chinese President 
Xi Jinping, as netizens are now prosecuted with “unprecedented” inten-
sity for their offending content. There would be 84 netizens in Chinese 
jails as of September 2015, according to Reporters Without Borders. Xi 
has declared that the Internet has become the main battlefield for public 
opinion struggle. The Chinese Communist Party propaganda department 
and other agencies employ thousands of people to monitor, censor and 
manipulate content. China is also a major global source of cyberattacks.
Vietnam is another country classified as “not free”, and is one of the 
world’s worst jailers of bloggers. And since Thailand’s military coup in 2014, 
harassment and arrests of Internet bloggers and users has skyrocketed.
AsiA’s AppAlling HuMAn rigHts
One of the hallmarks of a middle-class society should be the protection of 
human rights by sound legislation and their fair enforcement by the 
authorities. Nowhere in this world can you find a perfect situation for 
human rights, most notably in the US, that eternal preacher of human 
rights. Most regrettably, many people in positions of power will exploit 
this power by abusing the human rights of weaker people. And when it 
comes to human rights, Asia has never been a beacon.31,32,33
Asia has of course the notorious case of North Korea, the most repres-
sive country in the region. A United Nations Commission of Inquiry in 
2014 found that the North Korean regime practices extermination, mur-
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der, enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape, forced abortions and other 
sexual violence. North Korea also has secret gulags for opponents of the 
regime.
As appalling as the case of North Korea might be, what is perhaps most 
disturbing is the lack of meaningful progress, and indeed the recent regres-
sion, in human rights in Asia’s most dynamic economies. Political scien-
tists imagine that human rights would improve in tandem with economic 
development and prosperity. In today’s Asia, however, there are many 
grounds for disappointment.
It is true that Chinese citizens enjoy a much broader range of freedoms 
than they did just a few decades ago, especially under the regime of Mao 
Zedong. The Chinese can travel and study overseas, have relative freedom 
of movement within their country and have access to the Internet, despite 
its censorship. But this authoritarian state, which has always employed 
repression to maintain its grip on power, has only ramped up its repression 
under the regime of President Xi Jinping. Indeed, as China’s economy and 
society have become more sophisticated, so have the instruments of 
human rights abuse and repression. Chinese citizens now talk about China 
becoming more and more like North Korea, a country they despise.
The most important policy initiative of President Xi has been his anti- 
corruption campaign. Rampant corruption on an industrial scale has been 
perhaps the greatest abuse of the Chinese Communist Party, and President 
Xi believes that this is a major threat to the Communist Party’s rule. But 
as laudable as the anti-corruption campaign may seem, those accused and 
prosecuted are rarely being given a fair trial. Most observers believe that Xi 
is using the anti-corruption campaign as a ruse to eliminate his political 
enemies. At the same time, civil society groups that expose corruption are 
invariably put in jail and prosecuted themselves.
More generally, Xi has launched a widespread crackdown on lawyers, 
activists, journalists and civil society groups who are seen as a threat to 
the government. Torture of detainees remains widespread. The treat-
ment of Nobel-prize winner Liu Xiaobo, who was denied potentially life-
saving treatment, is testimony to how badly opponents of the regime can 
be treated. Forced confessions on the television, including by foreigners, 
are now increasingly common. While these confessions are seen as an 
obvious sham, they contribute to an atmosphere of fear of the Communist 
Party authorities. Censorship of the Internet and other media is intensify-




Beijing has also been spreading its net beyond its borders in the search 
for threats to the Communist Party’s grip on power. Five Hong Kong 
booksellers who were selling material critical of China were abducted to 
mainland China in 2015. This is just one example of the steady encroach-
ment of the Communist Party on Hong Kong’s freedoms, following the 
territory’s “Umbrella Revolution” movement. The government success-
fully pressured Thailand to repatriate Chinese Uighur men back to China 
and also pressured Kenya to send some alleged Taiwanese criminals to 
China.
Freedom of religion is under even greater threat, with the campaign 
against Christianity intensifying through the removal of crosses from 
churches and the demolition of some churches in Zhejiang Province, the 
heartland of Chinese Christianity. Members of Falun Gong and other sects 
continue to be harassed and punished, while Tibetans and Uighurs con-
tinue to suffer from discrimination, repression, human rights abuses and 
restrictions on personal movement.
China’s noxious attitude toward human rights is also evident at the UN 
Human Rights Council, as the pressure group Human Rights Watch has 
argued, where “China continues to act as a spoiler, blocking greater scru-
tiny of human rights situations in other countries, including Belarus, Iran, 
North Korea, Syria, and Ukraine.”
But what is perhaps most disheartening about China’s human rights 
situation is the relative silence on the matter by Western governments. 
They prefer to do profitable business with China, while only paying lip 
service to human rights.
Vietnam’s trajectory is often compared with China’s. And although it 
started its economic rise sometime after China, it has enjoyed similar rapid 
economic growth and poverty reduction, thanks to exports and foreign 
direct investment. But Vietnam is also similar to China in that human 
rights are not improving either. In the words of Human Rights Watch, 
Vietnam’s human rights are “dismal”.
The Vietnamese Communist government places great restrictions on 
freedom of speech, opinion, press, association and religion. The state has 
firm control over the media, the judiciary, and political and religious insti-
tutions. As in China, the government has been cracking down on indepen-
dent writers, bloggers and rights activists seen as threatening to the ruling 
Communist Party.
Malaysia and Thailand are Asia’s two great disappointments when it 
comes to human rights. Both have enjoyed great economic growth, 
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achieved middle-income status and virtually eliminated extreme poverty. 
But both are now mired in middle-income traps and political crises, with 
human rights sadly deteriorating.
Malaysia’s respect for human rights has been “plummeting”, in the 
words of Human Rights Watch, as the crackdown on human rights defend-
ers, activists, political opposition figures and journalists intensifies. And 
yet, Malaysian citizens have every reason to protest against the govern-
ment. A government-owned investment fund, 1Malaysian Development 
Berhad (1MDB), whose board of advisors is chaired by Prime Minister 
Najib, has been severely tainted by a scandal involving allegations of mas-
sive corruption.
In February 2015, the Malaysian Federal Court upheld the conviction 
and five-year sentence of Anwar Ibrahim, a leading opposition figure, on 
sodomy charges. This “politically motivated prosecution and jailing” (in 
the words of the US State Department) is widely perceived as merely an 
attempt to weaken Malaysia’s political opposition, at a time when the rul-
ing United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) is progressively losing 
its grip on power. In October 2015, the United Nations Working Group 
on Arbitrary Detention determined that Anwar was being arbitrarily 
detained and demanded his immediate release and reinstatement of his 
political rights.
Thailand has never been a paragon of virtue for human rights. But 
things took a giant turn for the worse in May 2014, following a military 
coup. Thailand is now in the grip of deepening authoritarianism, as free-
dom of assembly, expression, association and the press are under assault. 
The lese majeste (insulting the monarchy) law is now subject to increas-
ingly harsh and arbitrary enforcement.
Indians are proud of having the world’s largest democracy, an active 
civil society, vibrant media and independent judiciary. But in many respects 
human rights are simply lousy in India, and they are not getting any better 
under the administration of Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
Muslims and Christians have been under attack from extreme right- 
wing Hindus, and the government has been doing very little in their 
defense. Indeed, leaders of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have 
made inflammatory remarks against minorities. Many artists, writers and 
scientists have returned national honors in protest at the climate of grow-
ing intolerance. Minorities like Dalits and tribal groups are also subject to 
discrimination and violence. Violence against women, especially rape and 
murder, continues to run at epidemic proportions.
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Freedom of expression by civil society groups and the media who criti-
cize the government has also been under threat from authorities. Human 
rights defenders face arbitrary arrests and detentions. According to the US 
State Department, some of India’s most significant human rights prob-
lems are “police and security force abuses, including extrajudicial killings, 
torture, and rape”.
In Japan, extreme politeness, courtesy and kindness are the face of the 
country that most visitors see and appreciate so much. But there are other 
sides of Japan which are dark and sinister. This includes many shameful 
acts and practices which were highlighted by the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee (HRC) in 2014.34
For example, there is “widespread racist discourse against members of 
minority groups, such as Koreans, Chinese or Burakumin, inciting hatred 
and discrimination against them”. Foreign trainees and technical interns 
are the subject of “a large number of reports of sexual abuse, labour- 
related deaths and conditions that could amount to forced labour”. And 
“a large number of persons with mental disabilities are subject to involun-
tary hospitalization.”
It is of course true that obnoxious behavior exists in all countries. But it 
is the role of the state to legislate against such behavior and to enforce that 
legislation. The state should promote attitudes of tolerance, respect and 
openness. It should not be complicit in abuses of human rights. Unfortunately, 
the HRC notes that the Japanese government has “not made any progress 
to establish a consolidated national human rights institution”.
The HRC had stern comments to make about one of the great trage-
dies of modern times, the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. This is now 
widely regarded as a man-made disaster, not a natural disaster, as a Japanese 
parliamentary commission argued convincingly. The HRC is concerned 
that former residents have no choice but to return to highly contaminated 
areas because of “the high threshold of exposure level” that the govern-
ment set in Fukushima, as well as the decision to cancel some of the evacu-
ation areas.
The committee also expressed serious concern about the Japanese gov-
ernment’s contradictory position regarding the sexual slavery practices 
against “comfort women” by the Japanese military during wartime, as well 
as a lack of effective remedies available to them as victims of past human 
rights violations.
As Asia’s most mature democracy, and a country sitting in the midst of 
great economic and political power transitions, Japan should not treat the 
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HRC’s report lightly. Its traditional approach of stonewalling is no longer 
viable. The HRC noted that many of its previous recommendations have 
not been implemented.
HAppiness And AsiA’s Middle ClAss
As Asia aspires to realize a middle-class society, it is important for policy-
makers to bear in mind that happiness and well-being are the most impor-
tant measures of societal progress, not GDP alone. Disappointingly, most 
Asian countries score relatively poorly in the World Happiness Report35 
compared with North America, Western Europe and Latin America.36
Within Asia, Southeast Asia is doing better than East Asia, which is 
ahead of South Asia. And while happiness has improved in Southeast and 
East Asia over the past decade, it has declined in South Asia. Moreover, 
happiness in Asia is always not well correlated with GDP per capita. In 
other words, some advanced countries score poorly, while other less 
advanced countries do quite well.
Singapore is Asia’s most happy country, but is ranked only 26th in the 
world. Then Thailand (32nd) and Malaysia (42nd) come in well ahead of 
the more prosperous Japan (51st), Korea (55th) and Hong Kong (71st). 
Other Southeast Asian countries are further down the list—the Philippines 
72nd, Indonesia 81st and Vietnam 94th. While from South Asia, Pakistan 
ranks 80th, Bhutan 97th, Nepal 99th, Bangladesh 110th, Sri Lanka 120th 
and India 122nd. The case of China, ranked 79th, is particularly interest-
ing. While China has enjoyed sharply growing per capita income over the 
past 25 years, happiness fell steadily from 1990 until about 2005, before 
since recovering to 1990 levels. Falling happiness is attributed to rising 
unemployment and fraying social safety nets.
Southeast Asia’s positive edge was confirmed in a Gallup poll asking 
people if they experienced positive emotions the previous day, as Indonesia, 
the Philippines and Thailand come in at 12th, 13th and 14th in the world, 
way ahead of all other Asian countries.37 Much further down the list are 
China (31st), Japan (60th), India (78th) and Korea (95th). In another 
initiative, the Gallup-Healthways global well-being index,38 four Southeast 
Asian countries, Myanmar, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, are 
ranked in the top 50, while Japan is 92nd, Korea 117th, Hong Kong 
120th and China 127th.
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In the OECD Better Life Index,39 the Japanese and Koreans are less 
satisfied with their lives than the OECD average, with particularly low 
scores for work–life balance and self-reported health.
In short, money doesn’t necessarily buy happiness. Southeast Asian 
countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand 
perform much better than wealthier countries of Northeast Asia.
While happiness and well-being are important life objectives, they can 
also be important for the economy and society. Happy people with high 
well-being are healthier, more productive and creative, and more resilient 
in the face of crises and shocks. And happy members of society can con-
tribute to a rich civil society. Countries like Australia, Canada, Denmark, 
Germany, Sweden and the US highlight the importance of happiness and 
well-being to all aspects of economic, social and political life.
Asian government, business and civil society leaders must pay much 
greater attention to happiness and well-being, and not just economic 
growth. Indeed, as Asian societies are now maturing, happiness and well- 
being can provide a new path to economic prosperity, as well as social 
stability and harmony.
tHe rise of AsiA’s super riCH
While the majority of Asians have barely escaped the clutches of extreme 
poverty, a super-rich elite is also blossoming. We cannot resist saying a few 
words on them.
As a delightful introduction to this bizarre world, nothing beats Kevin 
Kwan’s novel “Crazy Rich Asians”.40 It recounts the lives of three super- 
rich, pedigreed Chinese families. And the gossip, backbiting and scheming 
that occurs when the heir to one of the most massive fortunes in Asia 
brings home his American-born Chinese (ABC) girlfriend to the wedding 
of the season.
When Rachel Chu agrees to spend the summer in Singapore with her 
boyfriend, Nicholas Young, she envisions a humble family home, long 
drives to explore the island, and quality time with the man she might one 
day marry. What she doesn’t know is that Nick’s family home happens to 
look like a palace, and that she’ll spend more time in private jets than cars. 
And with one of Asia’s most eligible bachelors on her arm, Rachel might 
well have a target on her back.
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Kwan introduces us to many of the super-rich stereotypes of the Asian 
century in this story of over-the-top consumerism, social excesses and jet- 
setting lives of the wealthiest and most snobbish families in Asia.
Here is a short sampling: Chuppies (Chinese yuppies); Hennessy- 
swirling, cigar-puffing fat-cat Asian tycoons; Hong Kong fashionista men; 
marriage-scheming mothers, aunts and in-laws; fortune-hunting 
“Taiwanese tornadoes”; Henwees (high-net worth individuals); bitchy 
shopaholic parties; penny-pinching old-money overseas Asians; spend-
thrift new-money mainlander Chinese; and an Indian Singaporean who 
sends her saris back to New Delhi to be specially cleaned.
This is a story that reveals many of the social forces and tensions in Asia’s 
rapidly changing society. Old money and new money. Overseas Chinese 
and Mainland Chinese. Generational divide between young Westernized 
Asians and their traditional parents. Snobbery attached to Asians who speak 
English with British rather than American accents. And more.
This is the world of at least some of Asia’s super rich, the 412 Asian 
billionaires, who make up one-quarter of the world’s 1694 billionaires.41 
Asia’s leading super rich are China’s Wang Jianlin (18th in the world), 
Hong Kong’s Li Ka-shing (20th), Hong Kong’s Lee Shau Kee (31st), 
China’s Jack Ma (33rd) and India’s Mukesh Ambani (36th).
Already China has 251 billionaires, placing it second on the global 
league table after the US, with India placed 6th and Hong Kong 8th. 
Even relatively poorer Asian countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand 
and the Philippines have their fair share of billionaires.
Even if Asia’s super rich may not be a source of spiritual and cultural 
inspiration, they are certainly becoming drivers of the global economy, 
especially through their purchases of luxury products and international 
real estate, business and financial investments, and their children who 
attend international universities, sometimes showing off their Ferraris.
Indeed, China has been the engine of the global luxury goods market for 
a number of years now, especially for products, accessories and hard luxury 
items like watches and jewelry. Chinese consumers bought the largest por-
tion of global luxury purchases (31%), followed by Americans (24%) and 
Europeans (18%), according to one survey.42 Chinese shoppers spend far 
more abroad than in mainland China, which only accounts for 20% of their 
global purchases. In 2000, Japanese consumers accounted for more than 
one-quarter of global luxury purchases, but now they represent only 10%.
But as some Asians have become super rich, Asia has also become the 
center of rich country problems. For example, the world is in the midst of 
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a diabetes epidemic, as this condition has risen astronomically these past 
three decades. More than 60% of the world’s 382 million people who suf-
fer from diabetes come from Asia.43 Indeed, China has some 114 million 
adults with diabetes, and another 493 million with prediabetes, while 
India has 65 million with diabetes. And with obesity rising in Singapore, 
it is estimated that the city state will have half a million people with diabe-
tes by 2020 and that this will rise to 1 million by 2050.
* * *
Asia’s rapid economic development has driven a dramatic improvement in 
Asian lives. But Asia is still suffering from stunted economic development, 
and the notion of middle-class Asia still remains a myth. In the following 
chapters, we examine the seven challenges that we believe are crucial for over-
coming stunted economies and societies, and realizing an Asian century.
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CHAPTER 4
Getting Better Value Out of Global Value 
Chains
“Where do you think that your iPhone was made?” This is my favorite 
question to my economics students at Tokyo’s Sophia University.
They all respond “China!” But the situation is much more complex 
than that, as Chinese professor Yuqing Xing has demonstrated.1 The 
iPhone is assembled in China by Taiwanese companies Foxconn and 
Pegatron. But this assembly process accounts for less than 5% of the 
iPhone’s manufacturing value added.
In reality, the iPhone is produced through a “global value chain” (GVC) 
which starts with its conception and design in California. High- tech com-
ponents come from Japan, Korea, Germany, the US and elsewhere, with 
Japanese-made components contributing the biggest share. The iPhone is 
then assembled in China, while California manages the marketing and 
branding. One consequence of this supply “fragmentation” is that Apple 
directly employs only 63,000 of the more than 750,000 people globally 
involved in designing, selling, manufacturing and assembling its products.2
Many of us still harbor a nationalistic perception of how products are 
manufactured. But this does not make any sense in today’s world of GVCs. 
Very few products are still made in one country. Most products are thus 
made “in the world”, with different parts and components coming from 
different countries, and different production processes located in different 
countries. Overall, GVCs would account for some 80% of global trade, 
and they are much more developed in Asia than in other regions.3
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A similar GVC story can be told for clothing, much of which today is 
manufactured in China, Bangladesh, Vietnam and Cambodia. For exam-
ple, a jacket which is designed and sold in the US for $425, but manufac-
tured in China, might have manufacturing costs representing only 9% of 
the total sales value.4 US companies would account for much of the other 
91%, through their intellectual property; services like retail, logistics and 
banking; and profits. In other words, products like jackets, which seem to 
be manufactured goods, are substantially packages of intangible, 
knowledge- based services. In fact, all manufactured goods embody large 
shares of services.
There are many other surprising examples of GVCs, some of which 
highlight the role of Japan in the engine room of today’s GVCs. Japanese 
high-tech parts and components account for some 35% of the value of 
Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner and 21% of the 777 widebody jets.5 And as 
China is now celebrating the production of its first big passenger plane, 
the C919, which is in the testing stage, the reality is that many technolo-
gies, systems and parts are supplied by foreign companies, like the engines 
which come from a joint venture between America’s General Electric and 
France’s Safran.
While many Japanese manufacturers may have slipped off the global 
radar screen, they are indispensable linchpins in Asia’s GVCs, as Japan 
accounts for 20–60% of the world’s production of semiconductors, optical 
components, image sensors, microcontrollers, display drivers and silicon 
wafers.6 And many of these parts and components are made by a new wave 
of small and medium Japanese companies (“hidden champions”), rather 
than big conglomerates.7
Even the explosives used by the Islamic State (IS) would be produced 
through a complex GVC. Conflict Armament Research (CAR) examined 
more than 700 components used by IS forces to manufacture improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs), identified their provenance and traced their 
chains of custody.8 CAR identified 50 commercial entities and 20 coun-
tries involved in the GVC for components used by IS forces to construct 
IEDs. Turkey was the most important supplier, with 13 companies 
involved in the GVC supplying chemical precursors, containers, detonat-
ing cord, cables and wires.
India was the second most important supplier of components as seven 
Indian companies manufactured most of the detonators, detonating cord 
and safety fuses. Companies headquartered in Japan, Switzerland and the 
US manufactured the microcontrollers, signal relays and transistors used 
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in the devices. The CAR report did not find any evidence that there were 
direct sales companies from these countries to the IS. Rather, there were 
sales to other companies, with the parts and components finding their way 
to the IS through subsequent transactions.
In sum, international trade and production of manufactured goods 
(even explosives) mainly take place through GVCs. Production is frag-
mented into different phases, which are located in different countries 
according to their comparative advantages. GVCs are usually driven by 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) through their business decisions, and a 
large share of international trade and investment now takes place within 
MNEs’ networks of affiliates.
GVCs have been a major factor driving Asia’s economic development. 
But to continue its rapid development, Asia must get better value out of 
the region’s GVCs, and better manage their many risks and challenges, as 
we will discuss throughout this chapter.
GVCs are however a relatively new phenomenon, which took off dur-
ing the 1980s and 1990s. When Japan was developing rapidly from the 
1950s to the 1970s, the manufacturing landscape was fundamentally dif-
ferent. Most manufacturing activity took place under one factory roof, 
and in one country. So how did GVCs come about?
Birth of GVCs
Politics played an initial role in the development of Asia’s GVCs. In 1978, 
Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping visited Japan, the first-ever visit of a 
Chinese state leader.9 Deng took Japan’s bullet train (“shinkansen”) from 
Tokyo to Osaka, and was stunned by Japan’s technological development 
and modernity.
Deng visited a Panasonic TV factory in Osaka and queried the company 
founder Konosuke Matsushita, “Mr Matsushita, you are called the god of 
management in Japan. Would you be willing to help us advance the mod-
ernization of China?” The founder immediately responded, “We will do 
whatever we can to contribute to the modernization of China”.10
Throughout the 1980s Matsushita transferred technology, trained 
Chinese workers and otherwise helped China modernize its industry 
through 150 separate projects. China learned how Matsushita made every-
thing from electric irons to transformers and semiconductors. In return, 
Matsushita earned the Chinese government’s goodwill and gained unpar-
alleled expertise in manufacturing and selling in the Chinese market.
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Panasonic’s investment in China was just the beginning of the wave of 
Japanese investment in emerging Asia that was crucial to the establishment 
of the region’s GVCs. Another impulse to the creation of GVCs occurred 
in 1985 when Western leaders pushed Japan to allow the yen to rise via the 
“Plaza Accord”. As the higher yen adversely affected the competitiveness 
of exports, Japanese companies began relocating labor-intensive parts of 
their manufacturing industry elsewhere in Asia, especially to East and 
Southeast Asia.
Japanese companies now have some $360 billion worth of investments 
in Asia, with $110 billion in China and $50 billion in each of Singapore 
and Thailand. And as Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan climbed 
the development ladder, they also offshored large slabs of their labor- 
intensive manufacturing industry to Southeast Asia and China. Indeed, 
Japan’s investments in China are now well exceeded by those of Taiwan 
and Hong Kong, with Hong Kong being by far the largest single source 
since China opened to foreign investment in the late 1970s. Today China 
might seem like an economic giant. But just a few decades ago, it was very 
much an economic pygmy compared with Hong Kong, Japan and Taiwan.
There were many other factors that combined to facilitate the develop-
ment of GVCs. Seeing the success of export-oriented policies in Japan, 
Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, Southeast Asian countries and 
China opened their markets to attract investment and stimulate trade. 
Governments offered great incentives like tariff free imports, and tax con-
cessions, especially through special economic zones and export processing 
zones where loose policies with regard to labor rights and environmental 
standards were usually the norm. And China’s membership in 2001 led to 
an acceleration of GVCs in the 2000s.
Declining transport costs also played a role, as it became less costly to 
ship components from one location to another. The falling cost of pas-
senger aviation made it easier for managers and engineers to travel 
between locations. Chinese investors can easily afford a day-trip to visit 
their factories in Cambodia. Indeed, the close location of a large number 
of Asia economies of diverse levels of development and comparative 
advantages provided an opportunity to tie these economies together 
through GVCs.
Rapid progress in information technology has provided an essential 
tool for the coordination of what have become very complex GVCs. The 
challenge of managing Asia’s GVCs is evident from the Apple’s China 
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GVC which in 2015 included 198 companies and 759 subsidiaries, 336 
(44.2%) of which were located in China.11 It is no surprise that GVC man-
agement should be one of the most challenging and enriching jobs in Asia 
today.
So today, East and Southeast Asia is criss-crossed by a dense network of 
GVCs for a wide range of manufacturing products, notably electronics, 
automobiles, machinery and clothing. Each country specializes in tasks 
according to their comparative advantages. Hong Kong and Singapore 
tend to specialize in logistics and finance, and be home to corporate 
regional headquarters. Japan and Korea focus on branded product designs 
and high-tech components, and Malaysia and Thailand specialize in mid- 
range manufacturing. Thailand has become a regional manufacturing hub 
for the automobile industry in particular, being used by companies like 
Toyota, Mazda and Ford. China specializes in product assembly and 
lower-skilled manufacturing, although it is now graduating to higher 
value-added activities. Bangladesh and Cambodia are very active in cloth-
ing manufacture, while Indonesia and Mongolia are rich in natural 
resources.
This phenomenon has come to be known as “Factory Asia”, and China 
is often referred to as the “Factory of the World”. But since foreign invest-
ment in China’s GVCs is still such as important motor of China’s develop-
ment, trade by MNEs still accounts for some 45% of China’s total trade.12 
This may be down from the peak of 59% in 2005, as Chinese companies 
are becoming more active in international trade. However, MNEs remain 
a very important feature of China’s GVCs and economy more generally. In 
a similar vein, the foreign value-added share in exports is above 30% in 
Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam.13
East and Southeast Asian countries participating in GVCs have expe-
rienced very rapid economic growth, poverty reduction and rising 
incomes. GVCs have also been empowering for women, who dominate 
workforces in factories for garments and textiles, electronics and com-
mercial horticulture. But not all Asian countries have managed to inte-
grate into GVCs. Much of South Asia is missing the GVC boat, and 
being left behind, although India has been very active in the develop-
ment of GVCs for IT-based business services, something we will discuss 
later.
All things considered, how useful are GVCs for countries wishing to get 
on a fast track to economic development?
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GVCs, a fast traCk to DeVelopment
The advent of GVCs can indeed offer a fast track to development. It is no 
longer necessary for one country to be capable of every phase in the pro-
duction of, for example, an automobile or a television, as was the case 
when Japan and Korea were in the midst of their fast growth periods. 
Today, it is only necessary to perform one stage or task in the GVC to be 
able to hook onto new development opportunities. And small and medium 
enterprises have greater opportunities to participate in GVCs, by export-
ing just one part or component.
For example, the Chinese town of Qiaotou, once a mere farming vil-
lage, has made its mark on Asia’s GVCs by becoming the “button capital 
of the world”. According to one estimate, Qiaotou’s 700 family-run fac-
tories would produce over 60% of the world’s clothing buttons, and 80% 
of the world’s zippers, as it manufactures 15 billion buttons and 200 mil-
lion meters of zippers a year. But Qiaotou is not the only example. China’s 
industrial heartland is dotted with towns that specialize in all manner of 
things like socks, toothbrushes and cigarette lighters!
In a similar vein, Cambodia has hooked onto Asia’s GVC for garment 
manufacture and export, and has thus joined the “Olympians of growth”, 
according to the World Bank.14 Following the UN-sponsored national 
elections in 1993, the Cambodian government opened up the economy to 
international trade and investment.15 This enabled the country to attract 
enormous flows of foreign direct investment (FDI), coming mainly from 
China, Malaysia, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam and Japan. Cambodia’s 
stock of inward FDI in Cambodia increased from $125m in 1993 to 
$14.8bn in 2015, an increase from 5% to 82% of the country’s 
GDP. External factors like rising labor costs in China, the 2011 floods and 
political instability in Thailand, and the desire of Japanese investors to 
diversify their investment destinations have also driven inflows of FDI.
Cambodia’s economy has grown at an annual rate of 7.7% over the past 
two decades, making it the world’s sixth fastest growing economy, with 
exports contributing more than 50% to Cambodia’s growth over the past 
decade. The garment sector accounts for three-quarters of merchandise 
exports, and has benefited from preferential access to US and EU markets, 
and relocation of production from China as the latter’s wage costs have 
risen.
Thanks to a strong economy, the share of Cambodia’s population living 
in extreme poverty (less than $1.90 a day) fell from 30% in 1994 to 2% in 
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2012 (those living in moderate poverty—less than $3.10 a day—fell from 
67% to 22% over the same period).16 And Cambodia’s women, who 
account for 85% of the 600,000 employees in the garment sector, have 
benefited in particular from the sector’s relatively higher wages. This is an 
astonishing achievement for a country that was torn apart by a horrifically 
genocidal war just a few decades ago that killed one-quarter of its 
population.
But Cambodia remains one of Asia’s very poorest countries, with a 
GDP per capita of only $3483, well below its neighbors of Laos and 
Vietnam, and the lowest in Southeast Asia. And despite the undeniable 
benefits of hooking onto the GVC for garments, Cambodia faces the risk 
of getting stuck producing low value-added garments forever, unless it can 
upgrade its economy.
Cambodia faces daunting challenges in attracting higher quality FDI 
and in climbing the GVC to higher value-added activities. For one, its very 
successful garment sector is basically an enclave, with a few linkages to the 
rest of the economy. Domestic value added in the garment sector is low, 
with local workers undertaking merely “cut, sew and trim” functions. 
Higher value-added activities, like design, branding and marketing, are 
undertaken by MNEs like H&M, Inditex, Gap, Banana Republic, Nike, 
Levi, C&A, Puma, Old Navy, Adidas and Calvin Klein.
Most importantly, the country is still suffering from the lingering 
impact of the massive loss of skilled Cambodians and severe disruption to 
the country’s education system suffered during the 1975 to 1979 Khmer 
Rouge period, when the country’s educated elite was decimated.
“Cambodia’s labour force is still characterised by low education and 
low skills. The average educational attainment of the labour force is cur-
rently at primary education level or even lower,” says Shandre Thangavelu, 
a professor at Australia’s University of Adelaide. “To continue to reap the 
benefits of FDI, it will be necessary to make major investments in school 
education, and technical and vocational training, as well as infrastructure 
and public institutions.”17
Improving human capital is a long-term endeavor. But as Mr. 
Thangavelu says: “Without strong interventions to develop human capi-
tal, there is a high possibility of the economy becoming caught in a ‘low- 
skill, low-wage’ trap in the near future.”18
Very poor governance is also holding the country back from realizing 
its great potential, as Cambodia is one of the world’s most corrupt coun-
tries. It is ranked 156 out of the 176 countries in Transparency 
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International’s Corruption Perceptions Index,19 and 112 out of 113 coun-
tries in the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index.20 Cambodia’s gar-
ment workers also suffer from widespread labor rights abuses like forced 
overtime, pregnancy discrimination, child labor and anti-union practices, 
as NGO Human Rights Watch has reported.21 The Cambodian govern-
ment makes little effort to enforce labor laws, while big Western apparel 
brands, whose garments are produced in Cambodia, turn a blind eye. 
Chinese-owned garment factories are reportedly among the worst offend-
ers when it comes to labor rights abuses. Cambodia is also a hotspot for 
human trafficking, according to the US State Department.
The case of Cambodia shows that when a country is at the rock-bottom 
of the global development ladder, as Cambodia was, getting just a few 
things right (like its liberal trade and investment regime) can enable a 
country to join GVCs and stimulate rapid growth, and poverty reduction. 
But the case of Cambodia also shows that to continue developing, and 
extracting greater value out of GVCs, it is necessary to improve human 
capital, the quality of governance and infrastructure. Cambodia’s develop-
mental journey has barely begun.
hookinG on to GVCs
All Asian countries, including Cambodia, could do much more to exploit 
the possibilities of GVCs by attracting more and better-quality foreign 
investment.
Since GVC participation by low- and middle-income countries is mainly 
driven by investment from MNEs, it is critical to foster an investment- 
friendly ecosystem. This means good transport, logistics and other infra-
structure, human capital, open trade and investment policies, intellectual 
property protection, minimal red tape especially for customs procedures 
and strong institutions.
But the narrative is all too often the same in Asia. A small group of 
countries are world leaders, while the rest trail off into the distance. For 
example, only Singapore, Hong Kong and Japan make it into the world 
top 20 in the World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index,22 while only the 
same three countries and Taiwan score a top 20 ranking World Economic 
Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index,23 and the same three countries 
and Korea are classed in the top 20 of the World Justice Project’s Rule of 
Law index.24 Outside of North East Asia, other Asian countries score 
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poorly in the OECD’s PISA study, which assesses the education perfor-
mance of 15 year old students.25
At the same time, China, India, Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines 
and, to a lesser extent, Malaysia have simply enormous barriers to foreign 
investment, which greatly restrict their capacity to participate in Asia’s 
GVCs. While Japan may have low formal barriers to foreign investment, 
this unique country’s business and social practices have proved a virtual 
insurmountable barrier to investors.
This means that Japan, which has done so much to create GVCs in 
other Asian countries, has virtually no GVC footprint at home. Japan’s 
economy is losing so much through its inability to attract GVC invest-
ments at home. Indeed, it is a vast outlier compared with other advanced 
countries like the US, Germany, UK and France, which are enormous 
overseas investors, but which also receive large inward flows of investment. 
In Japan’s case, the stock of inward foreign investment is less than 15% of 
its stock of outward investment.26
Asia is in desperate need of a new boost to its GVC-driven develop-
ment, and trade and investment liberalization offers one path forward. But 
the arrival of Donald Trump in the presidency of the US, and his with-
drawal of America from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) will only 
undermine the prospects for trade and investment liberalization in Asia.
asian traDe anD inVestment liBeralization
Opening economies to international trade and investment has played a key 
role in the development of Asia’s GVCs. Some countries have unilaterally 
opened their economies. For example, Hong Kong and Singapore have 
the world’s most open economies in contrast to most of their trading part-
ners. This is one reason why they are Asia’s most advanced economies. 
China and indeed most Asian economies have made partial openings of 
their economies through special economic zones. They can be an effective 
way of attracting international business and starting liberalization, but 
such zones also result in unbalanced, distorted economies.
Countries like China have liberalized their trade and investment as they 
joined the World Trade Organization (China joined in 2001), while 
longer- term members of the WTO/GATT have opened markets during 
multilateral trade deals like the Uruguay Round. And India, Indonesia, 
Korea and Thailand liberalized trade and investment in response to finan-
cial crises, often under pressure from the IMF.
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Regional integration has also played a role. The Southeast Asian coun-
tries of ASEAN signed an ASEAN Free Trade Area agreement (AFTA) in 
1992, and this is now being transformed into an “ASEAN Economic 
Community”. The AFTA was also enhanced through a series of separate 
FTAs between ASEAN and six other regional countries, namely China, 
Japan, Korea, Australia, India and New Zealand. For its part, Taiwan has 
been virtually shut out of most Asian FTAs because of pressure from 
China, although Taiwan does have an FTA with Singapore, New Zealand, 
and in 2010 it did sign the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement 
with China. Taiwan is also pursuing a possible FTA with India.
Despite the apparent great success of Asia’s trade and investment poli-
cies, most Asian countries have relatively closed economies, according to 
the OECD’s FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index. Indeed, only 
Cambodia and Japan score better than the average for the advanced 
OECD countries. And the Philippines, Myanmar, China, Indonesia and 
India are highly closed to foreign investment, the key driver of GVCs.
In other words, there is much work that Asia needs to do to open its 
economies to trade and investment, and make the most of GVCs. In 
recent years, two separate sets of multilateral trade talks have offered the 
hope of a new wave of trade and liberalization in Asia, namely the TPP and 
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
trans-paCifiC partnership
The TPP negotiations were successfully concluded on 6 October 2015, 
but the US Congress never ratified the deal. And then in January 2017, to 
the dismay of the US business community, US President Trump withdrew 
the US from the TPP. This was after all a trade agreement designed by the 
US business community, for the benefit of the US business community, 
pushed onto allies and partners, and then rejected by a business man pres-
ident. Above all, the TPP was an important geopolitical initiative that 
would have enabled the US to set high standards for trade, investment 
and GVCs in twenty-first century Asia, something that no other country 
could do.
On the presidential campaign trail Trump declared the TPP “another 
disaster done and pushed by special interests who want to rape our coun-
try”. No trade and investment deal is perfect. They are the product of 
compromises between participating governments. But this is a great pity. 
The TPP was very much the right agreement for today’s world of GVCs 
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where companies from “headquarter economies” like the US, Japan and 
Korea create and design products, and then outsource the labor-intensive 
stages of manufacturing to “factory economies” like Southeast Asia or 
China.
The TPP went beyond mere trade liberalization and sought to establish 
a more seamless environment for trade and investment. It dealt with issues 
like services, electronic commerce, telecommunications, competition pol-
icy, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), intellectual property, government 
procurement, and transparency and anti-corruption. The concerns of US 
workers and environmental activists were also taken on board in labor and 
environment chapters. Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei made important 
commitments regarding freedom of association for trade unions, forced 
labor and human trafficking.
The TPP was economically very important. Its signatories were 
Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, New 
Zealand, Singapore, the US and Vietnam, which account for 40% of the 
world economy and one-quarter of world trade. The absence of China is 
often alleged to be a deliberate geopolitical ploy by the US.  In reality, 
China was invited to join the TPP trade talks, but declined. And China 
would have immense political difficulties signing up to the TPP’s chapters 
for labor rights and SOEs. While all countries including the US stood to 
gain substantially from the TPP, countries like Vietnam, Malaysia and 
Japan stood to gain the most through their promised market opening.
The great value of the TPP is evident in the efforts of governments 
from Japan, Australia, Singapore and others to try to convince the Trump 
administration to reconsider its objection to the TPP. The 11 remaining 
members of the TPP are now discussing the possibility of proceeding with 
the TPP without the US. It is far from clear that all 11 would be willing to 
proceed without the prospect of improved access to the large and lucrative 
US market. It is also far from clear that they will all be willing to sign up 
to the labor rights, SOE and environmental chapters without US 
pressure.
trump traDe poliCy
During the US presidential election campaign and before his inaugura-
tion, Donald Trump had much to say about US trade and investment with 
Asia. He accused China of raping the US. He threatened to label China a 
currency manipulator, to levy an import tariff of 45% on American imports 
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from China and to penalize companies that locate manufacturing invest-
ments in China rather than the US. But Trump’s rhetoric on trade policy 
has been evolving and softening from these defiantly protectionist mes-
sages. He is now emphasizing his support for both free and fair trade.
According to the President’s 2017 Trade Policy Agenda, America has 
not benefited from its trade deals over the past couple of decades due to 
the lack of reciprocity in trading relations. He complains that many coun-
tries have high trade barriers, while their companies can export freely to 
the US. Indeed, there is a widespread consensus that China has been flout-
ing world trade rules, stealing US intellectual property, conducting state- 
sponsored industrial espionage, buying up US companies while keeping its 
own markets closed, and discriminating against American companies 
based in China. In a retreat from a practice from the Cold War, the Trade 
Policy Agenda indicates that US will no longer turn a blind eye to unfair 
trade practices that disadvantage Americans for “putative geopolitical 
advantage”, something which make Japan and Korea shudder.
The US’ trade deficit is the lightning rod for Donald Trump. Indeed, 
the US has had a trade deficit since 1975, and today has the world’s largest 
trade deficit, some $763 billion in 2016. The US’ trade deficit with China 
of $347 billion represents almost half, with Japan ($69 billion) and Korea 
($28 billion) being among the other leading contributors.
Trump would now like US trade policy to focus on bilateral rather than 
multilateral deals. Through bilateral trade diplomacy an aggressive hege-
mon like the US can extract maximum benefits from its relatively weaker 
partners, and can also unilaterally sanction any partner that causes it dis-
pleasure, without having to bother with international dispute settlement 
mechanisms and the rule of law. Trump clearly has China, Japan and Korea 
in his sights. The new Trade Policy Agenda highlighted the tripling of the 
US’ trade deficit with China since it joined the WTO, and the doubling of 
its trade deficit with Korea following their free trade agreement.
On the occasion of their summit meeting in February 2017, Trump 
and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe agreed to establish a new 
framework for economic dialogue, which is expected to lead to a bilat-
eral free trade agreement. And when Trump met Chinese President Xi 
Jinping in April 2017, trade was also top of the agenda. Xi was very keen 
to avoid a trade war with its biggest trading partner as the two sides 
agreed to a rushed 100-day negotiation over some of their thorniest 
trade and investment disputes. But very little was achieved through this 
100-day deal. And at their June 2017 summit, President Trump told 
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Korean President Moon Jae-in that the US intended to renegotiate their 
free trade agreement.
While the US Treasury has backed off from Trump’s claims of Chinese 
currency manipulation, it did establish a “Monitoring List” of major trad-
ing partners that merit close attention to their currency practices, which 
includes four Asian economies, namely China, Japan, Korea and Taiwan.27 
Despite some softening in Trump’s trade rhetoric, there remains a strongly 
protectionist undercurrent, as Trump’s overriding trade policy goals are 
reducing the US’ bilateral trade deficits (notably with China, Japan and 
Korea), and bringing back manufacturing jobs to America. And Trump’s 
launching in August 2017 of an investigation into China’s alleged theft of 
US intellectual property has deeply troubled the Chinese government, 
and raised the specter of a possible trade war between China and the 
US. Trump has also threatened to disregard World Trade Organization 
dispute settlement rulings. While Trump is promising to shake up trade 
relations with Asia, China is actively seeking to foster trade within Eurasia 
through its Belt and Road Initiative.
With America’s retreat from the TPP, many commentators have argued 
that China will take over the lead of trade liberalization in Asia, notably 
through the RCEP. Nothing could be further from the truth!
reGional ComprehensiVe eConomiC partnership
The RCEP is a negotiation which seeks to create one single FTA between 
the ten ASEAN member states (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam) 
and those six countries which already have FTAs with ASEAN—Australia, 
China, India, Japan, Korea and New Zealand—the “Plus-6 countries”. 
The RCEP were launched in in November 2012, with the goal of com-
pleting the deal by end 2015.
On paper, the RCEP looks like a huge deal. It involves half the world’s 
population. The participating countries account for 30% of global GDP 
and about a quarter of world exports and foreign investment. It could 
thus become the world’s biggest trading bloc. The RCEP promises to cre-
ate one agreement building on the complex “noodle bowl” of agreements 
between ASEAN and the Plus-6 countries, and result in “significant 
improvements” over the existing agreements. The RCEP will also require 
agreements between those Plus-6 countries that don’t already have 
agreements.
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But the RCEP is proving much more difficult than envisaged. 
Rationalizing into one agreement the complex “noodle bowl” of agree-
ments between ASEAN and the Plus-6 countries is in fact very challeng-
ing, as many of these agreements are quite different from each other, 
having been negotiated at different points in time. Filling in the gaps 
between the Plus-6 agreements is also proving arduous, especially in light 
of the need for FTAs between China and India, China and Japan, and 
Korea and Japan, countries which have testy relations. And the RCEP is 
ultimately not very ambitious. Its main focus is on merchandise trade bar-
riers, rather than issues like services, investment, intellectual property and 
competition policy which are key to GVCs.
The reality is that the RCEP negotiation may never be concluded. And 
if it is, it will not result in any significant market opening. In fact, apart 
from Singapore and Hong Kong, Asian economies have never been 
thrilled about open markets for trade and investment. They are mainly 
concerned with serving the interests of their entrenched business elites. 
This is a great pity as Asia desperately needs much more open markets to 
continue its development.
In the press the RCEP was often billed as a China-led negotiation, 
which excludes the US, and which seeks to rival the US-led TPP, even 
though officially it is an ASEAN-led deal. But from all reports, the RCEP 
negotiations are suffering from a lack of strong leadership. Some countries 
like India and Indonesia are not enthusiastic at all about RCEP, and China 
shows no visible signs of wishing to further open its markets. The negoti-
ating deadline of end-2015 was initially extended to 2016, and now there 
is the mere hope that it will be finalized in 2017. Perhaps the best  indicator 
of the value of the RCEP is that US business is not interested in it at all.
In sum, Asia is in desperate need of a new wave of trade and invest-
ment liberalization to dynamize its GVCs as a motor of development. 
But the US’ abandonment of the TPP and adoption of a bilateral rather 
than multilateral approach means a great loss of leadership in trade and 
investment liberalization, and we can expect trade relationships between 
the US and Asia’s leading countries to be fractious. While many assume 
that China will be able to step into the empty gap left by the US, there 
is no evidence whatsoever of Chinese leadership in trade and invest-
ment diplomacy. Like Japan and Korea before it, China practices mer-





A major development challenge for Asia’s emerging economies is to 
increase their share of the value added in their GVC exports through func-
tions such as high-tech componentry, product design and branding. As 
the examples of the iPhone and the jacket at the beginning of this chapter 
highlight, all too often Asia’s emerging economies contribute only a minor 
share to their GVC exports, even if they have been increasing their value 
added since 2008.28 And perhaps the ultimate challenge is to become cor-
porate leaders of GVCs, rather than just following the lead of MNEs from 
advanced countries, which direct most of the GVCs in Asia today.
How can a country climb up the GVC and become a GVC leader? The 
bottom line is that Asia’s emerging economies need to develop their eco-
nomic, business and technological sophistication.
The very act of participating in GVCs facilitates knowledge and tech-
nology transfers. Local people who work in MNEs gain valuable experi-
ence and exposure to global best practices. Local companies who have 
supply contracts with multinationals also learn to comply with the global 
product standards. In other words, GVCs provide an opportunity for 
learning by doing, as knowledge can flow along GVCs and lay the founda-
tion for them to make a high value-added contribution to GVCs.
But experience shows that such passive upgrading may not take you a 
long way up the GVC. As in the case of Cambodia, all too often GVC 
activities can be an enclave that has very few linkages to the local economy. 
And for its part, Apple has been reluctant to involve many Chinese com-
panies in its GVC as suppliers of key components or as major assemblers 
of Apple products.29 The majority of Apple’s suppliers, even many of those 
located in China itself, are foreign companies, principally from US, Japan, 
Taiwan and Korea. Apple’s choice of supplier companies reflects their abil-
ity to deliver the highest quality in good time and at the negotiated price. 
This may reflect questions of trust related to business culture, as protec-
tion of intellectual property is notoriously weak in China.
At the same time, it is also true that China is in the midst of an impres-
sive process of technology catch-up. China has developed a strong niche 
in high-speed trains building on technology transfer from Japan. And 
e-commerce giant Alibaba has been an amazing success story. But many 
other successful Chinese companies, like Huawei, Xiaomi, Lenovo and 
ZTE, remain basically “copycat companies” which are now tackling the 
lower ends of markets occupied by advanced countries.
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Today, there is no government making greater efforts to climb Asia’s 
GVCs and get better value for its economy than China’s. It is keenly aware 
that its position as a low-cost producer is now being challenged by coun-
tries like Cambodia, India, Indonesia and Vietnam, while there is a yawn-
ing gap between China’s manufacturing capacities and those of Germany, 
Japan and the US, despite some isolated success stories.
It is also relevant that countries like Malaysia and Thailand, which have 
been successful participants in GVCs, have never managed to break out 
and become industrial and technological leaders themselves. Technology 
is also seen as a security issue by the Chinese government. It craves to have 
indigenous information technology and to not be dependent on American 
and other Western companies.
At this stage, China’s manufacturing industry is facing four major chal-
lenges—insufficient innovation, weakness in core technologies, excess 
energy consumption and severe pollution. This is why the Chinese gov-
ernment launched a “Made in China 2025” initiative which seeks to 
upgrade China from a manufacturing giant into a manufacturing power, 
building on earlier such initiatives.
While delivering the 2015 Annual Government Work Report, Chinese 
Premier Li Keqiang said, “We will implement the ‘Made in China 2025’ 
strategy, seek innovation-driven development, apply smart technologies, 
strengthen foundations, pursue green development and redouble our 
efforts to upgrade China from a manufacturer of quantity to one of qual-
ity”.30 The ultimate goal is to become the world’s leading manufacturer by 
2049, the hundredth anniversary of the foundation of the People’s 
Republic of China.
China’s efforts to ClimB GVCs
China has thus been pursuing various activities to acquire knowledge and 
technology to improve the sophistication of its economy, such as investing 
in domestic R&D, investing in foreign companies to acquire their technol-
ogy, promoting “innovation mercantilism”, practicing industrial espio-
nage and fostering entrepreneurship—all of which can play an important 




China has been ramping up its spending on R&D dramatically, with R&D 
averaging 20% annual growth between 2003 and 2013.31 China accounts 
now for about 20% of global spending on R&D, not too far behind the 
US’ 27%. China will likely overtake the US in the coming years, and 
become the world’s leading R&D nation. Indeed, China’s new 5-year plan 
promises that by 2020, R&D investment will account for 2.5% of gross 
domestic product, compared with 2.05% in 2014 (US spending on R&D 
represents 2.7% of GDP).32
Many questions are raised about the quality of China’s R&D spending 
which tends to favor large companies and high-profile prestige projects, 
rather than dynamic small companies and projects that would have more 
of an impact on the lives of Chinese citizens. But China is unquestionably 
on the road to becoming a science and technology powerhouse. China 
and India now together produce almost half of the world’s new under-
graduate science and engineering (S&E) degrees, the EU 12% and the US 
9%. The US, however, still produces more S&E doctoral degrees than 
China and India and remains the leader in S&E higher education, as well 
as the destination of choice for international students.
China “Innovation Mercantilism”
China has long practiced “innovation mercantilism”, a strategy that 
embraces a new kind of protectionist trade policy, to improve domestic 
innovation capacity and technology—even though it regularly contravenes 
its commitments under its membership of the WTO.33 This involves many 
things like subsidies and access to finance to keep production artificially 
cheap. This underpins its massive excess capacity across a wide range of 
industries. Although it is less of a problem today, for a long time China 
manipulated its exchange rate to enhance the competitiveness of its export 
and import-competing sectors.
China also uses the power of its market size to force MNEs to transfer 
technology to Chinese companies, to push them to go into joint ventures 
with Chinese companies, and to coerce require them into establishing 
research centers into China. For example, Apple has been coerced into 
establishing R&D centers in China. And in order to open motor vehicle 
factories in China, Ford had to enter into a joint venture with Chinese 
automobile producer Chang’an Motors. It was also required to open an 
 GETTING BETTER VALUE OUT OF GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS 
108 
R&D laboratory employing at least 150 Chinese engineers. Forced tech-
nology transfer was also how China became a leader in the high-speed 
train sector.
China has many restrictions on market access, such as for its semicon-
ductor market. The “Made in China 2025” initiative is targeting “40 per 
cent self-sufficiency in semiconductors by 2020, rising to 70 per cent by 
2025”. This would reduce Chinese imports of US semiconductors by half 
in 10 years and ultimately eliminate them entirely within 20 years.
The Chinese government introduced “indigenous innovation” policies 
explicitly designed to discriminate against foreign-owned companies in its 
enormous government procurement market. It has introduced security 
and industry rules, especially requirements for “secure and controllable” 
equipment, which effectively exclude foreign technology products.34
China’s Outward FDI
Over recent years, China has become a major outward investor, with flows 
averaging $120 billion a year over the past three years.35 A number of years 
ago, it was mainly investing in energy, natural resources and agricultural 
properties in Australia, Africa and Latin America. But now China’s invest-
ment is now increasingly targeting Western companies with technology, 
know-how and brands to enable it to climb further up the GVC.
Both the US and Europe have been receiving large inflows of Chinese 
investment. Some of the most important recent investments in the US 
have been Haier’s acquisition of GE’s appliances unit, Wanda’s purchase 
of Legendary Entertainment, the acquisition of Omnivision Technologies 
by a Chinese consortium and, in the automotive sector, Ningbo Joyson’s 
acquisition of Key Safety Systems.36
In Europe, Tencent bought Finland’s Supercell, Beijing Enterprises 
bought Germany’s EEW Energy from Waste operation, and ChemChina 
acquired Switzerland’s Syngenta, Italy’s Pirelli and Germany’s KraussMaffei 
Group. Fosun bought Germany’s Hauck & Aufhäuser Privatbank, Dalian 
Wanda acquired Britain’s yacht maker Sunseeker and Haitong bought 
Spain’s Banco Espirito Santo’s investment banking business.37
China has also reportedly been hiring German and Japanese industrial 
experts. And companies like Huawei, ZTE, Lenovo and Xiaomi have been 
buying patents through licensing deals and acquisitions.
But China’s accelerating purchases of Western companies is giving rise 
to many concerns by Western governments, and may not be a sustainable 
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strategy, even though the accumulated stock of Chinese investment 
remains modest for the moment. Among these many concerns are: the 
potential loss of core technologies and the impact that may have on the 
local economy; the lack of transparency of some Chinese investors; and the 
perceived political risks of accepting investments from state-owned com-
panies with close links to the Chinese Communist Party. Other concerns 
are that China’s own market remains relatively closed to foreign investors, 
and no foreign company would be allowed to buy critical infrastructure or 
core technologies in China.
More recently, the Chinese government has become concerned about 
the quality of some of its companies’ investments, especially at a time 
when it is concerned about controlling capital outflows. So in 2017, it 
began clamping down on some overseas investments by Chinese 
companies.
China’s Industrial Espionage
China did not invent industrial espionage, but it has certainly mastered the 
art. And intellectual property theft, especially from the US has been 
reportedly rampant, and has been called the “great brain robbery”.38 Keith 
Alexander, former director of the US National Security Agency, once said 
the loss of industrial information and intellectual property through cyber 
espionage constitutes the “greatest transfer of wealth in history”.39 The 
US Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property estimates 
that the annual cost to the US economy continues to exceed $225 billion 
in counterfeit goods, pirated software and theft of trade secrets and could 
be as high as $600 billion, and that China remains the world’s principal IP 
infringer.40 And Microsoft estimates that 95% of the copies of Microsoft’s 
Office software in China are pirated, and at least 80% of China’s govern-
ment computers use versions of the Microsoft Windows operating systems 
that were illegally copied or otherwise not purchased.
In 2015, US President Obama and Chinese President Xi agreed that 
the US and Chinese governments would not conduct cyberattacks to steal 
intellectual property for economic gain from each other. Reports suggest 
that there may have been a subsequent fall in such espionage, although 
there is always a risk that implementation of this agreement could fall foul 
of future tensions in US/China relations. But even if there were a sudden 
stop to industrial espionage, China would already have stolen a big march 
in its development through its acquisition of technologies in the areas of 
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IT, renewable and nuclear energy, biotechnology, telecommunications, 
agriculture and so on.
Entrepreneurship in China
Chinese Premier, Li Keqiang is also promoting “mass entrepreneurship” 
(along with innovation) as a new engine of China’s economic develop-
ment. This is a very good initiative. Since the Chinese government started 
removing the shackles of central planning and state ownership, entrepre-
neurship has been a key driver of the Chinese economy. Chinese entrepre-
neurs range from families that open up a small restaurant, shop or factory 
to people like Jack Ma of Alibaba, Ma Huateng (Pony Ma) of Tencent or 
Lei Jun of Xiaomi.
Jack Ma is the symbol of the swashbuckling Chinese entrepreneur. He 
admits with almost great pride that Harvard University rejected his appli-
cation ten times, and that his job application at Kentucky Fried Chicken 
was also rejected. And yet as the founder of e-commerce behemoth 
Alibaba, he is now the world’s eighth richest man in tech with a net worth 
of $29 billion.
Despite the great success of Jack Ma and others, budding entrepreneurs 
have faced many great challenges in China. Better education for entrepre-
neurship is needed. China’s typical rote learning education is not very 
useful for stimulating the animal spirits of budding entrepreneurs. Weak 
rule of law, rampant corruption and heavy state bureaucracy are further 
drags on entrepreneurial ambitions. And access to finance, a break on 
entrepreneurs everywhere, is even more of a challenge in China where so 
much finance from state-owned banks is channeled to SOEs, based on 
cozy connections.
Under the leadership of Premier Li Keqiang, the Chinese government 
is making radical changes to improve the climate for young entrepreneurs, 
and according to all the signs, entrepreneurship is booming in China, 
especially in the IT space. But needless to say, Rome wasn’t built in a day.
All things considered, China’s efforts to get better value out of Asia’s 
GVCs are very impressive, and will no doubt help climb further up the 
GVC. But China’s approach is basically a top-down, centrally-controlled 
brand of “techno-nationalism”. Japan and Korea have also implemented 
similar policies in earlier years. This enabled them to climb fair way up the 
GVC, but their progress became stunted.
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The real lesson of the world’s innovation leaders like Switzerland, 
Sweden, the UK and the US41 is that other ingredients are necessary. Open 
economies are necessary to boost competition as well as cooperation 
between different companies and countries. Open societies are required to 
allow academic freedom, freedom of speech and thought, and a dynamic 
competition of ideas. And open politics and the rule of law are necessary 
to keep governments clean and honest, and so that bad ones can be thrown 
out of office. China and much of Asia are a very long way short of these 
ideals, and will never maximize the value of their participation in GVCs 
until they embrace and practice them.
asia’s Weak partiCipation in GVCs for serViCes
Asia’s GVC successes, such as they are, have been mainly in the manufac-
turing sector. In contrast, the services sector in most of Asia’s emerging 
economies is bogged down in traditional services with low productivity. 
Heavy government regulations that protect incumbent players are the 
main factor holding back the development of high-value modern services 
like information and communication technology, finance, logistics, profes-
sional business services and transport.42 And together with barriers to 
trade in services, this is preventing most Asian countries from participating 
in GVCs for services. In China, India and Indonesia such barriers are often 
two to three times higher than in the advanced OECD countries. World- 
class service sectors cannot be developed if they are isolated from best 
international practice and world-class inputs.43
Shortages of highly skilled workers (notably accountants, business 
managers, engineers, lawyers, medical doctors, scientists and software spe-
cialists) and inadequate infrastructure are also preventing Asia from devel-
oping modern services sectors and joining services GVCs. Even Japan44 
and Korea,45 two of Asia’s leading economies, have weak services sectors, 
with services productivity just half that of their manufacturing sectors. In 
Asia, only Singapore and Hong Kong have dynamic services sectors.
Asia will never fully climb the development ladder and GVCs until it 
takes its services sector more seriously. You cannot succeed with lop-sided 
development that sees fully one half or more of the economy limping 
along. In much of developing Asia, labor productivity in the services sec-
tor is less than 20% that of advanced economies, while it languishes at 
around 10% in China and India. This is also holding back manufacturing 
sectors where services provide critical inputs.
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There is, however, one area where India and the Philippines are enjoy-
ing great success, and that is in GVCs for business process outsourcing 
(BPO). Advances and diffusion of information technology have facilitated 
the outsourcing of business services, especially those which are routine, 
and which are electronically deliverable and don’t require face-to-face 
contact with customers. The BPO sector began with call centers, and then 
extended to telemarketing, accounting, paralegal, human resources, soft-
ware development, medical transcription and so on.
India and the Philippines, more than any other Asian countries, have 
been able to seize the opportunities of the BPO sector thanks to several 
factors—good English language skills, low-wage costs and tech-savvy 
youth. For some time, India was the BPO front runner. But according to 
market reports, the Philippines has leapt ahead to become Asia’s call cen-
ter leader, with India losing a great chunk of its business to the Philippines. 
Citibank, Safeway, Chevron and Aetna are just a few of the international 
corporations to have BPO operations in the Philippines.
The Philippine government has also provided greater support to the 
BPO sector than the Indian government. Most BPO offices are designated 
as special economic zones, with benefits like tax holidays, duty-free import 
of capital equipment, simplified import and export procedures, and free-
dom to employ foreign nationals. The passage of the Data Privacy Act has 
also put in place international data privacy standards, which are beneficial 
especially for the multitude of sensitive information like banking and 
insurance details handled by the BPO sector.
Call centers and associated BPO services now employ more than one 
million Filipinos, an increase of ten times over the past decade. The BPO 
sector is now the country’s fastest growing sector and brings in $24 billion 
in revenues in 2015, not far behind the $27 billion the country earned 
from migrants’ remittances. However, the majority of these revenues 
come from voice call centers, as opposed to more technical IT outsourcing 
where India still retains an edge.
Overall, the BPO sector now makes up 6% of the Philippines’ GDP. But 
it has tended to be an economic enclave, with very little interaction with 
the rest of the economy.46 It is neither a large buyer nor provider of inputs 
to other sectors of the economy, and its main impacts have been through 
the retail and real estate sectors.
Could BPO activities become a key driver of economic development in 
India and the Philippines, as manufacturing has been in countries like 
Japan, Korea and China?
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Most regrettably, the BPO sector seems unlikely to become a key driver 
of economic development, despite the sector’s many benefits. It is no 
development panacea. The BPO sector only offers employment to the 
relatively well educated, and not to the vast swathe of lower-skilled people 
who need jobs. Only 2% of the Philippine workforce is employed in the 
BPO sector. Both India and the Philippines need a manufacturing renais-
sance to offer employment to the lower-skilled.
There is also much that both the Philippines and India could do to get 
better value out the GVC for BPO activities. This means stronger invest-
ments in human capital and infrastructure, and further opening of the 
economy to foster higher value-added activities like animation, software 
development, game development, engineering design and knowledge pro-
cess outsourcing research activities.
risks anD ChallenGes of GVC-BaseD DeVelopment
While Asia needs to do much more to get better value out of GVCs, the 
region also needs to better manage some of the risks and challenges from 
staking their development strategies on GVCs.
Many East Asian countries, especially China, had placed their bets 
strongly on GVCs as a key and reliable driver of economic development. 
They had even biased their development strategies in favor of GVCs by 
creating special economic zones and export processing zones, which gave 
special treatment to MNEs which invested in them. Such special treatment 
can take the form of duty-free imports, tax holidays, soft regulations for 
labor and environment, access to cheap land and other resources, and 
exemption on limits on foreign ownership.
But while these special economic zones encouraged participation in 
GVCs, they were a form of unbalanced development that indirectly dis-
criminated against the domestic economy. They also overly exposed these 
East Asian economies to the vagaries of international markets, most nota-
bly in the context of the 2008 Lehman shock, and ensuing the global 
financial crisis and “great trade collapse”. The recession in the US and 
Europe saw international trade fall five times more than global GDP from 
2008 to 2009. And ever since there has been protracted sluggish growth 
in advanced markets and growing protectionism.47
The global financial crisis has thus highlighted the need for “rebalanc-
ing” growth and fostering new sources of growth in the domestic econ-
omy. Hence, the new mantra in China has become the need to rebalance 
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its economy away from export- and investment-led growth toward a 
model based on domestic consumption and the services sector.
This is easier said than done for many reasons. It is not easy to just close 
up export factories and switch investment and above all workers to the 
domestic economy. Then there are many vested interests—many of whom 
are high-ranking Communist Party officials—who oppose the difficult 
adjustments. And the holy grail of a consumption-led economy is becom-
ing elusive as China’s labor share of GDP has been declining, as China’s 
has experienced the greatest increase in income inequality in Asia, and as 
citizens save in preparation for the country’s rapid population aging.
China’s rebalancing agenda has become even more acute as it colliding 
with the effect of rising labor costs, which undermine its competitiveness, 
and an associated trend of “reshoring” of previously offshored manufac-
turing activities back to the US and other advanced markets. Chinese 
wages have been increasing strongly, as its pool of “surplus labor” is 
becoming exhausted, thereby reducing its attractiveness as low-cost desti-
nation, an issue that we will explore in great depth in the next chapter.
“Reshoring” or “insourcing” of production back to high-cost destina-
tions like the US, Europe and Japan is being driven by several factors. 
While Asia’s wage costs have been rising, the US has also regained com-
petitiveness thanks to post-crisis restructuring and lower US domestic 
energy prices. Rapid technological changes, like robotics, 3D printing, 
artificial intelligence and the Internet of things, are making advanced 
countries more attractive business destinations. Indeed, John Lee of the 
Hudson Institute has argued that robotics and 3D printing might even kill 
the Asian Century, and that Asia’s newly emerging economies will need a 
changed model from the “export manufacturing” that drove development 
in Japan, Korea and Taiwan.48
Some observers also argue that offshoring to Asia had become a fad, 
with many companies being seduced by low labor costs and not taking 
account all of the hidden costs. For example, outsourcing puts you at a 
time-disadvantage in getting products to market. Another lesson is that 
the co-location of manufacturing and R&D can exploit the obvious syner-
gies. Insourcing also makes it easier to protect intellectual property, a big 
issue especially in China. And since President Xi Jinping came to office, 
many foreign companies have experienced increasing costs and frictions of 




Maintaining adequate quality control is also critical for keeping GVCs 
competitive. China has been littered with many scandals regarding the 
quality of food and other products in recent years—to such a point that 
Chinese citizens often travel abroad, especially to Hong Kong, to buy 
safer internationally branded food products. The tales from Paul Midler’s 
“Poorly Made in China” highlight the difficulty of product quality in 
China.
Political and social instability can also present risks to the benefits of 
GVCs. Political tensions in recent years between China and Japan led to 
physical attacks on Japanese products and production facilities. They 
adversely affected demand for Japanese products by Chinese consumers. 
This is one reason why Japanese business has been turning away from 
China toward the Southeast Asian economies (ASEAN) and India. The 
economic costs of China’s foreign policy posture toward Japan have 
become evident to the Chinese leadership and have been one factor behind 
the calming down of tensions. With an increasingly wobbly economy at 
home, China cannot afford to scare away good Japanese investment.
And lastly, we cannot talk about politics and GVCs without mentioning 
Donald Trump’s posture toward outsourcing to China and his desire to 
bring manufacturing back to the US. Trump has been pressuring compa-
nies to bring manufacturing back to America, and he claims that “Since 
my election, Ford, Fiat-Chrysler, General Motors, Sprint, Softbank, 
Lockheed, Intel, Walmart, and many others, have announced that they 
will invest billions of dollars in the United States and will create tens of 
thousands of new American jobs.”49 Whether these investment plans are 
due to pressure from Trump or not is difficult to assess. But Trump is 
certainly offering incentives which may encourage investors to change 
their plans.
the Quest for soCially responsiBle GVCs
Socially responsible GVCs, with socially responsible business practices, are 
essential for decent middle-class societies. But the widespread occurrence 
of labor rights and other human rights abuses in Asia’s GVCs highlights 
how far Asia is from this aspiration.
How can such abuses happen in countries that seem to have made 
much such economic and social progress? In some cases, there are no 
appropriate laws and regulations in place. And more often where laws and 
regulations do exist, they are not effectively enforced. All too often, these 
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abuses take place in special economic zones which are very light on laws 
and regulations, and where foreign investors are pretty free to do whatever 
they want.
In this section, we will review three illustrative cases—working condi-
tions at Apple’s China-based subcontractors, forced labor in Malaysia’s 
electronics industry and the tragic collapse of Rana Plaza in Bangladesh.
Jobs at the factories of Apple’s China-based subcontractors, Foxconn 
and Pegatron, are very much sought after because they usually pay quite 
well by Chinese standards. But in recent years, there has been a series of 
horror stories about the sweatshop working conditions.
The horror stories include forced excessive working hours (over 60 
hours a week); paltry wages; living in crowded dormitories; exorbitant 
obligatory payments for living expenses; exposure to toxic chemicals; 
coercion of students to work as interns; child labor; and substantial use of 
“dispatch workers”, who have employment contracts with an agency, but 
not directly with the factory, meaning that they are deprived of benefits 
and protections.
It is perhaps not totally surprising that in 2010 there was a spate of 14 
suicides at Foxconn’s factories. Foxconn responded by increasing wages, 
installing suicide-prevention netting, conducting prayer sessions with 
Buddhist monks and asking employees to sign no-suicide pledges. For its 
part, Apple also responded swiftly by establishing a Code of Conduct for 
its suppliers, conducting factory audits, pressuring its assemblers to 
improve working conditions and preparing an annual Apple Supplier 
Responsibility Progress Report.
In Apple’s 2016 Report, Chief Operating Officer, Jeff Williams, said 
“At Apple, we are deeply committed to making sure everyone in our sup-
ply chain is treated with the dignity and respect they deserve”.50 Apple’s 
report presents an impressive story of Apple’s efforts across its supply 
chain. But scratching through the details of the report, you will find that 
there was only a 66% compliance with Apple’s standards of excellence for 
“wages, benefits and contracts”. There were also relatively low compliance 
rates for health and safety permission (55%), emergency prevention, pre-
paredness and response (63%) and occupational health safety and hazard 
prevention (66%).
In other words, despite Apple’s hype, all is not yet well across Apple’s 
GVC. Indeed, an investigator from China Labor Watch, an activist group, 
was hired at Pegatron as a production line worker. He reported that the 
awful working and living conditions that Pegatron workers faced in 2015 
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were generally no better than those witnessed in 2013.51 Young produc-
tion workers toil six days a week in 12-hour shifts. But each day they are 
only paid for 10 and a half hours, not counting 15 minutes of unpaid 
meetings. The mandatory overtime shift runs from 5.30 pm until 8.00 
pm. Seventy-one percent of the pay stubs collected in October 2015 
showed average workweeks that exceeded Apple’s self-imposed 60-hour 
limit.
After their long shifts, workers took a 30-minute shuttle bus back to 
their dormitories where up to 14 people were crammed into a room. Mold 
grew pervasively along the walls. Bed bugs had spread throughout the 
dormitory, and many workers were covered in red bug bites.
It is understandable that workers’ wages should be low in a relatively 
poor country like China. But as Apple says itself, workers in its GVC 
deserve to be treated with the dignity and respect. Despite the protesta-
tions of Apple CEO Tim Cook and other Apple senior management, 
Apple still has a long way to go to achieve this objective.
Malaysia is one of Asia’s very most successful countries. From 1990 to 
2016, its GDP per capita quadrupled to $28,000, and it has virtually 
 eliminated poverty. Participation in Asia’s GVCs, especially for electronics, 
has been one of the secrets of the Malaysian success story. The electronics 
sector, which accounts for one-third of Malaysia exports, is mainly driven 
by investment from MNEs from the US, Japan, Europe, Taiwan and 
Korea, which usually operate in special economic zones.
But Malaysia’s success has ridden substantially on the back of large 
numbers of vulnerable migrants who are victims of “forced labor”, as doc-
umented by the non-profit organization, Verite.52 Some 32% of foreign 
workers surveyed by Verite were assessed to be victims of forced labor, 
while another 46% of all workers were deemed to be on the threshold of 
forced labor.
One in five workers in the study were deceived about their wages, 
hours, overtime requirements or pay, provisions regarding termination of 
employment, or the nature or degree of difficulty or danger of their jobs. 
Virtually all foreign workers interviewed reported that their passports 
were held by their employer or their broker/agent, something which is 
against the law in Malaysia.
Many foreign workers are in a state of virtual bondage, as they are tied 
to their employers and jobs through their work permits, which require the 
sponsorship of a particular employer. Almost half reported experiencing 
harassment from immigration officials, police or volunteer citizen security 
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corps—oftentimes they were subject to financial extortion from these 
groups.
There was hope that Malaysia’s participation in the TPP would help 
improve the situation. It had committed to significant legal and institu-
tional reforms in the areas of forced labor and freedom of association. It 
had also committed to fully implement the recently passed amendments to 
the anti-trafficking law to allow trafficking victims to travel, work and 
reside outside government facilities, including while under protection 
orders. Even though the TPP discussions are still continuing, without the 
US in the TPP there will be much less pressure on Malaysia to work for 
socially responsible GVCs, even if the TPP talks succeed with the remain-
ing 11 members.
The Malaysian government has the aspiration to climb Asia’s GVCs, 
and move its semiconductor industry beyond basic operations such as 
assembly, testing and packaging to higher value-added activities. But 
Malaysia will never achieve its ambition of reaching high-income status, 
while ever it bases its development strategy on low-wage, low-skilled fac-
tory jobs performed by vulnerable and abused foreign workers.
Bangladesh is one of Asia’s very poorest countries, with an annual GDP 
per capita of merely $3600. Its population of 163 million is densely packed 
into this small country which is often afflicted by natural disasters. In many 
ways, Bangladesh seems a country with little hope. It is one of the world’s 
most corrupt countries according to Transparency International, ranked 
145th out of 176 on its Corruption Perceptions Index.53 It suffers from 
chronically poor competitiveness according to the World Economic 
Forum, which places it 106 out of 138 on its Global Competitiveness 
Index.54
And yet, seemingly against the odds, things have been improving in this 
country, born a little more than four decades ago following the Bangladesh 
Liberation War. Economic growth has averaged more than 5% since 1990. 
The share of the population living in extreme poverty has fallen sharply, 
from 44% in 1990 to 19% in 2010 (based on the $3.10 poverty line, pov-
erty fell from 82% to 57% over the same period). Since 1990, life expec-
tancy has leapt by ten years to 70, while infant, child and maternal mortality 
rates have improved dramatically.
One key factor in Bangladesh’s improved conditions, especially for 
women, has been its success in hooking onto GVCs as an exporter of 
“ready-made garments” (RMGs), thanks in large part to its free access to 
the EU market. RMGs account for over 80% of Bangladesh’s total 
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exports,  and more than 10% of GDP. The industry employs some 4.2 
million people, of whom about 80% are women. It thus contributed 
greatly to the empowerment of women in this very traditional society. It 
also indirectly supports as many as 40 million Bangladeshis, about 25% of 
the population. Bangladesh’s clothing industry is only second to China’s 
in size.
But the dark side of Bangladesh’s participation in garment GVCs was 
brought to the attention of the whole world in April 2013, when Rana 
Plaza, a building housing several RMG factories, collapsed killing 1138 
workers, mainly young women, and left more than 2000 injured. It was 
one of the worst industrial accidents in history, and came close on the 
heels of the Bangladesh’s Tazreen factory fire of November 2012, in which 
112 people died.
Who was responsible for this tragic disaster? In the words of Philip 
Jennings, General Secretary, UNI Global Union, a trade union group, 
“Many were complicit: the international brands that turned a blind eye to 
glaring problems in the factories where their garments were made; the fac-
tory owners who knowingly put their workers at risk in order to keep costs 
low; and the Bangladeshi authorities who made no effort to enforce their 
own health and safety laws”.55
The many red faces were pressured into responding. A Sustainability 
Compact was thus forged, committing the Government of Bangladesh, in 
cooperation with the EU, the US, the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) and the private sector to bring about the necessary changes in the 
garment sector. But overall, responses and reactions have been “too little, 
too late”.
It took more than three years for murder charges to be brought against 
those responsible for the building collapse. The Rana Plaza Donors Trust 
Fund was established by the ILO in January 2014 in order to collect vol-
untary contributions to finance the compensation awards. But it took until 
June 2015 for companies to make sufficient payments to meet the target 
of $30 million.
On the third anniversary of this tragedy, the EU noted the “tangible 
progress on the ground”, but insisted that “essential reforms—not least as 
regards the effective respect of trade union rights and promotion of genu-
ine social dialogue—are still needed to ensure a better future for 
Bangladeshi garment industry workers … The EU sees still an urgent need 
to swiftly investigate and prosecute all acts of anti-union discrimination, 
including in export zones.”56
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On the same occasion, Human Rights Watch noted that “Garment 
workers face daunting challenges to unionisation, and remain at risk of 
interference and threats by factories three years after the Rana Plaza build-
ing collapse”.57 As Phil Robertson of Human Rights Watch said, “Let’s 
remember that none of the factories operating in Rana Plaza had trade 
unions … If their workers had more of a voice, they might have been able 
to resist managers who ordered them to work in the doomed building a 
day after large cracks appeared in it.”
These issues have given rise to a lively debate on the extent and nature 
of corporate social responsibility of the brands that sourced their products 
from Bangladesh, notably Benetton, Bonmarche, the Children’s Place, El 
Corte Ingles, Gap, H&M, Joe Fresh, Monsoon Accessorize, Mango, 
Matalan, Primark and Walmart. OECD Secretary-General, Angel Gurria, 
argues that “global businesses must look beyond the bottom line and “go 
responsible” … they must act responsibly through their supply chains.”58 
But the reluctance of much of the business sector to play the game respon-
sibly is evident in the comments of Winand Quaedvlieg, chair of the 
investment committee of the Business and Industry Advisory Committee 
to OECD, “an over-extensive interpretation of responsibilities along the 
supply chain would be counterproductive”.59
* * *
Asia’s participation in GVCs has provided a fast track to development. 
GVCs have also been substantially staffed by workers who have migrated 
from the countryside to the city. But while urbanization also has great 
potential to drive Asia’s development, Asia is not making the most of 
urbanization’s potential, as we analyze in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
Making the Most of Urbanization’s Potential
There are many good reasons for people to leave the country for city life 
(“urbanization”), as millions of Asians are doing today: job opportunities, 
availability of services, bright lights and excitement, or an escape from 
constraining social and cultural traditions in rural villages. Some people 
are also pushed into urbanization as they flee hunger and poverty, con-
flicts, natural disasters and environmental crises like desertification. There 
is, however, one common denominator—all these people are seeking a 
better life, and usually urbanization can satisfy that wish.
Interestingly, there are growing numbers of reports of the joy that 
young Indian girls experience when leaving the strictures of rural life—
with its obligation of arranged marriages and subservience to a male- 
dominated traditional society—to work in a factory in the city. It may be 
difficult for Westerners to think of work in a factory, earning $100 a 
month, with the opportunity to meet both boys and girls who are not 
from your own village or family, as a sort of emancipation. But it certainly 
seems to be, even if the distant family still holds great sway.
My friend Ashok left his home in a small village in the northern Indian 
state of Himachal Pradesh for New Delhi for quite different reasons. He 
came to Delhi to earn enough money to send his two daughters to a pri-
vate school because India’s public education system is so lousy. He wants 
them to have the education that he wishes that he could have had. And so 
with an average income of $10 a day, he is able to support the lives of his 
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wife and daughters in their village. But Ashok does not want to stay in 
Delhi, despite all its opportunities, because he misses his family dearly. His 
dream is to save up enough money to buy a business or farm back in his 
home village.
And so it is that Asia is in the midst of the fastest tide of urbanization 
that the world has ever seen. Asia’s urban population has jumped from 
27% of the total population in 1980 to 48% in 2015, while over the same 
period China’s urban population skyrocketed from 19% to 56%, India’s 
increased from 23% to 33% and Indonesia’s increased from 22% to 54%.1 
Despite these mind-boggling statistics, we are little more than half way 
through Asia’s potential urbanization process. For example, Asia’s urban 
population of 48% of total compares with 94% for Japan and 89% for 
Australia. According to the UN, 64% of Asia’s population could live in 
urban areas by 2050, with urbanites accounting for 76% of total in China, 
50% in India and 71% in Indonesia.
This means that Asia’s transition from having 10% of its population living 
in urban areas to 50% (in 2025) will take only 95 years.2 This compares with 
210 years in the case of Latin America, 150 years in Europe and 105 years 
in North America. China made this urban transition in just 61 years! Overall, 
from 1980 to 2010, Asia added more than 1 billion people to its cities, with 
a further billion set to become city dwellers by 2040.
Asia leads the world for megacities, meaning cities with populations 
over 10 million. Eight of the world’s ten biggest megacities are in Asia—
Tokyo, Shanghai, Jakarta, Seoul, Beijing, Guangzhou, Karachi and Delhi 
(New York City and Mexico City are the only non-Asian cities in the top 
ten). But while Asia’s megacities capture the headlines, most urbanites 
actually live in second- or third-tier cities and towns. Asia is also home to 
eight of the world’s most densely populated cities—Mumbai, Kolkata, 
Karachi, Shenzhen, Seoul, Taipei, Chennai and Shanghai. Such high den-
sity makes their populations highly vulnerable to natural disasters.
While Asia’s new urbanites have their personal motivations for moving 
to towns and cities, urbanization can bring many great benefits to the 
whole economy. As people move from the countryside to the city, they 
also usually move from a very low-productivity job on a farm to a much 
higher-productivity job in a factory or construction or the urban services 
sector. There are also many great efficiencies arising from business and life 
being on a much larger scale (economies of scale). And there are also 
economies of agglomeration to be harvested as different businesses and 
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workers cluster together creating networks for knowledge-sharing and 
cooperation, as well as boosting competition.
It is more cost effective for governments to provide public services in 
big cities than in villages. City governments also usually have much more 
resources for public services like education—for example, the quality of 
public education in China’s cities is very much better in its cities than in 
the countryside. Urbanites are usually faster adopters of new technologies, 
in part because information technology infrastructure is better developed 
in cities. And most significantly, cities can also become hubs of creativity 
and innovation, thanks to the co-location of companies, universities, 
research institutes, and cultural and sporting activities, which attract cre-
ative workers and create an environment which is propitious for 
innovation.
Despite all these potential benefits of urbanization, Asia’s model of 
urbanization is flawed in many respects. In China, migrants from rural 
areas are denied access to social services. In all emerging Asian economies, 
too many people leave rural poverty only to live in urban slums with poor 
infrastructure, while most of Asia’s cities are environmental disasters. In 
the case of Asia’s advanced countries, very few cities offer an “ecosystem” 
which fosters innovation-driven development. In other words, there is 
much that can be done by Asian governments to make the most of urban-
ization’s potential.
InsIghts from sIr W. Arthur LeWIs
In 1979, Sir W. Arthur Lewis, from the small Caribbean island of St Lucia, 
was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics for his simple, but profound, 
insights into economic transformation. Lewis paints a picture of a “dualist 
economy” which has an advanced capitalist sector, but also a “subsistence” 
non-capitalist backward sector.3
“Surplus labor”, with very low productivity in the subsistence sector, 
migrates to the capitalist sector, attracted by higher wages. This enables 
the capitalist sector to grow, and make profits which fuel continued invest-
ment. Initially workers’ wages do not increase. The demand for labor by 
the capitalist sector is satisfied by a continued flow of surplus labor from 
the subsistence sector. And economic activity and wages in the subsistence 
sector are not affected because the surplus labor had only very low 
productivity.
 MAKING THE MOST OF URBANIZATION’S POTENTIAL 
128 
But comes a day, predictably, when the surplus labor becomes exhausted. 
Labor shortages are felt in both the capitalist and subsistence sectors. And 
wages begin to rise. This moment is known as the “Lewis turning point”.
This is a very critical point in an economy’s development process. It is 
the moment where businesses can no longer rely on cheap labor alone for 
their competitiveness. They need smart labor. Investment in human capi-
tal, technology and research become necessary to drive development for-
ward, especially as cheap labor activities migrate to lower-cost countries. 
Asian countries like Japan, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan 
navigated their Lewis turning points successfully to become high-income, 
knowledge-based economies, notwithstanding their current challenges. 
By contrast, Malaysia and Thailand have become bogged down as middle- 
income economies, as they have not adjusted to the challenges of this 
phase of their development.
Many analysts argue that China reached the Lewis turning point around 
2010.4 Certainly Chinese wages have increased dramatically, with an aver-
age annual growth rate of 15% in dollar-terms between 2000 and 2012, 
and with continuing increases expected through to the year 2020 at least.5 
And China has been losing investments to lower cost countries like 
Vietnam, Bangladesh and Cambodia. There have even been reports that 
some iPhones will be assembled in India, starting from 2017. China’s 
many initiatives to climb global value chains (GVCs) which we discussed 
in the previous chapter are critical for enabling China to graduate success-
fully from its Lewis turning point. If China does not navigate this stage 
successfully, it could fall into a “middle-income trap” and see its develop-
ment severely stunted. Indeed, as we have discussed in earlier chapters, 
China’s reform momentum may have run out of steam, and its future 
progress is very much in question.
Transition through the Lewis turning point is challenging for other 
reasons. The current generation of rural migrants in China’s factories is 
different from the first waves of migrants. They are better educated, more 
aware of their rights, and more willing to protest. So, not only have 
Chinese workers been demanding high wages, they have also been 
demanding better working conditions and the right to form trade unions. 
More recently, wage increases have slowed a little due to the sluggish 
world economy, and there have been growing numbers of factory clo-
sures, layoffs, restructurings, relocations and pay cuts. All these factors 




China is in the midst of a big wave of labor unrest and could well become 
the “epicenter of global labor unrest”.6 According to the China Labor 
Bulletin, a Hong Kong-based advocacy group, there were over 2700 
strikes and protests in 2015, more than double the previous year.7 Labor 
unrest can take many forms, such as strikes, suicide threats, holding cor-
porate executives hostage and threatening to reveal a company’s dirty 
laundry. Such unrest has also been facilitated by social media and grass- 
roots activist groups.
The main factors driving this new wave of labor unrest are unpaid 
wages, severance payments and other benefits like pension contributions. 
The fact that some local governments habitually fail to enforce labor laws 
doesn’t help. In addition, younger workers have higher expectations and 
are no longer willing to tolerate the abuse and exploitation their parents 
had to endure. High profile industrial disasters, like the 2015 explosion at 
a Tianjin chemicals warehouse, are also motivating labor unrest.
In the face of this labor unrest, the Chinese government is caught 
between the devil and the deep-blue sea. It has been pressuring companies 
to pay workers unpaid salaries and other benefits. It has also been offering 
financial assistance to companies to retain workers. But it has also fearful 
of labor unrest turning against the government, in the context of more 
general social unrest. It has thus been clamping down aggressively on pro-
testing workers, imprisoning activist groups and dismantling grass-roots 
labor rights groups. China would be one of the world’s worst countries for 
workers, according to the International Trade Union Confederation.8
A recent appalling example of repression, in March 2015, was the case of 
a group of eight construction workers who were arrested for staging a pro-
test over unpaid wages in the city of Langzhong in Sichuan province.9 They 
were found guilty of “obstructing official business”, and sentenced to six to 
eight months in jail, with the court holding a public sentencing to humiliate 
them. The employers who did not pay their wages got off scot-free.
Today’s labor unrest highlights the fragile state of China’s social con-
tract. The public has accepted the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 
monopoly on political power because it had guaranteed economic growth, 
full employment and improved living conditions. So today’s labor unrest, 
and social instability more generally, is spooking the CCP, as it clings to 
power.
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The CCP has every reason to be spooked. Labor unrest could increase 
further in China in the coming years, as the country needs massive restruc-
turing of its economy to return to a high-growth path. Inefficient, debt- 
ridden “zombie” state-owned enterprises need to be brought to heel, 
which will require massive layoffs (up to six million according to some 
estimates). As will the shift from a manufacturing-export colossus to mod-
ern service-oriented economy. Quite obviously factory workers cannot be 
transformed into management consultants overnight. It is not surprising 
that the government is now becoming cautious about the necessary 
restructuring of zombie companies, since it will lead to structural unem-
ployment. At the same time, delaying these necessary reforms would also 
compromise further growth prospects.
How the Chinese government manages the labor unrest in the years 
ahead may well determine the survival of the Communist regime. Its cur-
rent knee-jerk reaction toward repression is not the most effective way. It 
needs to let steam out of the social pressure cooker. One thing that it 
should certainly do is to allow workers to form free trade unions, as they 
provide a means of dialogue between labor and management, which could 
ease labor unrest. But as part of President Xi Jinping’s clampdown on all 
voices of dissent, clandestine labor rights organizations are also suffering 
from renewed repression. Chinese legal trade unions must be affiliated 
with the official All-China Federation of Trade Unions which is merely a 
stooge of the Communist Party, which typically supports management 
over workers. The government should also bolster social security nets, 
rather than increasing its public security budget for even more 
repression.
In addition to having very poor labor rights, China’s rural migrants 
suffer from great discrimination in their life in China’s cities, through the 
household registration system, known as the “hukou” system in Chinese.
ChInA’s urbAn ApArtheId
When the new Communist government assumed power in 1949, after its 
victory in China’s civil war, it decided to prevent the movement of rural 
citizens to the city through a household registration (hukou) system. Each 
Chinese citizen had either a “rural” or “urban” hukou, which was basically 
an internal passport system. This was a divisive system that created two 
classes of citizenship. Urban citizens worked in the industrial sector and 
had access to social welfare and full citizenship. Peasants were confined to 
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farms where they grew food for urban workers, but for the rest, they had 
to fend for themselves.
As Professor Chan Kam Wing said, “These measures effectively circum-
scribed the peasantry’s economic, social and political opportunities and 
rights, creating a massive pool of super-low-cost rural labor tied to land of 
very little market value—essentially a de facto underclass.”10
But when China opened up to the global economy in the 1980s and 
1990s, there was a great need for low-skilled manual labor to work in fac-
tories, construction and low-end services. So the Chinese government 
lifted restrictions on internal migration for rural labor who then became 
the backbone of China’s manufacturing GVCs. But these rural migrants 
did not become eligible for regular urban welfare benefits like access to 
schools, health-care, pensions or public housing.
Rural migrant labor, while living and working in the city, retained their 
rural hukou, and became an urban underclass, de facto foreigners in their 
own country. They are often referred to as China’s “floating population”. 
Even their children who were born and grew up in the city retain a rural 
hukou. Thus, a city’s population is now divided into local and outside 
populations. In short, it is a system of urban, social apartheid.
China’s floating population has risen exponentially since the early 
1980s when it was only 20–30 million. By 2000, it was 130 million, after 
which it leapt to 250 million in 2014 (more than 10 million of whom are 
college graduates). By the year 2020, they could be close to 300 million.
This means that China’s apparently impressive urbanization needs to be 
interpreted carefully, since the floating population makes up a growing of 
urban residents. While some 56% of the Chinese population may live in 
urban areas, only 37% do so with urban hukous (not far ahead of India’s 
urbanization rate of 33%). China’s floating population now represents 
some 19% of China’s total population, a share that has been continuously 
rising. In manufacturing hubs like Shenzhen and Dongguan, rural 
migrants represent some 70–80% of the city’s population, while about 
40% of Shanghai’s population are rural migrants.
Many urban, middle-class Chinese are very happy with the hukou sys-
tem. They like having rural migrants to work as maids and nannies. And 
they appreciate having a low-cost working class to work in factories, 
building construction, restaurants and massage parlors. But they also 
object to the idea of sharing their privileged access to public social services 
with peasants. Indeed, according to some surveys, large numbers of 
China’s city dwellers look down on rural migrants and would never want 
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to live next to them. At the same time, some rural migrants would prefer 
to keep their rural hukou because they fear losing the plot of land in their 
village.
The hukou system imposes great costs on the Chinese economy, despite 
the country’s ambition of becoming a global economic power. It traps 
rural migrants in low value-added activities and near-poverty, by prevent-
ing them and their families from improving their human capital and ben-
efiting from basic social services. The social costs are also large. Families 
are split up. There are some 61 million children “left-behind” in their 
villages, usually staying with their grandparents. They typically receive a 
poor education in country schools, with enormous class sizes and very few 
computers. There have been cases of child suicides, and reportedly wide-
spread psychological problems.
The hukou system is also a major factor driving China’s yawning 
inequality. And rural migrants are treated like second-class citizens, as they 
suffer from disenfranchisement, marginalization and vulnerability. Large 
numbers of rural migrants live in factory dormitories, construction sites 
and slum conditions in “villages-in-city”. And many suffer from wage 
arrears and other abuses at the hands of their employers. In short, they are 
at the very bottom of the GVC.
Over the years, there has been talk of reform of the hukou system, but 
little action. Most recently, in 2014, the Chinese government announced 
an ambitious urbanization blueprint to increase China’s urbanization rate 
to 60% in 2020 (from 54% in 2014), with plans to grant 100 million urban 
hukous to rural migrants during the period to 2020.
Priority for urban hukous will be given to those with stable work and 
the well-educated, only exacerbating China’s inequality. Further, the gov-
ernment also announced a full opening for migration (with hukous) to 
towns and small cities, an orderly opening in medium-sized cities, while 
maintaining strict control in very large cities. But this is not expected to 
improve the lot of rural migrants, most of whom are attracted by the very 
large cities which offer the most job opportunities, and have by far the best 
infrastructure.
Overall, under these reforms the share of the floating population would 
only decline a couple of percentage points by 2020, and it would take 
three to four decades at least to fully dismantle China’s hukou system, if 
ever. Interestingly, some argue that the government really wants to main-
tain the hukou system, because it also operates as a system of social con-
trol. For example, the Shanghai government has been trying to control 
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real estate prices by imposing restrictions on the capacity of residents with-
out a Shanghai hukou to purchase real estate.
The cost of offering social services to rural migrants is usually cited as a 
reason for not reforming the hukou system, especially by local govern-
ments which would foot the bill for providing public services. But such 
concerns about the cost of hukou reform are totally ingenuous. The 
Chinese government has plenty of money for building high-speed trains, 
creating new institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, 
and establishing military installations in the South China Sea, but at the 
same time claims that it does not have enough money for the country’s 
rural migrants.
The slow pace of hukou reform will not only pose great costs on the 
Chinese economy. It also runs great risks for the Communist Party. Labor 
and other social unrest is invariably perpetrated by rural migrants, espe-
cially the new generation of migrants which is more aware of their rights.
All things considered the hukou system is a relic from a bygone era of 
history, which has now gotten out of control. It should be abolished as 
soon as practicable to enable all Chinese citizens to make the most of 
urbanization’s potential. Professor Chan Kam Wing has made ambitious, 
but realistic, proposals for gradually eliminating China’s hukou problem 
over the period through to 2030.11 But it does not seem that Beijing is 
reading them.
While the hukou system is fairly unique to China, most of Asia’s emerg-
ing countries have disenfranchised underclasses who suffer from urban 
poverty in slums.
urbAn poverty And sLums
It should not be surprising that Asia’s poverty rates are much lower in 
urban areas than in rural areas given the availability of employment and 
public services in cities and towns. Indeed, urbanization has been one of 
the principal drivers of economic development and poverty reduction in 
Asia. But urban poverty is still a major problem, especially in India and 
other South Asian countries.12 And as Asia’s urbanization proceeds, Asia’s 
poverty is becoming increasingly urban in nature.
While urban poverty is in some ways similar to rural poverty, a life in 
urban poverty can also be fundamentally different and profoundly insidi-
ous. Very often the urban poor lack the familiar social and community 
networks of rural areas, they can be victims of crime and violence, exposed 
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to pollution, and be at a greater risk of HIV/AIDS. Slums are the urban 
face of poverty, and emerge when cities do not provide basic services and 
jobs for their citizens, and do not plan and regulate urban development.
Although we all have some sense of what a slum is, UN Habitat has 
come up with a helpful definition—“a slum household is a group of indi-
viduals living under the same roof in an urban area who lack one or more 
of the following: 1. Durable housing of a permanent nature that protects 
against extreme climate conditions. 2. Sufficient living space which means 
not more than three people sharing the same room. 3. Easy access to safe 
water in sufficient amounts at an affordable price. 4. Access to adequate 
sanitation in the form of a private or public toilet shared by a reasonable 
number of people. 5. Security of tenure that prevents forced evictions.”13
Asia’s slum population has declined significantly as a proportion of total 
urban population over the past decades—from 49% of the total urban 
population in 1990 to 30% in 2009—in tandem with the reduction in 
poverty in the region.14 But as Asia’s urban population has grown, the 
actual number of people—over 500 million—living in slums has not 
declined over this 20-year period. Even in Asia’s great success stories, slum 
population remains very high, with China’s at 29% of the total urban pop-
ulation, and India’s and Indonesia’s at 29% and 23% respectively. The slum 
situation is horrendous in countries like Bangladesh (62%), Nepal (58%), 
Pakistan (47%) and the Philippines (41%). And many more live in slum- 
like conditions in areas which are not officially designated as slums.
Asia is increasingly suffering from an “urban divide” as the rich live in 
well-serviced, gated communities, while the poor live in slums or poor 
neighborhoods, either in the inner-city or the edge of the city. Poverty 
leads many Asian slum populations to settle in areas greatly exposed to 
natural hazards. For example, Metro Manila, one of the world’s most 
densely populated city, with its 13 million inhabitants, is often a victim of 
typhoons, floods and earthquakes, with its slum population being the 
most affected. And fires in Manila’s slums are also a regular occurrence, 
with a fire tearing through Navotas in early 2017, leaving 15,000 
homeless.
Asia’s urban divide is just one manifestation of Asia’s divided societies. 
And the enormous disparities between in wealth, services and opportuni-
ties can be a source of social frustrations and political tensions. Fragile 




Asia’s future is being threatened by unplanned urbanization. But there 
is much that governments can do to tackle these issues and make the most 
of urbanization’s potential—rapid economic growth alone cannot solve 
urbanization’s challenges. It is critical to provide infrastructure and public 
services in tandem with the growth of urban populations, an issue that we 
will explore in one of the following sections. Urban planning is also neces-
sary, rather than just allowing the uncontrolled settlement of any land, 
irrespective of whether it is a high-risk location. And an effective system of 
land tenure must be established. Many slum dwellers are merely squatters 
with no title for the land.
But too many local governments are ineffective and/or corrupt. The 
building collapses and factory fires that are ever too frequent, especially in 
Bangladesh and India, are just one manifestation of this. Usually, as in the 
case of Rana Plaza, they are due to building owners flouting building, 
safety and fire regulations, often with the complicity of local authorities.
In the next section, we will have a look at life inside Dharavi, India’s 
most famous slum, before digging in deeper to Asia’s infrastructure defi-
cits, focusing on Indonesia’s capital of Jakarta.
dhArAvI, IndIA’s most fAmous sLum
Asia has many large slums, like Manila’s Tondo, Jakarta’s Kelurahan 
Penjaringan, Dhaka’s Korail, Karachi’s Orangi Town, Baotou’s Beiliang in 
China, Osaka’s Kamagasaki, Seoul’s Guryong Village and Hong Kong’s 
rooftop slums. But Mumbai’s Dharavi may be the most famous, thanks in 
part to the film it inspired, “Slumdog Millionaire”.
Tragically, India is tainted by having the world’s biggest slum popula-
tion. And according to one estimate, over 60% of the population of 
Mumbai lives in slums. Some even refer to Mumbai as the global slum 
capital. And yet, it is India’s capital of finance, business and cinema capital. 
This is India, with the best and worst of everything.
Slums, like all human settlements, are a world of the own, and a world 
to discover for the curious at heart, as we will see in Dharavi. Obviously, 
there is the squalor. And there is no shortage of that at Dharavi. Although 
there are no hard data, most of Dharavi’s slum dwellers reportedly survive 
on a $1–2 a day. There are about one million people living within 1 square 
mile (almost 3 square kilometers), making it perhaps the most densely 
populated area on planet earth.
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The entire residential area lacks any sort of infrastructure such as roads, 
public conveniences and toilets. With an average of 1 toilet per 500, most 
residents use alleys or the local river as a toilet, even though the river is also 
a source of Dharavi’s fresh water. Children play in open sewers, while dead 
rats line the alleyways, and live ones run up and down.
The slum has severe public health problems, with a long history of epi-
demics and other disasters. While India’s life expectancy is 67 years, the 
average life span in Dharavi is less than 60. Virtually all housing has been 
constructed illegally, and is extremely crowded and small. Up to five peo-
ple sleep in each tiny bedroom.
But Dharavi is not only squalor. There are also important businesses 
there with leather, textiles, pottery, jewelry and steel being the most 
important industries, along with a large recycling business.15 There are 
reportedly some 300 bakeries. And with “slum tourism” a recent fad, 
Dharavi is now receiving a rising number of visitors. According to one 
estimate, Dharavi would have a billion-dollar economy, with over 15,000 
factories, which export products all over the world.
Dharavi’s business is illegal, untaxed and unregulated. Needless to say, 
the work environment is extremely hazardous and unsafe, resulting in fatal-
ities and disease. Toxic sludge flows down alleyways. And child labor is 
widespread—many of Dharavi’s kids start school, but few of them finish.
Dharavi is also a hub of creativity, which was highlighted in a mobile 
museum, the “Design Museum Dharavi”, conceived by two Amsterdam- 
based artists. In addition there is the Dharavi Biennale, “Alley Galli 
Biennale”, which showcases installation and performance art. And 
Dharavimarket.com has been established as an ecommerce marketplace for 
leather product manufacturers, potters, shoe makers, jewelers and various 
accessory makers who want to sell their wares on domestic and interna-
tional markets.
Dharavi also has a vibrant society. Since all activities involve sharing 
cramped spaces, life is a continuous social affair. As many urban planners 
say, Dharavi has a very strong sense of community, its residents seem 
happy, and the crime rate is very low—although one should not romanti-
cize too much about life in Dharavi.
There are three main communities—Hindu (60%), Muslim (33%) and 
Christian (6%)—each living in its own district, with temples, mosques and 
churches. Badi Masjid, a mosque, is the slum’s oldest religious structure. 




Dharavi has a long history.16 The area was a mangrove swamp inhabited 
by Koli fishermen. Then the slum was established in 1882 during the 
British colonial era, and grew due to the expulsion of factories and resi-
dents in downtown Mumbai by the colonial government. Some 60% of 
Dharavi’s families have lived in the slum for more than 60 years.
There have long been plans to redevelop Dharavi. It is located on prime 
building land, and would be worth millions to developers. But resistance 
is great from its inhabitants and activists. Offers of compensation for the 
locals have been inadequate. And many residents like Dharavi’s very cheap 
and affordable housing, with rents as low as $3 a month. Mumbai is one 
of the world’s most expensive cities. The slum is also conveniently located 
smack in the middle between Mumbai’s two main suburban rail lines, the 
Western and Central Railways.
It is tempting for city governments to succumb to the temptation of 
such development projects. But history shows that they are invariably a 
heartless failure. Former slum residents usually get packed up into charac-
terless apartment blocks. All sense of community is lost. And industries 
like pottery and recycling disappear.
It would be much more human to provide slum residents with ade-
quate infrastructure, and titles to the property they occupy, and then help 
them clean up the slum. De-slumification might then occur naturally in 
tandem with economic development, and obviate the need for simply 
demolishing whole communities. But Indian cities are still grossly under- 
prepared to deliver a high quality of life that is sustainable in the long 
term. In a recent survey, Mumbai scored an appalling 4.2 on a scale of 
1–10 (New York scored 9.70), but it was still the second highest ranking 
of the assessed 21 Indian cities, with Chandigarh bringing up the rear 
with 2.17
Appalling infrastructure may be the bane of life in Mumbai and indeed 
much of “Incredible India”. But when it comes to infrastructure deficits, 
India is far from alone in Asia. The Asian Development Bank estimates 
that Asia’s infrastructure needs amount to $1.7 trillion a year, including 
the effect of climate change mitigation and adaptation costs, if the region 
is to maintain growth momentum.18 And with Asia’s urban population 
growing rapidly, an ever-increasing share of these infrastructure needs is to 
be found in urban centers. And yet, ironically, Asian cities like Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Tokyo and Seoul have some of the world’s best infrastructure, 
something that make visitors from Australia and North America feel rightly 
jealous. This is yet another manifestation of the “Asian divide”.
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In the following section, we look at Indonesia’s infrastructure crisis 
which is also inhibiting poverty reduction and economic growth, and is 
breeding dangerous slums in its major cities.
IndonesIA’s InfrAstruCture CrIsIs
Jakarta and other Indonesian cities are feeling the pinch of the nation’s 
infrastructure crisis at many different points. Indeed, under-investment in 
the nation’s infrastructure, chiefly transportation, would have lopped 
more than one percentage point a year off Indonesia’s potential economic 
growth over the past decade, thereby robbing the country of further pov-
erty reduction and prosperity growth.19
Although traffic is notoriously bad in many Asian cities, Indonesia’s 
capital city of Jakarta’s traffic is regularly rated as among very worst traffic 
in the world.20 Other Indonesian transportation infrastructure is also 
totally inadequate, notably rail networks, seaports and airports. This is of 
course a great inconvenience to Indonesian citizens. But it also has severe 
adverse effects on domestic business and foreign investment. Indeed, 
Indonesia’s logistics costs, at around 24% of GDP, are very much higher 
than neighbors like Malaysia and Thailand.21 A telling example of 
Indonesia’s logistics problems is that it is cheaper to import oranges from 
China than from the Indonesian island of Kalimantan.
The 34 million Indonesians who still live in urban slums also suffer 
from an acute infrastructure deficit,22 especially for things like water, sani-
tation, electricity and Internet access.23 Some 80% of Indonesians lack 
access to piped water, and 98% of the population doesn’t have access to 
sewerage systems. This means that, taking account of all the population’s 
deprivations, Indonesia’s poverty would be higher than based on income 
measures of poverty.
Many Indonesian regions suffer electricity blackouts and brownouts, 
with power demand outstripping supply. Indonesia may be on the brink of 
a power crisis, despite the country’s abundance of energy resources. Some 
47% of the country’s primary schools lack access to electricity, effectively 
excluding their students from e-learning. Indonesia has only around 1.2 
fixed broadband connections per 100 persons, as compared with 8.4  in 
Malaysia and 5.0 in Vietnam.
How did Indonesia get into its infrastructure crisis? Indonesia’s infra-
structure investment collapsed during the 1997/1998 Asian financial 
 crisis, and has not fully recovered since. Infrastructure spending averaged 
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less than 2–3% of GDP over the 2000–2014 period, compared with 6% 
during Soeharto era before the financial crisis. In sharp contrast, China 
and Indonesia’s neighbors have been investing 7% or more of GDP in 
infrastructure.
There are several factors which have kept infrastructure spending low, 
notably low and falling government revenues, heavy public spending on 
subsidies and entitlements, and a 3% cap on the budget deficit, which has 
limited government financing for infrastructure. It is also the product of 
ineffectual government under the previous President, Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono, who did not manage to get many projects got off the ground. 
In short, Indonesia’s infrastructure spending is way below the level that is 
needed to cope with continuing rapid urbanization.24 It is also below the 
level need to sustain a respectable economic growth rate of 6–7% of GDP.
The present government of President Joko Widodo has made infra-
structure investment one of its highest priorities, while the new Indonesian 
National Medium Term Development Plan (2015–2019) devotes signifi-
cant attention to infrastructure. And there has been an acceleration in the 
launch of projects. However, despite these good intentions, Indonesia 
faces many challenges in addressing its infrastructure crisis, which will take 
many years, if not decades, to solve. The government doesn’t have the 
wherewithal to finance the country’s infrastructure needs. And not even 
the finances of the World Bank, Asian Development Bank or the much- 
publicized Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank would be sufficient. 
Although there is much talk about the potential of public–private partner-
ships, the best thing that Indonesia could do is to make better efforts at 
improving tax collection and tackle the widespread tax cheating of the 
country’s elites.25
But despite the urgency of the situation, the government bureaucracy 
has been slow to move into action, in part due to weaknesses of institu-
tional capacity. Inefficient state-owned enterprises dominate the infra-
structure scene. And to attract private sector interest requires a robust 
pipeline of bankable projects. But Indonesia suffers from issues of project 
preparation quality, regulatory clarity, legal certainty and corruption. One 
of the biggest bottlenecks is land acquisition as local people refuse to sell 
their land or only do so at very high prices.
For Indonesia to make the most of its rapid urbanization, it needs to 
make very much more serious efforts to improve the state of its urban 
infrastructure. Otherwise, urbanization will lead to growing urban pov-
erty, squalor and slums, with even greater risk of social instability, crime 
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and violence. Too many Asian cities are also becoming environmental 
disasters.
AsIA’s urbAn envIronmentAL dIsAster
A few years back, the Asian Development Bank bravely made a case for 
“green urbanization” in Asia.26 And there certainly are some reasons why 
urbanization can be good for the environment. Urbanization brings 
higher productivity thanks to economies of scale and agglomeration, 
thereby reducing the economy’s ecological footprint. As development 
proceeds, lower-pollution services take over from manufacturing as key 
driver of the economy. And compact urban-living reduces energy con-
sumption, a major source of pollution.
Environmental-friendly infrastructure and public services are more 
affordable for urban governments, than in dispersed rural communities. 
Experience also shows that urbanization can foster innovation, including 
for green technologies. And as urbanization drives economic develop-
ment, emerging middle-class populations will pressure governments, even 
in authoritarian China, to manage the environment better. Middle-class 
families are very rightly worried about the health of their children.
Many economists believe there to be an “environmental Kuznets’ 
curve” (the original curve by economist Simon Kuznets pertained to 
inequality). This means that while the early stages of economic  development 
see a deterioration in the urban environment, over time, urbanization and 
development become positive forces for the environment.
When you visit cities like Singapore and Tokyo, it is easy to be con-
vinced of an environmental Kuznets’ curve operating in Asia. But most 
Asian countries are not at all in this situation. Urbanization and develop-
ment are creating great stresses for the environment, and vulnerabilities to 
climate change and natural disasters are only getting worse. Indeed, much 
of Asia is still very much on the bad side of the Kuznets’ curve. And it will 
take very many years, if ever, for most Asian cities to see the good side of 
the Kuznets’ curve.
Most Asian cities now have simply terrible pollution problems. As Asia’s 
rural residents rush to live in cities, they buy cheap cars, take high- polluting 
public transport and work in dirty factories. Traffic-related congestion 
costs in Asia are estimated to amount to 5% of GDP. Many Asians still 
cook their food and heat their habitations with small fires, the major 
source of air pollution. And if they have access to electricity, it comes from 
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small-scale diesel electricity generators or coal plants. And the weak, 
incompetent and often corrupt governments who allow more than 500 
million Asians to keep living in slums contribute to pollution by not pro-
viding clean toilets, and leaving trash to rot, rather than collecting it.
It is not surprising that the environment of most Asian cities is simply 
appalling and even life-threatening for many. Out of the world’s 3.3 mil-
lion premature deaths due to air pollution, 1.4 million occur in China, 
followed by India with 645,000 and Pakistan with 110,000. By 2050, 
there could be 6.6 million such premature deaths every year worldwide.27 
Asia tops the world when it comes to all the indicators of polluted cities. 
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), some 62 Asian cit-
ies figure in the list of the world’s 100 most polluted cities by “particulate 
matter concentration”, with the top ten including Delhi, Patna, Gwalior, 
Raipur, Ahmedabad and Lucknow from India; and Karachi, Peshawar and 
Rawalpindi from Pakistan.28
On an average day, the residents of Delhi breathe air fouled by fine 
particles at a concentration of 153 μg/m3. This has damaged the lung 
function of half the city’s 4.4 million children so severely that they will 
never fully recover. Delhi’s score is close to three times the Beijing mean 
and 15 times the WHO guideline of 10 μg/m3. Beijing, with its notorious 
air quality, only ranks 76th on the world list. China’s air pollution may 
seem not so bad compared with other countries because some Chinese 
cities allegedly manipulate air pollution data to comply with the air quality 
standards.
But this WHO index only measures one of the many forms of pollu-
tion. There are many other Asian cities which suffer from other forms of 
pollution. In Linfen, China, the air is constantly soiled with burning coal. 
Also in China, a lot of lead ends up in the soil and water in Tianying, and 
ultimately in the bloodstream of children, because of a lack of regulation 
of lead production in China. In Sukinda, India, studies show that the 
drinking water includes more than double the international standard of 
Hexavalent Chromium. And in Vapi, India, groundwater has been found 
to contain mercury levels almost 100 times higher than the WHO’s rec-
ommended amount.
Climate change is another factor adversely affecting urban life. Indeed, 
Asia has some 15 of the world’s top 20 cities ranked in terms of population 
exposed to coastal flooding for the period 2010/2070, due to the effects 
of both climate change and socio-economic change.29 And it is the urban 
poor who face the greatest risk from such natural disasters because they 
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tend to live in areas which are most prone to disasters, and have the least 
assets for protecting themselves. The cities are Kolkata, Mumbai, Dhaka, 
Guangzhou, Ho Chi Minh City, Shanghai, Bangkok, Yangon, Haiphong, 
Tianjin, Khulna, Ningbo, Chittagong, Tokyo and Jakarta. In terms of 
numbers, over 300 million Asian urbanites were at risk of coastal flooding 
in 2010, a figure which could rise to 410 million by 2025.30 In 2010, 
about 250 million people were vulnerable to inland flooding, which could 
also rise to about 350 million by 2025.
The prospects for climate change, and thus Asia’s urban environment, 
have only become worse since the election of US President Donald Trump. 
He has withdrawn the US from the Paris Climate Change Agreement, 
rolled back Obama-era clean energy regulations, proposed slashing the 
budget of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and appointed 
as EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt, who is a staunch opponent of the work 
of the Agency.
While many Asian cities will be adversely affected by global warming, 
they are also part of the problem in that they emit a disproportionate 
amount of greenhouse gases due to the concentration of economic activi-
ties in urban areas. But there is also much that Asian governments could 
do to turn around their urban environmental disaster, and make the most 
of urbanization’s potential for Asia’s development.
Since energy consumption is one of the biggest sources of pollution, it 
is critical to improve energy efficiency by eliminating energy subsidies, tax-
ing pollution using the polluter-pays principle, promoting the use of 
renewable energy and smart electricity grids. And environmental regula-
tions and standards should be elaborated and above all enforced. Slum 
conditions can be improved by providing basic services, and granting land 
titles to slum dwellers. And rather than passively letting urbanization hap-
pen, governments should create satellite cities linked by high-speed public 
transport, and incorporate environmental priorities into city planning.
Given the exposure of Asian cities to the adverse effects of climate 
change, they also have a stake in working toward solutions. This means 
implementing carbon taxes and/or cap-and-trade schemes and imple-
menting the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. Already, three of the 
world’s top five carbon-emitting nations are in Asia, viz., China, India and 
Japan. And looking ahead, Asian cities are poised to contribute more than 
half the rise in global greenhouse gas emissions over the next 20 years, if 
no action is taken. Urban infrastructure will also need to be able to cope 
with Asia’s increasingly frequent natural disasters, notably by building in 
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safe areas, investing in drainage infrastructure and climate forecasting 
technology, and improving housing affordability for the poor.
With Asia’s continuing rapid development, its environmental chal-
lenges and vulnerability to climate change and natural disasters will only 
get worse, in the absence of decisive action. Indeed, GVCs in Southeast 
Asia are likely to experience significant falls in productivity over the next 
30  years due to rising temperatures and extreme heat stress impacting 
labor forces.31
As a late-comer to urbanization, Asia has much to learn from other 
countries’ experiences and mistakes. With political will and leadership, it 
could solve Asia’s urban environmental disaster. Most regrettably, however, 
except for a few cases, Asia’s urban environmental crisis seems to be getting 
only worse, not better. Another area where Asian governments could do a 
lot better is in providing ecosystems that foster innovative cities.
urbAnIzAtIon And AsIA’s InnovAtIon ImperAtIve
Economies like Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea and Taiwan have 
long reached the point where innovation should be a principal motor of 
economic growth. They have passed through the “copycat” stage of devel-
opment, where much progress up the development ladder can be made by 
absorbing technology, knowledge and lessons from more advanced coun-
tries. And now that China has passed the Lewis turning point, it must also 
focus more on the innovation imperative.
Urbanization is key to innovation—meaning “new” or “significantly 
improved” products, processes, marketing or organizations—because cities 
are the human hubs where most innovation takes place. More than 80% of 
the populations of these five Asian economies now live in urban centers.
How can we ignite the innovation genie? Innovation analysts highlight 
the necessity of developing an “ecosystem” that fosters innovation. There 
is not one magic bullet. The OECD emphasizes things like knowledge and 
skills to generate new ideas and technologies, bring them to the market 
and implement them in the workplace; an open and competitive business 
environment; public investment in research; government incentives for 
business investment; and open access and participation in the digital 
economy.32
A Melbourne-based organization “2thinknow” has a different approach, 
as it emphasizes three preconditions for innovation, namely cultural assets, 
human infrastructure and networked markets.33 Cultural assets include 
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arts, culture, sports, music, environment, parks and spaces—they inspire 
new ideas. Human infrastructure means universities and businesses which 
help with the development of ideas. And networked markets through 
physical trade or digital communication enable the sharing of ideas with 
the rest of the world.
Our take is that a melting pot of artists, academics and investors, men 
and women, young and old and of different ethnic and cultural back-
grounds, provides a potent force for generating and realizing new ideas. It 
also helps if there is an environment which tolerates or even encourages 
differences, rather than conformity, promotes risk taking and does not 
instantly punish making mistakes.
How do Asia’s leading cities stack up in terms of the innovation imper-
ative? This is an impossible question to answer accurately and thoroughly. 
But let’s have a look at a few indicators.
Universities are key for innovation. They produce our brightest minds, 
they are the cradle of much fundamental research, and many of the best 
ones work in partnership both with the business sector and internationally. 
Asian cities have some excellent universities, and they are certainly getting 
better. But overall they are not yet in the same league as Western universi-
ties like Oxford University, California Institute of Technology, Stanford 
University, University of Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology and Harvard University.34
According to the Times Higher Education, the highest ranked Asian 
university in 2016–2017 is National University of Singapore which comes 
in 24th. Other Asian universities drift off further down the top 100 list, 
namely Peking University, 29th; Tsinghua University, 35th; University of 
Tokyo, 39th; University of Hong Kong, 43rd; Hong Kong University of 
Science and Technology, 49th; Nanyang Technological University, 54th; 
Seoul National University, 72nd; Chinese University of Hong Kong, 76th; 
Korean Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, 89th; and Kyoto 
University, 91st.
And only seven Asian “think tanks” have been rated in the top 50 of 
Think Tanks Worldwide.35 These are Japan Institute of International 
Affairs, Asian Development Bank Institute, China Institutes of 
Contemporary International Relations, Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, China 
Institute of International Studies and Korea Development Institute.
The livability of our cities is key to attracting the “creative class”, 
including from overseas, who typically drive the innovation process. So 
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how “livable” are Asian cities? Singapore is the most livable Asian city, 
based on Mercer’s assessment of the political, economic, socio-cultural 
and natural environment, education, health and other public services.36 
But it only ranks 26th in the world, well behind many cities from Europe, 
Canada and Australasia, though ahead of 28th placed San Francisco, 
America’s highest ranked city. You then have to slide further down the list 
to 44th place to find Tokyo, which is followed by Kobe (46th), Yokohama 
(49th), Osaka (58th), Nagoya (62nd), Hong Kong (70th), Seoul (73rd), 
Taipei (84th), Kuala Lumpur (86th), Busan (91st) and Taichung (100th). 
The highest ranked Chinese city is Shanghai at 101st, the top Indian city 
is Hyderabad at 139th, while Manila and Jakarta make it at 136th and 
142nd respectively!
The low ranking for the livability of many Asian cities is hardly surpris-
ing in light of the horrendous pollution, the congestion and insecurity 
that many have, not to mention their restrictions on social and political 
freedom. And as my friend Asit Biswas has argued, the truly great cities 
have a soul.37 This is where high-tech, squeaky-clean cities like Singapore 
or Korea’s Songdo miss the boat. And this is why we love San Francisco 
and New Orleans.
An open competitive economy is also crucial for fostering innovation. 
And Asia’s leading economies are doing pretty well on that score, accord-
ing to the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index.38 
Singapore (2nd), Japan (8th), Hong Kong (9th) and Taiwan (14th) all 
rank in the world’s top 20 nations. Just a bit further down the list are 
Malaysia (25th), Korea (26th), China (28th), Thailand (34th) and India 
(39th).
An open society and political system are crucial for the innovation 
imperative. Innovators need to be able to think the unthinkable, say the 
unsayable and do the undoable. Japan and Korea are regarded as free and 
open societies by most observers like Freedom House, even if there has 
been backsliding under the regimes of Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, 
and Korea’s former President Park Geun-hye.39 Taiwan also has an open 
and free society, and a vibrant democracy, but the island’s freedom is con-
stantly and increasingly undermined by interference from Beijing.
The situation is much less promising in Asia’s innovation-oriented 
economies. Freedom House ranks Hong Kong as only “partly free”, with 
things only getting worse due to recent restrictions on freedom of the 
press and freedom of assembly due to Beijing’s nefarious influence over 
Hong Kong. Singapore is “partly free” case with the “soft authoritarian” 
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regime maintaining restrictions over freedom of speech, Internet and 
assembly. Such freedoms are very much worse in the “unfree China”, and 
have only been deteriorating under the leadership of President Xi Jinping.
All things considered, Asian cities and countries are laggards in the 
global innovation race. Only seven Asian cities make it into the world’s top 
50 as estimated by the “global innovation agency”, 2thinknow.40 These 
cities are Tokyo, Singapore, Seoul, Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong and 
Osaka.
Over the years, there has been much analysis and speculation on the 
limitations of the Asian model, a few of which we will conclude with here.
Widespread government controls and regulations in many Asian societ-
ies stifle freedom of thought and action. Economies are dominated by 
established big business with collusive links to government, which pro-
tects their dominant positions. Most small and medium enterprises tend to 
be subcontractors for large enterprises, rather than startups and indepen-
dent drivers of innovation. And financial systems are dominated by banks 
which service mainly large enterprises—risk capital for innovative startups 
is all too scarce.
Education systems tend to emphasize rote learning and memorization 
rather than critical thinking. All too often academics are locked away in 
prestigious ivory towers, rather than working in partnership with business. 
Societies are usually male-dominated, hierarchical, conservative and con-
formist, rather than risk taking. And migrants tend to be marginalized, 
rather than providing the power of diversity. This means that innovation 
in Asia rarely involves disruptive, major breakthroughs, and tends to be 
“incremental innovation” which adapts and perfects innovations coming 
from elsewhere.
Most Asian governments are very conscious of their innovation impera-
tive. Some even speak of the desire to create a new Steve Jobs or Bill 
Gates. But they are also uncomfortable with the free and open societies 
which provide the fertile soil that allowed such innovation leaders to flour-
ish. Success stories like Chinese artist Ai Weiwei, SoftBank’s Masayoshi 
Son or even Grameen Bank’s Muhammad Yunus are too often seen as 
threats rather than social assets. As the old saying goes, if you want to 
make an omelet, you have to break some eggs. In this context, many Asian 
countries need to take new approaches in governing their urban econo-




AsIA’s best CIty: sIngApore versus hong Kong
As Asia’s leaders in terms of GDP per capita, and the region’s only truly 
cosmopolitan cities, Singapore and Hong Kong have long vied for the 
crown of Asia’s best city. But Singapore has crept well ahead of Hong 
Kong, a trend that is bound to continue, in light of China’s persistent 
interference and mismanagement of Hong Kong.
However you measure it, Singapore has an edge on Hong Kong. Its 
GDP per capita is higher, despite Hong Kong having a locational advan-
tage, sitting right next to fast-growing China. The Lion City is also ahead 
of Hong Kong when it comes to education, according to the OECD. 
Singapore is an easier place to do business, reports the World Bank, and is 
also ahead of Hong Kong in terms of competitiveness, with the World 
Economic Forum noting that “The challenge for Hong Kong is to evolve 
from one of the world’s foremost financial hubs to become an innovative 
powerhouse”. Innovation is one of the weakest aspects of Hong Kong’s 
performance and the business community consistently cites the capacity to 
innovate as their biggest concern. Most other analyses of innovation 
capacity also put Singapore ahead of Hong Kong.
When it comes to the quality of governance, Singapore again maintains 
its edge in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, 
and the World Justice Project’s rule of law index. And Hong Kong topped 
the list of 23 advanced countries in the Economist “crony-capitalism 
index”. In other words, it has the worst cronyism of all the economies 
surveyed, while Singapore is further down the list at 5th. Despite Hong 
Kong’s free market pretensions, its domestic economy is in reality domi-
nated by cartels, monopolies and oligopolies. The tycoons control every-
thing from supermarkets to drugstores, electricity supply to ports and 
buses, and construction. This pushes prices up and quality down, and 
results in low environmental standards. In other words, Hong Kong poli-
ticians and businessmen have their hands deep in each other’s pockets.
The social and political context in Hong Kong has been changing dra-
matically, in response to two main factors. Student-led protests, under the 
banners of “Occupy Central” and the “Umbrella Movement”, seeking 
greater social justice and democracy have unsettled both Beijing’s and 
Hong Kong’s leaders. Beijing has been more openly asserting its influence 
over Hong Kong, often in defiance of Hong Kong’s constitution, the 
“Basic Law”, since Xi Jinping has been China’s President.
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There are very many examples of Beijing’s interference. Academic free-
dom and university autonomy are now increasingly compromised in Hong 
Kong. Publishers of books critical of Beijing have been abducted to the 
mainland. In a speech on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the 
handover of Hong Kong to China, Chinese President Xi Jinping made 
clear that Beijing is the boss of Hong Kong. Xi warned that “any attempt 
to endanger China’s sovereignty and security, challenge the power of the 
central government” or to “use Hong Kong to carry out infiltration and 
sabotage against the mainland is an act that crosses the red line and is 
absolutely impermissible.”
In sum, Hong Kong’s fading freedom, together with China’s growing 
interference and mismanagement of Hong Kong, is gradually undermin-
ing the island’s uniqueness relative to other Chinese cities, and especially 
relative to Singapore.
Nevertheless, citizens from both Singapore and Hong Kong have many 
reasons to be cheerful. Their economies are very prosperous, and well- 
managed, and their societies are among the safest in the world. And while 
both can pride themselves as gastronomic hubs, Hong Kong wins hands 
down, with 6 Michelin three-starred restaurants, whereas Singapore only 
has one!
But citizens from both also have reasons to be frustrated. The gap 
between rich and poor is enormous, with Hong Kong having the highest 
inequality in the advanced world, just ahead of Singapore. Beyond the 
manifest glitz and bling of both cities, lurks poverty for too many citizens, 
as well as slave-like conditions for the low-skilled migrants who keep these 
economies ticking over. And Singapore is the world’s most expensive city, 
with Hong Kong just a sliver behind at number two, according to one 
survey.41
All things considered, it is thus not surprising that Singapore should 
score much better than Hong Kong on international league tables like the 
World Happiness Report,42 where Singapore ranks a respectable 26th, 
while Hong Kong is languishing at 71st out of the 155 countries 
covered.
Another report, by Civic Exchange, a Hong Kong-based think tank, 
suggests that Hong Kongers are miserable compared with residents from 
Singapore and Shanghai.43 Some two-thirds of Hong Kongers believe 
that their city has become a worse or much worse place in which to live 
since they started living there, and that it is not a good place to raise 
children. Only about one-tenth of Shanghai and Singapore residents 
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have the same feelings about their cities. And it’s young Hong Kongers 
who are most likely to say that their city has become worse, with 79% in 
the 18–29 age cohort saying so. Hong Kongers’ main concerns are 
housing, quality of government, education and environmental 
protection.
What future for Asia’s leading cities? As Hong Kong is increasingly 
swallowed up into China’s world, its competitive edge vis-à-vis cities like 
Shanghai, in terms of rule of law, freedom of the press and good gover-
nance, will gradually diminish. It will continue to play an important role, 
but one that is less unique than in the past. Hong Kong is now little more 
than a Chinese economic dependency, reliant on China for its commerce 
and tourists, with very little economic independence. And political ten-
sions will continue to rise, as Hong Kong’s youth population become even 
more frustrated with Beijing’s influence over Hong Kong, and push for 
greater freedom and even independence.
Singapore is a very different case. The government is resolutely com-
mitted to managing the economy as best it can, in Singapore’s interest, 
and promoting a Singaporean identity. It maintains very good relations 
with both the US and China, and is able to balance relations with these 
super-powers, and remain staunchly independent. Singapore also has a 
unique broader Asian role, with excellent links, not only with China but 
also with Southeast Asia and India. As a Singapore-based journalist once 
said to me: “Singapore is the only truly Asian city in the region. All the 
other big Asian cities are more national in focus.”
* * *
GVCs and urbanization have provided immense opportunities for Asian 
economies and their citizens. But as we discuss in the next chapter, too 
many Asians are prevented from accessing opportunity because of dis-
crimination, prejudice and persecution.
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CHAPTER 6
Giving All Asians a Chance!
“I’m proud to be gay, and I consider being gay among the greatest gifts 
God has given me,” said Tim Cook, CEO of Apple, in an essay published 
by Bloomberg Businessweek.1 “Part of social progress is understanding that 
a person is not defined only by one’s sexuality, race, or gender … The 
company that I am so fortunate to lead has long advocated for human 
rights and equality for all.”
The “coming-out” of Tim Cook is emblematic of the wave of openness 
and tolerance, and embrace of diversity that is occurring in many Western 
countries today. True, discrimination, prejudice and persecution of some 
groups of citizens still exist and may never be fully beaten. But through my 
own life I have witnessed a sea change in attitudes. It is ironical that on the 
very same day that Cook’s essay was published, Singapore’s Court of 
Appeal upheld the country’s ban on gay sex.
Indeed, while many Asian countries have made progress over the past 
few decades, social inclusion remains a distant ideal, as testified by the 
experiences of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) com-
munity, women, ethnic and religious minorities and lower castes which we 
explore in this chapter. Insufficient efforts to give all Asians a better chance 
in life will continue to cost Asia dearly in terms of both its economic devel-
opment and its quest to create decent middle-class societies.
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LGBT RiGhTs in AsiA
LGBT communities may suffer from some of the most egregious discrimi-
nation in Asia. According to a 2014 Gallup poll, most Asian countries are 
not LGBT friendly, and things may have since gotten worse.2 The best 
performing Asian countries are the Philippines and Taiwan, where 58% 
and 39% of respondents, respectively, consider their home city or area to 
be LGBT friendly (indeed, in May 2017, Taiwan’s top court ruled that 
gay couples will be allowed to marry). Scores were less than 30% for Japan, 
India, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam, below 20% for Bangladesh, Korea 
and China, and 10% or below for Malaysia, Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Indonesia 
and Pakistan.
Indonesia is an interesting case. Unlike its neighbors Malaysia and 
Singapore, it does not have national laws that punish homosexuality, 
although there has reportedly been a proliferation of homophobic bylaws 
at the local/provincial level. Nor does it have laws that protect the LGBT 
community from discrimination and harassment. Traditionally, Indonesia’s 
LGBT community has lived in relative peace, in large part by keeping a 
low profile. They need to do so. A 2013 report by the Pew Research 
Center showed that over 93% of Indonesians believe that homosexuality 
should not be accepted3 (other Asian countries with high non-acceptance 
rates were Pakistan, Malaysia, China and South Korea). And according to 
a report by a local NGO, “Arus Pelangi” (Indonesian for Rainbow 
Currents), over 89% of LGBT people have been victims of “psychological, 
physical, sexual, economic and cultural abuses”.
Against this background, a wave of homophobia has been sweeping 
through Indonesia, and threatens to undermine its economic and social 
progress. “Beginning in January 2016, however, a series of anti-LGBT 
public comments by government officials grew into a cascade of threats 
and vitriol against LGBT Indonesians by state commissions, militant 
Islamists, and mainstream religious organizations”, reports Human Rights 
Watch.4 In response to media pressure to comment on Indonesia’s 
homophobia, Indonesian President Joko Widodo has claimed that there is 
no discrimination against anyone in Indonesia. But he repeatedly qualifies 
such comments by noting that Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim 
nation and that LGBT rights are not consistent with its religious and social 
norms.
The regression in LGBT rights in Indonesia runs directly against the 
positive revolution in LGBT rights that is sweeping through the Western 
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world. In the same 2014 Gallup poll, some 69% or more of respondents 
from 14 Western countries indicated that their city or area is a good place 
to live for gay or lesbian people. And LGBT rights are increasingly accepted 
as fundamental human rights, and promoted as such by the United 
Nations (UN), the US foreign aid agency (USAID) and NGOs like 
Human Rights Watch—all of which are active in Indonesia.
In addition to being fundamental human rights, LGBT rights also 
make good economic sense. As Cook said, Apple is a “company that loves 
creativity and innovation and knows it can only flourish when you embrace 
people’s differences.” It is not surprising that Apple should be ranked the 
most innovative company.5
Indonesia, Singapore, China and other Asian countries dream of having 
homegrown companies like Apple. But until they embrace diversity, and 
fight against discrimination, prejudice and persecution of LGBT and other 
social groups, the dream of building successful innovative companies will 
remain a pious hope.
Is there any glimmer of hope for LGBT rights in Indonesia and other 
Asian countries? Sakdiyah Ma’ruf is a female Indonesian stand-up come-
dian who tackles many taboos in Islamic culture in her comedy routines, 
and who reminds us of the power of educated youth in fostering a more 
open-minded and tolerant future. We can only hope for social progress 
thanks to generational change through Asia’s millennials.
Under the Obama administration, USAID also worked to bolster basic 
LGBT rights across the continent through its “Being LGBT in Asia” ini-
tiative. Between 2012 and 2014, USAID and the United Nations 
Development Programme implemented a landmark review and analysis of 
LGBT circumstances across 18 Asian countries. It found that Asia’s LGBT 
people suffer not only from unsupportive policies and laws but also from 
high levels of stigma and discrimination, affecting every aspect of LGBT 
people’s lives from families and the workplace to law enforcement, the 
media and health and education services.
Key objectives of “Being LGBT in Asia” include working with LGBT 
civil society to engage with country level institutions to advocate for 
LGBT protective laws and policies, and supporting community empower-
ment and mobilization activities. The initiative also supports multi- 
stakeholder dialogues on LGBT rights, promoting advocacy frameworks 
to address discrimination and assist in legal challenges. It’s not difficult to 
imagine that this very important initiative could be one of the victims of 
President Trump’s proposed slashing of the USAID budget, along with 
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the agency’s active work in the promotion of gender equality and advanc-
ing the status of women and girls in Asia.
* * *
As we explored in earlier chapters, there is much to admire in Asia’s eco-
nomic development, even if most countries remain underachievers. But 
there is much less to admire when it comes to the region’s social develop-
ment, especially for women’s rights and access to opportunity. Asia’s lead-
ing economies are way down the list in the World Economic Forum’s 
Global Gender Gap Index which examines the gap between men and 
women in four fundamental categories—economic participation and 
opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival, and political 
empowerment.6
Singapore may have the highest GDP per capita in Asia, and one of the 
very highest in the world. But it only ranks 55th out of the 144 countries 
surveyed in the Global Gender Gap Index. Japan and Korea have long 
been leading Asian economies, but the relative status of women is near the 
bottom of Asia’s list, with rankings of 111th and 116th. And while Asia’s 
three giants of China, India and Indonesia may be ahead of Japan and 
Korea, they are still wallowing at ranks 87, 88 and 99, respectively, in the 
Global Gender Gap Index. Asia’s best performers are the Philippines, 
which comes at 7th, and Laos at 43rd.
In the following sections, we explore a few of the very many ways in 
which Asian women are prevented from contributing to Asia’s economic 
and social development.
The MAny TRiALs of WoMAnhood in JApAn
It would be easy to imagine that the lot of Japanese women is finally 
beginning to change. In July 2016, Tokyo elected its first woman mayor, 
Madame Yuriko Koike, who beat a male candidate supported by Japan’s 
ruling right-wing government. In September 2016, Japan’s opposition 
Democratic Party of Japan elected its first woman leader, Madame Renho 
Murata (who has since resigned from that position). And “womenomics” 
has been at the center of the Japanese government’s Abenomics 
program.
But overall the lives of most Japanese women are changing ever so 
slowly, if at all. As the OECD reports, women’s wages are much lower 
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than men’s, with the gender wage gap being the third highest among the 
OECD group of advanced countries.7 And as Japanese Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe once said, “Japan’s corporate culture, by contrast, is still one 
of pinstripes and button-downs. After all, the female labour force in Japan 
is the most under-utilised resource. Japan must become a place where 
women shine”.
For all Mr. Abe’s ambitions for women to play a much greater role in 
business and government, progress has been glacial. Women still only hold 
2% of seats on boards of directors in Japan, compared with 36% in Norway, 
around 30% in France and Finland and about 20% in Canada and the US. 
And women only filled 3% of managerial positions in the national govern-
ment in 2014.
There are many factors that conspire to restrict the opportunity of 
Japanese women to succeed in business, government and politics.8 Japan’s 
gender discrimination raises its ugly head around the moment of child-
birth, when the majority of women leave their careers and stop working. 
Japanese corporate life with its long hours, late drinking sessions with col-
leagues and forced transfers to other regions or countries is not readily 
compatible with family life.
The macho-sexist attitude of Japanese corporate life is enforced by 
Japanese men who can make work environment insufferable for profes-
sional Japanese women. Maternity harassment, or “matahara” in Japanese, 
is a growing problem in Japan. A recent government study showed that 
20% of full-time working women are bullied, fired or pressured into quit-
ting by their employers once they become pregnant, while nearly half of 
temporary workers suffer from matahara. The only recourse that these 
women have is to take their bosses to court, which most do not want to 
do. So the usual scenario is for Japanese women to only return to the 
workforce after they have raised their children. But when they do so, the 
majority are only able to find relatively low-paid non-regular jobs.
The plight of Japanese women imposes many costs on the Japanese 
economy. Japan desperately needs more workers, as its poor demographics 
mean that the nation’s workforce has been declining for over 20 years, and 
now the total population is declining. The organization of the Tokyo 
Olympic Games in 2020 is also increasing the demand for workers. At the 
same time, Japan still has a cultural aversion toward substantial increases in 
immigration.
Improving the opportunity for Japanese women to work is an ideal 
response to this predicament. Indeed, the OECD has estimated if female 
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participation in the workforce were to converge to the same rate as men 
by the year 2030, the country’s GDP could be almost 20% higher. Indeed, 
the impact might well be higher since young Japanese women are on aver-
age better educated than young Japanese men. In 2013, 67% of Japanese 
women aged 25–34 years had a tertiary degree compared with just 56% of 
men. And Japanese women have the world’s highest life expectancy at 
87 years (compared with 81 year for men).
There is so much that the Japanese government could do, but isn’t 
doing, to improve the opportunity of Japanese women to pursue a career. 
Fundamentally, it is a matter of creating an environment that enables 
women to easily combine a family life with a working life. Japan’s draco-
nian immigration laws should be relaxed to enable families to hire care 
workers from countries like the Philippines. The government needs to 
substantially boost its investment in childcare and after-care facilities. 
Japan spends only about one-third as much as Sweden and the UK, as a 
share of GDP, on such facilities. And Japan’s tax system should also be 
amended to eliminate the disincentive for women to work.
There is also much that the business sector could do. Japan’s crazy 
work culture is in desperate need of modernization. Japanese companies 
should wake up to the fact that militaristic work practices may have been 
effective in the country’s recovery from World War 2, but that today Japan 
has much lower productivity than most other advanced countries. Japanese 
companies could boost their productivity by adopting more flexible work-
ing practices, and installing childcare facilities to help their female workers. 
Japanese companies should also wake up to the fact that more gender 
diversity in their workforces can be a strength, and managers should be 
given diversity targets to achieve.
If Japanese men also had a more sane working life, they could do much 
more at home to support the lives of their working wives. The typical 
Japanese man doesn’t do anything at home other than eating and sleep-
ing. They spend less than one hour per day of household chores and child-
care—compared with 3+ hours for Swedish and German fathers and 
2.5 hours for Americans.
There are many womenomics naysayers, and one of their standard argu-
ments is that Japan’s already low birth rate would fall even lower if more 
Japanese women had careers. This is wrong. Today, many women are vir-
tually forced to choose between a working life and a family life. However, 
the international evidence shows that countries which have family-friendly 
working environments—countries like Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
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and the UK—tend to have both higher female labor force participation 
and higher fertility rates.
There is much pessimism about the prospects for womenomics in 
Japan. You can still meet many Japanese men who are convinced that 
Japanese women do not want to work, that they prefer a life at home, 
going to coffee shops with their girlfriends and package tours to Europe. 
Akira Matsumoto, Chairman and CEO of Calbee, advises women to be 
more aggressive in upending “vested interests” rooted in power, money 
and status  — traditionally the domain of men—“Men’s mindset won’t 
change. …If you wait to see change, it will probably take another 
300 years”.
But having spent a lot of time in Japan, on-and-off for eight years, it 
seems to me that attitudes may be changing in the millennial generation. 
Japanese boys seem much less macho than their fathers, while Japanese girls 
are becoming more assertive. Female entrepreneurship also seems to be a 
burgeoning new trend. Ambitious women who can see the limited pros-
pects of upward mobility in a traditional Japanese company are sometimes 
more willing to try starting up their own business. And if Japan does suc-
ceed in attracting more foreign investment into its market, foreign compa-
nies will surely start hiring many of Japan’s talented women. In other 
words, the future may not be so bleak, even if change will come slowly.
The pLiGhT of souTh AsiA’s WoMen
As dismaying as the situation of Japanese (and also Korean) women might 
be, the plight of many women in poorer Asian countries, especially in 
South Asia, is nothing short of tragic, as we will discuss in the next few 
sections. East Asia has now moved well ahead of South Asia, as the sub-
continent now has more in common with Sub-Saharan Africa for things 
like nutrition, health, education and economic and political participation 
when it comes to gender equality, depriving the region of a significant 
source of human potential.
Half of South Asian women still cannot read. In South Asia, women are 
also much more vulnerable to poverty, sexual and other violence, and 
HIV/AIDS.  Overall, the UN’s Gender Development Index for South 
Asia is now the lowest of all the world’s regions. Perhaps the most impor-
tant thing holding South Asian women back is conservative traditional 
values in male-dominated societies that deprive them of both the neces-
sary security and opportunities to lead fulfilling lives.
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In the following sections, we look in detail at the issues of Asia’s miss-
ing women, forced child marriage in Asia and Pakistan’s dishonorable 
honor-killing epidemic.
AsiA’s MissinG WoMen
Perhaps the greatest opportunity that too many Asian women are deprived 
of is the right to life. From the 1990s, prenatal gender selection has 
resulted in a sharp decline in the proportion of girls being born, especially 
in China and India. This has given rise to the phenomenon of Asia’s “miss-
ing women”, which was first identified by Nobel Prize-winning economist 
Amartya Sen,9 and represents a manifest violation of women’s human 
rights.
There are three main reasons for the phenomenon of Asia’s missing 
women.10 First, in Confucian and patriarchal cultures, families have a pref-
erence for sons over daughters, because sons inherit the family name and 
assets, and they look after parents as they age. This is very important in 
countries with very weak social welfare systems. And in India, girls are seen 
as a bad investment because of the dowry that their marriage will require.
Then, the ability to exercise this preference for a son has been facilitated 
by the spread of ultrasound technology and the availability of abortion in 
the private healthcare system. And the general decline in fertility rates, in 
tandem with economic development and rising education, has heightened 
the need for prenatal gender selection. When family sizes were large, there 
was always a high likelihood of having at least one son. But as family sizes 
declined dramatically, there is a much greater risk of not having a son 
among the one or two children in the family. In this regard, China’s one- 
child policy no doubt played in gender birth selection.
Sex ratios at birth are estimated by the UN to be 118 boys for every 
hundred girls in China, and 111 in each of India and Vietnam. This com-
pares with the standard biological level of around 105 male births for 
every 100 female births. It is thus estimated that the world would have 
117 million missing women, with 57% being attributable to China and 
30% to India. According to a study by Mara Hvistendahl, the figure could 
be as high as 163 million.11
Please don’t think that it is poor and illiterate families who are the main 
cause of Asia’s missing children. On the contrary, it is the urban and edu-
cated middle classes who are leading the way in having smaller families and 
have the financial wherewithal to make prenatal gender selection. And for 
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those girls who are lucky enough to be born, life is not always rosy. Many 
suffer from discrimination in their access to healthcare, nutrition and 
education.
Looking ahead, it is possible, as in the case of Korea, that with eco-
nomic and social development over time, Chinese and Indian families 
become more gender neutral in their birth preferences. But there is also a 
risk of a continued deterioration in gender birth ratios, as gender birth 
imbalances have not yet spread across the entire country in China and 
India.
One dramatic consequence of Asia’s missing women is the increasing 
number of Asian men who will be unable to find a wife and have a family 
(surplus men are known as “bare branches” in China). According to the 
UN, after the year 2030, the number of single men looking for a wife in 
China and India could exceed the available unmarried women by 50–60% 
for several decades. And the men most adversely affected will likely be 
those who are underprivileged in terms of income and education. In other 
words, unequal opportunity for marriage is becoming another feature of 
an increasingly unequal Asia.
The potential socio-economic consequences of the rise in involuntary 
bachelorhood are enormous, with the likelihood of mental health prob-
lems, increased crime, violence and drug abuse. There is also evidence of 
abduction and trafficking of women for marriage, with Vietnamese girls 
often being victims of kidnapping for marriage in China. Marriage migra-
tion is also a growing trend in East Asia, but this only transfers the missing 
women problem from one country to another.
Governments need to implement stronger policies to prevent prenatal 
gender selection, and campaign against traditional patriarchal value sys-
tems. But change will only come slowly, and the impact of the past decades 
of prenatal gender selection will continue also for decades to come.
foRced chiLd MARRiAGe in souTh AsiA
If a South Asian girl is lucky enough to survive prenatal gender selection, 
and be born, the next problem that she could face is being forced into a 
marriage while she is still a child.
“In South Asia, young girls are a burden, especially for poor families”, 
an Indian colleague once explained to me. “They are just an expense 
item—a mouth to feed, a person to educate. And when times get tough, 
like when a natural disaster strikes, poor families feel obliged to look after 
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young boys first. Since the cost of a dowry is much lower for young girls, 
many families marry off their young daughters as soon as they can.”
There are also social pressures for girls to marry as soon as they reach 
puberty. Many families see early marriage as a means of protecting their 
daughter from possible abduction, and sexual violence.12 There are also 
reports from Malaysia where men accused of rape seek to marry their 
alleged (usually very young) victims in order to avoid prosecution, since 
rape within marriage is not a crime.
Child marriage, defined by the UN as marriage under the age of 18, is 
endemic in South Asia.13 Despite laws against child marriage, some 66% of 
girls from Bangladesh get married before the age of 18, while 47% of 
Indian and 41% of Nepalese girls do so.14 What’s even worse, 29% of 
Bangladeshi girls get married before they reach the age of 15. And despite 
Asia’s rapid economic progress, there has only been a slight decrease in the 
prevalence of child marriage these past three decades.
The effects of child marriage can be catastrophic for the poor girls 
involved. Many abandon school and become pregnant, bringing an abrupt 
end to their education and childhood. They are more likely to die during 
pregnancy and childbirth than women in their twenties. Their children are 
more likely to be stillborn or die during their first month of life. Child 
brides are also more vulnerable to domestic violence and HIV/AIDS.
These South Asian governments have been making commitments to 
seriously tackle the issue of forced child marriage, including through a UN 
Girl Summit in 2014. But progress has been slow. There is much push 
back from conservative forces in these male-dominated societies.
pAkisTAn’s dishonoRABLe honoR-kiLLinG epideMic
While forced child marriages are a tragedy for young girls in South Asia, 
those girls who stand up for themselves and refuse such marriages, or 
allegedly bring dishonor on their families in other ways, expose themselves 
to the risk of being murdered in so-called honor killings. The year 2016 
saw an epidemic of honor killings in Pakistan, with the murder of Pakistani 
social media star, Qandeel Baloch, by her brother being only the most 
talked about.
Indeed, it seemed like every week that a new case of an honor killing hit 
the international media. One Pakistani man reportedly killed his two sis-
ters the evening before their weddings because they had chosen their own 
husbands, rather than settling for arranged marriages According to another 
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report, a Pakistani mother-of-three and a 21-year-old man were tortured 
and hanged from a tree after reportedly having an affair. Similarly, a 
British-Pakistani beautician was allegedly killed by her ex-husband as her 
father held her down, while visiting relatives in her ancestral village in 
northern Punjab. Another Pakistani man said “I am not ashamed what I 
have done” after he slit his second wife’s throat, 15 years after murdering 
first wife.
What exactly are honor killings? The most typical example occurs when 
someone (usually a young woman) is deemed to have brought dishonor 
on a family by marrying a person of lower status or caste, by refusing to 
enter into an arranged marriage, having sex outside of marriage, being a 
rape victim or even dressing inappropriately.
In these circumstances, the family leaders might get together, and 
decide that it is necessary to murder the offending person(s) in order to 
restore the honor of the family. A family member is usually appointed to 
commit the murder. This is sometimes a young person, who would be 
subject to lesser punishment than an adult. Another frequent scenario is 
when one person takes it upon themselves to undertake the honor killing 
to the shock and horror of other family members.
There have been all too many headline cases in recent times. Another 
example, in 2014, was that of Farzana Parveen, who was three months 
pregnant, and was stoned to death in the front of the courthouse of Lahore 
(Pakistan’s most cultured city) by family members angry that she had mar-
ried without their permission.
Honor killing is against the law in most countries. But all too often, the 
police turn a blind eye, considering this to be a matter for the family. 
Punishment could be lightened or waived, if the victim’s family forgives 
the murderer. In the year 2000, the UN estimated that there were about 
5000 honor killings in the world annually, with 1000 taking place in each 
of Pakistan and India. And there is a growing number of cases in Western 
countries like the US, UK, Canada and Australia, in tandem with the 
increasing numbers of migrants from these regions. The real figure for 
world honor killings may be closer to 20,000, according to Amy Logan, 
President of the US National Committee for UN Women. Large numbers 
go unreported, or are falsely reported as suicides.
There is every reason to expect that these figures are growing. As eco-
nomic development and urbanization proceed, young women are better 
educated and have aspirations for a more independent and freer life. In 
countries like Bangladesh, where clothing and textile manufacture is a 
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growth industry, many women are the principal breadwinner, something 
which can be a big “ego-shock” in male-dominated societies. Overall, 
there is a growing gap between the traditional attitudes of parents, and 
those of younger women, in South Asia and the Middle East.
The numbers of deaths from honor killings may seem small for highly 
populous countries like Pakistan and India. And indeed they are when 
compared with the numbers of people who die in these countries from car 
accidents or from air or water pollution. But the other side of the tragedy 
is that of the millions of women who live their life in fear, who forego mar-
rying the person they love, who accept forced arranged marriages or who 
are subject to other abominable acts like acid-throwing attacks. Aspiring 
economic powerhouses like India and Pakistan will never succeed or 
achieve their potential, while ever archaic medieval practices like honor 
killings remain part of the social landscape.
Thankfully, the film, “A Girl in the River: The Price of Forgiveness”,15 
directed by Pakistani woman filmmaker Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy, won the 
2016 Oscar for the best documentary short subject, and attracted global 
attention to this problem. It really is a must-see. The girl in the river, Saba, 
was shot in the face and thrown into a river by her father and uncle, after 
she married for love and not through an arranged marriage. Miraculously, 
Saba survived. Saba was then pressured to forgive her father and uncle to 
restore peace to her village. Saba’s father remained unrepentant. “Everyone 
says I am more respected. They say I am an honourable man. They say 
what I did was right,” he said. “I have other daughters. Since this incident, 
each daughter has received proposals because I am called an honourable 
man.”
After he saw the film, Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, announced 
that his government was “in the process of legislating to stop such brutal 
and inhumane acts in the name of honor”. Then following the murder of 
Qandeel Baloch, the Pakistani Parliament finally revised its laws to stiffen 
the punishment for honor killings, as well as for rape. But of course there 
are loopholes that will allow killers to get off light and may be even escape 
punishment altogether.
What will it take for Pakistan to seriously tackle this heinous crime 
against women?
Fundamentally, it will require a revolution in the misogynist mind-sets 
of Pakistani men. But this will be difficult. Some Pakistani politicians and 
religious leaders criticized Obaid-Chinoy for bringing dishonor on Pakistan 
through her film! Right-wing political groups and Muslim clerics have 
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strongly resisted attempts to provide legislative protection against honor 
killings. Tribal leaders and family members exert immense pressure to stay 
quiet. As in the film, survivors of attempted honor killings are forced to 
forgive their aggressors. And murder is condoned in Pakistani society.
Pakistani women have a massively uphill battle in their quest for a 
decent life. Pakistan is an extremely backward country in many respects. It 
is ranked the second worst country among the 144 countries surveyed in 
the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report.16 Pakistan 
ranks just ahead of the unsavory case of Yemen, and just behind Syria. 
Pakistan would also be one of the world’s worst countries for rule of law, 
according to the World Justice Project. And the Fragile States Index has 
put Pakistan on “high alert”.
Most regrettably, this is the state of Pakistan. In many ways, it is the 
direct descendant of the great Mughal civilization, and yet today it is one 
of the very least civilized countries on the planet!
* * *
Following our discussion of some of the very many ways in which Asia’s 
women are not given a fair chance to contribute to the economy or soci-
ety, we will take up the case of Asia’s indigenous peoples and ethnic 
minorities who are similarly disadvantaged.
AsiA’s indiGenous peopLes
Asia’s indigenous peoples are another segment of the region’s citizens 
who are deprived of the opportunity of contributing fully to the economy 
and society. According to the International Work Group for Indigenous 
Affairs (IWGIA), there are some 260 million indigenous peoples in Asia, 
three-quarters of the world’s total.17 This makes Asia the most culturally 
diverse region in the world.
“Asian indigenous peoples face problems such as denial of self- 
determination, the loss of control over their land and natural resources, 
discrimination and marginalization, heavy assimilation pressure and vio-
lent repression by state security forces”, reports the IWGIA.  In other 
words, they suffer from a profound lack of empowerment. The average 
poverty rate of Asia’s indigenous peoples is three times higher than the 
Asian average. And education, health and other social conditions are also 
much worse.
 GIVING ALL ASIANS A CHANCE! 
166 
While rapid economic growth has lifted millions of Asians out of pov-
erty, most indigenous peoples have benefited little from this economic 
growth. Specific policy interventions will be required to improve the lives 
of indigenous peoples. In particular, it is necessary to fight against dis-
crimination, prejudice and persecution even if the experiences of the US, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand highlight how very difficult it can be 
to bring indigenous peoples into the mainstream of the economy and 
society.
Who are Asia’s indigenous peoples? Where do they live? As the IWGIA 
documents, indigenous peoples live in most Asian countries, for example:
• Myanmar has over 100 different ethnic groups, with Burmans mak-
ing up an estimated 68% of the country’s 53 million people. The 
other ethnic nationalities include the Shan, Karen, Rakhine, Karenni, 
Chin, Kachin and Mon. These indigenous groups suffered greatly 
from the oppressive policies of the former Burman-dominated mili-
tary regimes. As the country has moved toward democracy, political 
prisoners have been released, and the government has engaged in 
ceasefire and peace talks with ethnic armed groups. However, many 
critical issues remain unresolved, most notably regarding the Muslim 
Rohingya in Arakan State, who are known as the world’s most perse-
cuted people. They have been victims of terrible state-sponsored 
human rights abuses for a number of years, which is not abating. The 
human tragedy of the Rohingya reached a head in 2015 with a 
human smuggling crisis, and again in 2017 as thousands of Rohingya 
fled to Bangladesh to escape violence from the military (we take up 
this issue in greater detail in Chap. 9).
• In India, 461 ethnic groups are recognized as Scheduled Tribes, 
“Adivasis”, who are considered to be India’s indigenous peoples. 
With an estimated population of 84.3 million, they comprise 8.2% of 
the total population. There are, however, many more ethnic groups 
that should qualify for Scheduled Tribe status but which are not offi-
cially recognized.
• Japan has two main indigenous peoples, the Ainu and the Okinawans. 
The Ainu mainly live in Japan’s northern island of Hokkaido, 
although many have migrated to Japan’s urban centers for work and 
to escape discrimination on Hokkaido. According to government 
surveys, Ainu population in Hokkaido would be 16,786, although 
Ainu observers estimate those of Ainu ancestry to be between 100 
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and 300,000. The Okinawans, which number over one million, live 
in Japan’s southern islands of Okinawa.
• The Philippine national population of over 100 million includes an 
indigenous population of between 10% and 20%. They generally suf-
fer from a lack of access to education and other basic social services, 
and few opportunities to participate in economic or political life. 
Since their lands are rich in minerals, forests and rivers, they are vul-
nerable to land grabbing and other “development aggression”.
• Vietnam’s 53 recognized ethnic groups, beyond the Kinh majority, 
account for around 14% of the country’s total population of 90 mil-
lion. While Vietnam has achieved a spectacular decline in its poverty, 
among its ethnic minorities poverty remains very high.
The sad reality is that Asia’s authoritarian regimes and fragile democra-
cies usually see indigenous peoples as at best a nuisance, and all too often 
as a threat to their fragile grip on power. This is in sharp contrast to 
Western countries like the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, with 
important indigenous populations, which are often motivated by a sense 
of historical guilty conscious, and moral rectitude to help their indigenous 
populations.
In this context, we will look in a little more detail at the cases of 
Indonesia’s West Papuans, China’s Tibetans and China’s Uyghurs in the 
following sections.
indonesiA’s WesT pApuAns
Indonesia’s West Papuans and China’s Tibetans share similar fates in that 
their hopes for independent nationhood were dashed by greedy big 
brothers.
In many ways, Indonesia is defined by its immense ethnic diversity. Its 
population of 260 million includes some 50–70 million indigenous peo-
ples, from 1128 officially recognized ethnic groups. And while the popu-
lation of West Papua may only be around 3 ½ million, this people has 
endured a tragic history.
West Papuans, who are the neighbors and ethnic brothers and sisters of 
Papua New Guinea, have virtually no common cultural links with the rest 
of Indonesia. West Papuans are mainly Christian and Melanesian, while 
Indonesians are principally Muslim and of Malay race. The only thing that 
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tied them together was their common colonial history, as both were part 
of the Dutch East Indies.
Immediately following the end of World War 2, Indonesia became an 
independent nation, while West Papua remained a Dutch colony. The vast 
majority of West Papuans wanted independence for their land, and in prin-
ciple West Papua was being prepared for independence. But it became 
entangled in Cold War political machinations involving the US, the 
Netherlands, Indonesia and the UN. Then, following a sham referendum 
in 1969, in which little more than 1000 Papuans were allowed to vote 
(out of a population of around 800,000), West Papuan became part of 
Indonesia. The Indonesian government since has turned it into two sepa-
rate provinces, namely, Papua and Papua Barat, in order to weaken it 
politically.
Since being folded into Indonesia, West Papua has been a veritable 
battleground. It has been basically occupied by Indonesia military and 
security forces who have waged a struggle against the West Papuan pro- 
independence movement, the Free West Papua group. Some 500,000 
West Papuans have been allegedly killed by Indonesian security forces, 
with many more raped, tortured or imprisoned. Some have called it a 
“slow motion genocide”. Some West Papuans are now refugees in Papua 
New Guinea, or working as virtual slaves in mines or forests. A strong 
undercurrent in the relationship is the attitude of arrogance and derision 
of Indonesians who consider West Papuans to be primitive natives.
Also at stake have been West Papua’s immense rich natural resources, 
especially copper, gold and timber. Some of the worst human rights abuses 
take place in the vicinity of major resources developments, which pay for 
protection from the Indonesian military forces. Abuses include land-grabs 
by Indonesian and international business groups, denial of land rights and 
severe environmental degradation. And many international companies are 
in a virtual race to destroy West Papua’s tropical forests.
The Grasberg Mine—the world’s largest gold mine and second largest 
copper mine—has been a major sore point. This is owned by the American 
mining giant, Freeport-McMoRan. The rights to this mine were estab-
lished between the US and Indonesia four years before West Papua even 
became Indonesian. Some argue that this project motivated US govern-
ment support for Indonesia’s takeover of West Papua. There has been 




By the same token, the Indonesian government has also been paying 
off West Papuan elites to keep them onside. Migration to West Papua 
from elsewhere in Indonesia has been very substantial such that West 
Papuans are now becoming a minority in their own land. Indonesia’s 
actions and policies in West Papua have been facilitated by its closest 
neighbor, Australia, which has turned a blind eye, as it does not wish to 
disturb the important relationship.
Despite West Papua’s immense resources, and being host to Indonesia’s 
largest taxpayer, Freeport-McMoRan, West Papuans suffer from high pov-
erty, poor healthcare and education, high infant and maternal mortality, 
and a high incidence of HIV/Aids. They also suffer from stringent restric-
tions on freedom of expression and assembly.
Governments like that of Indonesia usually hope that a problem like 
West Papua would fade away in time. They hope that restrictions on access 
to West Papua imposed on foreign journalists and rights monitors will 
keep it out of the news. But it hasn’t. In 2015, West Papua was granted 
observer status in the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), a sub-regional 
coalition composed of Fiji, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Papua New 
Guinea and New Caledonia’s Front de Liberation Nationale Kanak et 
Socialiste (FLNKS). West Papua will now sit on the inside of the organiza-
tion alongside Indonesia. This is hoped to be an historic step toward 
addressing the human rights atrocities committed by the Indonesian army. 
The MSG was founded in 1986 to promote and strengthen trade, pro-
mote Melanesian cultures, further the economic growth of its members, 
sustainable development, good governance and security.
There was great hope that Indonesia’s President Jokowi would turn a 
new page in human rights in West Papua, and he has indeed released some 
political prisoners, and granted access to West Papua for foreign journal-
ists. But there is virtually no likelihood of a sea change under his 
presidency.
chinA’s TiBeTAns
For its part, China is also a multi-ethnic country, and all ethnic groups are 
considered equal before the law. Besides the Han Chinese majority, the 
government recognizes 55 ethnic minority peoples within its borders, 
who number 114 million persons, or 8.5% of the country’s total popula-
tion. The government has made great efforts to improve the lives of 
China’s indigenous peoples, in the areas of education and health. They 
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were also allowed to have two or three children, and were thus exempt 
from the one-child policy. But certain groups like Tibetans and the 
Uighurs still suffer terrible human rights abuses.
Tibet has indeed lived through a turbulent history. There were times 
when it was ruled by the Mongols and Chinese, together with times when 
it was independent, such as through much of the first half of the twentieth 
century. But through all this Tibet developed and maintained a distinctive 
religion, culture and way of life. At the same time, economic development 
was minimal, and most Tibetans were desperately poor.
In 1950, following the Communist Party’s victory in the Chinese Civil 
War, the Chinese military invaded Tibet to assert what it claimed to be 
centuries-old sovereignty. The Chinese government considers Tibet to be 
an important strategic buffer between China and India. It is also inter-
ested in Tibet’s vast natural resources. Following a failed anti-Chinese 
uprising in 1959, the Dalai Lama fled Tibet for India where he set a 
government- in-exile, which has ever since been a strain on Indo-Chinese 
relations. Most Tibetans consider Tibet to be under occupation by a for-
eign power.
The Dalai Lama has been a voice for Tibetans on the international 
stage, and the Tibetan question has been a symbol of the tortured rela-
tions between China and the West. Human rights supporters and activists 
have an idealistic and almost romantic sympathy toward Tibet. This was 
most manifest in the Dalai Lama being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 
1989. For its part, the Chinese government reacts with hysteria when 
senior Western political and other personalities meet with the Dalai Lama. 
So most Western governments and businesses now cave into Chinese eco-
nomic and political power and ignore the Dalai Lama.
China has poured literally billions of dollars of investment into Tibet. 
This has developed Tibet’s transport, power and other infrastructure, and 
boosted the economy, which today is growing faster than the rest of the 
Chinese economy. High-speed rail links have fostered a booming tourist 
industry. China’s state-owned enterprises have also been instructed to 
invest in Tibet. At the same time, there has been a large wave of immigra-
tion into Tibet of Han Chinese. It is a common assessment that these 
Chinese immigrants have benefited much more than the local Tibetans 
from this economic development, and that all the massive subsidies from 
Beijing have done little to promote private sector development.
But the Chinese government has also combined political repression 
with its economic development policies, with the Dalai Lama being a 
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favorite target of Chinese government vitriol. The Chinese government 
has aggressively suppressed Tibetan political opposition and Tibetan iden-
tity. Most of Tibet’s monasteries were destroyed during the Cultural 
Revolution. Some 1.2 million Tibetans would have been killed under 
Chinese rule, according to the Dalai Lama, who accuses China’s govern-
ment of “cultural genocide”. In more recent times, there was a wave of 
unrest in 2008, and there has been a wave of self-immolations by Tibetans 
opposed to Chinese rule. And under President Xi Jinping, political repres-
sion of peaceful dissent has increased in Tibet, as it has elsewhere in China.
In order to solve the current Tibet issue, the Dalai Lama has proposed 
the “Middle-Way Approach” through a non-violent and negotiated solu-
tion. He is not seeking independence for Tibet. Rather he is seeking to 
achieve a genuine autonomy for all Tibetans living in the three traditional 
provinces of Tibet within the framework of the People’s Republic of 
China. According to the Dalai Lama, this approach “safeguards the vital 
interests of all concerned parties—for Tibetans: the protection and preser-
vation of their culture, religion and national identity; for the Chinese: the 
security and territorial integrity of the motherland; and for neighbors and 
other third parties: peaceful borders and international relations.”18
China simply rejects the Dalai Lama’s Middle-Way Approach, and is 
clearly waiting for the 82-year-old Dalai Lama to die, hoping that this will 
see the end of the Tibet issue. But this may well be a miscalculation. When 
the Dalai Lama passes, the Chinese government will lose a voice of reason 
and moderation, and will likely get entangled in disputes and conflicts as 
it tries to control the nomination of the next Dalai Lama.
diRe siTuATion of chinA’s uiGhuRs
The sentencing of Chinese Uighur scholar Ilham Tohti to life imprison-
ment in 2014 highlights the dire situation of this poor Muslim commu-
nity. It is also a harsh reminder that China is still an empire, not a 
nation—an empire that employs repression and violence to control peo-
ples within its imperial borders, and which hinders their ability to contrib-
ute to both society and the economy.
The Uighurs are a Sunni Muslim people of ten million people, of which 
eight million live in the vast Xinjiang region in western China, which bor-
ders five Muslim countries. They are ethnically and culturally much closer 
to Central Asia than to China. The region’s economy was traditionally 
based on agriculture and trade, with towns like Kashgar being part of the 
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famed Silk Road. The Xinjiang region was brought under Chinese impe-
rial administration through the Xing Dynasty conquests of 1745. But the 
region was left largely to its own devices. Following the fall of the Xing 
Dynasty in 1904, Xinjiang enjoyed a few brief periods of independence.
Following the 1949 Communist Party victory in the Chinese Civil War, 
the new People’s Republic of China reasserted control over Xinjiang. 
According to the Chinese government, Xinjiang has been an inseparable 
part of the Chinese nation for over 2000 years, since the days of the 
Western Han Dynasty. The Uighurs are officially recognized by the 
Chinese government as one of the country’s 55 ethnic minorities. Back in 
1949, Han Chinese only accounted for 7% of Xinjiang’s population. But 
internal migration, especially since the 1990s, has dramatically increased 
the Han population to over 8 million (and may be a lot more, if Chinese 
police and military are fully counted), such that the Uighurs now find 
themselves a minority in their own province.
The Chinese government has actively developed the Xinjiang’s vast 
mineral and oil deposits. Xinjiang accounts for 28% of China’s natural gas 
reserves, and gas output increased sixfold between 2000 and 2012, while 
oil production rose by half. Some 60% of Xinjiang’s GDP is now derived 
from petroleum. Most job opportunities are given to Han Chinese. Many 
job advertisements indicate that only Han Chinese or native Mandarin 
speakers will be considered. Uighurs are frozen out of government posi-
tions, the region’s booming oil and gas industry, and many other indus-
tries because of the perceived risk of terrorism. Uighur unemployment is 
very high. Education favors Mandarin over Uighur. And very few local 
Chinese speak the Uighur language.
Poverty is high among the Uighur population. Some Uighur farmland 
has reportedly been confiscated for development. Their culture is also 
under threat through restrictions on religious practices, including bans on 
the observance of Ramadan, and rules that discourage women from wear-
ing headscarves and young men from growing beards. It is difficult for 
Uighurs to get passports. They are routinely denied access to hotels. 
Heavily armed police are positioned throughout Uighur neighborhoods. 
There is a vast web of government informers, and Internet and cellphone 
surveillance. Uighurs are second-class citizens in Xinjiang.
Ethnic tension has been fueled by economic disparities, cultural repres-
sion, and the fundamental lack of trust between the Uighurs and the 
Chinese government. This has given rise to movements for greater auton-
omy and independence, as well as incidents of terrorism.
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Separatist groups rose in importance after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, and the independence of Muslim states in Central Asia, with street 
protests in the 1990s, and again in the lead-up to the Beijing Olympic 
Games. In more recent times, there has been an escalation of violence. In 
2009, there was large-scale rioting in the regional capital of Urumqi, with 
200 people being killed, most of them Han Chinese. In 2012, six Uighurs 
reportedly tried to hijack an internal flight. In 2013, Uighurs were alleg-
edly behind a car explosion in Tiananmen Square. In 2014, two cars 
crashed into an Urumqi market.
China blames the conflict on independence-seeking separatists, terror-
ists and the spread of radical Islam. The government believes acts of ter-
rorism are organized by jihadists outside of China. China has used the 
post-9/11 war on terror to paint the Uighurs as terrorists. Authorities 
have stepped up campaign against terrorism, and tightened up security. 
Most observers believe that the Chinese authorities exaggerate the threat 
posed by the Uighurs, even if a small minority is radicalized.
Uighur groups claim that their discontent is a response to religious 
oppression and economic marginalization. Many prominent Uighurs have 
been imprisoned or sought asylum abroad. As China responds to its fears 
of fundamentalism and radicalization, it appears to be actually provoking 
troubles. “The entire Uighur ethnicity feels asphyxiated, having become 
suspect as sympathetic to extremism,” said Nicholas Bequelin of Human 
Rights Watch. “Xinjiang is trapped in a vicious cycle of increased repres-
sion that only leads to more violence.”
It was against this background that Ilham Tohti, an economics profes-
sor at Beijing’s Minzu University, was arrested and eventually sentenced to 
life imprisonment for separatism in September 2014. Ilham has long spo-
ken critically of the Chinese government’s policies toward the Uighurs. 
The Chinese court found that Ilham had “bewitched and coerced young 
ethnic students” into writing separatist tracts for Uighur Online, a website 
he founded in 2006. The court found that he had “encouraged his fellow 
Uighurs to use violence” and that he had “internationalized” the Uighur 
issue by giving interviews to foreign media. The court also demanded the 
seizure of all his assets. Ilham has become yet another victim of Xi Jinping’s 
broader crackdown on activists, intellectual and lawyers.
The verdict is “a sign of further tightening of civil liberties that has 
been going”, said Maya Wang of Human Rights Watch. “It does not bode 
well for the already tense relationship between Han and Uighurs in 
Xinjiang”. Ironically, Ilham is a voice of moderation who wants better 
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treatment for Uighurs and more autonomy for Xinjiang, rather than inde-
pendence. Many see the life sentence as an act of repression itself. It is 
much worse than sentences to be handed out to other dissidents for simi-
lar activities.
The sentence will make this previously little-known lawyer, who repre-
sented hardly any threat to the Communist Party, an international symbol 
for human rights activists just like Liu Xiaobo, who was awarded the 2010 
Nobel Peace Prize. Dissident writer Wang Lixiing said that the Chinese 
government has made him a “Uighur Mandela”. Overall, the approach of 
the Chinese government to the Uighurs has been denial of self- 
determination or greater autonomy, taking control of their land and natu-
ral resources, discrimination and marginalization, heavy assimilation 
pressures and violent repression by state security forces.
History shows that such an approach is not only unjust, it is doomed to 
failure. China should employ policies of inclusive development, whereby 
Uighurs are given autonomy to manage their affairs within China, and 
have the opportunity to develop their own natural resources and the free-
dom to practice their own culture. Openness and dialogue, rather than 
repression, is necessary to achieve reconciliation between the Uighurs and 
the Chinese government. This would require wise leadership on both 
sides. It is ironical that Ilham, the man who has been imprisoned for life, 
is a very effective and moderate leader who may have been able to help 
facilitate a peaceful reconciliation between the Uighurs and the Chinese. 
But eliminating a voice of moderation makes it easier for the Chinese gov-
ernment to paint a negative image of all Uighurs.
sRi LAnkA needs nATionAL ReconciLiATion
Sri Lanka, a teardrop-shaped tropical island, would seem to have every-
thing going for it. Delicious tea. Fragrant cinnamon and other spices. 
Precious gemstones. Abundant rubber. And wonderful beaches and hill 
country. It truly is the “great and beautiful island”. Over 90% of its popu-
lation is literate, and its life expectancy of 74 years is eight years higher 
than India’s.
It is thus not surprising that Sri Lanka’s GDP per capita of $12,300 in 
2016 should be about double that of India, while only 15% of its popula-
tion live on less than $3.10 a day, compared with close to 60% for India. 
But Sri Lanka could have been even much further ahead had it not suf-
fered from a three-decade-long civil war, which pitted the island’s  minority 
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Tamil population (around 12% of total) against the majority Sinhalese 
(74%).
How could this predominantly Buddhist and Hindu nation descend 
into the horrific violence that ravaged the country?
In the eyes of the Buddhist-Sinhalese population, the Hindu-Tamils 
received favorable treatment by the British colonial administration, which 
ruled the country from 1802 to 1948. And so, following independence, 
the new Sinhalese-dominated government, propelled by Buddhist nation-
alistic fervor, implemented policies that favored the Sinhalese majority and 
discriminated against the Tamil minority. For example, in 1956 the 
“Sinhala Only Act” replaced English with Sinhala as the only official lan-
guage of the country. This meant that it was very difficult for Sri Lankan 
Tamils to work in the civil service. Until then, 60% of civil service workers 
were Tamils.
Frustration, resentment and disenfranchisement of the Tamil popula-
tion led to disintegrating communal relations. Periodic tensions and con-
flicts escalated into a full-blown civil war from 1983 to 2009, with the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam “Tamil Tigers” opposing Sri Lanka’s 
national army. Despite several international attempts at peace negotia-
tions, the conflict only came to end when former “strong-man” President 
Mahinda Rajapaksa launched a decisive attack by the Sri Lankan Army, 
which destroyed the Tamil leadership and recaptured their lands in 2009.
According to one estimate, the total economic cost of the war was $200 
billion, about 5 times the GDP of Sri Lanka in 2009. At least 100,000 
people died in the bloody conflict. A report by a UN-appointed panel of 
experts concluded that as many as 40,000 people, mainly civilians, were 
killed in the final weeks of the war.19 Buoyed by the final victory, which was 
very popular among much of the Sinhalese population, President Mahinda 
Rajapaksa’s regime descended into authoritarianism, nepotism, corrup-
tion, and restrictions on freedom of the press and expression. Rajapaksa’s 
government rejected calls by the UN and major countries to seriously 
investigate human rights abuses during the war. Ostracized by Western 
countries, Rajapaksa turned to China, which became the country’s biggest 
investor and second-largest trading partner.
To the surprise of most observers, and to his great dismay, Rajapaksa 
was defeated in the presidential election of January 2015 by Maithripala 
Sirisena, who had defected from Rajapaksa’s government. Sirisena now 
leads a national unity government, with support from all of Sri Lanka’s 
ethnic groups. But Rajapaksa, still a popular figure among Buddhist 
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nationalists, remains ever present as he has returned as a member of 
parliament.
Under President Sirisena, Sri Lanka has come a long way in terms of 
improving human rights. And the Sri Lankan government has adopted an 
open and cooperative approach to the UN’s human rights concerns, in 
sharp contrast to the hostile attitude under Rajapaksa. However, a 
September 2015 UN report concludes that there are reasonable grounds 
to believe that gross violations of international human rights law, serious 
violations of international humanitarian law and international crimes were 
committed by all parties in the conflict, notably unlawful killings, arbitrary 
arrest and detention, abductions, enforced disappearances, torture, rape 
and other forms of sexual violence, recruitment of children and their use 
in hostilities, and more.20
Thus, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has recom-
mended the establishment of a “hybrid special court”, integrating interna-
tional judges, prosecutors, lawyers and investigators, to try war crimes and 
crimes against humanity allegedly committed by all parties to the armed 
conflict. The UN believes that State’s criminal justice system is not yet 
ready or equipped to do so alone.
The Sri Lankan government has committed to setting up “National 
Consultations on transitional justice” to investigate the atrocities commit-
ted during the conflict. But it has been very slow in honoring this commit-
ment, and is staunchly resisting international participation. Many members 
of Sri Lanka’s ethnic Sinhalese majority do not want foreigners to get 
involved in prosecuting such cases. The same nationalism that under-
pinned the long conflict is also undermining national reconciliation. 
Indeed, many Sinhalese are unrepentant, as they proudly tell you that 
theirs is the first country in the world to eliminate terrorism at home.
Since the cessation of the conflict, the Sri Lankan economy has enjoyed 
a “peace dividend”, with the economy growing in the 6–7% range. But the 
Sri Lankan economy could be doing so much better. The civil war left 
deep unresolved scars and fractures on Sri Lankan society, which are also 
undermining the country’s further economic development. As the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights has said, there is much that the 
government could do to promote social cohesion and reconciliation.
Rebuilding trust in the state and between communities will be neces-
sary since large parts of the country have been physically, politically, socially 
and economically separated from each other for much of the past three 
decades. Further, the military is still holding much land that it seized, and 
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this should be returned to its rightful owners. This would enable commu-
nities of displaced people to return home. But according to a report by the 
Oakland Institute, the military has engaged in large-scale property devel-
opment, running luxury tourist resorts and business ventures on land 
seized from local populations.21 This raises serious questions about the 
government’s seriousness regarding national reconciliation.
The size of the military force in the North and the East should be 
reduced to a level that is less intrusive and intimidating. As the Oakland 
Institute also reports, some six years after the end of the war, the tradi-
tional Tamil homeland is still under heavy military occupation by at least 
160,000 mostly Sinhalese soldiers, one for every six Tamil civilians. And as 
the International Truth and Justice Project–Sri Lanka has documented in 
its report on torture, sexual violence, arbitrary detention and more during 
the 2009–2015 period, ethnic Tamils continue to face grave and compre-
hensive challenges in post-war Sri Lanka.22 The report highlights the com-
prehensive, wide-ranging and pernicious nature of Sri Lanka’s state 
security apparatus, which continues to operate with impunity. The coun-
try’s state security apparatus does not seem to have changed its ways since 
Sirisena assumed the presidency.
In the words of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Prince 
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, “Sri Lanka must confront and defeat the demons 
of its past. It must create institutions that work, and ensure accountability. 
It must seize the great opportunity it currently has to provide all its people 
with truth, justice, security and prosperity.”23
The Sri Lankan government has indeed a daunting agenda before it. 
But the stakes are high, and achieving success is imperative. We could, for 
example, imagine a prosperous and peaceful Sri Lanka becoming the 
Singapore of South Asia one day in the future. However, continued dis-
gruntlement by the country’s Tamil minority could feed future instability, 
and drag the country down again. President Sirisena will need to demon-
strate great political will and courage than he has done to date to chart the 
country on a path of stability and security.
indiA’s cAsTe sysTeM is sTiLL ALive And WeLL
“I can sweep your living room, Ma’am, but I cannot sweep your garden. 
Someone from another (lower) caste must do that”.
This fragment of a conversation between an Indian maid and her 
Western employer reveals many things. Despite some waning in India’s 
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caste system, it is still alive and well, even in a big city like New Delhi. The 
caste system is more complex than the simple four groups presented in 
introductions to Indian society. And it continues to divide society, restrict-
ing opportunity for large numbers of Indian citizens and preventing the 
nation from realizing its full human potential.
Academics are still debating the origin of India’s caste system. All soci-
eties are of course shaped by social stratification, and that was more marked 
before modernization. India’s caste system has now endured longer than 
most others, and seems more rigid. Some argue that it became more rigid 
under British colonial rule, with the British appointing only upper-caste 
members to its colonial government.
The caste system is typically classified into four castes, namely, Brahmins 
(priests), Kshatriyas (warriors), Vaishyas (merchants) and Shudras (arti-
sans). Dalits or untouchables were excluded from this classification. In 
reality, there are thousands of sub-castes. And even within the Dalit, who 
account for over 200 million of India’s total population 1.3 billion, there 
are reportedly more than 900 sub-castes.
The term Dalit means in Hindu “ground”, “suppressed”, “crushed” or 
“broken to pieces”. Traditionally, Dalits have worked in “impure” occupa-
tions involving leatherwork, butchering, removal of rubbish, animal car-
casses, and cleaning streets, latrines and sewers. Hence, there is an 
argument for separating them from other castes. While upper castes were 
happy to employ Dalit for these tasks, even today some Dalits are keen to 
keep their monopoly over these occupations.
Discrimination against lower castes is illegal under India’s constitution. 
And since 1950, the government has implemented a number of  affirmative 
action initiatives to improve socio-economic conditions, such as college 
entry quotas and job reservations. There certainly has been much progress 
in the situation of Dalits, especially in the urban environment. Some Dalit 
success stories include Ram Nath Kovind who was elected as India’s 14th 
president in July 2017. Kovind is the second Dalit to become Indian presi-
dent, after K. R. Narayanan who held office from 1997 to 2002. In addi-
tion, K. G. Balakrishnan was Chief Justice, Mayawati Kumari was Chief 
Minister of Uttar Pradesh and Meira Kumar was the first female speaker of 
the Indian parliament.
Today, Dalits are doing much better than before in terms of education, 
health and poverty. Inter-caste marriage is also increasing, though limited 
in this country where arranged marriages are still all too common. Despite 
these positive trends, Dalit poverty is twice the national average and dis-
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crimination on the ground remains endemic, especially in rural areas 
where most Indians live. In parts of India, Dalit communities are still 
denied access to community water sources, denied service by barbers, 
served tea in separate cups, barred from entering shops, excluded from 
temples and prevented from taking part in community religious and cer-
emonial functions. Not surprisingly, most people of low-caste background 
remain low in the social order today, and most of those from the higher 
castes are still top of the social pecking order today.
In 2007, the UN found that “de facto segregation of Dalits persists” 
and highlighted systematic abuse against Dalits including torture and 
extrajudicial killings, an “alarming” extent of sexual violence against Dalit 
women, and caste discrimination in post-tsunami relief.24 It called for 
effective measures to implement laws on discrimination and affirmative 
action, and sought proper protection for Dalits and tribal communities 
against acts of “discrimination and violence.” Human Rights Watch 
reports that Dalits endure segregation in housing, schools and access to 
public services.25 They are denied access to land, forced to work in degrad-
ing conditions and routinely abused at the hands of the police and upper- 
caste community members who enjoy the state’s protection.
Manmohan Singh became the first sitting Indian prime minister to 
openly acknowledge the parallel between the practice of “untouchability” 
and the crime of apartheid. Singh described “untouchability” as a “blot on 
humanity” adding that “even after 60  years of constitutional and legal 
protection and state support, there is still social discrimination against 
Dalits in many parts of our country.”
Human Rights Watch documents how Indian schools persistently dis-
criminate against Dalit, tribal and Muslim children, denying them their 
right to education.26 Four years after an ambitious education law went into 
effect in India guaranteeing free schooling to every child ages 6–14, almost 
every child is enrolled, yet nearly half are likely to drop out before com-
pleting their elementary education because of caste or other forms of dis-
crimination at school.
Another Human Rights Watch report from 2014 documents the coer-
cive nature of “manual scavenging.”27 Across India, “manual scavengers” 
collect human excrement on a daily basis, and carry it away in cane baskets 
for disposal, despite long-standing legislation and government policy to 
end manual scavenging. More than 1.3 million Dalits—mostly women—
clear human waste from dry pit latrines, while men do the more physically 
demanding cleaning of sewers and septic tanks. The report describes the 
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barriers people face in leaving manual scavenging, including threats of 
violence and eviction from local residents but also threats, harassment and 
unlawful withholding of wages by local officials.
In many ways, the next phase of the Asian Century could well belong 
to India, which will become Asia’s most populous country in 2022, and is 
the world’s fastest-growing large economy. But for India to realize its 
great potential, it will be necessary to address very seriously its discrimina-
tion, prejudice and persecution of lower castes, women, indigenous peo-
ple and also religious minorities, especially Muslims.
Before we complete our quick overview of India’s caste system, please 
don’t think that it is the only country with an untouchable class. Japan 
has a similar outcast group, the Burakumin, who are at the bottom of the 
Japanese social ladder. Like in India, the Burakumin worked in occupa-
tions like executioners, undertakers, workers in slaughterhouses, butchers 
or tanners. Japan’s Burakumin can still be subject to discrimination espe-
cially in the context of marriages, for which background searches are 
often made. A high-profile case of discrimination was that of Hiromu 
Nonaka, a Chief Cabinet Secretary, a natural candidate for prime minister 
in the 1990s, who was reportedly sidelined because of his Burakumin 
origin.
* * *
Discrimination, prejudice and persecution are some of the social ills that 
are holding back Asia’s economic and social development. In the next 
chapter, we will explore another social issue, the demographic dilemmas 
that afflicting both Asia’s rapidly aging societies and those with large youth 
bulges entering labor market.
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CHAPTER 7
Solving Asia’s Demographic Dilemmas
Japan has a new breed of modern young women, the “parasaito”, accord-
ing to Michael Zielenziger.1 These women choose career over marriage 
and family, despite Japan’s endemic gender discrimination in the work-
place. They live with their parents well into their twenties and thirties, and 
their favorite pastimes are shopping, traveling abroad and living for the 
moment. He refers to this as the “womb strike”.
Fundamental changes have also swept through Japanese society. Until 
the 1970s, marriages were often arranged. For example, in Japanese com-
panies and government ministries, one of the responsibilities of a senior 
(“sempai”) was to find a wife for his junior (“kohai”). As recently as 1982, 
three in ten marriages were arranged. With modernization, there has been 
a decline in matchmaking, which means that young Japanese may have 
more difficulty meeting each other. The dramatic rise in non-regular 
employment is also changing the nature of working relationships in Japan.
Social relations in Japan would also be affected by its “homosocial soci-
ety” says Zielenziger. Social life for most Japanese men involves drinking 
with other male colleagues. You only have to walk the streets of Tokyo to 
see salarymen drinking and eating together. At the same time, fancy res-
taurants and tea salons are full of well-dressed ladies gossiping together. 
This is why the Japanese government has been increasing its sponsorship 
of spouse-hunting events (“konkatsu”) to encourage more people to 
marry and lift the nation’s fertility rate.
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Then there are more than half a million young Japanese who you don’t 
see, the social recluses (or “hikikomori”) who avoid contact with the out-
side world and rarely leave the house. According to a Japanese cabinet 
survey, there would be 541,000 young Japanese aged between 15 and 39 
leading such lives, who have not left their homes or interacted with others 
for at least six months.2 The hikikomori are typically men, rather than 
women, who suffer from anxiety or depression due to the shame associ-
ated with an experience of failure in life or the high expectations that 
society placed on them. They typically spend their days playing computer 
games and reading manga (Japanese comic books).
These socio-psychological factors would be some of the causes of the 
drop in Japan’s fertility rate from 2.1 children per woman in 1974 to 
around 1.4 today, which is driving the aging of Japanese society and the 
decline in its population, thereby threatening the nation’s prosperity (a 
fertility rate of 2.1 is necessary to maintain a country’s population size and 
is called the “replacement rate”).
China’s fertility rate, which fell from around 2.7 children per woman in 
the 1980s to around 1.7 today, has also been affected by socio- psychological 
factors, in particular China’s “leftover women” (“sheng nu” in Mandarin).3 
As everywhere, Chinese women are now much better educated and more 
career oriented than in the past. One consequence is that one in five 
Chinese women in the 25–29 age group would still be unmarried today in 
China. But even though China suffers from a shortage of women, as dis-
cussed in the previous chapter, the vast majority of Chinese men believe 
that women should be married by the age of 27. And what’s more China’s 
notoriously macho men prefer to “marry down” in terms of age and edu-
cational attainment. In practical terms, this means that that A-quality guys 
will look for B-quality women, B-quality guys look for C-quality women 
and C-quality men look for D-quality women.
The net result of all of this is that China’s best educated and most suc-
cessful women find themselves unmarried (and so are China’s least privi-
leged men). And like Japan’s parasaito girls, China’s leftover women are 
not necessarily unhappy about that. While they are typically not against 
marriage, they also have other aspirations like career and travel. The main 
problem that China’s leftover women have to deal with is the pressure 
from family, friends and even state-run media. In typical Chinese commu-
nist style, the national media seeks to stigmatize and bully leftover women 
into getting married and starting a family. After all, A-quality women are 
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critical to China’s future. As in Japan, some Chinese local governments are 
now in the business of organizing matchmaking events for leftover women.
But there is another demographic reality in Asia. Countries like India 
and Pakistan, where child marriage is still widespread and female educa-
tion weak, have fertility rates of 2.5 and 3.3 children per woman, respec-
tively. These fertility rates may be around half those of 50 years ago, but 
they are still sufficient to keep their populations young and growing. 
According to the UN, the population of India will overtake China’s in 
2022, to become the world’s most populous country.4
The Philippines is another country whose fertility rate is still relatively 
high at 3.1 children per woman. In this country where the Catholic 
Church still casts a strong influence over sex education, the availability of 
contraception and attitudes toward family planning, teenage pregnancies 
are the highest in Asia according to the UN.5 One in ten young Filipino 
women—between 15 and 19 years of age—is already a mother, a figure 
that has not declined over the past two decades, bucking the trend in the 
rest of Asia where teenage pregnancy has declined.
This demographic diversity in Asia between the low-birth and high- 
birth countries creates a great opportunity for mutually beneficial migra-
tion which we will explore later in this chapter. However, the sad reality is 
that demographic-deficit countries like Japan and Korea are not opening 
up sufficiently to this great opportunity, while demographic-surplus coun-
tries, like India and the Philippines, are facing immense challenges han-
dling the colossal youth bulges entering their labor markets. Only Hong 
Kong and Singapore are seriously opening the gates to immigration, 
although only skilled migrants are treated decently in these economies.
But before we explore the issue of mutually beneficial migration, we 
must examine Asia’s demographic transitions, and the manifold challenges 
of population bulges and population aging. Demographic dilemmas rep-
resent one of the greatest risks to the Asian Century.
AsiA’s DemogrAphic TrAnsiTions
East Asia’s most advanced economies—Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, China and Thailand—are in the midst of rapid popula-
tion aging.6 In contrast to the others, China and Thailand will become 
“old” before they become rich. Another group of Asian economies, nota-
bly Bangladesh, India, Indonesia and the Philippines, have massive youth 
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bulges now entering the jobs market. In this section, we will review demo-
graphic transitions sweeping Asian societies.
For much of human history, both birth and death rates were very high, 
such that populations only grew very slowly. But since economic develop-
ment started taking off in Asia, the region has been experiencing major 
demographic transitions, meaning the transition from a high mortality 
and fertility pattern to a low mortality and fertility one, following the 
trend of Western countries in earlier times. The first demographic transi-
tion typically starts as mortality rates fall, especially for infants and children 
thanks to improved hygiene and nutrition as the economy develops. This 
leads to steep increases in the population, as the share of young and depen-
dent people grows.
When this large group of youth advances into working age, this is the 
moment to reap the potential a “demographic dividend”, as youthful and 
energetic workforces can drive their economies up the development ladder 
(the second demographic transition). This effect can be enhanced by a 
decline in fertility rates, due to the influence of urbanization, better educa-
tion for women, improvement in women’s rights and prosperity. This will 
reduce the numbers of dependent youth, and mean that a very large share 
of the population is of working age.
Economies like Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and 
China have all benefited greatly from demographic dividends. Some econ-
omists argue that one-quarter or even one-third of their rapid economic 
growth was due to their demographic dividends. But their demographic 
dividends were not only due to large youth bulges. They also occurred 
thanks to their youth being well educated, and their strongly growing 
economies which created sufficient job opportunities. Economies like 
Bangladesh, India, Indonesia and the Philippines are at this very point 
now. But all the signs are that they will struggle to benefit as much from a 
demographic dividend due to their relatively poorer education systems, 
and also the incapacity of their economies to generate enough job 
opportunities.
When this demographic bulge advances into retirement age, we are in 
the midst of the third demographic transition, whose effect is enhanced by 
increased life expectancy thanks to improved access to health care and 
healthy lifestyles. Population aging, the rising share of senior citizens in 
the population, can act as a tax on the economy, as senior citizens are 
much less likely to work. As Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore 
and China are now all discovering, population aging can be very expensive 
J. WEST
 187
for the public purse, or the purse of the extended family, because of the 
cost retirement income, and health and aged care expenses.
Lastly there is a fourth demographic transition which has surprised 
most demographers. That is where fertility rates fall and remain below the 
replacement rate of 2.1 children per woman, with the result that popula-
tions ultimately decline. Japan has led the world in this context, with its 
population falling from 128 million in 2010 to 127 million in 2016, and 
predicted to fall to 109 million by 2050 and further to 85 million by 
2100,7 with some estimating that before the year 4000 that we would see 
the end of the Japanese race. But Japan is not the only one to face the 
prospect of long-term population decline. A number of other countries 
are in a similar situation, especially many countries from East Europe 
(including the Ukraine and Bulgaria), and Central and Western Europe 
(such as Germany, Greece, Hungary and Italy), along with Puerto Rico in 
the Caribbean.
In the next section, we will explore India’s demographic destiny and 
the challenge it faces in realizing a demographic dividend, before then 
moving onto the other end of Asia’s demographic transitions, with the 
region’s fading fertility and China’s two-child policy.
inDiA’s DemogrAphic DesTiny
India, along with countries like Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Philippines, 
is in the midst of a major demographic transition. Life expectancy has leapt 
from just 41 years in 1960 to 68 in 2015 thanks notably to improvements 
in infant mortality. And while its fertility has fallen dramatically from 
almost 6 children per woman in 1960 to 2.4 in 2015, it still remains well 
above the replacement rate of 2.1.
The net result is that India’s population has boomed from 450 million 
in 1960 to some 1.3 billion today. Looking ahead, India’s population is set 
to overtake China’s by the year 2022 according to the UN, as we men-
tioned above. And by the year 2100, India’s population could be 1.5 bil-
lion, some 50% higher than China’s. Not only will India’s population be 
bigger than China’s, it will be very much younger for much of this period. 
For example, the median age of India’s population in 2030 will be only 
31, while China’s will be 43.
If population is power, then we should be looking more at India rather 
than China.
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The stark contrast between the demographic destinies of China and 
India is very much with us today. China’s workforce started declining in 
2012, while India’s is in the midst of a dramatic expansion. India will see 
an expansion in its working-age population of 300 million between 2010 
and 2040, representing one-quarter of the world population increase for 
this age group. But can India reap a large demographic dividend thanks to 
this large, youthful and energetic labor force? After all, Asia’s successful 
tiger economies like Japan, Korea, Taiwan and China benefited greatly 
from demographic dividends.
There are grounds for optimism, based on India’s experience over the 
past few decades. India’s youthful demography would have contributed a 
substantial fraction to India’s growth acceleration since the 1980s accord-
ing to the IMF.8 And a demographic dividend could add 2 percentage 
points to India’s annual economic growth rates over the coming three 
decades. But the prospects for achieving this also seem daunting. 
Demography is not just a question of quantity. It is also a question of qual-
ity. And the quality of India’s human capital is one of the poorest in Asia, 
despite the brilliance of the country’s elite.
Only three-quarters of the population are literate according to official 
statistics. And according to deeper analysis by Indian economist Santosh 
Mehrotra, only half the nation’s population would be “functionally liter-
ate”.9 Such an estimate is hardly surprising in light of India’s deep poverty, 
malnutrition, bad health conditions and poor education system. For those 
300 million additions to the Indian jobs market to find work, they will also 
need practical skills. But India has one of the lowest proportions of trained 
youth in the world. What’s more, many of this youth cohort will be Dalits. 
India will not reap the full benefits of its demographic dividend while ever 
caste discrimination remains as it is.
India needs to improve its education system at every level. What is 
most critical is to create an effective Vocational Education Training 
(VET) system which would cater to the vast majority of India’s young 
population.10 But VET has received very limited funding, is of poor 
quality, and involves little industry collaboration. The result is that just 
2% of the Indian workforce has skills training in formal vocational educa-
tion. And only another 2 ½% have received any informal vocational 
training at all.
The need for VET is perhaps the greatest for rural workers who are 
flowing into cities in search of opportunity in the construction, manufac-
turing and service sectors. Without any vocational training, these workers 
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end up in the informal sector, working in low-paid jobs and joining the 
ranks of urban poverty. Even today, India’s economy is being held back by 
a large skills deficit. Its jobs market suffers from shortages of skilled labor, 
while unemployment and underemployment are also widespread.
Training is only one side of the jobs equation. India also needs business 
investment to drive industrialization. As dazzling as India’s IT and busi-
ness process outsourcing might be, the sector only employs three million 
people. Realistically most Indians could not find a place in this sector. 
Only more serious industrialization could provide sufficient jobs for its 
growing workforce.
With China now suffering from rising wage costs and a weak demogra-
phy, India has a window of opportunity to become a manufacturing pow-
erhouse. And India has been attracting large flows of foreign investment 
thanks in part to the policy reforms of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 
government. But India will need to maintain the reform momentum, as it 
is also competing with countries like Vietnam, Cambodia and the 
Philippines to attract investment. If India’s leaders are unable to tackle the 
country’s chronic problems, the country will not only miss out on a big 
opportunity. Its demographic opportunity could turn into a demographic 
time bomb. Social unrest in recent years in Arab countries and elsewhere 
shows the social and political risks of large populations of unemployed and 
frustrated youth.
And while India and some other countries face the challenge of manag-
ing large youthful populations, Japan has led East Asia’s development in 
terms of its fading fertility. How did Asia’s most developed economies end 
up in such a quandary?
eAsT AsiA’s FADing FerTiliTy
Japan has led the world into the fourth demographic transition where 
fertility rates below the replacement rate ultimately result in a falling, as 
well as an aging, population. Today, it’s easy to forget that Japan’s fertility 
rate, which is 1.4 children per woman, was over 4 children per woman 
during the 1930–1950 period.
Japan’s experience is not unique in terms of having fertility below the 
replacement rate. Germany’s fertility rate fell below 2.1  in 1971, and 
today is lower than that of Japan, as is also the case for countries like 
Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Poland. In sharp contrast, Australia, 
France, the UK and the US still have fertility rates close to 2. Neither is 
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Japan unique in East Asia where Hong Kong, Korea, Macao, Singapore 
and Taiwan all have fertility rates below Japan.
What are the main factors behind East Asia’s collapsing fertility? This is 
a strange trend according to evolutionary biologists. Normally natural 
selection produces individuals who are good at converting their resources 
into lots of fertile descendants.
Fertility rates have fallen dramatically the world over reflecting changes 
in values and the status of women, education, industrialization, urbaniza-
tion and the advent of contraception. As we discussed above, a major 
reason why Japan’s fertility rate has fallen so low is that as Japanese women 
have become more educated, they are also more interested in working, 
but the Japanese work environment is not very compatible with raising a 
family. In this context, the declining rate of marriage in Japan is also often 
attributed to the reluctance of educated Japanese girls to assume all the 
traditional responsibilities of a Japanese wife, namely raising the family, 
looking after the husband, running the household and tending to 
in-laws.
It is also reported that the phenomenon of “hypergamy” is common, 
where educated Japanese girls will only marry men of equal or higher edu-
cation or income status to themselves. Hypergamy is becoming  increasingly 
difficult to practice since Japanese girls now achieve, on average, better 
education results than boys. And the growing prevalence of precarious, 
non-regular work situations provides a great disincentive for having a fam-
ily. Only 27% of men in their thirties with non-regular jobs are married, 
compared with 66% of men the same age with permanent jobs, according 
to government statistics.11 And even when they marry, Japanese girls now 
tend to do so at higher age which affects their reproductive behavior.
Some social commentators argue that Japan is suffering from a “celi-
bacy syndrome” or “sekkusu shinai shokogun”. A survey in 2011 found 
that 61% of unmarried men and 49% of women aged 18–34 were not in 
any kind of romantic relationship, a rise of almost 10% from five years 
earlier.12 Another study found that one-third of people under 30 had never 
dated at all.
Many of the same factors, notably the incompatibility of work and fam-
ily life, are relevant to East Asia’s other low-birth countries. Korean women 
seem to have much in common with their Japanese counterparts. They are 
less and less interested in marriage, with a recent government survey 
revealing that only 46% of Korean young women being interested in mar-
riage, in contrast to 63% for young Korean men.
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Soaring housing costs are another factor pushing down fertility in the 
small, tropical and highly urbanized Chinese-speaking islands of Hong 
Kong, Macau, Singapore and Taiwan. And like Japan, despite being Asia’s 
most developed economies, these “Chinese islands” are suffering from 
yawning income inequality and growing poverty in the midst of prosper-
ity, which are having an adverse effect on marriage and fertility.
The cost of education is a deterrent to child birth in some East Asian 
countries, none more than Korea. The country’s national obsession with 
achieving high grades means that vast amounts of money are spent on 
private education, especially for after-school tuition. Around three- 
quarters of Korean students undertake after-school education in private 
schools called hagwons, and many students have private tutors as well.13 It 
is not surprising that education fees should be cited as the most serious 
obstacle to having children in a survey undertaken by the Hyundai 
Research Institute.
One factor preventing fertility rates from falling even further in coun-
tries like Korea is the growing “marriage migration”, with China, Vietnam 
and the Philippines being the top sources for Korea’s migrant brides. The 
birth rate among immigrant mothers is higher than that of native Korean 
women reports Katharine Moon from the Brooking Institution.14
What should East Asian governments and societies do about their 
chronically low fertility rates? Japan’s population is already declining, and 
population decline is on the horizon for Korea, Taiwan and China. This is 
having dramatic effects on the economy, society, politics and even interna-
tional relations. All East Asian governments have provided various finan-
cial and other incentives to attempt to revive fertility rates. The Japanese 
and Singaporean governments have even had policies to encourage “dat-
ing and mating”. But none of these policies have had much effect.
At the heart of East Asia’s fading fertility phenomenon is rapid progress 
in the economy and education of women which has not been matched by 
commensurate changes in policies and attitudes in the workplace, the fam-
ily and society at large. We need to have societies which enable us to com-
bine both a work life and a family life. As we discussed in the previous 
chapter, this means major changes in government policy, corporate/work 
culture and family life.
A longer term perspective on population decline is also warranted. Of 
course it seems frightening at first blush, as it evokes images of the possible 
extinction of the human species. But what we may be seeing is only a par-
tial reversal in the world’s population explosion these past two–three 
 SOLVING ASIA’S DEMOGRAPHIC DILEMMAS 
192 
 centuries.15 And there are many benefits that could occur. A lower popula-
tion could ease the immense pressures on the global environment and 
resources like food, energy and clean water that are resulting from the 
combination of a large population and high economic growth. In a world 
with a lower population, workers’ wages may be higher as they become a 
relatively scarce resource.
But the process of adjusting to a lower population will be bumpy and 
difficult. Villages, towns and even cities might disappear. Japan already has 
a burgeoning ghost-town problem. There will also be a transitional period 
of super-aging societies, where small numbers of youth must support large 
numbers of seniors. And countries with declining populations may lose 
political power and feel strategically vulnerable.
We cannot leave the issue of Asia’s fading fertility without looking at 
perhaps the most horrific experiment in social engineering the world has 
ever seen, China’s one-child policy which is now being transformed into a 
“two-child policy”.
chinA’s “Two-chilD policy”
In 2015, when the Chinese government announced its decision to trans-
form its one-child policy into a two-child policy, there was much celebra-
tion in the media. With its rapidly aging population, and declining 
working-age population, demographers and economists had long argued 
that the one-child policy, whatever its initial merits, was no longer useful 
to China. But closer scrutiny suggests that the effect of the policy on 
China’s fertility rate may only have been modest, despite the associated 
horrors of the policy. And that the benefits of a two-child policy may also 
be modest.
How did China get itself into this “demographic pickle”? China’s great 
leader Deng Xiaoping is revered for his role in opening the Chinese econ-
omy to the world. But under his watch, the Chinese government also did 
some appalling things, like the Tiananmen Square massacre and imple-
menting China’s infamous one-child policy.
Population has long been an issue in China. Chairman Mao once 
famously said “The more people there are, the stronger we are.”16 But 
Deng and his experts thought differently, even though China’s fertility 
rate had already fallen from 5.8 children per woman in 1970 to 2.8  in 
1980 thanks to softer efforts to encourage fewer births. So in 1980, they 
implemented China’s infamous one-child policy.
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Like everything in China, the one-child policy was never implemented 
uniformly across the nation. Single women are still not allowed to have a 
child outside of wedlock. Against that, many people have long been 
allowed to have two children, such as ethnic minorities like the Tibetans 
and Uighurs, rural residents whose first child was a girl and couples where 
both parents are only children. This means that the strongest population 
growth has occurred among groups with the worst access to education 
and health services—not a good sign for China’s economic future.
In short, the one-child policy mainly applied to urban dwellers. But 
even here there were always inequities. Families who violated the one- 
child policy law were subject to fines (“social maintenance fees”), which 
the wealthy could usually afford to pay despite their arbitrary method of 
calculation. Another way around the system has been “birth tourism” 
whereby pregnant Chinese women travel to Hong Kong or the US (Saipan 
is the closest US territory to China, and Chinese citizens do not require a 
visa to travel there).
Since poor people could not afford to pay fines or travel overseas to give 
birth, they were all too often subject to horrendous forced abortions, ster-
ilization, contraception and other draconian acts by the family planning 
agency. According to one estimate, there have been 336 million abortions, 
196 million sterilizations and 403 million intrauterine devices inserted 
since 1971 in China.17 There are also many stories of “hidden children” 
(some 13 million were recorded as lacking birth registration in the 2010 
census), transferring excess children to childless couples, infanticide and 
about 100,000 adoptions by Western families. The Ministry administering 
the one-child policy behaves like a spy and police organization, with a 
system of paid informants, “womb police”. Human rights lawyers who 
defend victims of the one-child policy suffer abuses, the most prominent 
case being the blind lawyer, Chen Guangcheng, who escaped prison to the 
US.
There is much debate about the real impact of the one-child policy. 
Official experts claim that it has reduced China’s population (today around 
1.4 billion), by some 400 million.18 It is more likely that it only reduced 
China’s population by about 100 million, a decimal point in such a large 
country. As Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen has argued, 
China’s fertility rate would likely have continued its downward trend in 
tandem with economic development, urbanization and education.19 Most 
other East Asian countries have lower fertility rates than China’s 1.7 chil-
dren per woman—even Thailand’s is lower rate at 1.4. As we discussed in 
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the previous chapter, the one-child policy may have contributed to China’s 
prenatal gender selection in favor of boys. One of the many social implica-
tions of the one-child policy is the “little emperor syndrome” of spoilt 
one-child brats who are found to be “significantly less trusting, less trust-
worthy, more risk-averse, less competitive, more pessimistic, and less con-
scientious individuals” than previous generations.20
The Chinese government’s decision to transform its one-child policy 
into a two-child policy is a positive step. But it is a case of too little/too 
late. Many Chinese urban-dwelling women now would prefer to have just 
one child. In fact, the evidence to date shows only a small rise in fertility 
thanks to the two-child policy. Moreover, Chinese women will still have 
unfair restrictions on their reproductive freedom. And China’s dastardly 
family planning agency will still have too much power over Chinese citi-
zens. There have already been reports of its draconian enforcement of the 
two-child policy.
Indeed, one factor holding back more significant reform of population 
policy was the powerful family planning bureaucracy which employs 
500,000 full-time and 6 million part-time workers.21 It collected over $3 
billion in fines each year, with over $300 billion collected since 1980. 
With the new two-child policy, it is still in business! Some commentators 
like Reggie Littlejohn of Women’s Rights Without Frontiers have argued 
that the one-child policy is a system of social control, masquerading as 
population control.22 And that whether it is a one-child or two-child pol-
icy, it is still a system of social control, which the rich can avoid by paying 
fines, while the poor must obey.
China is in desperate need of sensible population policies to adjust to its 
aging population, already falling working-age population, and the prospect 
of a declining population (its population is projected to peak at 1.4 billion 
in 2030, before falling to 1.0 billion in 2100). But this means widespread 
reforms, not just family planning, to address its demographic challenges.
In the following sections, we will discuss some of the economic and 
social policy implications of population aging.
economic cosTs oF AsiA’s Aging populATions
Population aging started to bite hard on the Japanese economy from 
1995, when its working-age population (15–64) began falling. With less 
and less available workers, labor flipped being a positive to a negative force 
for the economy. Less workers also means lower national saving rates. So 
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Japan’s annual “potential” economic growth rate fell sharply from over 3% 
in the early 1990s, and has been hovering in the 0–1% range over the past 
15 years.23 The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) currently estimates Japan’s potential economic growth rate at 
½% a year. And with Japan’s stubborn reluctance to undertake structural 
reform, there has been no productivity improvement to offset the effect of 
falling labor supplies. Indeed, population aging would have exacerbated 
Japan’s productivity weakness, as history shows that much innovation 
emanates from younger workers.
In other words, Japan’s population aging, and above all the country’s 
failure to respond effectively to the challenge, is making the country rela-
tively poorer. Looking ahead, Japan’s growth potential faces continued 
downward pressure from population aging. The working-age population 
is already falling by more than one million per year and could decline by 
nearly 40% by 2050.
As in many things, Korea is following Japanese trends. Korea’s working- 
age population is set to peak in 2016, at 37 million before declining 
steadily to 33 million in 2030, and perhaps to 22 million in 2060 (total 
population decline is also on the cards, starting in 2030).24 Korea can also 
expect that its declining working-age population will drag down potential 
economic growth.
When Japan was struck by declining working-age population, it was 
already a very prosperous country, with GDP per capita within shooting 
distance of the US. And while it remains a moderately prosperous country, 
it has been slowly slipping down the OECD pecking order in terms of 
GDP per capita. For its part, Korea will be hit by a declining working-age 
population at an earlier stage than Japan. Today, its GDP per capita is only 
about half that of the US, and it declining workforce could see it fall slowly 
further and further behind the US.
But the impact of China’s population on the economy is likely to be 
very much more dramatic. Already in 2012, China’s working-age popula-
tion began its inexorable decline, with a combined decline of 10 million 
over the 2012–2014 period. Some estimate that China’s working-age 
population could decline by 1 1/2% a year over the coming decades, rep-
resenting big cumulative whack. But China is being hit by its demographic 
drama at a much earlier point in its economic catch-up, when its GDP per 
capita is only 26% of that of the US.
Thailand is a curious case where the working-age population is also 
expected to start falling after 2017.25 The country is set to become the 
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“old man” of East Asia, with its senior population (aged 65 and over) 
projected to increase from 8.9% in 2010 to 19.5% in 2030. Thailand is 
being hit by an aging population at around the same stage of development 
as China.
In other words, in contrast to the cases of Japan and Korea, China and 
Thailand are becoming old before they become rich. What to do? The 
reforms that we discussed in earlier chapters—getting better value out of 
global value chains, making the most of urbanization’s potential, and giv-
ing all Asians a chance—would all go a long way toward improving pro-
ductivity and better exploiting Asia’s potential in order to maintain 
prosperity in aging societies. In this context, the Japanese government has 
accepted very little of the advice offered from organizations like the 
OECD and the IMF, or even from Japan’s own distinguished like Masahiro 
Kawai or Naohiro Yashiro. And at this stage, Korea, China and Thailand 
seem to following Japan’s path of inaction.
There is also much that could be done to offer greater work opportuni-
ties to Japan’s seniors, who have the world’s highest life expectancy. After 
all, much of the challenge of aging comes from failure of things like retire-
ment ages to keep pace with rising life expectancy. But in the context of 
Japan’s rigid seniority-based wage system, Japanese companies have a 
retirement age of 60. True many workers are then rehired on irregular 
contracts at a much lower salary. But a much more flexible labor market 
would allow seniors to continue their career much later, making important 
contributions to the economy and society. Korean companies also have a 
rigid labor market with seniority-based pay, which means that seniors are 
pushed to retire at a low age. And similarly in China, the retirement age 
for men is 60, while that of women is only 50. Plans are reportedly afoot 
to gradually lift China’s retirement age in the coming years. And none too 
soon! Fast-aging Asian countries also need migrants, an issue that we will 
take up at the end of this chapter.
The experience of Japan, with over two decades of stagnation under its 
belt, should be salutary to not only China, Korea and Thailand but also 
Japan itself. Undertaking structural reform to lift productivity is always 
important, but even more so in an aging society, where productivity 
improvements can compensate for effects of a declining workforce. But 
postponing bitter medicine seems easy in the short term. Vested interests 
supporting the status quo are always difficult to tackle, be they in a democ-
racy or an authoritarian regime. Unless the Japanese, Korean, Chinese and 
Thai governments seriously tackle the challenge of aging populations, 
J. WEST
 197
their countries will likely wither away. Asia’s demographic dilemmas may 
be the greatest threat to the realization of an Asian Century.
In the next section, we will examine some of the social policy implica-
tions of Asia’s aging populations, notably retirement incomes and health 
expenses. In later sections, we will explore migration, one part of the solu-
tion to rapidly aging populations.
sociAl policy chAllenges oF AsiA’s Aging populATions
It’s not so long ago that the social policy challenges of aging populations 
were a non-issue in much of Asia. For one thing, life expectancy was much 
lower than it is today, and senior citizens made up a very much smaller 
share of the population.
And only back in 1990, some two-thirds of Asians lived in rural com-
munities, where extended families typically supported their elders. Today, 
only one-half of Asians live in rural areas, and this figure is rapidly declin-
ing as people move to cities in search of more opportunities. As urbaniza-
tion proceeds, traditional families and communities are breaking down, 
and being replaced by the nuclear family. While urban migrants send 
financial remittances to their families in rural areas, over time the Confucian 
sense of family responsibility is fading, as lifestyles become more individu-
alistic and Westernized. And as fertility rates decline, and family sizes 
become smaller, supporting one’s family can be an enormous burden, 
especially if you come from a one-child family. Today, a single child can 
find him or herself with the weighty burden of caring for two parents and 
four grandparents, the 4-2-1 problem! The Chinese government has 
responded with a law which requires adult children to visit and care for 
their aging parents.
All Asian governments are now faced with the responsibility of provid-
ing at least some social security, in the form of pensions and health care, to 
their senior citizens. As poverty declines and prosperity grows, senior citi-
zens have growing expectations. And as education and access to informa-
tion improves, governments must also take into account public opinion, 
and govern on the basis of a social contract, even in the case of authoritar-
ian regimes which are scared of social instability. All this means responding 
to the expectations of senior citizens for a better slice of the rapidly grow-
ing economic pie.
So all Asian countries are in the midst of establishing systems of social 
security which can provide government-financed pensions and health 
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care.26 Each Asian country will need to develop their own social security 
systems for their senior citizens in their own historical, political and social 
contexts. This is a challenging enterprise, as it involves a much greater role 
of the state than in the past. Revenues must be raised to finance such social 
security. Systems must be designed which are fiscally sustainable, and 
which are fair and equitable.
Despite the very rapid progress made, social security systems are still 
very underdeveloped in Asia and play a much smaller role than in advanced 
Western countries. Government spending on social protection and health 
only represents 5% of GDP compared with over 20% in the mature 
advanced economies. While only 22% of Asia’s population above the legal 
retirement age receive pensions against more than 80% for advanced econ-
omies.27 For its part, China has been quick to develop public pension 
systems, but these mainly apply to urban rather than rural residents. And 
in the hyper-wealthy Hong Kong and Singapore, public pensions are vir-
tually non-existent. Asian countries have many lessons to draw on from 
the experience of other countries, especially in Europe and the US. But 
closer to home the examples of Korea and Japan, two of Asia’s most 
advanced countries, highlight some of the potential pitfalls.
KoreA’s shAmeFul DemogrAphic DrAmA
Over the past half century, Korea has had the fastest-growing economy 
among the advanced OECD countries. But looking ahead, the OECD 
projects that population aging in Korea will also be the fastest in the 
OECD area.28 Already, Korea’s life expectancy has skyrocketed from only 
53 years in 1960 to 82 in 2015, while its fertility rate has fallen over the 
same period over 6 to 1.2 children per woman. This means that Korea’s 
seniors (aged 65 and over) could jump from 11% of the total population 
in 2010 to 37% in 2050, the second highest among the OECD countries. 
According to one estimate, if this trend continues, Koreans could be 
extinct by the year 2750.
The great shame of Korea’s demographic trends is that the generation 
that created the country’s economic miracle is now suffering, and is unable 
to enjoy the benefits that they so richly deserve. The OECD reports that 
in 2013 some 50% of the population aged 65 and over lived in relative 
poverty, more than three times greater than poverty rate for the nation as 
a whole. This is in sharp contrast to the OECD area as a whole where rela-
tive poverty for the elderly is about the same as for the overall population. 
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What’s worse is that some 30% of the elderly population are estimated by 
the Korean government to be living in “absolute poverty”, meaning that 
their income is below the minimum cost of living. Most of those living in 
poverty today were reportedly comfortable and prosperous in their careers, 
and have since fallen on hard times through the tumultuous changes 
transforming Korea.
Many elderly persons had assumed that their children would provide 
for them in the traditional Confucian manner. But over the past 15 years, 
the percentage of children who think they should look after their parents 
has shrunk from 90% to 37%, according to government polls, even though 
their parents may have invested greatly in their education.29 Confucian 
filial piety is now a waning phenomenon. Perhaps the Korean government 
should follow China in establishing “Confucius laws” which require chil-
dren to visit or provide for their elderly parents.
So increasing numbers of elderly Koreans are now turning to Christian 
charity, as they line up outside churches for handouts of cash or food. And 
violent crime by Korea’s elderly is also rising sharply, according Korean 
police statistics. This is put down to poverty, illness and loneliness. With 
three-quarters of Korea’s elderly poor now living alone, this is hardly sur-
prising. Increasing poverty among the elderly has contributed to a more 
than doubling of suicide among this group over the past decade—from 35 
per 100,000 persons in 2000 to 82 in 2010. The suicide rate among the 
Korean elderly is the highest in the OECD area, with the suicide rate of 
elderly men being double that of women.30
In short, the high poverty rate for Korea’s elderly population is a major 
and urgent social problem, which will only get worse in the decades ahead 
unless something is done. Successive governments have been slow to cre-
ate an old-age income support system that is necessary in a modern soci-
ety. The current system provides only paltry benefits to the country’s 
elderly, and is totally inadequate for dealing with the elderly poverty. The 
new Basic Pension is useful, but not sufficient. The old-age income sup-
port system needs a complete overhaul, including increasing taxes, to deal 
with not only today’s challenges, but also to prepare for the country’s 
prospective “silver future”.
The Global AgeWatch Index, which ranks countries by how well their 
older populations are faring, puts Korea at the lowly position of 60th out 
of the 96 countries covered, way behind Japan at 8th and even the 
Philippines at 50th and China at 52nd.31 If Korea does not get its act 
together, its inability to manage the challenges of its aging population will 
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result in not only a broken society but also a broken economy. This would 
be a sad ending to the “miracle on the Han River”.
We will now turn to the case of Japan where social welfare for the 
elderly, though not particularly generous, has driven Japan’s national gov-
ernment debt to world record levels.
JApAn’s silver DemocrAcy
Japan’s gross public debt has skyrocketed from 70% of GDP in 1992 to 
220% in 2016 following 22 years of budget deficits, reports the OECD. 
And the main driver has been the doubling as a share of GDP of public 
social spending, most of which goes on pensions, long-term care and 
health for senior citizens.32 Social spending now accounts for more than 
half of Japan’s general government spending. Looking ahead, unless 
something is done, Japan’s public debt could be heading over 600% of 
GDP by 2060!
Some say that this is no big deal. Some 90% of public debt is held by 
Japanese institutions, and with low interest rates, the servicing of this debt 
is not such a great burden. But the OECD is quite rightly worried that at 
some point markets could lose confidence in Japan. Interest rates could 
shoot up, adding further to the budget deficit and debt. Although loyalty 
is a prized Japanese virtue, it may not last forever among Japanese inves-
tors. This could lead to capital flight.
Japan desperately needs a serious “plan” to bring its debt under control 
which should include bringing public social spending under greater con-
trol. Lifting the retirement age (currently 65 for men and 63 for women) 
for receiving public pensions would be a great help. This should be no 
great burden since Japan still has the world’s highest life expectancy at 81 
for men and 87 for women. There is also much that could be done to cut 
back on public health expenditure. Japanese seniors spend enormous 
amounts of time in expensive hospitals, but often for long-term care rather 
than medical attention. It is a waste of money to use expensive hospitals as 
hostels for seniors who are looking for sociable company. And the cost of 
pharmaceuticals could also be cut back by greater use of generics, for 
example.
While it is scandalous that Japan’s seniors should be bankrupting the 
country, it is even more scandalous that the working population should be 
financing this highway robbery. After all, Japan’s seniors are the wealthiest 
segment of Japan’s population. This is a case of “intergenerational 
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 injustice”, one generation (Japan’s seniors) ripping off another generation 
(Japan’s working-age population), while Japan’s working-age population 
has been suffering from growing poverty and inequality.
Japan is an “intergenerationally unjust” country, ranking the second 
worst after the US among 29 advanced OECD countries, according to a 
study by Germany’s Bertelsmann Stiftung, that looks at its environmental, 
economic-fiscal and social aspects.33 The study assesses unfair burdens of 
policy outcomes and their legacies for future generations, and examines 
the extent to which current socio-economic policies reflect a bias toward 
today’s older generation.
Not surprisingly, Japan ranks the worst of all 29 countries for its public 
debt. Each Japanese child (between 0 and 14 years old) bore a crushing 
$794,000  in public debt in 2011. The burden of Japanese children is 
more than 2 ½ times that of Italy and Greece, the next two worst cases. 
Japan also scores poorly for other criteria like the strong bias of public 
social spending toward the elderly, and child poverty which restricts future 
economic and social opportunities.
In other words, Japan has been maintaining its wealth and prosperity at 
the expense of its children and succeeding generations. How could a 
country like Japan which, to outside Western eyes, seems to have such a 
cohesive society, be one of the world’s worst countries when it comes to 
socio-economic justice between generations?
Japan’s intergenerational injustice is a product of the country’s “silver 
democracy” or gerontocracy.34 In other words, Japan’s large senior popu-
lation has a large and dominant voice over the nation’s politics. The share 
of Japanese voters over 60 years old has more than doubled to 44% over 
the past three decades, while the share of voters in their twenties has fallen 
from 20% to 13% since 1980.35 This effect is magnified in rural areas, 
which have smaller population sizes and are dominated by senior citizens. 
And lastly, senior citizens, who know very well their interests, also have a 
much higher voting turnout than younger citizens.
In short, this means that it would be electoral suicide for any govern-
ment to propose a substantial cutting of benefits for seniors, especially if 
more benefits were to be allocated to the working-age population suffer-
ing from poverty and inequality. Many ideas have been put forward to 
address these issues. Political leaders could appeal to youth to become 
more involved in politics. The education system could seek to promote 
greater political literacy among youth. Leaders could undertake a cam-
paign to better inform seniors of the issues at stake, and appeal to their 
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reason and altruism. Electoral boundaries could be redrawn more fairly to 
reduce the influence of seniors in rural districts. Voting rights could be 
allocated to parents by the number of their children.
But advancing any of these ideas would take great political leadership, 
something for which Japan is not well known. It is difficult to see Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe investing himself in such a campaign, when he is fully 
occupied by security issues and Abenomics. The other fundamental prob-
lem is that any changes to Japan’s silver democracy would require the 
agreement of the country’s seniors, something which is unlikely in 
Confucian Japan where seniors take themselves very seriously!
We will now turn to the issue of immigration in Japan and Korea which 
could help these countries solve their demographic dilemmas.
JApAn’s immigrATion imperATive
Immigration has become a topic of lively debate in Japan over the past 
couple of decades, especially since its working-age population began 
declining in 1995. And Japan’s foreign-born population has indeed 
increased from about 1% of the total population in 1990 to 2% today. But 
Japan has the lowest foreign-born population, as a share of the total, of all 
the advanced OECD countries except for Mexico. It has always been 
averse to immigration due to the notions of cultural uniqueness and 
homogeneity that pervade Japanese thinking.
Japan’s immigration policies remain highly restrictive for lower skilled 
migration. And while Japan is very welcoming, in policy terms, to highly 
skilled migration, the country has had difficulty attracting such migrants. 
Many of them choose Hong Kong or Singapore instead. Japan ranked a 
mere 48th out of 60 countries for its “attractiveness to foreign-born highly 
skilled professionals” in a survey by Switzerland’s International Institute 
for Management Development.36
The most dynamic response to Japan’s immigration imperative has 
been an internship program which ostensibly gives people from develop-
ing countries the opportunity to learn skills they could bring back home. 
According to the Japanese government, there were close to 200,000 
interns in Japan at end-2015, an increase of about 15% over the previous 
year, with China, Vietnam and the Philippines being the biggest sources. 
But as the US government has observed, this program “has effectively 
become a guest-worker program” as many interns are “placed in jobs that 
do not teach or develop technical skills”, and “some of these workers con-
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tinued to experience conditions of forced labor.”37 Japan’s labor ministry 
has also found that abuses such as the failure to pay adequate overtime and 
subjecting workers to unsafe conditions are rampant in this program.38
With the continued decline in Japan’s working-age population, the 
country is now beset with labor shortages which are adversely affecting 
economic growth, as the IMF has argued.39 According to a study by Daiwa 
Institute of Research, there would be labor shortages in the 
340,000–660,000 range during FY 2015 and FY 2016, which are cumu-
latively cutting GDP by some 2%.
According to a survey by the Manpower Group, 81% of Japanese firms 
are having difficulties in filling jobs in 2014. This is the highest of all the 
countries surveyed. Japan’s labor shortages are most pronounced in con-
struction, health care, home service and long-term care, as well as restau-
rants. This presents a particular challenge for the reconstruction following 
the 2011 triple disaster (earthquake, tsunami and nuclear meltdown), and 
also with regard to preparing for the 2020 Olympic Games.
The corporate sector and some commentators have been arguing for 
greater openness to immigration. The government’s “Abenomics” pro-
gram also includes a policy to increase the utilization of foreign workers. 
The government has implemented some measures for highly skilled for-
eign professionals and for lengthening the stay of internship migrants 
from three to five years. But these responses remain very modest.
Looking ahead, there is little end in sight to Japan’s labor-shortage 
problems. Under one scenario, the Japanese government is projecting the 
labor force to shrink from 66.3 million in 2010 to 56.8 million in 2030, 
with economic growth remaining near zero. The Japanese government 
needs to abandon its ad hoc, reactive approach to immigration. It should 
develop a comprehensive immigration policy as an integral part of the 
country’s medium term growth strategy.
Taking this step is all the more important as immigration is an impor-
tant complement to other policy issues. This applies nowhere more than 
on Abe’s signature policy issue—“womenomics”. As we mentioned ear-
lier, enhancing women’s participation in the economy is constrained by 
restrictions on immigration of home service and care workers. That makes 
it difficult for Japanese women to combine work and family life.
Entrepreneurship and innovation are two other areas where Japanese 
performance has been relatively weak. According to the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), Japan’s entrepreneurial activity has 
been very low since GEM started collecting data in 1999. In 2014, Japan 
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ranked second lowest among the more than 100 countries surveyed (com-
ing just before Surinam). Many studies have shown that well-managed 
immigration can be a powerful source of entrepreneurship and innova-
tion. Where would Silicon Valley be without its immigrants?
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s ambitious target of doubling the stock of 
foreign direct investment into Japan from the woefully low 4% of GDP 
could also be facilitated by greater openness to immigration. Many immi-
grants arrive with a stock of assets for investment, and can also be useful 
workers for international companies requiring bilingual staff. And at a 
time when Japan is seeking to court more diplomatic friends in the Asian 
region, in the context of geopolitical rivalries, one important friendship 
gesture would be greater openness to immigration.
Given its concern about the cultural suitability of potential migrants, 
Japan should also make greater efforts to facilitate the integration of its 
international students into the economy following their graduation. After 
a few years study, they are usually at ease with the Japanese language and 
cultural customs. But less than 10% of Japan’s international students cur-
rently seek working visas. Targeting international students as potential 
immigrants might also improve the attractiveness of Japan as an interna-
tional education destination.
Japan could also enhance its position as a responsible stakeholder in the 
international community by reforming its closed-door refugee policy. Few 
nations are as financially generous as Japan in financing international relief 
efforts for persons displaced by war, civil strife and natural disasters. Japan 
is the fourth-largest donor to the UN High Commission for Refugees, 
with a grant of $182 million in 2014. Conversely, few nations are as 
miserly as Japan in providing physical asylum to refugees. In 2016, the 
Immigration Bureau only approved 28 of the 10,901 applications (0.26% 
of total) for refugee status.40
Is it realistic to think of Japan opening up to immigration as a potential 
source of economic revitalization?
After all, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and many parts of his government 
remain steadfastly against having an immigration policy, citing the social 
problems experienced in Europe with large-scale immigration. Against 
that, some government ministers like Shigeru Ishiba and Taro Kono have 
recently spoken out in favor of increased immigration.41 And a recent sur-
vey shows that Japanese public opinion may be changing, as 51% of 
Japanese respondents said they support Japan accepting foreigners who 
want to settle, while 34% were opposed to expanding immigration.42
J. WEST
 205
Without more serious efforts to address the challenges of its aging pop-
ulation, there is a risk of Japan simply withering away under the weight of 
poor demographics and the burden of massive public debt and increasing 
its vulnerability to the growing fragility of its regional security environ-
ment. A well-designed immigration strategy could make an important 
contribution to Japan’s future.
TowArD A mulTiculTurAl KoreA
Unlike its neighbor Japan, Korea has accepted a dramatic increase in 
immigrants. In 1990, Korea had only 50,000 foreign residents, represent-
ing just 0.1% of the population. By end-2016, this number had leapt to 
2.1 million or 4% of the total population. By the year 2020, foreigners 
could constitute about 5% of the total Korean population, and 10% by the 
year 2020, according to Brookings’ Katherine Moon.43 According to a 
report by the Korea Economic Research Institute, Korea might need up 
to 15 million migrants by the year 2060.44 But in contrast to the past, 
Korea will also need to attract highly skilled and educated foreign workers, 
as do Hong Kong and Singapore, in order to maintain its economic 
dynamism.
Who make up Korea’s foreign population, and by what means did they 
arrive in Korea? Korea’s foreign population covers students, white-collar 
workers, migrant workers in agriculture, low-end industries and service 
jobs, undocumented workers and foreign brides. Migrants from China, 
usually ethnic Koreans, are the most important group, accounting for 
around 40% of total. There is also a growing number of North Korean 
defectors, with some 30,000 reportedly living in the South today.
There have been several programs facilitating the arrival of Korea’s 
migrants.45 In the early 1990s, there was the Industrial Trainee System. 
Then from the 2000s, the Employment Permit System (EPS) has permit-
ted the entry of migrants from Southeast and Central Asia to work in 
labor-shortage industries like agriculture and stockbreeding, fishery, con-
struction and manufacturing. Many of Korea’s farming villages are now 
highly dependent on foreign labor. The EPS is in reality a guest-worker 
program, with little hope of nationalization, which only allows migrants to 
work for a limited number of years. EPS guest-workers are not allowed to 
bring family members and are only allowed to change jobs with the con-
sent of their employer, leaving many trapped and highly vulnerable to 
abuse.
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Marriage migration constitutes another avenue for migration to Korea. 
This enables a range of Korean men, such as agricultural workers, the 
urban poor or lower-middle-class bachelors or divorces, to find wives. 
Most foreign brides come from China (Korean ethnics), the Philippines, 
Thailand and Vietnam. Marriage migration is one of the very few paths to 
Korean naturalization. Marriage migration has become necessary because 
less and less Korean girls are now interested in marriage. Only 46% of 
Korean girls are interested in marriage, compared with 63% for Korean 
males, according to a recent survey. In more recent years, there has been 
an influx of professional expats, foreign teachers and international stu-
dents. Some students are reportedly attracted by Korea’s vibrant pop cul-
ture scene.
Today, there are over 820,000 people (including 300,000 foreign 
spouses) belonging to multicultural families in Korea, a figure which has 
more than doubled over the past eight years, reports Katherine Moon. 
Children born with at least one Korean parent are automatically granted 
Korean citizenship. In rural areas, about 40% of new marriages per year are 
between a Korean male and a foreign-born female. And for the Korean 
nation as a whole, some 10% of marriages are multicultural.
Despite these new trends toward a multicultural Korea, “New Koreans” 
suffer from discrimination by the larger society, and from economic 
 insecurity and socio-cultural marginalization. Korean businesses are free 
to refuse to serve foreigners, something which is not uncommon. Korean 
identity has long been based on notions of racial and ethnic purity. To put 
it bluntly, racism is a big problem in Korea, despite reports of Koreans 
becoming somewhat more accepting of foreigners.
The impact of discrimination is particularly disturbing for children of 
mixed marriages, very many of whom suffer greatly and do poorly at 
school. Many multiracial children have difficulty speaking Korean, because 
their mothers lack fluency. Over time, this could become a major problem 
unless addressed, as the immigrant mothers have a very much higher birth 
rate than natives. Other problems are domestic abuse of migrant wives by 
their Korean family members and labor or marriage brokers. This is creat-
ing diplomatic issues with countries like Vietnam. There have been some 
limited positive developments. In 2012, Jasmin Barcunay Lee, a 
Philippines-born immigrant, was the first naturalized Korea to win a seat 
in the National Assembly. Over the years, the government has imple-
mented a number of policies to facilitate the economic and social integra-
tion of migrants. It even promotes the idea of Korea becoming a 
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multicultural society. And foreign residents were given voting rights in 
2006, the first Asian country to do so.
The Korean government has however been taken to task by the UN for 
not having comprehensive anti-discrimination laws, and for the country’s 
racism and xenophobia.46
“As Korean society becomes more exposed to foreigners and migrant 
workers living in the country, it is important to continue addressing the 
issue of racism, xenophobia and discrimination,” said Mr. Ruteere, UN 
Special Rapporteur on racism. Mr. Ruteere noted that comprehensive 
anti-discrimination legislation would allow the appropriate institutions to 
play a more significant role in receiving complaints from victims, investi-
gate and issue relevant recommendations for the government to follow 
up.
He encouraged the South Korean authorities to fight racism and dis-
crimination through better education, as well as ensuring that the media is 
sensitive and conscious of the responsibility to avoid racist and xenophobic 
stereotypes and that perpetrators are punished where appropriate. He also 
called on the government to improve legislation on employment in order 
to offer a better protection to migrant workers and their families, and 
encouraged the authorities to ratify the International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families.
One of the most egregious examples of migrants’ rights abuses in Asia 
is that of the exploitation and forced labor of migrant agricultural workers 
in South Korea, as reported by Amnesty International.47 Listen to the 
voice of NT, a 35-year-old woman from Cambodia, who was working at a 
fruit and vegetable farm in South Jeolla province. “I was supposed to have 
a day off every other Saturday. But from April to June I worked every day 
without rest from 3am to 7pm. Otherwise rest days were given arbitrarily 
by the boss, who didn’t want me to be free on Saturdays, because he 
didn’t want me befriending other Cambodians. He was probably afraid 
that others would find out about my long work hours.”
Agricultural migrant workers in Korea typically enter under the 
EPS.  Their labor is important to the survival of farms throughout the 
country. Despite this, a significant number of employers exploit migrant 
agricultural workers who endure excessive working hours, underpayment, 
discrimination and poor living conditions. Many are also denied a weekly 
paid rest day and annual leave. Severe restrictions on migrants’ ability to 
change jobs prevent many from escaping exploitative conditions. In 
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 addition, the Labor Standards Act excludes agricultural workers from legal 
protections covering working hour, breaks and weekly rest days.
Amnesty’s report reveals how the majority of migrants interviewed 
were trafficked for exploitation and were working in conditions of forced 
labor. Most were coerced into working under conditions to which they 
did not agree, most commonly through threats and violence. Amnesty 
also highlights shortcomings in the redress mechanisms, finding that many 
people who sought help from the authorities were actively discouraged 
from taking complaints forward. Consequently, many unscrupulous 
employers have been allowed to exploit migrant agricultural workers with 
virtual impunity. Until the rights of these migrants are protected in prac-
tice, the EPS will continue to be synonymous with a system of labor 
exploitation, argues Amnesty International.
Amnesty’s findings are supported by evidence compiled by the National 
Human Rights Commission of Korea. Concerns about the treatment of 
migrants under Korea’s EPS have also been raised by a number of UN 
bodies, but the Korean government has consistently failed to implement 
their recommendations. Korea has not ratified a number of relevant inter-
national conventions, namely: the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; and the 
ILO Conventions on Forced or Compulsory Labour, and Abolition of 
Forced Labour.
When compared with cosseted Japan, Korea’s opening to immigration 
to help address its demographic drama is very impressive. But the Korean 
government and many Korean citizens do not treat their migrants as 
human beings, with human rights. They treat them more as a technical 
solution to a demographic and economic problem. Now that Korea has 
been a member of the OECD for some 20 years, it is high time that Korea 
adhered to the values of this organization, notably respect for human 
rights and pluralist democracy. Much more serious efforts to promote an 
open and inclusive multicultural society would not only provide great ben-
efits in terms of social cohesion and stability. It would also foster a more 
creative and dynamic economy.
* * *
Asia’s politics are being buffeted by its demographic dilemmas and a vast 
array of other factors. As we explore in the next chapter, fixing Asia’s 
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flawed politics will be crucial in Asia’s quest for economic development 
and middle-class societies.
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CHAPTER 8
Fixing Asia’s Flawed Politics
“The Communist Party are the lawmakers, but they do not follow the law, 
nor respect the constitution,” once said Chinese dissident artist Ai Weiwei.1 
“The problem is that the Party does not trust people, and is afraid of their 
power … The Party wants to take control of everything, even in areas it is 
incapable of dealing with.” And yet today the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) now seems more firmly in control of China than ever.
AsiA’s DemocrAcy Deficit
Democracy has very shallow roots and many enemies in Asia, and not only 
in China. Indeed, not one Asian country would have a “full democracy”, 
according to the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU).2 Asia’s most demo-
cratic countries—Japan, Korea, India and Taiwan—are classified as “flawed 
democracies”. And not one Asian country would have a “good situation” 
when it comes to freedom of the press, according to Reporters Without 
Borders, a media watchdog.3 The freest press in Asia would be in Taiwan, 
which was ranked only 45th in the world out of the 180 countries cov-
ered, and placed in the “satisfactory situation” category.
In sum, mature democracy is struggling to take hold in Asia, which is 
compromising the lives and freedoms of Asia’s citizens, and imposing 
great costs on the economy as well.
The parlous state of democracy in Asia is perhaps not totally surprising, 
as the region was traditionally governed by communist autocracies, 
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 military dictatorships and paternalistic strong-men. And overcoming the 
past is never easy. But political scientists are right to be disappointed with 
the state of democracy in Asia. There has been a long series of moderniza-
tion theorists starting with Seymour Martin Lipset,4 who have predicted 
that economic development together with rising middle classes, education 
and urbanization would foster democratization.5 And the successful trans-
formation of Korea and Taiwan from authoritarian regimes into democra-
cies raised hopes that other Asian countries would follow suit.
Many have also thought that encouragement from the international 
community, especially from “democracy evangelists” like the US, would 
motivate countries to democratize. Indeed, as emerging economies climb 
the development ladder, they can be attracted to becoming respected 
members of the international community. In the case of Korea, joining the 
Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was 
a great “badge of honor”, as the OECD is the group of rich, developed 
countries which stands for the principles of market economy, pluralist 
democracy and respect of human rights.6
More recently, many analysts have also thought that the advent of the 
Internet could fuel democratization. The Internet and social media are 
providing citizens in many non-democratic countries with unprecedented 
access to information and with effective tools for social mobilization. 
Indeed, Asia’s youth elite is typically tech-savvy, highly connected through 
social media, educated overseas, international in outlook, self-confident, 
and as I have seen through teaching many Asian students, they are all too 
aware of the moral bankruptcy of many of their own leaders.
But democracy is struggling to take root in many Asian countries where 
the preconditions should be ripe for democracy. And democracy is not 
maturing as countries climb the economic development ladder. Traditional 
elites are engaged in a strong rearguard action in their defense of authori-
tarian or single party regimes.7
The poverty of democracy in Asia is clearly evident from the EIU’s 
Democracy Index 2016 which surveys 167 countries. Asian countries find 
themselves in the flawed democracies, hybrid regimes or authoritarian cat-
egories, rather than the full democracy category where most Western 
countries are placed. This index recognizes that there is more to democ-
racy than holding elections (“electoral democracy”). And so it should. 
Asia is replete with countries that administer shonky elections, and have 
weak institutions and rule of law. In addition to the electoral process and 
pluralism, the EIU index takes into account other factors like the 
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 functioning of government, political participation, political culture and 
civil liberties.
To help understand the state of region’s politics, we would like to pro-
pose the following classification of Asian countries:
• Japan and Korea, Asia’s most democratic countries, which are ranked 
20th and 24th respectively by the EIU, are oligarchic democracies 
where big business has a large influence over policy-making through 
collusive relationships with government.
• Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore (ranked 68th, 65th and 70th) 
are pro-business economies which have very open markets, and are 
much more globalized than Korea or Japan. But these countries also 
have very much weaker democratic foundations than either Korea or 
Japan.
• Policy-making in Taiwan (33rd), Hong Kong (68th), Cambodia 
(112th) and Laos (151st) is subject, either willingly or unwillingly, 
to substantial influence from Communist China which is seeking to 
establish a system of client states in its neighborhood. In recent 
times, Sri Lanka and Myanmar have made some efforts to escape the 
tight clutches of Beijing.
• Asia has a large number of weak and fragile democracies which are 
riddled with corruption and burdened by ineffective states, namely 
India 32nd, Indonesia 48th, Philippines 50th, Mongolia 61st, Sri 
Lanka 66th, Bangladesh 84th, Nepal 102nd and Myanmar 113th.
• The military has long played an important role in Asian politics, 
especially in three countries where the military still plays an outsized 
role as it controls civil governments—Thailand (100th), Pakistan 
(111th) and Myanmar (113th).
• Lastly, there are three staunchly authoritarian Asian countries—Viet-
nam (131st), China (136th) and North Korea (167th). While there 
are some forces pushing for more transparency, accountability, rule 
of law and even democracy, these authoritarian regimes remain firmly 
in control with virtually no immediate threat to their viability.
WhAt’s holDing BAck AsiA’s DemocrAtizAtion?
There are many factors which are responsible for the parlous state of 
democracy in Asia. For example, many in Asia’s middle and upper classes 
are not great supporters of democracy, as they have been substantial 
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 beneficiaries of Asia’s rapid economic development, and rising inequality. 
Rather, they are supporters of the status quo, and often fear the possible 
impact of allowing the whole population to have a say in their nation’s 
politics. They often look upon poorer, rural populations as uneducated 
country bumpkins, who represent a potential threat to their privileged 
position.
Some members of Asia’s middle and upper classes (especially from 
China) want democracy and freedom, but achieve this by opting out and 
migrating to countries like the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 
Recent years have seen large flows of Asian migration to these countries,8 
together with massive investments in real estate and illicit financial 
outflows.
The Internet and social media have proved to be two-edged swords in 
the quest for democracy. While they have greatly improved access to infor-
mation, many Asian governments have responded by imposing censorship 
controls on the Internet (like China’s great firewall), by disseminating 
propaganda through the Internet, and by using the Internet for surveil-
lance of its citizens. The Internet and social media are now a dynamic 
battleground where activists are working to get around government con-
trols and where both activists and governments are competing to get their 
messages out.
Desperate elites can also go to enormous lengths to hold onto power, 
as in case of Malaysia with its repeated prosecution of opposition leader 
Anwar Ibrahim. While the ruling party, the Barisan Nasional (BN), always 
wins national elections, its majorities have been declining. So in recent 
years, it has been involved in a dirty and violent struggle to hang on to 
power through “intimidation, electoral fraud and gerrymandering”, 
according to Joshua Kurlantzick.9
Western democracy is painted in a bad light in many authoritarian 
countries, especially in China, with the British referendum to leave the 
EU (Brexit) and the election of Donald Trump to the presidency of the 
US, being cited as evidence of the shortcomings of Western democracy. 
In response to the US State Department’s annual reports on human 
rights across the world,10 the Chinese government issues its own report 
where it castigates the state of human rights in the US.  In China’s 
2016 report,11 it said “Wielding ‘the baton of human rights,’ it [the 
US] pointed fingers and cast blame on the human rights situation in 
many countries while paying no attention to its own terrible human 
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rights problems.” It added “With the gunshots lingering in people’s 
ears behind the Statue of Liberty, worsening racial discrimination and 
the election farce dominated by money politics, the self-proclaimed 
human rights defender has exposed its human rights ‘myth’ with its 
own deeds.”
Most Western governments and business now widely accept and toler-
ate China’s one-party rule and all the human rights abuses that go with it. 
The attraction of China’s big market and growing political power mean 
that most criticism of China is very softly done. Some companies are even 
willing to adapt their products to meet China’s non-democratic concerns. 
Reports that Facebook has worked on special software so it could poten-
tially accommodate censorship demands in China are particularly 
disturbing.
There was a time when most political scientists believed that China’s 
growing integration into the world economy would foster a convergence 
of social and political culture with the West. If anything, the reverse has 
happened whereby Western dependence on Chinese markets, and political 
cooperation for issues like North Korea and climate change has eased 
external pressure on China’s one-party system. And China has been able 
to use other countries’ dependence on its market to impose economic 
sanctions on them to express its displeasure at their actions, as Japan, 
Korea and the Philippines have discovered.
Populism is another political force that is leaving its mark in Asia, not 
only in the US and Europe, and not always to the benefit of democracy. It 
should be hardly surprising that political leaders are appealing to the pop-
ular masses by criticizing traditional elites, with President Duterte of the 
Philippines being the prime example (Thailand’s Thaksin Shinawatra was 
an earlier case). Duterte promised and is now practicing an illiberal form 
of democracy through his murderous war on drugs and crime where 
human rights abuses and disrespect for the rule of law are the order of the 
day.
Against this background, we will examine in greater detail several cases 
of Asia’s flawed politics in the following sections: will China democratize, 
oligarchic democracy in Korea and Japan, the Philippines’ gyrating popu-
lism and military politics in Myanmar and Thailand. In the final sections, 
we will explore the debate about whether authoritarian regimes like 
China’s are more efficient than messy democracies like India’s, and the 
economic benefits of democracy.
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Will chinA DemocrAtize?
There is perhaps no issue that irritates the Chinese leadership more than 
America’s obsession about whether, when and how China will become a 
democracy. It seems natural for America that democracy will be China’s 
final political destination, and that single party rule by the CCP is just a 
transitional situation. It is perhaps part of the American mindset that we 
should all ultimately become like them. But the Communist Party believes 
that it should be in power forever, and is working toward that end.
It is easy for Western observers to underestimate the power and strength 
of the Chinese state. Indeed, China was the first country in the world to 
create a modern state—almost 2300 years ago and some 1700–1800 years 
before Europe—as political scientist Francis Fukuyama has argued.12 But 
it is also true that China has never had the rule of law, by which the coun-
try’s highest political authority should also obey the law. Even today, the 
Communist Party is a law unto itself, and China’s judiciary is highly politi-
cized and corrupt. “Constitutionalism” is a taboo subject in China.
Nor have China’s rulers ever been subject to “downward accountabil-
ity” to the country’s citizens through democratic elections. This situation 
was facilitated by the feudal nature of Chinese society through much of its 
history when the vast majority of Chinese citizens were poor farmers living 
in rural areas. Dramatic economic and social changes have totally trans-
formed China’s political context, as Chinese citizens are now better edu-
cated, more prosperous and urbanized, and they have breathed the fresh 
air of economic freedom and opportunity. The challenge for China’s gov-
ernment has thus been how to adapt single party rule to this new 
context.
Just a decade after Deng Xiaoping began opening the economy, the 
CCP was shaken to its bones by the near-death experience of the 1989 
Tiananmen Square student protests. Now more than 25 years after, the 
CCP still shudders on the anniversary of the “June Fourth Incident”. It 
clamps down on social and other media, and the movement of activists, 
and it exerts a maximum of repression of any possible commemoration or 
even discussion of the event.
China’s rehabilitation following this horrendous massacre took a few 
years. Deng Xiaoping’s “southern tour” of 1992, when he relaunched 
China’s economic reforms, marked the next phase in China’s economic, 
social and political development. The post-Tiananmen phase of China’s 
development proceeded on the basis of a “social contract”. The implicit 
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deal was that the Chinese population would accept the authoritarian rule 
of the CCP because it was very successful in engineering economic growth, 
the key to poverty reduction and prosperity.
This became the basis of the CCP’s legitimacy, “performance legiti-
macy”. And it also earned the admiration of many Western and other 
observers who were impressed with the Chinese government’s capacity to 
make big decisions, and implement large projects like the Three Gorges 
Dam in the face of large opposition and environmental destruction. 
Quashing human rights seemed to be a worthwhile price to pay for eco-
nomic efficiency, especially when compared with the inefficiency of India’s 
chaotic democracy.
Following the Tiananmen Square incident, the CCP further bolstered 
its role as the legitimate representative of the Chinese civilization and peo-
ple with a highly nationalistic discourse. One lesson that the Chinese lead-
ership drew from the Tiananmen Square incident was that the Communist 
Party needed to make greater efforts to promote nationalism to improve 
support for the Party. Students and citizens were taught how the 
Communist Party was leading China’s recovery from its “century of 
humiliation” (from the opium wars to the end of the civil war in 1949).
National victimhood has thus become a key narrative. But victimhood 
has morphed into resentment and the desire for revenge which is evident 
in much of its international behavior from cyber-hacking to claiming sov-
ereignty over the distant South China Sea. China is now not only in the 
midst of an economic recovery, but also the restoration of national pride, 
and the CCP is leading this battle.
The post-Tiananmen period has seen a great expansion in economic 
and personal freedoms. Many young Chinese have been allowed to study 
overseas, especially to the US.  More recently, the numbers of Chinese 
traveling overseas as tourists have grown to the point whereby China has 
the world’s highest number of international tourists, with Japan becoming 
a very popular destination. Chinese citizens also enjoyed increasing access 
to information and participation in social media thanks to the Internet. 
Indeed, during the regime of President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao 
(2002–2012), it seemed that China has loosening up its political controls. 
Premier Wen even made some encouraging speeches on China’s need for 
political reform.
But toward the end of the Hu/Wen regime, and especially under the 
current President Xi Jinping, political freedoms have moved backward, 
repression has intensified and China has become more assertive in its 
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 relations with both its neighbors and the West. China is in the midst of a 
“great leap backward” according to James Fallows.13 “The country has 
become repressive in a way that it has not been since the Cultural 
Revolution,” writes Fallows.
Increased repression is evident everywhere—be it in tighter controls 
over the Internet; instructions to the media that it must “serve the Party”; 
warnings by the Chinese leadership that dissent will not be tolerated; 
stiffer curbs on freedom of expression, association, assembly and religion; 
prosecution and jailing of lawyers and civil society leaders; extraterritorial 
actions against perceived enemies of the regime such as the abduction of 
booksellers from Hong Kong; and discrimination against foreign enter-
prises and all things foreign. Chinese leaders now explicitly reject the 
 universality of human rights, seeing them as “foreign infiltration”.14 And 
the Chinese military’s assertiveness vis-à-vis neighbors has greatly eroded 
trust, increased tensions and seen many countries turn to the US for 
support.
What is behind this great leap backward? Factors driving repression 
include the global financial crisis which highlighted the fragility of China’s 
export-oriented economic model, public disgust at the Communist Party 
corruption and rising inequality, the appalling local environment, shud-
ders at the sight of the Arab Spring and rising social unrest. According to 
one estimate, the number of public protests in 2010 was of the order of 
180,000 and 230,000.15 And while external assertiveness can be used to 
camouflage domestic fragilities, the Chinese leadership also interpreted 
the global financial crisis as a clear sign of the decline of the West, and the 
success of the 2008 Beijing Olympics as symbolic of Chinese ascendancy. 
They also saw US President Obama’s diplomacy-first approach to foreign 
relations as a sign of weak leadership it could take advantage of.
Xi Jinping’s ascension to the presidency of China and head of the 
Communist Party in late 2012/early 2013 was also marred by factional 
infighting and a murderous scandal involving his nemesis, Bo Xilai, who 
was prosecuted and now lives in jail. Xi thus began his presidency with a 
CCP more divided between factions and clans than since Tiananmen 
Square. In his first five-year term at the helm of China, Xi Jinping has 
focused almost entirely on fighting corruption which he believes is a live- 
or- death issue for the Communist Party.
Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has been vast, implicating thousands of 
both flies (low-level bureaucrats) and tigers. Although Xi’s anti- corruption 
drive has merely scratched the surface, he has exposed a complex system of 
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patronage which holds the CCP together. The anti-corruption campaign 
has equally been a strategy for eliminating Xi’s political enemies and rivals 
to “consolidate power”. And in doing so, Xi has accumulated more power 
than any Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping and perhaps since Mao 
Zedong—although many locals think that a comparison with Russia’s 
Putin might be more apt. At the same time, the deeper that the anti- 
corruption campaign digs, the more enemies Xi makes. President Xi has 
also launched his own propaganda campaign in the form of the “Chinese 
Dream”, which Xi has described as the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese 
people … improvement of people’s livelihoods, prosperity, construction of 
a better society and a strengthened military”.
Analysts have been predicting the possible demise of the CCP or the 
impending democratization of China for many years. In 2001, Gordon 
Chang predicted the “coming collapse of China”.16 In 2013, Minxin Pei 
argued that China’s GDP per capita was already well into the “zone of 
democratic transition”, and above those of Korea and Taiwan on the eve 
of their democratic transitions.17 Minxin Pei has also argued that President 
Xi’s war on corruption could hasten the CCP’s fall.18 And in 2016, David 
Shambaugh argued “the Chinese Leninist system [is] once again in a state 
of atrophy and inexorable decline … Hard Authoritarianism is a recipe for 
economic stagnation, social instability, and the political decline of the 
Chinese Communist Party.” Unless there is a return to Soft 
Authoritarianism, which is unlikely, “secular stagnation will continue, the 
reforms will continue to stall, and the CCP will gradually lose its grip on 
power”.19 There is much that the CCP could do to return China to “Soft 
Authoritarianism” or even transfer it into a “Semi-Democracy” like 
Singapore, without even necessarily giving up its monopoly on power. But 
this does not seem to be on the cards.
For its part, the CCP is openly worried that the stability of the Party 
will be undermined by Western ideas and “universal values” like constitu-
tional democracy, human rights, media independence and transparency, 
which it regards as being responsible for the “color revolutions” in Eastern 
Europe and the Middle East. It is also worried about the large flows of 
outward migration by China’s elites, as well as massive capital flight. And 
yet, despite all the doomsdayers, there are also many who believe that the 
CCP will hang on to power for at least the foreseeable future. They argue 
that much of the middle class, which has benefited from China’s economic 
miracle, still support the CCP, and most certainly fear the consequences of 
instability. Further, over 85 million people are members of the CCP, who 
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are important stakeholders in the existing system. The CCP “co-opts” 
into the Party members of social elites, like academics, professionals and 
entrepreneurs. This is a way to neutralize social groups who are normally 
forces for democratization.
China’s internal security service and the People’s Liberation Army are 
arguably strong enough to keep things under control. A massive domestic 
security budget (more than the military budget) is employed to maintain 
social stability. And China reportedly has an “Internet police force” of some 
2 million, who are constantly monitoring, censoring and spreading propa-
ganda on the Internet. Most certainly, President Xi is firmly intent on hold-
ing onto power, and has no intention implementing any democratic reforms. 
Xi has analyzed the demise of the Soviet Union, and concluded that, in 
contrast to Gorbachev, the CCP must stand firm. Any political reform is 
about the CCP reforming itself, not reform of the political system.
What does the future hold for China? Only time will tell. But as David 
Shambaugh said, we should not expect developments in China to be lin-
ear—“Sharp changes of course have occurred with some regularity 
throughout China’s history.” In the short term, we can expect President 
Xi to tighten even more his grip on power. He will be anointed for second 
five-year term at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of 
China in October 2017, when he will also stack the Politburo Standing 
Committee with loyalists. Policy will be geared to achieving the goal of 
“building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and double the 
2010 GDP and per capita personal income by 2020”. And Xi will invest 
great political energy and capital in the 2021 celebrations of the centenary 
of the founding of the Communist Party.
koreA’s corrupt DemocrAcy
The 2017 impeachment of Korean President, Park Geun-hye, and prose-
cution of Lee Jae-yong, the head of Samsung, highlight Korea’s deep cor-
ruption. But they are also testimony to the strength of Korea’s democratic 
institutions.
Korea experienced a horribly authoritarian period in the 1960s and 
1970s under President Park Chung-hee, the father of the impeached 
Korean president. But Korea’s political space was always contested—espe-
cially by two individuals who became president in the 1990s, Kim Young- 
sam, and Kim Dae-jung. And protests by Korea’s well-educated students 
were also a recurrent feature.
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In 1987, in the midst of widespread student and trade union protests, 
designated presidential successor Roh Tae-woo made the historic decision 
to hold elections, which he won. Korea’s democratic transition was con-
firmed by the election in 1992 of President Kim Young-sam from the 
center-right-wing Democratic Liberal Party. This transition was most sig-
nificant in that Kim, a democratic activist, succeeded Roh, who was a for-
mer army general, closely linked to Korea’s authoritarian past.
The 1997 election of President Kim Dae-jung from the center-left- 
wing party, National Congress for New Politics, demonstrated the capac-
ity of Korea’s new democracy to accept the alternance of power between 
right- and left-wing presidents. Kim Dae-jung had survived years in jail 
and several assassination attempts, and is often referred to as “Asia’s 
Mandela”.20 The growing maturity of Korea’s democracy was demon-
strated by the election of another center-left president, Roh Moo-hyun, in 
2002, followed by two right-wing presidents, Lee Myung-bak (elected 
2007) and Park Geun-hye (elected 2012). As Freedom House has 
observed, “Political pluralism is robust [in Korea], with multiple parties 
competing for power and succeeding one another in government.”21
Korea’s transformation from an authoritarian regime to a democracy 
represents one of Asia’s greatest post-war achievements. In the space of a 
generation, Korea moved from being a recipient of foreign aid to being a 
member of the OECD, the club of advanced democracies and aid donors. 
As former OECD Secretary General Donald J. Johnston said, “Korea has 
set an example for other emerging market economies to follow.”22
But Korea’s democracy is still very much tainted by the country’s 
authoritarian past. Freedom of the press is greatly compromised, and get-
ting worse, according to Reporters Without Borders, which ranked Korea 
only 70th in the world in 2016 (out of the 180 countries surveyed), ten 
places lower than in 2015.23 The Park government did not entertain criti-
cism, and threatened media independence. Public debate about relations 
with North Korea is taboo. Korea’s spy agency has now admitted that, in 
the lead-up to the 2012 presidential elections won by Park Geun-hye, it 
had cyber-teams spreading pro-government opinions and suppressing 
anti-government views.
And most troubling, as of March 2016, 74 trade unionists including 
the President of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) 
were in prison. Five hundred and four other KCTU members were charged 
with “obstruction of traffic” in relation to a demonstration held in 2015. 
When Korea joined the OECD in 1996, it committed to reform its labor 
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law to bring in line with the standards of the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO). Yet, basic labor rights, including the right to orga-
nize and to bargain collectively, are not observed in today’s Korea, accord-
ing to Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC) to the OECD. State 
interference in trade union activities remains the norm.
“Regrettably, twenty years after its accession, Korea is still far from hav-
ing built a system of industrial relations based on ILO standards that can 
manage conflict, reduce inequality and ensure social progress. In the past 
three years, repression against unions and the criminalisation of their activ-
ities appear to have returned,” said John Evans, TUAC General Secretary.24
Corruption is also endemic in the highest levels of Korean political and 
business life. Indeed, all of Korea’s democratically elected presidents or 
their families have been implicated in corruption scandals. For example, at 
a time of corruption scandals involving his family, Roh Moo-hyun com-
mitted suicide in May 2009. And President Kim Dae-jung’s historic peace 
summit in June 2000 with North Korean leader, Kim Jong Il, was also 
tainted by suicide. Hyundai’s Chairman Chung Mong Hun took his life 
while he was facing criminal charges for his part in a deal to allegedly pay 
a bribe of $500 million to Kim Jong Il for participating in the summit.
Even by Korean standards, the corruption scandal that brought down 
the presidency of Park Geun-hye in 2016–2017 was bizarre. President 
Park’s close friend Choi Soon-sil, a “Rasputin-esque” figure and daughter 
of a shadowy cult figure, extorted at least $70 million dollars from Korea’s 
chaebols for two of her foundations—allegedly in collusion with Park. 
Samsung, the veritable symbol of Korea, was also dragged into this scan-
dal. In August 2017, its head, Lee Jae-yong, was sentenced to five years in 
prison for bribery and embezzlement charges. Samsung allegedly gave 
$38 million to Choi in return for favors, notably government support for 
a merger of two Samsung affiliates in 2015 that helped Lee inherit corpo-
rate control from his incapacitated father.
President Park’s scandal is even murkier. She was seemingly possessed 
by Choi who is alleged to have dictated or influenced all manner of official 
and personal decisions taken by Park. Choi would have had access to con-
fidential documents and information of the president. The scandal was 
allegedly broken by Choi’s “toyboy” who apparently fell out with her. 
Choi has been charged with abuse of authority, coercion and fraud.25
As this scandal became public from October 2016, there were massive 
protests against President Park every Saturday evening in Seoul for two 
months. On 9 December 2016, the National Assembly passed a motion 
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recommending impeachment of Park. Korea’s leadership was put in the 
hands of an Acting President, Hwang Kyo-ahn. Then on 10 March 
2017, the Constitutional Court unanimously upheld the impeachment. 
Park has lost her presidential immunity and is now being prosecuted in a 
criminal trial.
In May 2017, Mr. Moon Jae-in, head of the left-of-center Democratic 
Party, won Korea’s presidential election. Like liberal presidents before 
him, Moon would like to reopen dialogue and cooperation with North 
Korea, in conjunction with tough sanctions. Although this puts him at 
variance with Donald Trump, Trump’s tough talk seems increasingly 
empty, as virtually all he is doing is begging China to solve his North 
Korea problem.
As a liberal, President Moon will likely be more conciliatory with China, 
to the displeasure of the US, and also tougher with Japan, again to the 
displeasure of the US, which has been encouraging its two Asian allies to 
improve cooperation with each other. At the moment, relations with 
China are tense, as China is objecting to the US’ installation of the 
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, ostensibly to 
protect Korea from missiles from the North. China is concerned that it 
will enable the US to spy into its territory, and imposed economic sanc-
tions on Korea.
As Korean leaders including Park have proposed in the past, President 
Moon will need to break the cozy ties between the chaebol and the gov-
ernment, which are at the heart of Korea’s big corruption problem. One 
heartening point that we can draw from President Park’s corruption scan-
dal is that Korea’s democratic institutions have functioned well, with Park 
having to face up to the will of the people and the rule of law. They give 
hope that Korea could reform its democracy and come out stronger in the 
end. The widespread protests are also perhaps evidence that Korean citi-
zens are democratic at heart, something we cannot yet say about Japan.
JApAn’s oligArchic DemocrAcy
Japan’s oligarchic democracy has much in common with Korea’s, but it 
also has important differences. In its long history as a nation, Japan had 
virtually never been a democracy, apart from a modest experience in the 
1910s and 1920s at the time of emperor Taisho (“Taisho democracy”).26 
Authoritarian, fascist, feudal and/or military regimes were the norm. After 
Japan surrendered in defeat at the end of World War 2 some 70 years ago, 
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the US post-war occupation regime under General Douglas MacArthur 
instituted democracy in Japan. Unlike France, Korea and many other 
cases, the Japanese people did not fight for their democracy. This may be 
why Japan has been a virtual one-party state for much of the post-war 
period, with the right-wing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) holding 
nominal power.
Nevertheless, political power has been substantially exercised by Japan’s 
powerful bureaucracy, which managed the “iron triangle” of bureaucrats, 
business and politicians, that engineered Japan’s miraculous recovery from 
the ashes of military defeat. Today, we may marvel at Japan’s excellent 
infrastructure as testimony to the great efficiency of the iron triangle. But 
public investment in infrastructure also served other roles, notably financ-
ing Japan’s electoral system through kickbacks from construction compa-
nies to politicians, and buying public support for LDP politicians. And 
Japan’s international corporate success stories like Toyota grew up behind 
walls of protection against international competition, which enhanced 
their support for the iron triangle system. While gerrymandering of rural 
political constituencies, and large financial support for Japan’s farmers, 
further bolstered support for the LDP.
The credibility of LDP-led government gradually eroded over the 
years, as a result of a series of outrageous corruption and other scandals, 
and its inability to respond effectively to the bursting of Japan’s bubble 
economy in the early 1990s. In 2009, the LDP was swept from power in 
a landslide electoral victory by the left-wing Democratic Party of Japan 
(DPJ), which won 64% of the parliamentary seats. This change of power 
raised many hopes that Japan had finally become a true democracy. But 
the DPJ’s tenure was a great disappointment. It was characterized by inex-
perience, incompetence, conflict with the bureaucracy which then under-
mined the government, and conflict/misunderstandings with the US 
concerning its military bases in Japan, which are still home to some 50,000 
troops.
Perhaps the greatest blunder of the DPJ government was the purchase 
of the Senkaku Islands from their private owner. As the sovereignty of 
these islands is still disputed with China, this act provoked an outsized 
reaction from the Chinese government, which continues to this day. The 
poor response to the March 2011 triple crisis of earthquake, tsunami and 
nuclear disaster was further evidence of the systemic weakness of Japan’s 
system of governance. As the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent 
Investigation Commission concluded, the nuclear crisis was not a natural 
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disaster, “…this was a disaster “Made in Japan”. Its fundamental causes 
are to be found in the ingrained conventions of Japanese culture: our 
reflexive obedience, our reluctance to question authority, our devotion to 
‘sticking with the program’, our groupism and our insularity.”27 The inad-
equate regulation and supervision of Tokyo Electric Power Company 
(TEPCO), another major cause of the disaster, also highlighted the role of 
the nuclear iron triangle (“nuclear village”), where business and political 
interests were ganging up against citizens’ interests. TEPCO is, for exam-
ple, a large donor to the LDP and other organizations.
In the space of three years, the DPJ had three leaders, which meant that 
there was very little policy continuity and very little was achieved. And so 
it was that LDP was swept back into power in December 2012, under the 
leadership of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. But this was not a real victory 
for the LDP. It was a rejection of the DPJ. The promise of democracy, 
raised by the 2009 DPJ victory, has faded in the distance. The DPJ was 
decimated in the 2012 election and is now a spent force as it won a mere 
12% of the parliamentary seats. The LDP, and its junior coalition partner, 
the “Komeito” Party (a Buddhist party), now govern without any effec-
tive opposition. As in much of the post-war period, Japanese political 
competition mainly takes place behind closed doors between the different 
factions within the LDP, a similar situation to the one-party rule in 
Communist China. And for the moment, the hyperactive Mr. Abe has 
been able to ward off opposition from rival faction leaders.
Although Mr. Abe’s principal mandate is to revive the economy through 
Abenomics, he has in fact spent much more energy on other issues, for 
which there is much less public support.28 Abe has pushed through a 
change in Japan’s post-war pacifist security policy in the area of “collective 
self-defense”, by reinterpreting Article 9 of the Constitution to the horror 
of most legal scholars. This would enable the Japanese military to come to 
the defense of allies, notably the US. Abe’s dream is to revise Japan’s paci-
fist constitution by which the “Japanese people forever renounce war as a 
sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of 
settling international disputes” and that military forces “will never be 
maintained”.
Today, Japan’s democracy is bedeviled by many factors—some old and 
some more recent. Japan has reverted to being a virtual one-party state 
dominated by the LDP and its leader, Shinzo Abe. Japan’s national politi-
cal opposition may never have been weaker than it is today. Japan has 
never had a truly free and independent media, and this continues to be 
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the case. The press clubs (“kisha clubs”) that each government ministry 
operates foster unhealthily cozy relations between journalists and govern-
ment officials, which inhibit critical reporting. The national broadcaster, 
NHK, is now clearly under the government’s thumb. NHK journalists 
have quietly told me they are not allowed to criticize the government. 
Some commentators have suggested that NHK behaves like a national 
broadcaster in Communist China. And like Korea, Japan continues to be 
plagued by high level corruption in the political and business spheres, 
even though at the street level, the Japanese people are perhaps the 
world’s most honest.
Japan’s oligarchic democracy is very costly to the country in many ways. 
Japan’s lost decades since the 1990s financial crisis are the direct result of 
vested interests blocking the necessary structural reforms, and of sluggish-
ness in responding to the unfolding demographic drama. The government 
is reluctant to hold open discussions on national security issues, with most 
important decisions being pushed through behind closed doors. And deci-
sions on questions like the future of nuclear energy are often taken in defi-
ance of public opinion.
Only the Japanese people can make Japan a real democracy by becom-
ing more politically active and assertive. But their society leaves them ill- 
equipped to do so for many reasons. For example, Japan’s deeply 
entrenched culture of social hierarchy means that there is insufficient 
questioning of authority. Its education system is based on rote learning 
and memorization, rather than critical thinking and analytical skills, leav-
ing youth insufficiently capable of analyzing the world around them. 
Fervent nationalism and an exaggerated sense of cultural uniqueness 
inhibit the capacity of Japanese citizens to draw lessons from the experi-
ences of other countries. And Japan’s conformist and conservative society 
is sustained by what Yoshio Sugimoto calls a system of “friendly authori-
tarianism”.29 “Japanese society has various forms of regimentation that are 
designed to standardize the thought patterns and attitudes of the Japanese 
and make them toe the line in everyday life,” according to Sugimoto.
philippines’ populist temptAtion
The Philippines’ modern political history is tainted with populism and 
turbulence. And yet, in the 1950s, the Philippines was one of Asia’s most 
promising young democracies. But the country’s leadership fell into the 
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clutches of President Ferdinand Marcos from 1965 to 1986, who hijacked 
its fragile democracy and instituted martial law for a decade. Marcos and 
his cronies wreaked havoc on the Philippine economy, just at the time that 
Asia’s miracle economies were taking off. During Marcos’ term, national 
debt grew from $2 billion to almost $30 billion, which Filipinos are still 
repaying to this very day. Marcos his family and cronies amassed an esti-
mated $10 billion. Human rights abuses were widespread, as opposition 
figures were murdered and tortured. The Philippines thus became the 
sick-man of Asia.
The populist People Power Revolution of 1986 restored democracy. 
Then in 1998, Joseph Estrada, a former actor, was elected President, as a 
man of the people, with the largest vote margin in Philippine history. But 
charges of corruption saw his political demise in another extra- 
constitutional People Power movement in 2001.
Since the restoration of democracy, the Philippine economy has slowly 
been clawing its way back. The economy improved greatly during the 
presidency of Benigno Aquino (2010–2016), when it has been one of the 
world’s fastest growing economies, with an annual growth rate of close to 
6%. Key drivers of the economy were migrants’ remittances and the busi-
ness process outsourcing sector. The Philippines also experienced a wel-
come boom in foreign direct investment.30 Aquino won plaudits from the 
international community for tackling corruption, and improving gover-
nance. For example, the Philippines was rewarded by the major interna-
tional credit rating agencies—Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, Fitch and the 
Japan Credit Rating Agency—with upgrades in its sovereign credit ratings 
to “investment grade”.
But Filipinos remained rightly frustrated, particularly when comparing 
their country with its neighbors like Malaysia and Thailand which are way 
ahead in terms of GDP per capita and poverty reduction. Lack of oppor-
tunity has pushed many talented Filipinos to find work overseas, all too 
often in jobs well below their skill level and in dangerous countries in the 
Middle East—10% of the population lives overseas. The appalling state of 
the Philippines’ infrastructure is evident as soon as you arrive at Manila 
airport, and then make your way, at a crawling speed through traffic jams, 
to your hotel.
And the Philippines is quite simply a very dangerous country.31 Violent 
crime is a significant problem, especially theft, physical assault, robbery, 
pickpocketing, confidence schemes, acquaintance scams and credit card 
fraud. Carjacking, kidnappings, robberies and violent assaults also occur 
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sporadically. Victims of kidnapping can be beheaded, if their family doesn’t 
pay a ransom. Terrorist attacks can occur at anytime, anywhere in the 
Philippines, including in Manila. Drug abuse and trafficking have been 
major problems in the Philippines, especially the reported usage of 
“shabu”, the street name of methamphetamine.
The regrettable reality is that the Philippines is neither a mature nor an 
effective democracy, and has never had a strong and effective state or lead-
ership. The EDSA People Power Revolution of 1986 only returned to 
power the old Philippine oligarchy which is mainly interested in its pro-
tecting privileges. As Philippine political scientist Richard Heydarian has 
argued, the Philippines’ dysfunctional democracy is dominated by the 
country’s oligarchic elites.32 “The vast majority of legislators (70 percent) 
hail from political dynasties, dwarfing even comparable Latin American 
countries like Mexico (40 percent) and Argentina (10 percent),” said 
Heydarian. And the Philippines’ elites have also been milking the econ-
omy dry in recent years, as Heydarian notes—“76% of newly-generated 
wealth was swallowed by the 40 richest families, the worst kind of growth 
concentration in Asia.”
It is perhaps not surprising that the Philippine people should have voted 
populist firebrand Rodrigo Duterte as their new president in 2016. Like 
Donald Trump, this man of the people, with his tough-talking style, seems 
much more authentic and entertaining than the representatives of the 
establishment. In this feudalistic nation, with an uncaring elite and disen-
franchised masses, personalities have always mattered more than policies in 
national politics. Duterte, also known by sobriquets like “Duterte Harry” 
and “the Punisher”, promised to tackle head on the country’s chronic 
problems of drugs, criminality and corruption. As Mayor of Davao City 
on the southern island of Mindanao for over 20 years, Duterte brought 
peace and security to this city, in the Philippines’ most violent and unsta-
ble region. However, Duterte also admitted to having links to Davao 
death squads which conducted extrajudicial killings of over 1000 alleged 
drug traffickers, criminals, gang members and other lawless elements.
Since assuming the presidency, Duterte has launched his war against 
drugs with a vengeance inviting citizens and vigilante groups to kill crimi-
nals. Various reports suggest that over 8000 people have been killed, and 
many more thousands have turned themselves in. As the US, Europe, the 
UN and others criticized his manifest abuses of human rights, Duterte 
merely responded with threats and insults. He has also been pursuing a 
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more “independent” foreign policy, by forging closer relations with China 
and Russia, and reducing the country’s longstanding reliance on the US.
While Duterte is losing friends in the international community, he is 
very popular at home, where people can already feel an improvement in 
the local security environment. Families and friends of innocent victims do 
not, as yet, seem to pose a threat to his popularity, as most of those killed 
come from poor and powerless backgrounds. Overall, Philippine citizens 
have been willing to trade some of their hard-won human rights and free-
doms for the promise of greater security from a brutal crackdown on 
crime, drugs and corruption in this dangerous country. Filipinos have suc-
cumbed to “authoritarian nostalgia”, as they look back to the mythical 
good old days of strong leadership under President Marcos.
As impressive as Duterte’s war on drugs and criminality may seem, it is 
deeply flawed in many ways. Most victims of the violent crackdown have 
been small-time drug users and sellers, with big drug lords, many of whom 
come from China, escaping scot-free. There have also been many innocent 
victims. And the Philippines does not have enough facilities to treat drug 
users, nor even sufficient jail space to house more criminals. It may be just 
a matter of time before Filipinos decide that wholesale murder is not a 
solution to the nation’s drug problem.
There is another war, a more important one, that the Philippines needs 
to win, and that is the war against poverty, which is a major root cause of 
the Philippines’ drug problem. Duterte does have some constructive pro-
posals, like boosting infrastructure spending. But progress has been slow.
More recently, the fragility of the Philippine state has been exposed by 
the infiltration of Islamic State (ISIS) ideology into the southern island of 
Mindanao, and the capture of the southern city of Marawi by Islamic 
extremists. While Islamic terrorism has long been a problem in the south-
ern Philippines, many observers, including Australia’s foreign minister 
Julie Bishop, are now concerned that ISIS might seek to declare a caliph-
ate in the southern Philippines, and that Southeast Asia could become the 
new battleground against ISIS.
There are also grave concerns that Duterte’s new love affair with China, 
and use of Chinese loans to finance much-needed infrastructure, could 
lead to a substantial rise in the country’s debt, and an erosion in national 
sovereignty, as potential debt bondage could leave the country vulnerable 
to Chinese geopolitical interests. Thailand is another country that has 
been vulnerable to populism and political instability. But its government 
has been more effective in promoting economic development.
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thAilAnD, the lAnD of A thousAnD coups
Thailand’s politics have long been dominated by the military and the 
monarchy, which have ensured that the economy serves the direct inter-
ests of the Bangkok elites (the monarchy, military, the judiciary, the senior 
civil service and business leaders). Governments have typically been kept 
weak and vulnerable, and regularly deposed by the military.
The “land of smiles” has nevertheless enjoyed great success over the 
past few decades. Thailand’s GDP per capita leapt from $4300 in 1990 to 
$16,900 in 2016. The country ranks 34th in the World Economic Forum’s 
Global Competitiveness Index. And extreme poverty has been virtually 
eliminated. Keys to Thailand’s success have been its ability to attract large 
flows of foreign direct investment, especially from Japan, and international 
tourists—despite periodic bouts of instability. And thanks to its “locational 
advantage”, it has been able to attract many corporate regional headquar-
ters. Thailand’s success is particularly outstanding compared with its 
neighbor, the Philippines.
Despite Thailand’s relative success, it has fallen into a “middle-income 
trap”. Like the cases of several Latin American countries before it, there 
seems little prospect of Thailand achieving high-income status. There are 
many reasons for this. Thailand’s education system is poor, as reflected in 
its low ranking in the OECD’s PISA education program.33 It has not been 
able to take advantage of its participation in global value chains to gradu-
ate to higher value added activities. Vietnam, Myanmar and Indonesia 
have recently emerged as strong competitors for Thailand. And it now has 
a very rapidly aging population, and the economy increasingly relies on 
poorly educated migrants.
Moreover, Thailand has a terribly polarized society. Income inequality 
is high. One of the most striking aspects of inequality is the large gaps 
between the poor, rural north and northeast regions, and the Bangkok 
area. And political instability has also been dragging the country down. It 
was against this background that in 2001 Thaksin Shinawatra was elected 
Thailand’s Prime Minister, as a “champion of the poor”, much to the dis-
pleasure of the Bangkok elites. Thaksin himself is not however poor. He is 
an extremely rich telecommunications tycoon.
Thaksin implemented pro-poor policies for infrastructure, education, 
public health, debt relief and microfinance. Most agree that these policies 
bettered the lives of poor rural north and northeastern communities. 
Moreover, Thaksin proved to be a politician who honored his promises to 
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the poor, who still support his party strongly today. Critics of Thaksin’s 
pro-poor policies describe them as “populist” or even vote-buying. But 
there was more to Thaksin than inclusive growth. Aggressive efforts to 
tackle the drug trade involved brutal, extrajudicial violence, and very many 
deaths. High-handed policies in Thailand’s deep south helped fan a  violent 
separatist insurgency. And Thaksin was seen as being extremely corrupt, 
even by Thai standards, for example, by exploiting government contracts. 
In short, Thaksin proved to be a divisive, polarizing figure, who pitted 
himself against the traditional Thai elite.
Thaksin was ousted in a bloodless military coup in 2006. He was con-
victed of corruption, and now lives in exile in Dubai. His proxy party was 
re-elected in 2007. But defections led to a change of government in 2009. 
The Democrat Party, led by Abhisit Vejjajiva, ruled from 2009 to 2011. 
However, in 2011 it lost an election to Thaksin’s sister Yingluck Shinawatra 
and her Phue Thai Party. The reign of Yingluck was also marked by con-
troversy such as accusations of behind-the-scenes interference by Thaksin, 
abuse of power in government appointments, and a flawed and corrupted 
rice scheme that created a national financial disaster, with estimated losses 
of $15 billion.
A major catalyst for further social unrest was a foolishly provocative 
attempt by Yingluck to pass an Amnesty Act that would have allowed 
Thaksin to return to Thailand without having to face a two-year jail sen-
tence for corruption. Yingluck was removed from power in May 2014 by 
the constitutional court, rather than through the democratic electoral pro-
cess. The military then took over in a coup, by one count the 20th coup 
since 1932. One of the reasons given for the coup was the violent civil 
unrest that had erupted between the supporters of the two main political 
factions: the “yellow shirts” (representing the establishment) and the “red 
shirts” (Thaksin and pro-democracy faction). There were rumors that 
royal palace members helped foment these street protests.
But the military’s 2014 coup had a much bigger agenda. First, the mili-
tary was determined to eliminate the Shinawatra family and the red-shirt 
movement from Thai political life (“de-Thaksinification”). It sees majori-
tarian democracy as an existential threat to its dominance of Thai political 
life, since the Bangkok elite does not have the numbers to win a demo-
cratic election. Indeed, Shinawatra-affiliated parties have won all elections 
since 2001. Yingluck was impeached in 2015 and banned from political 
life for five years. The military has substantially eliminated the red-shirt 
movement. The lese-majesty law (defaming, insulting or threatening the 
 FIXING ASIA’S FLAWED POLITICS 
234 
monarchy) is being freely used to curb political dissent and eliminate 
opposition figures. The military government is imposing widespread 
restrictions on freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there many 
reports of human rights abuses. In August 2016, the military government 
pushed a new constitution through a bogus referendum which tightens 
military rule in Thailand. In 2017, Yingluck was prosecuted for her flawed 
and corrupted rice scheme, but escaped the country before the judgment 
was handed down.
Human rights and civil rights activists, journalists and academics are in 
particular subject to great restrictions. For example, outspoken academic 
Pavin Chachavalpongpun, a Thai political scientist based in Japan, received 
an arrest warrant, had his passport revoked and had to apply for refugee 
status in Japan. His family has been intimidated, and the military govern-
ment unsuccessfully asked the Japanese government to extradite him (and 
other similar cases) to Thailand.
Second and most importantly, the military wanted to be in control of 
Thailand during the succession of Thai monarch, Bhumibol Adulyadej, 
who died in October 2016. The King was loved and revered by most Thai 
people and had been a key to national stability, intervening periodically as 
a national conciliator in Thai politics, with the support of the military. The 
major problem for Thailand’s royal succession was that the Crown Prince, 
Maha Vajiralongkorn, could never be like the semi-godlike figure of King 
Bhumibol. The Crown Prince is widely regarded as a playboy, with little 
interest in the royal court. He has not been liked by the Thai people or the 
military.
Thailand needs to establish a genuine majoritarian democracy, based on 
the rule of law, to ensure long-term political stability, and to return the 
country to a path of sustainable economic growth. Economic growth has 
been poor these past few years, averaging only around 3% per annum. But 
successful majoritarian democracy requires several challenging conditions. 
The military should return to the barracks, and no longer intervene in 
national politics. Military intervention in politics is now only exacerbating 
Thailand’s polarized society. The monarchy should also retreat from 
national politics.
Above all, national reconciliation and a new social contract are neces-
sary. The Bangkok elite must recognize that the world has changed. They 
must learn to compromise, share the spoils of economic growth and find 
a new political consensus. Thanks to Thaksin, the poor from Thailand’s 
north and northeast have tasted the benefits of inclusive growth, and many 
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are willing to fight on for social justice. Further, Thailand now has a grow-
ing democracy movement thanks to its emerging middle class and better 
educated population, which has access to the Internet and social media, a 
broader political awareness and desire for political participation.
In other words, Thailand needs a new democratically elected govern-
ment which governs on behalf of the whole nation, based on a new deal 
which is seen to be a fair deal by all major groups of society. But looking 
ahead, democracy’s prospects in Thailand are dim. Duncan McCargo of 
the University of Leeds once summed up the situation neatly when he said 
“I’ve never really been more pessimistic than I am at the moment.”34
militAry hAngs on in myAnmAr
The poor people of Myanmar have lived through a tragic history since the 
country’s independence from the UK in 1948. A young democracy was 
snuffed out by a military takeover in 1960, ushering in a regime which 
virtually closed the country to the rest of the world. This country of 
immense natural resources, which had been the world’s biggest rice 
exporter, descended into corruption and cronyism, with much of the pop-
ulation living in squalid poverty and suffering from appalling human rights 
abuses. The economy was run by the military and its cronies, which plun-
dered natural resources like oil and gas, jade and tropical timber, as well as 
trafficking in narcotics.
Civil war began at independence between the country’s Bamar 
Buddhist ethnic majority, led by the army, and the dozens of ethnic 
minorities living in Myanmar’s mountainous borderlands. Ethnic minori-
ties make up one- third of the country’s population. Control of Myanmar’s 
abundant natural resources is at the heart of the conflict. The military 
regime virtually destroyed the country’s economy, infrastructure, institu-
tions and society.
Following student protests in 1988, the military government decided 
to hold elections in 1990. But it then annulled the results when the 
National League for Democracy (NLD) won, under the leadership of 
Madame Aung San Suu Kyi. She is the daughter of General Aung San, 
leader of Myanmar’s fight for independence from Britain. The govern-
ment imprisoned NLD leaders and activists. Aung San Suu Kyi would 
spend 15 of the next 20 years under house arrest. She was thus unable to 
receive the Nobel Peace Prize that she was awarded in 1991. The US and 
the EU began imposing heavy trade and financial sanctions on Myanmar. 
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In 1989, the military regime changed the name of country from Burma to 
Myanmar.
In 2003, the military government outlined a seven-step roadmap to 
“disciplined democracy”, by which the army would still retain much 
power. And then in 2008, it drafted a new constitution, which it had 
approved by a sham referendum. This is a very special constitution, 
through which the military is able to keep its very strong grip on national 
power. The army is reserved 25% of the parliamentary seats. And to change 
the constitution requires the votes of more than 75% of members of 
parliament.
The army also has the control over three powerful ministries, namely, 
defense, border affairs and home affairs. It nominates one of the two vice- 
presidents. And then there is the National Defense and Security Council 
which is the most powerful body in Myanmar, and can overrule the gov-
ernment. It has 11 members, six of whom come from the military. The 
military is so fearful of the popularity of Aung San Suu Kyi that it drafted 
a clause in the constitution that prevents her from becoming president. 
The clause bars anyone with a foreign spouse or children from occupying 
this position.
Myanmar’s military dictatorship surprised the world by holding elec-
tions in 2010. These elections were however boycotted by the NLD and 
were won decisively by the Union Solidarity and Development Party 
(USDP), the main military-backed political party. The military govern-
ment was thus replaced by a new military-backed civilian government led 
by President Thein Sein, a former military officer. Although the elections 
were dismissed as a sham by the international community, they paved the 
way for gradual political and economic reforms, and opening up of the 
country.
One week after the elections, Aung San Suu Kyi was released from 
house arrest, and agreed to cooperate with the government. And respond-
ing to public opinion, in 2011 the President suspended construction of a 
controversial Chinese funded hydroelectric dam. Reforms included the 
release of many political and other prisoners, and child soldiers. Freedom 
of association for trade unions was authorized, media censorship was 
relaxed, and ceasefire agreements were signed with eight major non-state 
ethnic groups, even though conflicts continue with groups like the Kachin, 
Shan and Wa.
Economic reforms included liberalization of foreign investment, priva-
tization of state-owned enterprises, anti-corruption measures and exchange 
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rate reform. Thanks to the opening up of the telecommunications sector, 
virtually everyone can now have a smartphone and Internet access. But 
most of the benefits of reforms have gone to urban centers like Yangon. 
The military and their cronies have benefited greatly from privatization 
and infrastructure contracts. Rural Myanmar, where some 70% of the pop-
ulation lives and where poverty is endemic, has been forgotten. Indeed, 
farmers have suffered from rising prices and land grabbing. The gap 
between rich and poor in Myanmar is massive.
In 2012, the NLD members, including Aung San Suu Kyi, won 43 out 
45 seats in landmark parliamentary by-elections. In the same year, Barack 
Obama became the first US president to visit Myanmar, following a visit 
by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton the previous year. The US and the 
EU began easing many sanctions. But also in 2012, there was a wave of 
atrocious human rights abuses, allegedly with government complicity, 
against the Rohingya, a Muslim minority in the Rakhine state. More than 
100,000 Rohingya became displaced people, living in refugee camps, and 
very many also became victims of human smuggling and trafficking, an 
issue we look at in Chap. 8. Most regrettably, Aung San Suu Kyi was silent 
on this issue, fearing a backlash from the extreme Buddhist nationalists. In 
2017, the Rohingya were again victims of cruel violence from the Myanmar 
military. In the words of UN human rights chief Zeid Raad Al Hussein, 
this “seems a textbook example of ethnic cleansing”. More than 600,000 
Rohingya fled to Bangladesh.
In November 2015, general elections were held. The NLD won land-
slide majorities in both houses of parliament, with about 80% of the votes 
cast. According to most observers, Myanmar’s elections were a resound-
ing success, free and relatively fair. Over 6000 parliamentary candidates 
from 93 political parties contested the elections (but Muslim candidates 
were excluded from NLD lists). The outgoing president handed over 
power peacefully. And the head of the army, Min Aung Hlaing, supported 
the country’s transition. Mr. Htin Kyaw, a long-term confidante of Aung 
San Suu Kyi, was appointed president. The army refused Miss Suu Kyi’s 
lobbying to change the constitution to allow her to become president. She 
was thus appointed minister of the prime minister’s office and foreign 
minister, as well as “state counselor”, a position which she has indicated 
will be “above the president”.
The hybrid civilian-military nature of the new government was high-
lighted by the remarks of army head Mr. Min Aung Hlaing at a parade on 
27 March 2016 when he reminded Myanmar’s citizens that the army 
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“ensure[s] the stability of the country” and “has to be present in a leading 
role in national politics.” Thant Myint-U, an historian from Myanmar, 
summed up the situation neatly when he said this “was not an election of 
a government. It was an election for a spot in a shared government with 
the army.”
What motivated Myanmar’s surprising political changes? There has 
been much debate and speculation about the reasons for Myanmar’s sur-
prising political changes. It seems clear that sanctions imposed by the US, 
EU and other countries on Myanmar’s military regime had little impact. 
If anything, the sanctions may have hardened the resolve of the regime. As 
Joshua Kurlantzick and many others have argued, Myanmar’s “new open-
ness may stem from leaders’ fear that they had grown too dependent on 
Beijing.”35 Myanmar “was becoming virtually a Chinese client state, with 
Beijing offering a rich source of trade, aid, investment, and diplomatic 
cover for Myanmar’s military regime”. Democratization was the only way 
of resuscitating relations with the US and the EU, and thus breaking the 
hold of China’s suffocating embrace. “China sort of looks at the country 
as a province of China, in their sphere of influence”, said Priscilla Clapp, a 
former US chief of mission in Myanmar.36
Another factor is that Myanmar’s highly unpopular military rulers may 
have judged that a gradual reform process could enable them to retain 
their ill-gotten gains, and position of economic and political dominance, 
and avoid the risks of a more violent popular upheaval that several Middle 
East countries experienced during the Arab Spring. In this regard, 
Myanmar’s military has been brilliantly successful. It has greatly improved 
public support. It has achieved an end to many sanctions and its pariah 
status. At the same time, the military has maintained its dominant control 
of the country, and has been benefiting greatly from the opening of the 
economy. This has been called by some as “democracy on a leash”. 
Nevertheless, Myanmar and the lives of many of its citizens have changed 
immeasurably these past few years.
An optimistic scenario for Myanmar would be that continued economic 
development and an emerging middle class would eventually lead pres-
sures for full democracy. A great risk for the country, however, will be the 
transition to a post Aung San Suu Kyi era. She is 70 years old, and despite 
her saintly aura, she is far from immortal. Myanmar’s new politicians have 
no experience whatsoever in governing, and are not well placed to succeed 
her. (In point of fact, Aung San Suu Kyi herself has no experience in gov-
erning.) Thus, another realistic scenario is that Myanmar descends into 
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political instability following her eventual passing, and that the military 
reasserts great control over the country. And it is still not clear that 
Myanmar’s government and military will be able to achieve durable peace 
with the countries many armed ethnic groups.
Myanmar’s new government faces immense challenges as the military 
dictatorship has left the country in a deplorable state. Despite rapid eco-
nomic growth over the past decade or so, Myanmar’s GDP per capita is 
still one of the very lowest in Asia. It has the highest poverty rate in 
Southeast Asia. The country’s infrastructure and overall competitiveness 
would be among the worst in the world, and it is still one of the very most 
difficult countries in which to do business.
Economic wealth and power are concentrated among the army elite 
and their cronies. Myanmar would be one of the world’s very most cor-
rupt countries, and is one of the weakest countries when it comes to the 
rule of law. Myanmar is also a major center in Asia’s narcotic trade, being 
an important source of opium and exporter of heroin, second only to 
Afghanistan. And since the mid-1990s, it has also become a regional 
source for amphetamine-type stimulants.
In short, the government faces the daunting task of trying to manage 
three systemic transitions—from conflict toward peace, authoritarianism 
toward democracy and closed economy toward an open economy. Even in 
the most optimistic of scenarios, it would take several decades for Myanmar 
to even catch up with its Southeast Asian neighbors.
The greatest challenge that the government faces is that of working 
with the military, which still retains great power, and is not accountable to 
any civilian authority. Unfortunately, a very large share of the government 
budget is spent on the military, at a time when it is necessary to invest mas-
sively in education, health and infrastructure. Recalibrating Myanmar’s 
relationship with China will also be essential. While Myanmar had become 
overly dependent on China, cooperation with China has holds great 
promise for the economy, given their shared border, and Myanmar’s rich 
endowment of natural resources, low-cost labor and access to the Indian 
Ocean. And with the Trump administration distracted elsewhere, China is 
seizing the opportunity to rebuild good relations with the Myanmar gov-
ernment, especially through the peace process with ethnic minorities. 
Lastly, great patience will be necessary, together with managing high 
expectations of a public who have suffered repression and lack of opportu-
nity for over six decades.
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nAïve AppeAl of AuthoritAriAn government
As we have argued in this chapter, democracy has very shallow roots and 
many enemies in Asia. But does it really matter? After all, authoritarian 
states like China and Singapore, as well as Korea and Taiwan before they 
democratized, have achieved much superior economic development than 
chaotic democracies like India and the Philippines. Could a “good dicta-
torship” a much more effective path to prosperity than democracy?
It is true that Asia has seen some “good dictators” who have been able 
to rush their countries up the development ladder by enlightened leader-
ship. But a key element of their leadership has also been expanding eco-
nomic freedom, such that they are often less authoritarian than they are 
portrayed. Also they made efforts to share the benefits of development 
with their citizens through education, health and other social policies. The 
most notable examples are Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew, China’s Deng 
Xiaoping, Korea’s Park Chung-hee, Taiwan’s Chiang Kai-shek and 
Malaysia’s Mohamad Mahathir.
But Asia has also had more than its fair share of bad dictators notably 
China’s Mao Zedong, the military generals in Myanmar and Pakistan, and 
the Kim family in North Korea. And once bad dictators are in power, it 
can be very difficult to remove them and they can do immense damage 
along the way. Even after the horrors of the Great Leap Forward and the 
Cultural Revolution, our Chinese friends had to await the death of Mao to 
be rid of his murderous regime. Despite widespread agreement on Mao’s 
many mistakes, he remains a very important symbol of the Communist 
Party in Xi Jinping’s China. And as President Xi Jinping increasingly cen-
tralizes power, it is still not clear whether he will be a good or bad dictator. 
Repression at home and aggression abroad may not be a winning 
strategy.
Asia has also had some dictators who started strong, like the Philippines’ 
Marcos and Indonesia’s Suharto, but whose regimes deteriorated over 
time in terms of corruption and human rights. As dictators age, and their 
regimes hang on, it can be difficult for them to control the rapacious 
behavior of their families and cronies. Indeed, corruption which is difficult 
to control in any society is usually very much worse in non-democratic 
countries, as evidenced in the very low rankings of North Korea, Cambodia, 




Even the poster child for Asian benevolent dictatorship, Singapore, is 
facing its own challenges. Living in one of the world’s very richest coun-
tries, Singapore’s citizens should have every reason to be happy with their 
lot. Nevertheless, the People’s Action Party (PAP), a creation of Lee Kuan 
Yew, which has governed since Singapore’s independence, still goes to 
great lengths to win elections and retain its grip on power. The PAP “uses 
legal harassment to deter opposition leaders from seeking office, as well as 
the redrawing of district boundaries to minimize support for the opposi-
tion”, as Freedom House reports.37 And opposition parties are constrained 
by “a ban on political films and television programs, the threat of defama-
tion suits, strict regulations on political associations, and the PAP’s influ-
ence on the media and the courts … All domestic newspapers, radio 
stations, and television channels are owned by companies linked to the 
government.” Bloggers are increasingly subject to legal suits and criminal 
charges. One outrageous case was that of Roy Ngerng Yi Ling who was 
ordered to pay over $10,000 in defamation damages to the prime minister 
for alleging corruption in the management of Singapore’s retirement sav-
ings plan.
Although Singapore’s elections have always been won by the PAP, to its 
great displeasure, the PAP’s share of the national vote fell from over 75% 
in 2001 to barely 60% in 2011. Singapore’s brilliant technocrats, who had 
engineered the Singaporean miracle, began to stumble and seemed aloof 
and out of touch with their “client population.” Public concerns included 
the dramatic increase in immigration, a straining infrastructure, housing 
shortages, yawning inequality, and rising poverty. In a sign that the “House 
of Singapore” was nervous, the government called a snap election in 
September 2015, one year ahead of schedule, and with only nine days for 
campaigning. It was clearly seeking to exploit the wave of patriotism evi-
dent in the mourning of the passing of Lee Kwan Yew six months earlier 
(“the LKY effect”), and the extravagant celebrations of the 50th anniver-
sary of Singapore’s independence just one month before. The government 
was also seeking to “cash-in” on its policies to respond to popular con-
cerns, like restricting migration and increasing social benefits. The govern-
ment’s strategy was very successful, as the PAP won a resounding victory, 
with some 70% of the popular vote.
Despite the PAP’s impressive comeback, the next phase in Singapore’s 
political development could be problematic. The PAP’s current leader is 
Lee Hsien Loong, the son of Lee Kuan Yew, who has led the country since 
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2004, and will retire in the coming years, and there is no obvious replace-
ment. At the same time, infighting has broken out in the Lee family over 
Lee Kuan Yew’s estate, and in particular his family home. Lee Kuan Yew 
stated in his last will that it should be demolished after his death. Prime 
Minister Lee Hsien Loong has, however, been pushing to preserve it as a 
monument, against the wishes of his two younger siblings. In a statement 
on Facebook, these siblings declared they no longer trusted Lee Hsien 
Loong as a brother and a leader. “We have lost confidence in him,” the 
pair said. They also claimed that they “have felt threatened by Hsien 
Loong’s misuse of his position and influence over the Singapore govern-
ment and its agencies to drive his personal agenda”.
While this affair may seem like a mere bagatelle, it has captivated 
Singapore’s citizens who are used to highly disciplined and strait-laced 
leadership from the Lee family. It also highlights how problematic even 
the most efficient family dictatorships can be. History, like that of Spain 
under Franco, shows that the passing of heroic leaders can be the moment 
for a decisive move toward democracy. No-one can replace people like 
Franco or Lee Kwan Yew. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong would be wise 
to open up Singapore’s repressive system, and allow a real democracy to 
flourish, as Korea and Taiwan did. The PAP would likely continue to win 
elections, at least for many years.
Why DemocrAcy mAtters, even in AsiA
The real lesson from Asia’s successful economies like Japan, Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore, Hong Kong and post-Mao China is that they all had strong, 
effective and meritocratic states, which built up their economies and 
shared the benefits of economic development with their citizens. It was 
not political repression that produced economic development. But even 
these states are now being challenged as societies are modernizing rapidly, 
and inequality is growing. Moreover, mature  innovation-driven econo-
mies require a different type of governance from catch-up economies. 
Fundamentally, there is a great risk of political breakdown when the insti-
tutions of governance in authoritarian societies do not adapt sufficiently.
In this regard, there are many reasons why democracy matters for Asian 
development, even in China and Singapore. Continued economic  development 
over time requires a process of creative destruction whereby new firms with 
new ideas and technologies can take a leading role in the economy, as firms 
that were successful in the past, but are no longer competitive, fade in impor-
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tance or go bankrupt.38 But creative destruction can be inhibited in authori-
tarian systems where there are close links between established business and 
political powers which protect inefficient companies, such as in China where 
state-owned enterprises and banks still play an important role in the economy. 
In short, a level playing field is necessary to foster creative destruction, and 
this is much more likely under an open democratic system.
In a similar vein, open democratic societies are more conducive to cre-
ativity and innovation, which are the principal drivers of all mature econo-
mies. As Michael Schuman has argued, “In order to be innovative, you 
need full access to information, a confidence to speak your mind and a 
willingness to take risks. Fear caused by political control doesn’t foster an 
atmosphere conducive to free thinking.”39 Democratization in Korea has 
played a key role in enabling it to become a more innovative nation.
People like Lady Gaga, Mark Zuckerberg and Steve Jobs would find life 
difficult in China, as does Chinese artist Ai Weiwei who has spent long 
periods of time under house arrest for his politically inspired art. “Xi 
Jinping praises innovation in the abstract, but China’s system is not set up 
to encourage innovation in practice” says Kerry Brown.40
Maintaining authoritarian regimes is also very, very costly. For example, 
social repression is very widespread in China, with typical targets being 
ethnic minorities like the Uighurs and Tibetans, journalists, academics, 
lawyers and artists. The upshot is that China spends more money on inter-
nal security than its military. Despite its friendly veneer, Singapore also 
invests vast resources controlling its society.
Non-democratic political systems are also prone to unstable leadership 
and regime transitions, which can be very destabilizing. In the past, this 
was a great problem in China. The country may have partly solved this 
issue by limiting presidents to two five-year terms. But even today, it is still 
a problem in China, where President XI Jinping has felt the need to elimi-
nate his opposition figures in order to “consolidate power”—a process 
which has been underway ever since he took over the leadership, and with 
no immediate end in sight. And there are already signs that Xi Jinping may 
be planning to remain at the leadership of China after two-term limit. This 
shows that authoritarian regimes like China are fundamentally more frag-
ile than they might appear. In contrast, Prime Minister Narendra Modi 
had a very smooth transition to power in India thanks to the country’s 
democratic institutions.
Perhaps the most important reason why democracy matters is that, 
even if many upper- and middle-class Asians are happy with their lot, 
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growing numbers of Asians, especially youth, are demanding freedom, 
rule of law, clean governance and democracy. You only have to look at the 
activism today in Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand, as 
well as many parts of China. And a simple conversation with a poor person 
in the street in India will reveal how proud Indians feel about their democ-
racy, especially when compared with the case of China.
* * *
One of the many consequences of Asia’s flawed politics is that the region 
has become one of the centers of the global criminal economy. In the next 
chapter, we review Asia’s involvement in counterfeiting and piracy, illegal 
drug production and trafficking, environmental crime, human trafficking 
and smuggling, corruption, money laundering and cybercrime.
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CHAPTER 9
Combating Asia’s Economic Crime
We all enjoy buying fake Rolex watches, Nike shoes, Ray Ban sunglasses 
and Louis Vuitton handbags, as well as carvings from trafficked ivory, when 
we travel to China or Hong Kong. Some of our youth have fun experi-
menting with recreational drugs on their holidays to Bali or elsewhere.
But production and trade of counterfeit, pirated and other illicit goods 
are very serious matters. Such dirty business can endanger lives. Some of 
the traps are fake pharmaceuticals that make people sick or contribute to 
global microbial resistance and more virulent forms of disease, toys that 
harm children, baby formula that provides no nourishment or even endan-
gers babies’ health, medical instruments that deliver false readings and 
automobile parts that fail. Wildlife trafficking can destroy biodiversity and 
can trigger the spread of zoonotic disease, while a recreational drug habit 
is easier to start than to stop.
In addition, fake goods undermine our economy and employment as 
innovative individuals and companies see their good work stolen. 
Counterfeiting and piracy can impose additional costs for security and anti-
counterfeiting technology, and affected companies can incur reputational 
damages. This robs them of their competitive advantage and discourages 
future efforts in innovation, thereby compromising long-term prosperity.
Organized criminal groups play an increasingly important role in the 
production and trade of fake, and other illicit goods, especially narcotics 
and wildlife products. Some profits from illicit trade finance terrorism and 
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other nefarious activities. Narcotics trade is one of the primary sources of 
revenue of the Taliban. Dirty trade also robs governments of tax revenues, 
results in regulatory and enforcement costs and undermines the integrity 
of public institutions.
Illicit trade has prospered alongside the rapid globalization of the world 
economy and represents the “dark side” of globalization as criminal 
groups often exploit states with weak capacity, law and institutions. And 
East Asia’s vast number of special economic zones, which have very lim-
ited government regulation, are very fertile ground for illicit trade of all 
sorts.
In short, as Asia progressively becomes a major player in the global 
economy, so it is that Asia is at the center of the scourge of economic 
crime, and not only illicit trade.1 In this chapter, we will examine several of 
the very many aspects of economic crime in Asia, namely counterfeiting 
and piracy, illegal drug production and trafficking in Asia environmental 
crimes, human trafficking and smuggling, corruption, money laundering 
and cybercrime.
Counterfeiting and PiraCy
Getting a handle on the production of counterfeit, pirated and other illicit 
goods is not easy. But the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) has recently published two excellent reports that 
have estimates of international trade in such goods.2,3 First, we look at 
counterfeit and pirated goods. The OECD estimates that world imports 
of counterfeit and pirated goods were worth $461 billion in 2013 or 
nearly half a trillion dollars. This amounts to around 2.5% of global 
imports, significantly higher than an estimate of $250 billion or 1.8% in an 
earlier 2009 study. This means that national and international efforts to 
tackle this problem have not been effective. In the case of the European 
Union (EU), up to 5% of imports are fakes. And since advanced countries 
are prime targets for fake imports, the US figure might be of a similar 
order.
China (including Hong Kong) is far and away the world’s single big-
gest producer and exporter of counterfeit and pirated goods (including 
pharmaceuticals), accounting for 84% of estimated trade in fake goods. By 
comparison, China’s share of global manufactured exports in 2013 was 
only 17%. China’s e-commerce company, Alibaba, is notorious for its sale 
of counterfeit products. China is way ahead of the next most guilty 
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 country, which is Turkey with 3%. Four other Asian countries made into 
the top ten of offending countries, namely Singapore, Thailand, India and 
Pakistan.
But the reality of counterfeiting and piracy is much wider, as the OECD 
notes. Its study only deals with internationally traded counterfeit and 
pirated goods. It does not treat the issue of fake goods which are pro-
duced and sold within the same domestic market. There are millions of 
Asians and others who purchase counterfeit and pirated goods produced 
at home. This is a lower risk activity for the purveyors of fake goods, as it 
avoids customs controls. Furthermore, the OECD’s estimate does not 
cover pirated digital products that are distributed via the Internet, which 
is a further drain on the formal economy. It only covers all physical coun-
terfeit goods, which infringe trademarks, design rights or patents, and 
tangible pirated products, which breach copyright. As the OECD says, its 
data are largely “incomplete and limited”, just like data on any clandestine 
activity. Its quantitative results only illustrate “certain parts of the phe-
nomenon of counterfeiting and piracy”.
Fake products crop up in everything from luxury items (like fashion 
apparel or deluxe watches), via intermediary products (such as machines, 
spare parts or chemicals) to consumer goods that have an impact on per-
sonal health and safety (such as pharmaceuticals, food and drink, medical 
equipment, or toys). While footwear is the most copied item, trademarks 
are infringed even on things like strawberries and bananas. And according 
to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), one-third 
of malaria medicines used in East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa are fake.
How does trade in counterfeit goods happen? Postal parcels are the top 
method of shipping fake goods, accounting for 62% of seizures over 
2011–2013, reflecting the growing importance of E-commerce in inter-
national trade. Indeed, E-commerce has become a “major enabler for the 
distribution and sale of counterfeit and pirated tangible goods” according 
to the OECD.
Traffic in counterfeit and pirated goods usually goes through complex 
routes via major trade hubs like Hong Kong and Singapore and free trade 
zones such as those in the United Arab Emirates. Other transit points 
include countries with weak governance and widespread organized crime 
such as Afghanistan and Syria, but trade routes can change greatly from 
year to year as counterfeit gangs spot new weak points. In many cases, the 
proceeds of counterfeit trade go toward organized crime which are also 
involved in trafficking drugs, firearms and people.
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The top countries whose companies had their intellectual property 
rights infringed were the US, whose brands or patents were affected by 
20% of the knock-offs, then Italy with 15% and France and Switzerland 
with 12% each. Japan and Germany stood at 8% each followed by the UK 
and Luxembourg at 4% and 3% respectively. With China still being more 
of a copycat, rather than an innovation, nation, Chinese companies which 
suffered from fake production represented only 1% of total.
Massive efforts are required to promote “clean trade”. National gov-
ernments need to implement and enforce effective legislation, and to 
cooperate with other governments and international organizations, given 
the global nature of the problem. A multi-stakeholder approach involving 
partnerships with relevant business and civil society groups (including 
consumer protection advocates) is also necessary. In addition, educational 
and public awareness campaigns can play an important role.
But there are many factors which make tackling counterfeiting and 
piracy a daunting task, especially in the case where products are obviously 
fakes or even presented on the market as being fakes. After all, there is a 
strong demand for such goods in all our countries, especially by our youth. 
Why? Prices are usually much lower than for the genuine article and 
depending on the product, quality of the fake article can also be satisfac-
tory. In this context, the growing gap between rich and poor and rising 
poverty in advanced OECD countries are just some of the factors driving 
such demand, especially when the risk of being prosecuted is usually low. 
Ignorance of the safety and security risks of consuming fake goods can be 
another factor.
What is much more worrying is the case where fake products are pre-
sented as being genuine, but their apparent high-quality results in con-
sumers being deceived. In these circumstances, people unwittingly 
purchase counterfeit and pirated goods and are involuntarily exposed to 
the full range of product safety and security risks. The very big money to 
be made from counterfeit and pirated goods also means that implement-
ing regulation and legislation, and especially their enforcement, remains a 
gigantic challenge. The criminal organizations behind today’s 
 counterfeiting and piracy are very nimble. In addition, with intellectual 
property playing an ever-growing role in our economies, there are more 
and more opportunities to produce counterfeit and pirated goods.
It was hoped that following China’s membership of the World Trade 
Organisation in 2001, and rapid economic development, the Chinese gov-
ernment would begin to take intellectual property protection more 
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 seriously. Indeed, it is natural that improvements in institutions and gov-
ernance in middle-income countries follow behind economic develop-
ment. And as innovation becomes a more important component of China’s 
growth story, it should have an interest in protecting intellectual 
property.
But despite repeated promises by government leaders, this has mani-
festly not occurred. Indeed, many Chinese officials seem to show no 
shame for their country’s counterfeiting and piracy. As it seemingly pur-
sues a grudge match against the West for its sufferings through its “cen-
tury of humiliation”, counterfeiting and piracy of Western products is 
often considered to be fair game. And with the Chinese economy cur-
rently struggling, and President Xi Jinping pushing a highly nationalist 
agenda, we cannot expect the Chinese government to invest much effort 
into protecting Western intellectual property.
One day, we may hope that China will become an innovation power- 
house, and will therefore have a stake in fighting counterfeiting and piracy. 
But even if China does eventually lift its game on counterfeit and pirated 
goods, it might well be replaced by India or Russia as the global capital for 
counterfeiting and piracy. International crime syndicates are very quick to 
change their business plans in response to new circumstances. Beyond 
counterfeit and pirated goods, there is a vast array of other illicit trade 
such as drug trafficking, and trade in wildlife, timber, art & cultural prop-
erty, human organs, arms, diamonds, weapons, tobacco and alcohol. In 
the next section, we review drug trafficking, an area where Asia plays a 
major role on global markets.
illegal drug ProduCtion and traffiCking in asia
Asia has long attracted recreational drug tourism to take advantage of 
opium and heroin produced in its infamous “Golden Triangle” region, 
spanning Myanmar, Laos and Thailand. But the region is now also follow-
ing the Western world’s descent into a drug crisis, as the consumption and 
production of methamphetamine grow rapidly. East and Southeast Asia 
may also be emerging as driver of the global market for “ecstasy”. In short, 
Asia is a major player in this global drug trade, which was estimated at 
$320 billion in 2011 by Global Financial Integrity.4 Indeed, global trade 
in illegal narcotics is perhaps the single largest black market worldwide and 
finances notorious transnational criminal organizations. Narcotics have an 
adverse impact on human health and well-being, while drug trafficking is 
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usually accompanied by criminal violence that undermines state institu-
tions and is often difficult to reverse.
Let’s look at a few country cases, drawing on material from the US 
State Department’s excellent International Narcotics Control Strategy 
Report,5 and other sources.6
Myanmar is a major source of opium and exporter of heroin, second 
only to Afghanistan. Since the mid-1990s, Myanmar has also become a 
regional source for amphetamine-type stimulants. Production sites for 
heroin and methamphetamine are often co-located and are primarily situ-
ated along Myanmar’s eastern borders in areas controlled by ethnic armed 
groups beyond the government’s control. A general lack of capacity and 
resources hinders counternarcotics efforts, which are also hampered by 
extremely porous borders with India, Laos, China, Bangladesh and 
Thailand that continue to be exploited by traffickers. There are also infor-
mal reports that some senior government officials benefit financially from 
narcotics trafficking, and credible reports from NGOs and media that 
mid-level military officers and government officials are engaged in drug- 
related corruption.
Myanmar’s northeastern neighbor, Laos is a major transport hub for 
amphetamine-type stimulants, opium and heroin, and is a major producer 
of opium. Indeed, the country sits at the heart of the regional drug trade in 
mainland Southeast Asia and shares remote and poorly controlled borders 
with Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam and China. The US State 
Department reports that, ironically, economic development and the 
improvement in Laos’ transportation infrastructure have created opportu-
nities for the illicit drug trade to grow. Like Myanmar, Laos lacks the neces-
sary capacity and resources to tackle narcotics production and trade, and 
corruption in Laos continues to plague law enforcement and government.
Highlighting the regional nature of Southeast Asia’s illicit drug pro-
duction and trade, crackdowns on drug trafficking in Thailand and China 
in recent years have pushed traffickers to use alternate routes, including 
through Cambodia. Indeed, the manufacturing, trafficking and use of 
illicit narcotics within Cambodia have escalated. Thailand and Vietnam are 
illicit drug transshipment points for local and international criminal orga-
nizations, while Indonesia is both a transshipment point and destination 
country for illegal drugs. Indonesia is a significant consumer of cannabis, 
methamphetamine and heroin.
Drug trafficking through Malaysia to supply both domestic and regional 
markets remains a problem. Nigerian and Iranian drug trafficking 
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 organizations continue to use Kuala Lumpur as a trafficking hub. The 
Philippines remains a transshipment point and destination country for large 
shipments of methamphetamine, with the trade being dominated by Chinese 
drug trafficking organizations.
China, which shares borders with most of the aforementioned Southeast 
Asian countries, is a significant destination and transit country for illicit 
drugs, as well as a major producer of synthetic drugs and drug precursor 
chemicals. Heroin is the most abused drug in China followed by synthetic 
drugs. Ethnic Chinese criminal groups control most large-scale drug and 
precursor chemical criminal activities in China, while there are a large and 
increasing number of transnational criminal organizations from other 
countries operating in China. North Korea is also believed to be a major 
source of methamphetamine in China. The Chinese government is mak-
ing efforts to tackle its drug problem. However, the US State Department 
reports that China’s collaborative law enforcement efforts with US law 
enforcement officials are often hindered by cumbersome bureaucracy that 
limits direct access to local Chinese counterparts.
As with counterfeiting and privacy, tackling Asia’s illegal drug produc-
tion and trafficking requires a multi-pronged strategy attacking both the 
demand and supply side of Asia’s drug problem. Strong legislation and 
enforcement, buttressed by international cooperation, is necessary to 
tackle the traffickers who run the drug business. Demand reduction strate-
gies must focus on the prevention of drug use, and treatment and rehabili-
tation of drug users.
But there is also the situation of the poor farmers who grow opium or 
cocaine because they are their only potential source of income. This is why 
it is also necessary to implement “alternative development” strategy which 
can provide sustainable alternative livelihoods to communities that  cultivate 
illicit drug crops. As the UNODC has said the reality is that “drug crop 
growing areas are mostly areas where isolation and poverty are inherent 
and where farmers cultivate illicit drug crops because they are unable to 
obtain sufficient income from legal activities due to lack of markets, con-
flict, marginal land and absence of basic infrastructures.” Indeed, there are 
hundreds of thousands of farmers affected by poverty, food insecurity, lack 
of land, instability who as a result engage in illicit drug cultivation.
Alternative development has brought about a significant decline in poppy 
cultivation in Thailand, which now accounts for only a negligible portion of 
total global opium cultivation, according to UNODC figures. The UNODC 
now supports and promotes sustainable alternative  development programs 
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and projects in countries like Laos and Myanmar. The focus is on helping 
small farmers with licit income generation activities to reduce their depen-
dency on income from opium. But much more needs to be done, and much 
greater donor support is necessary.
environmental Crime
Keeping up with the Jones (or perhaps the Chans) is very much the obses-
sion of Asia’s nouveau riche, especially from China, Thailand and Vietnam. 
So what better thing to do than buying works of art made from precious 
elephant ivory. To feed your sophisticated appetite, some scaly anteater 
(pangolin), marine turtle or shark meat and fin are delicious. And to stay 
healthy, why not a dose of traditional medicine made from rhinoceros 
horn.
It is not surprising then that wildlife trafficking is now one of the most 
lucrative criminal activities, along with the global trade in narcotics, arms, 
counterfeits and humans. And it has more than doubled since 2007, 
reports the OECD. Sub-Saharan Africa has been the region most affected 
by Asia’s rapacious appetite for wildlife. But it is not the only region 
affected. For example, Asian elephants, rhinos and big cat skins (tiger, 
leopard, snow leopard) are also suffering greatly from poaching.
According to the United Nation’s Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species, some 1215 rhinos were killed in South Africa in 
2014, a record high and ten-times the number of rhinos killed for their 
horn in 2009. In the last three years, poachers have killed 100,000 African 
elephants. The slaughter of wildlife is not just a matter of conserving bio-
diversity. In some countries, the reserves where these animals live are 
important sources of tourism revenues and employment. But tackling 
wildlife trafficking in sub-Saharan Africa is a daunting undertaking, as gov-
ernments have few resource to patrol massive tracts of land. Violent con-
frontation with poachers also occurs regularly.
Wildlife trafficking is just one of the many forms of environmental 
crime that is endangering our planet and livelihoods.7 Other environmen-
tal crimes include smuggling of ozone-depleting substances (ODS); illicit 
trade in hazardous waste; illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing; and 
illegal logging and the associated trade in stolen timber. Root causes are 
primarily the low risks and high profits in a permissive environment as a 
result of poor governance and widespread corruption, minimal budgets to 
police, prosecution and courts, inadequate institutional support, political 
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interference and low employee morale, minimal benefits to local commu-
nities and rising demand in particular in Asia.
The UN and Interpol estimate that environmental crime is now in the 
range of $91–$258 billion, 26% higher than the estimate of two years ago, 
and that it is growing at two to three times the pace of the global econ-
omy. More than half of this is due to illegal logging and deforestation.
Indonesia’s rainforests have been victims of massive illegal logging since 
the late 1990s, and Indonesia has had the highest rate of deforestation in 
the world, with China’s booming wooden flooring industry being a major 
beneficiary.8 At one point, 80% of timber coming out of Indonesia was 
illegal, costing the government $4 billion a year, around five times the 
annual health budget. This rape and pillage of Indonesia’s environment 
have been masterminded and financed by the country’s “timber mafia” 
who have been effectively above the law, another example of the endemic 
corruption of Indonesia’s oligarchic economy. In more recent years, gov-
ernment action has managed to reduce, but not eliminate illegal logging. 
But Chinese timber dealers have merely switched their sourcing to Africa, 
while Vietnamese dealers switched to neighboring Laos.
Asia is also involved in many other forms of environmental crime. In 
2013, UNODC reported that illegal trade in E-waste (discarded electrical 
or electronic devices) to Southeast Asia and the Pacific was estimated at 
$3.75 billion annually or 1.5 times larger than the illegal trade in wildlife 
in the region. There is a large illegal trade in ODS principally involving 
China. China is also a major market for illegally harvested West Africa 
Rosewood.
Despite the fact that environmental crime poses a growing threat, it 
remains a low priority for the international enforcement community. For 
example, China accounted for nearly 80% of the reported seizures of ille-
gal rhino horns in Asia between 2009 and 2013, despite a national ban on 
the illicit trade. This is wrong. As disturbing as each form of environmen-
tal crime is, perhaps the most disturbing aspect is that modern crime 
entrepreneurs and syndicates are now increasingly diversifying into several 
illicit activities and are globalizing their operations through transnational 
criminal networks, as the OECD has noted.
For example, criminal syndicates involved in human trafficking might 
also be active in the drug trade, illegal fishing, environmental crimes, arms 
trafficking, maritime piracy and tobacco smuggling. Distribution chains 
for trafficking in counterfeit tobacco are sometimes used for counterfeit 
pharmaceuticals and counterfeit currency. This business of illicit trade is 
 COMBATING ASIA’S ECONOMIC CRIME 
256 
also facilitated by corruption through all its various phases, while the prof-
its are then laundered through tax havens, like Asia’s seemingly clean cities 
of Hong Kong and Singapore.
As the OECD concludes, “This level of sophistication presents a sub-
stantial challenge to government law enforcement agencies and interna-
tional institutions that are often unable to cooperate as rapidly as criminals 
can adapt their business practices to avoid identification.”
Human traffiCking in asia
Asia has long been a global hub for human trafficking and smuggling, 
perhaps the most heinous of all crimes. Motivated by greed, traffickers and 
smugglers exploit poor, vulnerable people. They are able to prosper where 
governments are weak or uncaring, and in societies where respect for 
human rights and dignity is shallow. Tragically, virtually all countries are to 
various degrees sources, transit points and destinations for human traffick-
ing and smuggling. And the efforts of governments and civil society to 
combat these vices vary greatly from country to country.
Human trafficking can take many forms as traffickers move people 
without their informed consent and exploit them along the way or at their 
final destination. For example, a young Asian lady may sign a contract with 
a migration agency to work as a maid in Saudi Arabia, only to find that 
when she arrives at her destination that she is actually working in a mas-
sage parlor in Dubai, that she owes a large financial debt to the agency, 
and that the agency has confiscated her passport to entrap her.
The many forms of human trafficking include forced labor, debt bond-
age, involuntary domestic servitude, forced child labor, trafficking of chil-
dren for armed conflict or petty crime or forced begging, trafficking for 
sex, forced marriage and trafficking for organ removal. And some groups 
are particularly vulnerable to human trafficking like LGBT individuals, 
indigenous persons, refugees, women and children. Trafficking can occur 
both within countries (notably in the case of India) and through labor 
migration especially to the Middle East, like the example above.
In more technical terms, the US State Department defines human traf-
ficking as “the act of recruiting, harboring, transporting, providing, or 
obtaining a person for compelled labor or commercial sex acts through the 
use of force, fraud, or coercion”.9 Human smuggling is different in that 
smugglers help people, with their consent, illegally cross borders for a pay-
ment, as we discuss later on.
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Some 30 million of the world’s 46 million victims of human trafficking 
(often referred to as “modern slavery”) come from Asia, according to the 
2016 Global Slavery Index. India tops the global list with over 18 million 
victims of modern slavery. The challenge of human trafficking in India is 
immense, with all forms of modern slavery present, especially inter- 
generational bonded labor, trafficking for sexual exploitation and forced 
marriage. Some 90% of India’s human trafficking occurs within the coun-
try, with members of lower castes and tribes, religious minorities and 
migrant workers being the most vulnerable. Forced labor is India’s most 
prevalent form of trafficking, especially in industries like brick kilns, carpet 
weaving, embroidery and textiles, forced prostitution, agriculture, domes-
tic servitude, mining and organized begging rings.
The next most important Asian locations for human trafficking are 
China with over three million and Pakistan with over two million. 
Bangladesh (1.5 million), North Korea (1.1 million) and Indonesia (0.7 
Million) also make it into the world’s top ten. It goes without saying that 
the actual figures are bound to be far higher than these estimates which 
probably only scratch the surface. The UN estimates that some 64% of 
human trafficking in Asia is for forced labor, servitude and slavery, while 
26% is for sexual exploitation (in Europe and Central Asia the figures are 
the inverse).10 In Asia, 36% of trafficked victims are children, while 64% are 
adults. Trafficking victims from Asia can be found all around the world. 
While 72% of convicted traffickers are men, the share of women is 28%, 
much higher than the share of women convicted of crimes in general 
(10–15%).
The International Labor Organization estimates the illicit profits of 
forced labor to be $150 billion a year.11 Many victims work in Asia’s global 
value chains for industries like food, garments and technology, including 
in middle-income countries like Malaysia. In short, modern slavery is big 
business. Most countries in the Asia-Pacific exhibit a range of pre- 
conditions for modern slavery including weak rule of law, corruption, high 
levels of poverty, along with highly mobile unskilled labor forces who are 
dependent on remittances. Only two Asian countries, South Korea and 
Taiwan, are making very serious efforts to combat human trafficking, 
along with most advanced Western countries, according to the US 
Department of State. Asia’s most notorious cases for human trafficking are 
North Korea, Thailand, Malaysia and China.
In North Korea, forced labor is part of the government’s political 
repression. Some 80,000–120,000 people are held in prison camps in 
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remote areas where they are subject to forced labor. The government has 
also sent 50,000 or more laborers to countries like Russia and China to 
earn much needed foreign exchange for North Korea’s atrocious govern-
ment, but not for the workers themselves.
In Thailand, there are three to four million migrant workers, mainly 
from Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia, some of whom are forced, coerced 
or defrauded into labor or sex trafficking in sectors like the sex industry, 
commercial fishing, forced begging, domestic work, manufacturing and 
agriculture. Indeed, Thailand is still notorious for slavery, trafficking, mur-
der and corruption at all levels of government in its billion-dollar fishing 
industry, despite recent arrests and the threat of an EU-wide boycott. And 
social media is being used to recruit children and women into sex 
trafficking.
There are reports that some Thai officials are complicit in trafficking 
crimes and corruption undermines anti-trafficking efforts. Migrant 
 workers are fearful of reporting trafficking crimes due to a lack of trust in 
government officials and a lack of awareness of their rights. According to 
the US State Department, the Thai government is not making significant 
efforts to fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of 
trafficking.
Most of Malaysia’s trafficking victims come from its more than four 
million documented and undocumented foreign workers who mainly 
come from Indonesia, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Nepal and Myanmar. 
Many are subjected to forced labor or debt bondage by their employers, 
employment agencies or labor recruiters. Authorities report that large 
organized crime syndicates are responsible for some instances of traffick-
ing. There are also reports alleging that some corrupt officials impede 
efforts to address trafficking crimes. Rohingya and other refugees lack for-
mal status or the ability to obtain legal work permits, thus leaving them 
vulnerable to trafficking.
In China, trafficking is most pronounced among the large internal 
migrant population, who can be subject to forced labor in brick kilns, coal 
mines and factories. Chinese women and girls are recruited from rural 
areas and taken to urban centers by crime syndicates and local gangs. 
There are also reports of young girls being kidnapped from Vietnam and 
other countries for forced marriage to Chinese men in light of the China’s 
“gendercide”, which has resulted in a high male/female birth ratio. Other 
countries like Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are also 
among the world’s worst offenders when it comes to human trafficking.
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Even seemingly civilized countries like Japan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore have human trafficking horror stories to tell. Japan has long 
been notorious for human trafficking for its sex industry. And despite pres-
sure from the international community, sex trafficking remains endemic in 
Japan. Many women and children travel to Japan from Asia (especially the 
Philippines and Thailand) and elsewhere for employment or fraudulent 
marriage and are subjected to forced prostitution in bars, clubs, brothels 
and massage parlors. Traffickers strictly control the movement of victims 
using debt bondage, threats of violence or deportation, blackmail and 
other coercive psychological methods. Japanese men are also notorious for 
their sex tourism in neighboring Asian countries.
In Hong Kong, which has one of the highest densities of migrant 
domestic workers in the world, forced labor and exploitation are wide-
spread, despite the efforts of the government to sweep the problem under 
the carpet, according to the Hong Kong-based Justice Center.12 Some 
17% of its study sample is subject to forced labor, which means that some 
50,000 of Hong Kong’s migrant domestic workers could be subject to 
forced labor. According to all reports, the situation of migrant domestic 
workers is fairly similar in Singapore.
Most countries have laws and policies to protect possible victims and 
prosecute offenders from human trafficking. But overall, there are still 
very few convictions, highlighting the gross inadequacy of enforcement 
of these laws and policies. According to the UN, only 40% of countries 
reported having ten or more yearly convictions, with nearly 15% having 
no convictions at all. This is unbelievable given the prevalence of human 
trafficking in Asia. The 2016 Global Slavery Index has highlighted in 
particular the cases of Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia and Singapore 
which are countries, despite their great wealth, have done little to 
respond to the challenge of human trafficking. As to Thailand and 
Indonesia, they appear to have strong responses on paper, but these are 
often poorly implemented or are hampered by high levels of corruption. 
In contrast, the Philippines is one country that, when national economic 
capacity is taken into account, is making strong efforts with limited 
resources.
At the regional level, there are also initiatives like the Coordinated 
Mekong Ministerial Initiative involving Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar, 
Thailand and Vietnam. And regional organizations like the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) and United Nations Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) have human trafficking 
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programs. But despite their good intentions, these initiatives rely on 
national governments for implementation and enforcement.
Human smuggling
Human smuggling is different from trafficking in that smugglers help 
people, with their consent, cross borders illegally for a payment, as we 
mentioned above. It is a very risky venture for these political and eco-
nomic refugees in light of the uncertain welcome they receive at their 
destination. But even when they consent to being smuggled, many people 
also suffer great abuses at the hands of their nefarious smugglers who 
coerce, force or even abduct them into being smuggled, who don’t inform 
them of the physical risks involved, and who abuse and extort them during 
their journey. Thus, most smuggled people also become victims of human 
trafficking as well, as many aspects of their journey are imposed without 
their consent.
Perhaps the most tragic cases of human smuggling in Asia are the 
Rohingya Muslims escaping persecution in Myanmar.13 The Rohingya is 
an ethnic group of over million people living primarily in Myanmar’s west-
ern Rakhine State. After decades of discrimination, the government 
stripped the Rohingya of their citizenship in 1982, leaving them stateless. 
The government considers them illegal migrants from Bangladesh, and 
refuses to use the word Rohingya. They are referred to as “Bengalis”. 
Anti-Muslim propaganda has become part of the regular nationalistic dis-
course. Even Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi refuses to say 
anything in support of the Rohingya. There are now hundreds of thou-
sands of Rohingya displaced in Bangladesh, Thailand, Malaysia and 
Indonesia.
Since 2012, the Rakhine state’s Buddhist majority, assisted by religious 
leaders, government officials, and state security forces have engaged in 
widespread violence against the Rohingya, who are perhaps the world’s 
most persecuted people.14 Hundreds have been killed, and homes and 
businesses destroyed. There have been claims of ethnic cleansing and even 
genocide. Over 150,000 Rohingya now live in virtual concentration camps 
where they lack access to health care, education and employment. Efforts 
by international organizations and civil society to provide assistance are 
often impeded by Myanmar authorities. This situation has led many 
Rohingya to risk their lives and flee by boat to neighboring countries, usu-
ally Malaysia, facilitated by Myanmar security forces and human smugglers 
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(some Bangladeshis escaping poverty at home are part of these boat trips). 
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates there 
have been 160,000 Rohingya maritime departures to neighboring coun-
tries since 2012.
They were typically transported to Thailand, where they were put in 
camps. Smugglers then demand a ransom before smuggling further by 
land to Malaysia. But if this extortion doesn’t work, Rohingyas are often 
killed. A number of mass Rohingya graves have been found in Thailand 
and Malaysia. These smuggling operations are reportedly arranged 
through well-organized transnational networks of smugglers and traffick-
ers, usually with the complicity or involvement of corrupt government 
officials.
The human tragedy of the Rohingya refugees reached a head in 2015.15 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand towed smugglers’ boats back out to sea. 
And when the Thai government announced a crackdown on smuggling in 
early 2015, many boats were abandoned at sea by their crews, leaving pas-
sengers at sea for weeks. Many Rohingya died. Eventually, following inter-
national criticism, Malaysia and Indonesia allowed the Rohingya to come 
ashore (Thailand refused), on the condition that they only stay one year, 
before being resettled in third countries. Since mid-2015, much fewer 
Rohingya have been leaving Myanmar, in part because of a crackdown on 
smugglers.
More recently, in 2017, the Rohingya have been victims of a cruel mili-
tary operation that the UN human rights chief, Zeid Raad Al Hussein, 
said “seems a textbook example of ethnic cleansing”. More than 600,000 
Rohingya Muslims fled to neighboring Bangladesh.
The attitude of the Myanmar government toward the Rohingya popu-
lation is reprehensible. The international community, which has been 
pressuring the government to be more humane, should be more forceful. 
But Myanmar is in the midst of a delicate transition to democracy, and the 
West is still seeking to woo the government away from the clutches of 
China.
The Rohingya refugee crisis cries out for effective regional cooperation 
to address the issue. Most regrettably, it has highlighted yet again how 
ineffectual Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) is when confronted 
with real challenges. Southeast Asian countries must cooperate to establish 
measures to combat human smuggling and trafficking, and to protect 
people from human rights abuses from smugglers and traffickers. A lot 
more could also be done at the national level. Both Thailand and Malaysia 
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are experiencing labor shortages, and could readily absorb large inflows of 
Rohingya migrants.
The crisis also highlights the apparent unwillingness of China, which 
has not been visible at all, to make a positive contribution to Asian 
regional problems—despite its massive buildup of naval and other mari-
time assets in the region, and also despite its desire to be a regional hege-
mon in Asia.
Our brief overview of human trafficking and smuggling in Asia can only 
leave one feeling deeply despondent about Asia. Economic development 
without human development makes no sense. And Asia’s human develop-
ment lags well behind its spectacular economic development. In 
particular:
• Japan, the region’s first economic mover, has never taken human 
trafficking and smuggling seriously, and is now moving backward 
through its bogus intern program.
• Hong Kong and Singapore, Asia’s current leaders in terms of GDP 
per capita, treat their maids and other low-skilled migrants 
abominably.
• Malaysia and Thailand are two economies that have enjoyed great 
economic success, but are at the bottom of the barrel in terms of 
human trafficking and smuggling.
• China has pretensions of becoming a great power, but is totally 
bereft of ethical and moral leadership when it comes to human traf-
ficking and smuggling.
• The Rohingya crisis in Myanmar highlights the fractured and fragile 
state of the country’s society and politics, and how ineffectual 
ASEAN is in dealing with regional problems.
We will now turn to another type of economic crime, that of 
corruption.
CorruPtion in asia
Back in 1974, the Hong Kong-based Far Eastern Economic Review wrote 
“If you want to buy a Sherman tank, a Red Cross blanket, or simply speed 
up the installation of a telephone, there is probably no easier place to do 
just that than in Asia—if you are willing to part with some cash, that is.16” 
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And over 40 years later, after major transformations to Asia’s economy, 
society and politics, things may not have improved very much.
Indeed, Asia would still be one of the most corrupt places on the planet, 
according to Transparency International (TI), an activist group that works 
together with governments, businesses and citizens to stop the abuse of 
power, bribery and secret deals. Only six Asian economies make it into the 
world’s top 50 cleanest economies in TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index—
Singapore (7th), Hong Kong (15th), Japan (20th), Bhutan (27th), Taiwan 
(31st) and Brunei (41st).
But as Alan Greenspan, former Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, 
once remarked, “Corruption, embezzlement and fraud are all characteris-
tics that exist everywhere! It is regrettably the way human nature func-
tions, whether we like it or not.”17 Another simple observation is that as 
economies become more sophisticated, so also does their corruption 
become more sophisticated. And that while petty corruption is endemic in 
poorer countries like India, richer countries tend to be plagued by grand 
corruption, the abuse of high-level power that benefits the few at the 
expense of the many. What could be more corrupt than all the shenanigans 
that take place in Washington DC?
What exactly do we mean by corruption? TI defines corruption as the 
abuse of entrusted power for private gain. So when a government official, 
who is working for the nation’s citizens, or a corporate employee who is 
working for his company’s shareholders, fills their pockets with money, 
they are guilty of corruption. But as we will discuss, corruption can take 
very many other forms.
Is corruption really such a problem? Many will argue that some of Asia’s 
most successful economies, like China and India, are also among the most 
corrupt and that before them Japan and Korea also suffered from great 
corruption during their high-growth periods. It may indeed be true that 
corruption payments can help get things done (facilitation payments) and 
promote economic development. But as economies become more sophis-
ticated, corruption acts as a deterrent to investment and development. 
Corruption also drives the yawning inequality in Asia which is fracturing 
societies, it undermines the integrity of public institutions which is essen-
tial for good governance, and can ultimately lead to social and political 
instability, as was evident, for example, in the Tiananmen Square incident 
in 1989. Well-educated, middle-class populations will not tolerate corrup-
tion forever.
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JaPan’s institutionalized CorruPtion
As any visitor to Japan can tell you, this country seems to be entirely 
squeaky clean. And the US State Department has noted “The direct 
exchange of cash for favors from government officials in Japan is extremely 
rare.” But as the State Department also notes, there is much more going 
on behind the scenes—“the web of close relationships between Japanese 
companies, politicians, government organizations, and universities has 
been said to foster an inwardly-cooperative business climate that is condu-
cive to the awarding of contracts, positions, etc. within a tight circle of 
local players.”18 One important factor greasing the wheels of collusion in 
Japan is that of “amakudari” whereby government officials retire into top 
positions in Japanese companies, frequently in industries that they once 
regulated, and where they can pressure former colleagues for favors—most 
notably in the agriculture, construction, whaling and banking sectors. 
Some have even remarked that the situation in Japan could be described 
as “institutionalized corruption”.
In 2016, Japan also received a scolding from the OECD for its paltry 
efforts in the global fight against foreign bribery.19 Indeed, since 2002, the 
OECD has continuously urged Japan to strengthen its efforts to fight 
bribery by Japanese companies in their foreign business activities, and 
implementation of the Convention on Combating the Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions. However, Japan 
has only prosecuted the incredibly low number of four cases of “foreign 
bribery” since 1999. The OECD has also repeatedly urged Japan, to no 
avail, to amend the Anti-organised Crime Law so that companies and indi-
viduals convicted of bribing foreign public officials cannot keep their ille-
gal proceeds, including by laundering them, as required by the OECD 
convention.
Japan seems to have had a never-ending series of high-level corruption 
cases which continue to this very day. For example, in 2011, it was revealed 
that Olympus had the longest-running loss-hiding arrangement in 
Japanese corporate history, while in 2013 the Mizuho Bank was discov-
ered to have loaned money to organized crime groups (“yakuza”). And 
just in 2016, the Japanese Government’s Minister for Economic 
Revitalization, Akira Amari, resigned over a cash-for-favors bribery  scandal. 
In short, there is much more to squeaky clean Japan than meets the eye. 
And as I have seen firsthand, there is no country which better at stonewall-
ing and fending off international pressure to do the right thing. As we 
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discussed in the previous chapter, Korea shares many similarities with 
Japan in terms of cozy relationships between government and business 
fostering corruption.
malaysia’s Crime of tHe Century
Malaysia is a country that once promoted the idea that Asian values are 
different from Western values, that Asians appreciate order and harmony, 
while Westerners appreciate personal freedom, and that other so-called 
Asian values include saving and thriftiness, insistence on hard work, respect 
for leaders and family loyalty. But as the current corruption scandal involv-
ing Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak demonstrates, such assertions 
of Asian values are invariably little more than attempts by authoritarian 
leaders to justify non-democratic forms of government.
Corruption in various forms has always been part of the Malaysian land-
scape, even if it is less rapacious than in some other Asian countries. 
According to an Ernst & Young survey, 39% of respondents say that brib-
ery or corrupt practices happen widely in Malaysia, which is nearly double 
the Asia-Pacific average of 21%.20 Corruption and inefficient government 
bureaucracy would be two of the most problematic factors for doing busi-
ness in Malaysia reports the World Economic Forum.21 Corruption is prev-
alent in state-owned enterprises, the logging industry, public procurement, 
the judicial system, arranging the delivery of public services and acquiring 
business and import licenses.22 Moreover, an intricate system of patronage 
and vote-buying, together with repression of political opponents, has 
enabled Malaysia’s ruling political party coalition, known as the Barisan 
Nasional, to win all the nation’s elections since independence in 1957.
Although most Asian polities are indeed held together through net-
works of corruption, Malaysian Prime Minister Najib went one step too 
far with the creation of sovereign wealth fund, 1Malaysia Development 
Bhd (1MBD). This fund, established in 2009, was ostensibly designed to 
drive sustainable economic development by forging strategic global part-
nerships and promoting foreign direct investment. But it has unfolded 
into a tawdry tale of deep corruption and shady transactions including an 
alleged payment of $700 million into Prime Minister Najib’s personal 
bank account, bond sales of $6.5 billion by Goldman Sachs, financing the 
Hollywood film “The Wolf of Wall Street” and investments in plush lux-
ury properties, private jets and paintings, and payments to cover gambling 
debts—most involving dubious people connected to Najib.
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The US, Swiss and Singaporean governments have been hot on the trail 
of this shady affair, as billions of dollars were allegedly laundered through 
their financial systems. The US Department of Justice alleged that $3.5 
billion was misappropriated from 1MDB. Former US Attorney-General 
Loretta Lynch described the affair as “the largest kleptocracy case” in US 
history. Former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad has called 
on Najib to resign. Najib has arranged the assistance of China to help bail 
out 1MDB by selling some of its assets to Chinese companies. Many now 
worry about the leverage will now have over Malaysian politics.
As Najib has been desperately struggling to hang on to power, he 
sacked his deputy Muhyiddin Yassin and replaced the former attorney- 
general over critical comments they made about the scandal. The new 
attorney-general cleared Najib of any wrongdoing after investigations by 
the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission. Large street protests, mainly 
by Chinese Malaysians, against Prime Minister Najib have taken place, 
with some activists being arrested. The government has cracked down on 
reporting of the 1MDB scandal, blocking access to certain online news 
portals and targeting media groups and journalists.
The 1MDB affair is also a product of the dirty and violent struggle to 
hang on to power waged by the Barisan Nasional. Malaysia’s politics start-
ing going off the rails almost two decades ago when Deputy Prime Minister 
Anwar Ibrahim fell out of favor with then Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamad. In 1998, Anwar was convicted of sodomy, and given a nine- 
year prison sentence. In 2004, the verdict was overturned, and Anwar was 
released from jail. Years later, he was charged and acquitted again, and 
then yet again in 2014 he was convicted and given a five-year sentence. It 
is widely believed that the sodomy charges were politically motivated and 
that this is merely a case of persecution of the highly talented Anwar, who 
is seen as a threat to the ruling party.
The Malaysian opposition coalition, led by Anwar, came close to achiev-
ing a majority in parliament in 2008 and won several state elections. 
Anwar’s opposition then won a majority of the popular vote in 2013, 
while the BN held onto power through a campaign of dirty tricks. Indeed, 
it has been reported that some 1MDB funds would have been used by the 
Barisan Nasional to help ensure its victory in the 2013 elections. With the 
next elections due in 2018, Najib has also been trying to turn the affair 
into an ethno-patriotic issue, arguing that support for the government 
represents support for Islamic Malaysia, and that Malays must fight against 
the ethnic Chinese-dominated opposition. Najib still retains strong 
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 support among the ethnic Malay community, but not among the Chinese 
and Indian communities. Indeed, despite the 1MDB affair, Najib has 
recently led BN to emphatic victories in a state election and two by-elec-
tions. And many are betting that Najib will call snap elections and try to 
capitalize on his continuing popularity among the Malay ethnic group.
The case of 1MDB highlights how successful, soft-authoritarian regimes 
can be highly vulnerable to corruption due to their weak institutions, and 
to repression by ruthless governments which seek to defy popular pressure 
for good governance and democracy. The only hope is that Malaysian civil 
society can exert sufficient pressure on the Barisan Nasional regime to 
bring about democratic change, with rule of law and freedom of speech, 
assembly and association. For the moment, Malaysia is in a state of creep-
ing authoritarianism.
China is also suffering from rampant corruption, but its government 
now has a vigorous campaign to fight corruption, which it sees as an exis-
tential threat to Communist Party rule of China.
CHina’s CanCerous CorruPtion
Corruption was not a major problem in Mao Zedong’s China, from 1949 
to 1976. But with the subsequent opening of the economy, corruption 
has exploded like a cancer through China’s polity, economy and society. 
China’s very impressive infrastructure development has fueled widespread 
graft. Urbanization has been associated with land grabs from poor Chinese 
citizens by local government officials who offer minimal compensation. 
State-owned enterprises, most of which operate in highly protected mar-
kets, have been milked for money by executives. Local government offi-
cials often collude with local business to rip off what they can. Government 
officials frequently extract bribes in administrations like taxation, customs, 
land, construction, judiciary, police, public procurement, natural resources 
and general public services. Corruption has been rife in the People’s 
Liberation Army, where large bribes are paid for promotion casting serious 
doubts on how powerful the People’s Liberation Army really is.
Misinvoicing of China’s international trade has facilitated massive illicit 
financial outflows (to the tune of more than $1 trillion over the decade to 
201323). The proceeds of economic crime are laundered, notably through 
Hong Kong, to disguise their criminality. The 2015 chemical explosions 
which killed over 170 people and injured hundreds of others in Tianjin 
highlighted how safety regulations are routinely flouted. Violation of 
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 regulations is the major cause of China’s food safety problems. Despite 
widespread concerns about China’s environment, environmental laws are 
frequently not enforced. The police sometimes collude with organized 
crime in the management of prostitution, gambling and drugs. Members 
of the Communist Party received favored treatment in many aspects of 
their lives. If you want a good hospital bed, privileged medical treatment, 
a place for child in a good school, or most anything, graft payments will 
help make things happen.
Most corruption in China would be graft, according to William 
H. Overholt, such as when officials take kickbacks for doing their job, like 
for building a road.24 China’s system of economic growth performance 
targets has provided officials with a strong incentive to get things done, 
even if they are corrupt. Such graft is much less debilitating for the econ-
omy than pure corruption where money is diverted but things don’t get 
done, such as in the cases of India and the Philippines. How could such 
corruption spread so quickly through the Chinese economy? Much of the 
reason is because the Chinese government freed up markets in the econ-
omy, but did not complement such liberalization with well-enforced regu-
lations and institutional development.
Public outrage at corruption has also been a long-running affair. The 
1989 Tiananmen Square protests were mainly motivated by public con-
cerns about corruption. In the subsequent period, government efforts 
to combat corruption had some success, particularly for petty corrup-
tion. You are now much less likely to be hit up for a few dollars (or 
renminbi) by low-level government officials. But corruption exploded 
again during the regime President Hu Jintao, from 2002 to 2012 when 
reform efforts slowed. The government’s mega stimulus package in 
response to the global financial crisis provided fresh opportunities for 
corruption. The revelation by the New  York Times in 2012 that the 
family of Premier Wen Jiabao has hidden riches of at least $2.7 billion 
was symbolic of the rampant corruption that had spread through 
China.25
It was against this background that in late 2012 new Chinese President 
Xi Jinping launched an anti-corruption campaign as the centerpiece of 
his reform program, along with a “Disciplinary Code” to improve the 
ethics of Communist Party officials. In explaining the need to combat 
corruption, President Xi stressed that the Communist Party risks “losing 
the trust and support of the people … In our vigorous campaign against 
corruption, we have punished both tigers and flies—corrupt official—
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irrespective of ranking, in response to our people’s demand. This has 
nothing to do with power struggle. In this case, there is no House of 
Cards.”26 Indeed, Xi sees corruption as a potential existential threat to 
the Communist Party’s one-party rule in China, especially since the 
Chinese public considers official corruption as the country’s biggest 
problem.27 Xi has much to be concerned about—a major reason why 
Mao Zedong’s Communist Party was able to beat the Nationalist 
Kuomintang in the Chinese Civil War was because of the latter’s rampant 
corruption.
Many have been arrested and punished over the past five years, with 
the biggest catches being: former security czar, Zhou Yongkang; for-
mer  chief of staff of former President Hu Jintao, Ling Jihua; former 
Minister of Railways, Liu Zhijun; and former Vice Chairmen of the 
Central Military Commission, General Xu Caihou and General Guo 
Boxiong. According to one report, 1880 officials, including 184 tigers, 
would have been sentenced for corruption.28 The Chinese government 
has also spread its campaign overseas, putting pressure on foreign govern-
ments to repatriate fugitives. In 2015, China reportedly provided the US 
government a list of 150 corrupt Chinese officials believed to be hiding 
in the US. China’s most-wanted economic fugitive Yang Xiuzhu surren-
dered in November 2016. And to stimulate popular support for the anti-
corruption campaign, the government produced an eight-part television 
series, “Always on the Road”, which features confessions of convicted 
high-level officials.
Despite what President Xi said, most analysts believe that the anti- 
corruption campaign has been important for Xi in terms of eliminating 
political rivals and facilitating his consolidation of power. Indeed, the anti- 
corruption campaign has been conducted in a very selective way—a large 
share of convicted officials are linked to Zhou Yongkang, and no “prince-
lings29” have been prosecuted. And a vast array of China’s vested inter-
ests—like managers of state-owned enterprises and banks who sit on the 
Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Central Committee—have not 
been  tackled by Xi’s anti-corruption campaign. Although Xi’s anti- 
corruption drive has merely scratched the surface, he has exposed how 
thoroughly corrupt the whole system (and the CCP) has become. It is a 
complex system of patronage which holds the CCP together.
Many expected that the anti-corruption campaign would only last a 
year or two, but it now seems to have morphed into a never-ending cam-
paign. But five years after the launch of the anti-corruption campaign, 
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China is doubling down on fighting corruption. A major message of the 
2016 October’s Communist Party plenum was more discipline; punish-
ment with tougher penalties and zero tolerance, regardless of position. 
China set up new anti-corruption body to oversee all public servants as it 
intensifies battle against graft.
There has also been much debate the effectiveness of the anti- corruption 
campaign. It is difficult to see how such deeply entrenched corruption can 
be solved by a campaign like that of President Xi which seems to attack the 
symptoms rather than the root causes of corruption. Experience shows 
that all countries are vulnerable to corruption, and the only effective way 
of controlling corruption is by allowing freedom of the press, civil society 
watchdogs, independent anti-corruption commissions, rule of law and 
accountability through elections.
There is none of that in Xi’s China. The CCP, not the state judiciary, 
decides who is and is not corrupt. According to Human Rights Watch, 
the CCP has a secretive detention system which is uses torture to 
extract confessions from corruption suspects.30 For its part, the CCP 
itself is opaque and accountable to no-one. Media and civil society 
activists who speak up on corruption are arrested. And it is clear that Xi 
is using the anti- corruption campaign as a means of eliminating politi-
cal enemies and rivals. But it also seems that the deeper the anti-cor-
ruption campaign digs, the more enemies Xi has. Despite the 
shock-and-awe facade of the anti- corruption campaign, analysis by the 
Financial Times suggests that the statistical probability of being pun-
ished for corruption are slim—fewer than 0.5% of Chinese officials were 
prosecuted, while most people believe that a majority of officials have 
been corrupt some time in recent years.31 And according to most 
reports, corruption still remains widespread in China.
For the moment, it seems that the anti-corruption campaign is having 
an adverse effect on the economy, as the luxury and entertainment sector 
is being hit. The campaign has also forced local officials to become highly 
risk averse and unwilling to attempt policy innovations on the ground. 





In many ways, Mongolia has everything going for it. After being a satellite 
state of the former Soviet Union for much of the twentieth century, 
Mongolia regained its independence with the end of the Cold War. A rela-
tively peaceful political revolution in the early 1990s ushered in a multi-
party democracy and open society which have remained in place. Mongolia 
is an enormous country, more than twice the size of France, but only has 
a population of three million people. And it is blessed with vast reserves of 
copper, gold, coal, molybdenum, fluorspar, uranium, tin and tungsten 
deposits. True, Mongolia experienced great upheavals as the breakup of 
the Soviet Union saw its trade decline by 80%. But Mongolia was also 
perfectly placed to be benefit from the commodity super cycle driven by 
China, which is now the destination for the vast majority of its exports.
However, despite much hype about the Mongolian “wolf economy”, 
this country of so much promise is being dragged down by massive corrup-
tion. According to the Gan Business Anti-corruption Portal, corruption is 
a high risk in the judicial system, in land, tax and customs administrations, 
in public procurement, and also when acquiring public licenses, permits or 
utilities. And Mongolia’s mining sector would also be highly vulnerable to 
corruption. Mongolia’s corruption problems have long been a topic in 
domestic political debates, and with international investors and donors. 
But it is not clear that things are improving. In its 2016 Investment Climate 
Statement on Mongolia, the US State Department noted with concern 
that “the opportunities for corruption have increased at both the ‘petty’ or 
administrative and ‘grand’ or elite levels.”
Mongolia’s corruption is greatly weakening its attractiveness as an 
investment destination, is fracturing its society and weakening its fragile 
political institutions. Its culture of corruption has also fed its love–hate 
relationship with foreign investors, which has destabilized the economy. 
And as Jargal Dambadarjaa, an Ulaanbaatar-based commentator, has 
argued, corruption is feeding Mongolia’s debt problems. While economic 
growth virtually ground to a halt in 2016, the fiscal deficit reached 18% of 
GDP, up from 8% in the previous year, and public debt exceeded 90% of 
GDP by year-end. The Mongolian government also made some large bor-
rowings on international markets in recent years to finance infrastructure, 
but is now faced with more than $1 billion in debt repayments in 2017 
and early 2018. Mongolia’s increasingly precarious finances led credit 
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 rating agencies Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, to downgrade Mongolia’s 
sovereign rating in August 2016.
The country’s mounting double deficits prompted the new govern-
ment led by Prime Minister Erdenebat Jargaltulga to turn to the IMF, the 
ADB and other donors for rescue loans. But Mongolia has too many 
friends coming to its rescue when greater discipline is necessary to get its 
house in order. Mongolian friends like the Japan, US, UK and Australia 
are very keen to support this fledgling democracy which is landlocked 
between the two non-democratic giants of China and Russia. The 
Mongolian government was also keen to avoid seeking extra support from 
China, following an earlier currency swap agreement to support its 
currency.
There is hope that when Rio Tinto’s Oyu Tolgoi mine, the world’s 
largest underdeveloped reserve of copper, and some other mines get into 
full production swing, that Mongolia will turn the corner and realize its 
great potential. But another scenario is that increasing resource revenues 
will only fuel more corruption.
Mongolia needs to desperately kill its corruption curse and build the 
institutions for a successful young democracy. If it doesn’t, it will be 
trapped in the competition between China and Western countries for its 
attention. And ultimately, Western donor fatigue could set in, and 
Mongolia could find itself being bought out by communist China, and 
losing its democracy forever. This would be a sad ending to one of democ-
racy’s great hopes.
lessons from Clean singaPore
Singapore would be Asia’s least corrupt country, ranking seventh in TI’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index 2015, well ahead of 15th placed Hong 
Kong and 20th placed Japan. What can we learn from this bastion of 
authoritarian capitalism?
In private discussions with Asit K. Biswas of the National University of 
Singapore, the late Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew recalled that corruption 
was once commonplace in Singapore’s colonial civil service.32 When his 
People’s Action Party came to power, it made anti-corruption policies a 
key priority in order to attract foreign investment and foster economic 
development. As Jon S.T. Quah has analyzed, this required eliminating 
both the opportunities and incentives for corruption.33
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In his insightful analysis, Professor Quah suggested a number of lessons 
from Singapore’s success in fighting corruption, including: (1) commit-
ment of the political leadership, especially Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew—
indeed, anyone found guilty of corruption must be punished, regardless of 
his status or position in society; (2) anti-corruption measures must be 
comprehensive, not piecemeal, to prevent loopholes, and must be con-
stantly reviewed; (3) there are a number of government ministries and 
agencies which are particularly vulnerable to corruption, notably like cus-
toms, immigration, internal revenue, traffic police and the above all the 
anti-corruption agency, and which require special attention for eliminat-
ing the opportunities for corruption; and (4) it is important to pay civil 
servants competitive salaries to reduce the incentive for corruption. Today, 
Singapore’s politicians and civil servants are among the very best paid in 
the world.
Singapore has shown Asia, and the rest of the world, that it is possible 
to virtually eliminate corruption. Indeed, Chinese President Xi Jinping is 
inspired by his perception of the Singapore model—a war on corruption, 
a crackdown on dissent, and pro-market economic reforms—which he 
hopes would allow the Communist Party to retain its monopoly on politi-
cal power.
But there is much more to the Singapore model than that.34 Singapore 
allows opposition political parties and holds elections, even if they are far 
from free elections. This allows the public to express their point of view 
and hold the government somewhat accountable. Indeed, the 2011 
national elections saw a 6% swing against the ruling party, which recorded 
its lowest score since independence. Singapore also rates very highly when 
it comes to the rule of law. And so it was that with his strong leadership, 
limited democracy and the rule of law that Lee Kuan Yew was able keep 
the predatory appetite of Singapore’s elite under control.
money laundering in asia
When it comes to money laundering (i.e., concealing the identity of crimi-
nal proceeds so they appear legitimate), Asia is even much worse shape 
than it is for corruption. Not one Asian economy makes it in the world’s 
cleanest 50 countries of the 149 surveyed by the International Centre for 
Asset Recovery. Indeed, nine Asian economies make it into the worst 50, 
namely Cambodia, Myanmar, Nepal, Laos, Sri Lanka, China, Vietnam, 
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Pakistan and Thailand. Seemingly respectable ones like Taiwan, Malaysia, 
Hong Kong and Japan only make it into the middle of the pack.
The very many reported cases, as well as the Panama Papers, highlight 
the prominence of Hong Kong as a hub for money laundering. As one of 
the world’s leading financial centers, it has facilitated the massive rise of 
illicit financial flows from China through middlemen entities that set up 
companies, foundations and trusts to help clients hide their wealth. 
According to the Panama Papers, Hong Kong has the most offshore com-
panies surpassing the UK and Switzerland as the economy with the most 
offshore companies. Hong Kong’s crime proceeds can be generated from 
a vast array of activities like drug trafficking, smuggling and illegal gam-
bling. In a similar vein, Singapore’s role as an international financial center 
makes it vulnerable to money laundering, all the more so given position as 
a haven of sophistication in Southeast Asia, a region riddled with orga-
nized crime and large-scale corruption.
According to Banker’s Academy, “Money laundering in Japan is a per-
sistent problem.” And the US State Department reports that Japan con-
tinues to face substantial risk of money laundering by organized crime, 
and that there has been an increase in financial crimes by citizens of West 
African countries, such as Nigeria and Ghana, who reside in Japan. Drug 
trafficking, fraud, loan sharking (illegal money lending), remittance frauds, 
the black market economy, prostitution and illicit gambling are the main 
sources of laundered funds.
CyberCrime
Asia has also become a major theater for global cybercrime. This was high-
lighted in 2016 when cyber criminals used the Philippines and a SWIfT 
code to steal $81 million from the account of the Bangladesh central bank 
at the Federal Reserve of New York. But unfortunately, the majority of 
cyber attacks in Asia go unreported. This actually increases the region’s 
vulnerability to cybercrime, as it feeds the perception that the cyber threat 
is lower than it actually is.
Cybercrimes are vast in scope—from hacking, data theft and espionage, 
identity theft, malware, ransomware, phishing, spamming, content-related 
crime like child pornography, copyright and trademark-related offenses 
and fraud. Cybercrime is also facilitating many traditional crimes like 
human trafficking, drug dealing, corruption and money laundering.
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Cybercrime attacks in the Asia-Pacific have increased dramatically, 
according to ThreatMetrix. Business revenues lost to cyber attacks in Asia 
came to over $80 billion in the 12 months to September 2015, according 
to the professional services company Grant Thornton. Some 28% of orga-
nizations in Asia were hit with an advanced cyber attack in the second half 
of 2015, double the world average, according to FireEye, an American 
security company. For the first time, Asian enterprises have identified 
cybercrime as a critical business risk, according to Aon’s 2017 Global Risk 
Management Survey. Reflecting the gravity of cybercrime in Asia, 
Microsoft has opened Cybercrime Satellite Centers in Tokyo, Beijing and 
Singapore.
To reduce its vulnerability to cybercrime, Asia needs to improve cyber-
security awareness, especially in the business sector, to strengthen cyber 
regulations and their enforcement, and above all, to take international 
cooperation much more seriously, in light of the trans-border nature of 
cybercrime. Fortunately, the US and China, two top sources of cyber-
crime, are now cooperating closely. Australia is also cooperating closely 
with China, Singapore and Thailand on combating cybercrime in Asia.
* * *
Can Asian countries live together in peace and harmony is the question we 
ask in the next chapter. The relative stability of postwar Asia, led by the 
US, is being shaken by the rise of China, as China is now engaged in a 
bitter power struggle with the US and its Asian allies for the political lead-
ership of Asia. We review some aspects of China’s relations with the US, 
Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, North Korea and Southeast Asia, and the 
many of the manifold tensions.
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CHAPTER 10
Can Asian Countries Live Together in Peace 
and Harmony?
“If the US would only leave Asia, we Asians could all live together in peace 
and harmony,” a group of over 40 Chinese students said in response to my 
question. But when I reported this exchange back to another one of my 
classes, the Americans in the group instantly retorted that “Asia would 
descend into war if ever the US left Asia to itself—Asians hate each other.”
I was shocked at both the sharpness of the two reactions and the una-
nimity of the feelings of each of the two groups of students. So I invited a 
Chinese professorial colleague to lunch to see her reactions. She almost 
jumped in responding: “Why must the US have a system of alliances with 
so many Asian countries surrounding China? The US is not an Asian 
country. The US is just encircling China, trying to hem us in. It is trying 
to stop China’s rise. It sees China’s rise as a threat. The US just wants to 
remain Asia’s hegemon.”
These revealing comments highlight the great power transition under 
way in Asia—from a US-led region to perhaps a China-led one. Asia’s 
post-World War 2 geopolitics are being shaken by the rise of China, and 
China is now engaged in a bitter power struggle with the US and its 
Asian allies for the political leadership of Asia. At this stage, the US seems 
to be losing its hold over Asia, something which will likely accelerate 
under the Trump administration. China has signed up most Asian coun-
tries to its new initiatives like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which the US and Japan 
have boycotted. China is also proving very effective at subjugating many 
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of its neighbors through its market, financial and military power. For its 
part, the US is distracted by the Middle East, Russia and the circus of 
Washington, and has difficulties being consistent from one administra-
tion to another.
China’s burgeoning domination of Asia is incongruous in many ways. 
When compared with Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, 
China’s economy is inferior in terms of GDP per capita, and economic, 
business and technological sophistication. Its citizens suffer from human 
rights abuses, widespread restrictions on freedom, censorship of informa-
tion and dubious official propaganda. And its government is neither dem-
ocratic nor transparent, and is shrouded in secrecy and is accountable to 
no one but itself.
But China does have size on its side thanks to its enormous population. 
This means that it has the world’s biggest economy in purchasing power 
parity terms, the largest foreign exchange reserves and the highest military 
expenditure in Asia. China is also the most important trading partner of 
virtually all other Asian economies. And it is not shy to assert its political 
and military power, even it means breaking international law to which it 
has signed up.
The Chinese are also motivated by an enormous belief in their destiny. 
As former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, once said, “The Chinese 
think of themselves as having always been on top and that there was only 
an interruption of a hundred years in which the West exploited its momen-
tary weakness. And in their mind, they are reclaiming their traditional 
position.”1 In short, China has great economic weight and motivation, 
which it has transformed into economic, political and military power.
No one can be sure how the future will unfold and what the “new nor-
mal” will be. Traditional military conflict cannot be ruled out, though 
perhaps not between China and the US. American business is hooked on 
the Chinese market, and US diplomatic and military leaders would not 
want to put this at risk. The US also needs Chinese cooperation on issues 
like North Korea, counter-terrorism, cyber-security, Iran and, depending 
on the administration, climate change. And both sides seem very con-
scious of the futility and massive costs of a possible military conflict.
But despite the size of its market and military, China has very few 
friends in Asia, and the potential is enormous for conflict with Japan, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Vietnam and especially India. And China has been 
the ultimate guarantor of North Korea, Asia’s greatest security risk.
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The relative peace that Asia has enjoyed these past seven decades has 
been key to the region’s economic renaissance. But as we discuss in this 
chapter, a peaceful future in Asia cannot be taken for granted. Indeed, the 
ability of Asians to live together in peace and harmony will perhaps be the 
most important determinant of a successful Asian Century.
How did we get into this situation? What are Asia’s hot spots? And 
what will the future hold?
US and aSia dUring the Cold War
The Chinese communist government’s giant military parade on Tiananmen 
Square on 3 September 2015 to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the 
“Victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese 
Aggression” was a grotesque affair with perfectly goose-stepping soldiers 
and a massive display of new military equipment, including the DF-21D, 
the so-called carrier killer anti-ship ballistic missile. It was also a sham. The 
US, along with China’s nationalist army (the Kuomintang—KMT), was 
responsible for bringing an end to Japan’s aggression and to the Pacific 
side of World War 2—the Communist Party had virtually nothing to do 
with it.
In fact, China’s communists were fortunate that the KMT had invested 
so much energy in fighting the Japanese that they could then easily beat 
the diminished KMT in the subsequent Chinese Civil War, which ended in 
1949. Another major event that shaped Cold War relations in East Asia 
was the Korean War which saw the peninsula divided between North 
Korea, supported by China and the USSR, and South Korea, supported 
by the US and its allies, from war’s end in 1953.
As the ultimate victor of World War 2, the US faced a complex post-
war geopolitical landscape. Asia’s only great power, Japan, was not only 
defeated, it was virtually destroyed. The process of decolonization in 
Asia was beginning, leaving many new nations to fend for themselves. 
This period also witnessed the onset of the Cold War with countries 
like Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand lining 
up on the American side, and China, North Korea and the USSR on 
the other side. Reflecting these Cold War politics, Taiwan occupied 
China’s seat at the United Nations (UN), the IMF, World Bank and 
other international organizations, with the People’s Republic being vir-
tually sidelined.
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The US government was very keen to provide its allies with security. 
But the US did not want to give them a blank check to start wars and 
entrap it in parochial conflicts. The US needed to control these allies. So 
the US created a bilateral “hub-and-spoke” alliance system in Asia, 
which provided its Asian allies with security, but kept them under con-
trol. Quite deliberately, it did not create an “Asian NATO”, because the 
US did not have sufficient trust in its Asian allies. For their part, these 
Asian countries did not have any need for an Asian NATO once the US 
had provided them with sufficient security through tight bilateral agree-
ments. In the case of Japan, at the time Asia’s most important country, 
the US occupying powers went further, and virtually created a new 
nation, a democracy, with a constitution that renounced to right to 
wage war.2
The alliances with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand 
remain in place to this very day (the US also has a close military partner-
ship with Singapore). In 1979, the US switched its allegiances and recog-
nized mainland China as “one China” rather than Taiwan. But the US did 
not totally abandon Taiwan. It implemented new security obligations 
through the US Taiwan Relations Act which states that “the United States 
will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in 
such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a suffi-
cient self-defense capabilities.” This legislation is designed to deter both 
China from invading Taiwan and Taiwan from unilaterally declaring 
independence.
As the US system of alliances provided security to its Asian friends, it 
also underpinned the exceptional economic development that these coun-
tries would experience. But the US provided even greater support to its 
Asian friends. In the immediate post-war years, they received financial 
assistance to help reconstruct their economies. They benefited from the 
stability and open markets fostered by the new multilateral economic sys-
tem, including most notably the UN, IMF, World Bank and the GATT 
(which would become the World Trade Organisation). The export-driven 
development of Japan, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan would 
also benefit greatly from the substantial openness of US markets to exports 
from these countries. It is important to stress that as generous as the 
American actions might seem, they were substantially motivated by geo-
politics. After years of World War 2, and with the emerging Cold War, the 




Perhaps one of the most important developments in the post-war 
period was that, despite the violent war, Japan was able to reestablish 
peaceful and friendly relations with most of its former adversaries. For 
example, on the 70th anniversary of the end of World War 2, on 2 
September 2015, US President Barack Obama said:
“The end of the war marked the beginning of a new era in America’s 
relationship with Japan. As Prime Minister Abe and I noted during his visit 
in April, the relationship between our two countries over the last 70 years 
stands as a model of the power of reconciliation: former adversaries who 
have become steadfast allies and who work together to advance common 
interests and universal values in Asia and globally. Seventy years ago this 
partnership was unimaginable. Today it is a fitting reflection of our shared 
interests, capabilities, and values, and I am confident that it will continue 
to deepen in the decades to come.”4 Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe’s visit to Pearl Harbour in late 2016 was also emblematic of the rec-
onciliation and friendship between the US and Japan. It may also have 
been motivated by Abe’s fear that President Trump will downplay the 
US–Japan Alliance.
In a similar spirit, Australia’s former Prime Minister Tony Abbott told 
Japan’s Shinzo Abe, when these two prime ministers met at an East Asia 
Summit in Brunei in 2013. “As far as I’m concerned, Japan is Australia’s 
best friend in Asia and we want to keep it a very strong friendship.”5 There 
are now only a few Asian nations with which Japan now has poor relations, 
notably China, North Korea and South Korea. Efforts by the US to prod 
Japan and South Korea to bury the hatchet, notably over Japan’s forced 
employment of Korean “comfort women”, are still struggling to achieve 
durable results.
On a visit to Japan in 2015, Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel had 
some wise advice on post-war reconciliation when she spoke of Germany’s 
readiness “to face our history openly and squarely”, but also of the “gen-
erous gestures of our neighbours”. In other words, post-war  reconciliation 
requires efforts on both sides. And regrettably, anti-Japanese sentiment is 
a still an important tool in domestic politics in China, and North and 
South Korea.
Overall, the US played a major role in fostering the rapid and peaceful 
development of its allies and friends in the post-war period, including the 
successful democratization of Korea and Taiwan. The US would also make 
a major contribution to China’s development, when it finally opened up 
its economy.
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rehabilitation of China
Although China was substantially isolated from the West and the rest of 
Asia, over the years from 1949, the People’s Republic of China worked 
hard to secure international recognition and support for its position that 
it, not Taiwan, was the sole legitimate government of all China, including 
Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. Thus, a growing number of Western 
countries recognized the People’s Republic of China, starting with 
Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark and Finland in 1950. Other important 
milestones along the way included recognition by Canada (1970), UK 
(1972), Japan (1972) and Australia (1972). A major turning point 
occurred when Taiwan, which had occupied China’s seat at the UN since 
1945, was effectively expelled on 25 October 1971, with its seat being 
taken over by the People’s Republic of China. Indeed, the People’s 
Republic took over the China seat in all international organizations.
But the most important event in the rehabilitation of the People’s 
Republic was the visit to China in 1972 by US President Richard Nixon 
and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, and the subsequent, in 
1979, formal recognition of the People’s Republic by the US, and its sev-
ering of relations with Taiwan. At China’s insistence, the US also adhered 
to the “One-China Policy” by which there is only one China, and Taiwan 
is considered a renegade province which must in time be reunited with the 
motherland.
While the US was keen to join forces with China against the USSR in 
the Cold War of the day, it was also motivated by Nixon’s belief that China 
should be brought into the international system. In 1967 Nixon wrote 
“Taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever 
outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates 
and threaten its neighbours…. There is no place on this small planet for a 
billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation.”6 In 
more recent years, US President Obama emphasized that his administra-
tion welcomes China’s peaceful rise, and believes that a strong and pros-
perous China is one that can help to bring prosperity and stability to the 
region and the world.
From the moment of US recognition of People’s Republic of China, 
through various administrations, US policy was always designed to sup-
port the revival of the Chinese economy, even if there have been ups and 
downs, like the Tiananmen Square Massacre. Another major step took 
place in 2000, when President Bill Clinton signed into law the U.S.–China 
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Relations Act which granted permanent normal trade relations to China, 
against stiff opposition from labor and human rights groups. This facili-
tated China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001. Prior to 
passage of the bill, China was subject to an annual review of its trade status 
with the US.
There were of course powerful US business interests supporting the 
normalization of trade relations between the US and China. But President 
Clinton believed that there were also powerful political interests when he 
said: “…many of [China’s leaders] believe that we honestly don’t want 
their country to assume a respected place in the world. If … we turn our 
backs on them, it will confirm their fears.” He also said: “Membership in 
the WTO, of course, will not create a free society in China overnight or 
guarantee that China will play by global rules. But over time, I believe it 
will move China faster and further in the right direction, and certainly will 
do that more than rejection would.”7
While China’s dramatic economic transformation since 1978 owes a 
great deal to the reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping, China has benefited 
greatly from the openness of the US economy, which is vastly more open 
than the Chinese economy. Today, China is the US’ largest supplier of 
merchandise imports and the third largest market for US merchandise 
exports. US goods and services trade with China totaled an estimated 
$659.4 billion in 2015, with the US having a goods and services trade 
deficit with China of $336.2 billion in 2015.8
The US is becoming a very important destination for China’s outbound 
investment, with Chinese companies investing a record $45.6 billion of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2016. This threefold increase from 
2015 is helping Chinese companies acquire technology, knowhow and 
brands, and penetrate US markets. It is estimated that the US has received 
over $100 billion in FDI from China since the year 2000.9 Since Chinese 
outbound investment is a relatively new phenomenon, the stock of US 
investment in China is very much higher.
Another point of point of access to US knowledge is through the 
330,000 Chinese students studying in the US in 2016, accounting for 
over 30% of the US’ international students. China has also become a mas-
sive source of tourist revenues for the US.  In 2016, 3 million Chinese 
tourists visited the US, and with $33 billion in visitor spending, they were 
by far the US’ most important source of tourist dollars. And according to 
the 2010 census, there are some 3.8 millions of Americans of Chinese 
descent, reflecting the openness of America’s society.
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In sum, the US has contributed greatly to the development of the 
Chinese economy. But as China’s rise has progressed, the US economy has 
become increasingly dependent on China, which has reduced US’ political 
leverage over China.
As we discussed in Chap. 4, trade and investment with Japan has been 
another factor driving the Chinese economy forward. But friendly rela-
tions between these countries took a turn for the worse after the Tiananmen 
Square massacre, thereby destabilizing the foundations for peace and har-
mony in Asia.
Japan, from ChineSe friend to foe
Japan has been the subject of growing Chinese vitriol these past few years. 
The dispute over the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has only 
increased. Despite Japan’s manifold apologies for its atrocious war crimes 
in World War 2, China keeps questioning Japan’s sincerity, and requests 
more and more apologies. The Chinese government seeks every opportu-
nity it can to humiliate Japan.
At the same time, the actions of the Japanese government have not 
helped. Visits by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and other leading 
government figures to the Yasukuni Shrine which honors among others 
Japanese war criminals have incensed not only China but also Korea. 
Comments by right wing Japanese political figures which question the 
veracity of events like the Nanjing Massacre and other Japanese wartime 
violence only add fuel to the fire. But what is also clear is that the Chinese 
government is actively promoting anti-Japanese sentiment, especially 
through grotesque television dramas. And as China regularly whips itself 
up into a frenzy over Japan, it is perhaps easy to forget that China’s mod-
ern anti-Japanese sentiment is only a recent phenomenon.
During the 1970s and 1980s, China and Japan actually had good rela-
tions. In 1972, Mao Zedong told Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka that his 
apologies for Japan’s wartime aggression were not necessary, and expressed 
gratitude for Japan’s help in defeating Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT national 
army. Also in 1972, in a joint communiqué signed by Premier Zhou Enlai, 
China magnanimously renounced its right to war reparations, satisfying 
itself with Japan’s acceptance of “responsibility for serious damage caused 
to the Chinese people through war.” And following Deng Xiaoping’s his-
toric visit to Japan in 1978, relations between the two countries improved 
greatly. Japan played a key role in the take-off of the backward Chinese 
J. WEST
 287
economy through financial assistance, corporate investments and technol-
ogy transfer.
But things changed quickly after the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre, 
even though Japan was the first country to restore high-level relations 
with China following the diplomatic rupture with advanced countries. 
One lesson that the Chinese leadership drew from the Tiananmen Square 
incident was that the Communist Party needed to make greater efforts to 
promote nationalism to improve support for the Party. So under the lead-
ership of Jiang Zemin, China embarked on a massive campaign of patri-
otic education. Students and citizens were taught how the Communist 
Party was leading China’s recovery from its “century of humiliation” 
(from the opium wars to the end of the civil war in 1949). And at the 
heart of this patriotic education was anti-Japanese propaganda, since 
Japan was the country that inflicted the most suffering on China. As aca-
demic Minxin Pei has argued, the official anti-Japanese campaign has left 
deep scars: “Chinese state media and history textbooks have fed the 
younger generation such a diet of distorted, jingoistic facts, outright lies, 
and nationalistic myths that it is easy to provoke anti-Western or anti-
Japanese sentiments.”10
There have been other factors that have weakened China’s burgeoning 
friendship with Japan. With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution 
of the USSR, China and Japan lost a common enemy which had helped 
unite them. And with its rapid development, China increasingly believed 
that it had less need for Japanese aid, investment and technology.
Is there any hope that China and Japan could bury the hatchet and have 
friendly relations?
It is very difficult to see a positive way out in the immediate future, even 
though it is ultimately in the interests of both countries to have good rela-
tions. The Chinese government has invested so much political energy in 
its anti-Japan propaganda that it would be difficult for it to back down. 
With its shaky economy and obvious political fragility, we are likely to see 
more, not less, Chinese nationalism. And China’s anti-Japan propaganda 
has also emboldened Japan’s right wing, which seeks to minimize Japanese 
wartime atrocities. It is also fostering “apology fatigue”, especially among 
Japanese citizens born after the war.
Over the past couple of years, there has been a little softening of the 
rhetoric between the two countries. They regret the unfortunate eco-
nomic costs of the “war of words”, especially as Japanese investment in 
China has fallen dramatically over the past few years. Both leaders have 
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met at international events. But it will likely require generational change 
in both countries, and probably democracy and freedom of the press in 
China, for real reconciliation to ever take place between the two 
countries.
As reconciliation will take a very long time, Asian neighbors and indeed 
the whole world must stay prepared for Northeast Asia remaining one of 
the world’s political hotspots. Indeed, as Japan’s Akiko Fukushima has 
argued, the security environment in Northeast Asia has seriously worsened 
over past decade with China’s military buildup, the thickening of its pres-
ence in the South and East China Seas and North Korea’s missile testing. 
This was the motivation for Japan’s new security strategy, released in 2013, 
by which it has shifted from a passive and reactive approach to a proactive 
one.11
Like Japan, Taiwan is another country which, through its trade and 
investment, has made a major contribution to China’s development. But 
since the election in 2016 of Tsai Ing-wen of the pro-independence 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to presidency of Taiwan, the Taiwan 
Straits have become another one of Asia’s hotspots.
taiWan and China: it’S CompliCated
China still regards Taiwan as a renegade province, which must be reunified 
with the mainland under the banner of its “one-China policy”, even 
though it is almost seven decades since Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese 
Nationalist Party (KMT) fled to Taiwan after losing the China’s Civil War 
in 1949. Today, China’s claims seem anachronistic, as Taiwan’s GDP per 
capita is more than three times that of the mainland, and Taiwan has been 
a successful democracy since the early 1990s in sharp contrast to the 
increasingly authoritarian China. But China’s claims to Taiwan are only 
intensifying in tandem with its growing economic power. The growing 
impatience of Chinese President Xi Jinping was palpable when he said that 
the “Taiwan issue cannot be passed on from generation to generation.”
Taiwan is one of Asia’s most democratic countries. Its citizens have a 
choice between two major political parties with different policy agendas. 
The KMT supports Beijing’s one-China policy, and has had very good 
working relations with Beijing. The DPP is a pro-independence party 
which Beijing detests. In recent years, there has also been a real and mean-
ingful alternance of power between these two parties, in contrast to Japan 
which has been dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party. Chen 
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 Shui- bian of the DPP was Taiwan’s President from 2000 to 2008, and was 
followed by Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT from 2000 to 2016. And then fol-
lowing widespread dissatisfaction with the KMT, Madame Tsai Ing- wen of 
the DPP was elected president, the first female head of state or govern-
ment in a Chinese territory.
Why would Taiwanese citizens elect the DPP’s Madame Tsai and risk 
the wrath of China’s assertive leaders?
The return of the KMT to the presidency in 2008 under Ma Ying-jeou 
ushered in a golden age of relations between Taiwan and China. Official 
contacts with Beijing, which had been on hold since 1999, were revived. 
A free trade agreement between China and Taiwan was signed in 2010. 
Tourists from Mainland China were permitted to visit Taiwan starting in 
2008, with more than ten million Chinese tourists traveling to Taiwan 
since that time. Overall, more than 20 economic, academic and cultural 
agreements were signed between Taipei and Beijing under Ma’s watch. 
Underpinning this rapprochement was the “1992 Consensus” by which 
both sides commit to the principle of “One China”, even if they may inter-
pret that principle differently. Notwithstanding these positive develop-
ments, Taiwan is substantially shut out of most international organizations 
and free trade agreements because of pressure exerted by Beijing on the 
international community. Taiwan only has formal diplomatic relations 
with a very few countries, 21 mainly small, poor countries at last count.
To the great dismay of Beijing, this period of closer economic linkages 
saw the two sides drifting apart politically. There was widespread popular 
discontent in Taiwan, especially among youth, as the public was experienc-
ing rising inequality, high cost of living and declining opportunity. There 
was a widespread perception that while the Taiwanese business sector ben-
efited from closer linkages with China, ordinary citizens suffered, as busi-
ness increasingly moved production facilities, and hence jobs, from Taiwan 
to the lower-cost mainland.
Ma himself became deeply unpopular. There were public concerns 
about the growing dependence of Taiwan on China, as Ma has been “sell-
ing out” Taiwan to the mainland. These feelings came to a head in 2014, 
when students and activists (“the sunflower movement”) occupied the 
national parliament for three weeks to block the approval of a free trade 
agreement, and again when students protested against China-friendly 
changes to curriculum guidelines in Taiwanese schools. These develop-
ments took place in a context where the vast majority of Taiwanese citi-
zens now feel a greater attachment to their distinct Taiwanese identity 
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rather than to a Chinese identity. Generational change is fundamentally 
transforming Taiwan’s society and politics, and a majority of its citizens 
have no interest in unification with China.
It was against this background that Madame Tsai Ing-wen won Taiwan’s 
presidential elections on 16 January 2016 as a representative of the pro- 
independence DPP, with her inauguration taking place on 20 May. China’s 
communist government has always had a deep allergy to the DPP because 
it fears that it could declare independence. Indeed, Beijing has long threat-
ened military intervention should Taiwan seek to declare independence. 
Thus the victory of Tsai Ing-wen was a defiance of Beijing’s playbook. 
Taiwan’s citizens should have appreciated the benefits of closer economic 
and person-to-person linkages under the KMT. Ironically, the increase in 
person-to-person contacts between China and Taiwan seems to have 
emphasized their differences for the Taiwanese.
Through the presidential election campaign and subsequently, Tsai 
Ing-wen refused to adhere to the 1992 Consensus and say that Taiwan 
and China are part of one country. Rather, she tried to dance a fine line 
between the pro-independence elements from her party and the incessant 
demands from Beijing that she commit to the one-China policy. Her 
 standard formulation was that she supports the “status quo”, meaning 
neither independence nor reunification, a position which is supported by 
the majority of Taiwanese people. But this is not good enough for Beijing 
which does not trust Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP. Beijing continues trying 
to bully her into formally accepting the 1992 Consensus on one-China.
Since Tsai’s election victory, Beijing has been tightening the screws on 
Taiwan, employing “megaphone diplomacy” to tell Tsai what to do, stop-
ping all official contacts with Taiwan, encouraging some of Taiwan’s dip-
lomatic partners to sever relations with Taiwan, pressuring third countries 
to repatriate alleged Taiwanese criminals to China, pressuring interna-
tional organizations to withhold invitations to meetings, and sharply 
reducing the number of mainland tourists visiting Taiwan.
It is clearly Beijing’s intention to undermine the government of Tsai 
Ing-wen, something which is supported by Taiwan’s pro-Beijing business 
elite. But Beijing’s actions may also stiffen the backbone of Taiwanese citi-
zens, especially its youth. Clearly, what is required is a period of trust- 
building between the two sides. Looking to the longer term, Beijing needs 
to learn the merits of soft power. Playing hardball is certainly no way to 
win the hearts and minds of the people of Taiwan. But it has seen a 
strengthening in the already warm relations between Taiwan and Japan.
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Any desire of Taiwanese citizens for the reunification of their country 
with mainland China is frittering away in tandem with growing interfer-
ence of Beijing in the affairs of Hong Kong, another source of political 
instability in Asia.
hong Kong and China: it’S even more CompliCated
After more than 150  years of British colonial rule, Hong Kong was 
returned to China in 1997. It was to be governed under the “One coun-
try, two systems” principle for the next 50 years. Hong Kong could retain 
a “high degree of autonomy” for its domestic legal and economic system, 
while China assumed control of Hong Kong’s foreign affairs and interpre-
tation of Hong Kong’s Basic Law, a mini-constitution negotiated between 
the British and Chinese governments.
This was seen to be a “win-win” solution. Hong Kong citizens would 
keep the many freedoms they enjoy. The Chinese economy would con-
tinue to benefit from Hong Kong’s role as an important gateway to the 
global economy thanks to its sophisticated financial, legal and logistics 
sectors, and its sound rule of law, and advanced education system. And 
both China and Hong Kong would have 50 years to adapt to each other.
But there has been a progressive deterioration in relations between the 
Hong Kong population and Beijing in recent years, and Beijing is now 
openly flouting the Basic Law. There are very many factors which have 
been driving a wedge between Hong Kong and Beijing. Despite Beijing’s 
reputation for meritocracy and wisdom, its choices for Hong Kong’s Chief 
Executive have been anything but meritocratic or wise. Tung Chee-hwa, 
the first Chief Executive chosen by Beijing, was widely considered to be 
incompetent and was deeply unpopular with the Hong Kong public. In 
2003, some 500,000 Hong Kongers protested against Tung, who ulti-
mately resigned in 2005, three years into his second five-year term. In 
February 2017, the second Chief Executive, Donald Tsang, was sentenced 
to 20 months in prison for corruption, becoming Hong Kong’s highest- 
ranking official to be jailed. The third Chief Executive, Leung Chun-ying, 
mismanaged Hong Kong’s growing social unrest, and did not seek a sec-
ond term. Beijing has great hopes for Carrie Lam, who was elected as the 
new Chief Executive in March 2017.
Hong Kong has experienced growing social unrest in recent years, most 
notably through the “Occupy Central” and “Umbrella Revolution” 
 pro- democracy protests, about the method for choosing future chief 
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 executives. Based on the Basic Law and commitments from Beijing, 
Hong Kong’s Chief Executive was scheduled to be elected by universal 
suffrage from 2017. But Beijing insisted that it choose the election can-
didates. It insisted that chief executive candidates must “love China and 
love Hong Kong”. Protesters wanted an open nomination process for 
candidates.
Ultimately, in 2015 pro-democracy members of Hong Kong’s 
Legislative Council (“LegCo”) rejected a bill supporting Beijing proposals 
for the 2017 Chief Executive elections, and Hong Kong’s Chief Executive 
is still not elected via universal suffrage. Relations between Hong Kong 
and Beijing deteriorated further in 2016 when anti-establishment candi-
dates won 29 out of 70 the Lego seats, including many new faces from the 
post-Occupy political movement. Beijing then expelled two of these new 
pro-independence lawmakers from LegCo for “insincere oath-taking” 
when they severely criticized Beijing.
Although Beijing is very keen for Hong Kong’s new Chief Executive, 
Carrie Lam, to greatly improve relations between the territory and Beijing, 
this will be a great challenge. In March 2017, Lam was elected by an 
1194-member Election Committee, representing only 0.16% of Hong 
Kong’s population. Lam, a former Chief Secretary for Administration, was 
Beijing’s preferred candidate, but not the preferred candidate of the Hong 
Kong population. That was former Financial Secretary John Tsang. But 
Beijing intervened to pressure Election Committee members to vote for 
Lam.
Hong Kongers see the “hand of Beijing” interfering more and more in 
Hong Kong affairs, in defiance with the Basic Law. Hong Kong’s freedom 
of the press freedom has been in sharp decline, as the number of physical 
attacks on journalists has increased. Academic freedom and university 
autonomy are now increasingly compromised in Hong Kong. There have 
been cases of academics, who are seen as critical of Beijing, being demoted 
or coming under attack by pro-Beijing media. China’s pervasive political 
influence over Hong Kong was evident in the 2015 extraterritorial abduc-
tions, apparently orchestrated by the Chinese government, of booksellers 
and others who offended Beijing.
Hong Kong’s protests were not only inspired by a desire for democracy. 
They also reflected a broader feeling of popular discontent concerning the 
cost of living and housing, poverty and inequality, air pollution and the 
growing presence of mainland tourists, migrants and business. Way back 
in 2009, then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao raised the issue of Hong 
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Kong’s “deep contradictions” when he pushed then Chief Executive 
Donald Tsang to do better in maintaining “Hong Kong’s harmony and 
stability”, to little effect.
Hong Kongers can see that its government’s policies are stacked in 
favor of the territory’s pro-Beijing business elite. More fundamentally, 
Hong Kong society is becoming deeply polarized between pro- and anti- 
Beijing camps. Increasing numbers of youth have no desire to live under 
Beijing’s rule and favor independence of the territory.
Beijing and Hong Kong leaders have blamed “foreign intervention” 
(meaning US and UK) for stoking up social unrest, reflecting their state of 
denial of the genuine grievances of Hong Kong citizens, and divisions in 
Hong Kong society. In fact, Hong Kong’s churches played a quiet but 
important role in the city’s protests, offering food and shelter to demon-
strators, with some organizers and supporters citing Christian values as 
inspiration in their fight. “Christians, by definition, don’t trust commu-
nists,” said Joseph Chan, a political-science professor at Chinese University 
of Hong Kong.
In his speech in 2017 on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of Hong 
Kong’s return to China, China’s President Xi Jinping made clear that 
 protests in support of democracy or independence are unacceptable: “Any 
attempt to endanger China’s sovereignty and security, challenge the power 
of the central government and the authority of the Basic Law of the 
HKSAR or use Hong Kong to carry out infiltration and sabotage activities 
against the mainland is an act that crosses the red line, and is absolutely 
impermissible … making everything political or deliberately creating dif-
ferences and provoking confrontation will not resolve the problems.12” As 
Beijing becomes more assertive in its relations with Hong Kong, the UK, 
the country which agreed the Basic Law with Beijing, is very reluctant to 
criticize Beijing, as it does not wish to upset the strong business and politi-
cal relationship between China and the UK.
In all likelihood, Hong Kong will continue to be another growing flash 
point for Beijing to manage. But the biggest flashpoint in China’s sphere 
of influence is North Korea.
north Korean imbroglio
North Korea and the US are locked in a stalemate in their struggle over 
North Korea’s growing nuclear threat. How did we land in this imbro-
glio? Is there a way out? Where is China in this imbroglio?
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No one should blame North Korea for equipping itself with adequate 
self-defenses. Every country does that. And following the end of the 
Korean War in 1953, North Korea had more reason to worry than most 
countries, being “a shrimp among whales”. It was indeed surrounded by 
the giants of the Soviet Union and China, and enemies like South Korea, 
Japan and the US with its military bases in these latter two countries.
And as the South Korean economy grew rapidly through the 1970s and 
1980s, North Korea felt even more vulnerable with its stagnating centrally 
planned economy. It was during the 1980s that North Korea reportedly 
began acquiring nuclear technology with lots of help from friends like 
Pakistan, China and the Soviet Union.
The end of the Cold War and the 1990s was a major turning point in 
North Korea’s modern history. It suffered greatly from the loss of financial 
support from the Soviet Union, natural disasters and economic misman-
agement which led to a massive famine with over 300,000 people dying (it 
did however benefit from out-of-work Russian rocket scientists who 
sought work in North Korea). And then Kim Il-sung, the founding father 
of North Korea, died in 1994, and was succeeded by his eccentric and fun- 
loving son, Kim Jong-il.
The Kim dictatorship was spooked by the democratization and adop-
tion of market economics in Russia, and Soviet satellites in Central and 
Eastern Europe, and Mongolia. The reunification of East and West 
Germany also exacerbated North Korea’s fear of a US desire to reunify 
North and South Korea.
The lesson that North Korea drew from the end of the Cold War was 
that rather transforming into a market economy and democracy, it should 
double down on efforts for regime survival. So it invested heavily in its 
military capabilities both to act as a deterrent to potential aggressors and 
to extract economic concessions from the US, Japan and South Korea. 
North Korea also maintained firm control over the economy (the self- 
reliance or “juche” philosophy), in contrast to China’s market opening.
The US interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya only confirmed 
the vulnerabilities that the Kim regime felt, and vindicated its policy of 
building up nuclear weapons. As a North Korean official once said, “the 
US would not have invaded Afghanistan if it had nuclear weapons.”
Over the past two decades or so North Korea has been playing cat and 
mouse with the international community over its development of ballistic 
missiles and nuclear weapons. Following each nuclear test or missile 
launch, the UN Security Council declares its condemnations, and imposes 
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trade and financial sanctions on North Korea, but nothing changes. “Six- 
party talks” involving North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, US and 
Russia were held from 2003 to 2009. But North Korea sabotaged and 
walked away from these diplomatic efforts to bring a halt to North Korea’s 
development of nuclear weapons.
Today, the Chinese government is immensely irritated by North Korea, 
and sees great dangers in its volatile behavior. But China has played a cru-
cial role in the development of the North Korean menace. Some 90% of 
North Korea’s trade is with China, which is also responsible for the lion’s 
share of its foreign investment. China also hosts thousands of North 
Korean workers, most of whose wages goes back to the North Korean 
regime. North Korea is highly dependent on Chinese aid, especially for 
food and energy.
The Chinese government has allowed North Korean state-owned enter-
prises to operate in China. They very often buy materials and goods from 
Chinese and international companies, and then export them to North 
Korea. Then there are Chinese enterprises like the Dandong Hongxiang 
Development Company which have been helping North Korea procure 
raw materials for nuclear weapons. And Chinese banks reportedly hold 
some of the Kim family assets. At the UN Security Council, China always 
pushes for moderation and loopholes in sanctions on North Korea. China 
routinely condemns North Korea’s actions and urges it to comply with UN 
resolutions. But it has never implemented US sanctions seriously.
Why would China support such a heinous regime? It’s a question of 
strategic buffers. As Beijing looks out toward the Pacific Ocean, it feels 
encircled by a string of US allies—from South Korea and Japan to Taiwan 
and the Philippines. In other words, the Chinese see North Korea as a 
critical protective buffer for them against the US.
So China does not want a regime change that would see the US and 
China battling for control of the Korean peninsula. The last thing that 
China wants is a failed nuclear state on its border, with the prospect of 
millions of poor refugees flooding into the country. It is also fearful that 
regime change could result in a reunification of North and South Korea, 
with the new state aligned with the US, and American troops sitting 
directly on its border.
China is of course not the only friend of North Korea. The Pakistan 
Energy Commission has reportedly sold nuclear materials to North Korea, 
some of which they have initially bought from China. The recent murder 
of Kim Jong-nam has highlighted the close links between Malaysia and 
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North Korea. And Myanmar’s military reportedly has close ties with 
Pyongyang.
US–North Korean relations have been on a downward slide for many 
years. But North Korea’s rogue activities took a dramatic turn for the 
worse with the ascension of Kim Jong-un to North Korea’s leadership, 
following the death of his father, Kim Jong-il, in 2011. The new 
30- something-year-old dictator, with no direct military or governmental 
experience, has had to consolidate and assert his leadership to win the 
necessary loyalty of the military. This has meant eliminating all possible 
rivals, including his uncle and most recently his half-brother, Kim Jong- 
nam, as well as accelerating his missile and nuclear program. Kim Jong-un 
conducted two nuclear tests and more than 20 ballistic tests in 2016 alone. 
And already, he has greeted Donald Trump with a flurry of missile launches 
in 2017.
After Donald Trump won the US presidential election, outgoing 
President Barack Obama warned Trump that the first major challenge he 
would face was North Korea. Indeed, North Korea is widely perceived to 
be the greatest threat to security, stability and peace in Asia and the rest of 
the world. Today, North Korea could attack South Korea, Japan, the US 
base in Guam, and probably even the US mainland with nuclear and other 
missiles.
The bellicose Donald Trump, surrounded by ex-army generals in his 
Cabinet, may not be the coolest head for dealing with North Korea. The 
Trump team announced that the era of Obama’s “strategic patience” is 
over. That all options are on the table, including the military option. The 
possibility of taking out Kim Jong-un has also been raised. In other words, 
it is hardly surprising that Kim should have upped the ante in 2017.
The Trump team believes that by ratcheting up the pressure, as the UN 
did in 2017, North Korea can be forced to give up its nuclear weapons, 
and to engage dialogue. But the evidence suggests that the more North 
Korea feels cornered, the more it will still stick to its nuclear weapons. 
North Korea sees the US and US-supported South Korea as being the 
principal threats to its security.
Trump had a successful first summit with President Xi Jinping in April 
2017 and seemed to have enlisted his support to help control North 
Korea. However, it only took a couple of months for Trump to realize that 
China is reluctant to seriously tackle North Korea for fear of destabilizing 
the regime, despite agreeing to new, tougher UN sanctions.
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Chinese President XI Jinping seems equally fearful of Donald Trump as 
of Kim Jong-un. He is pushing both sides to de-escalate tensions and 
engage in dialogue. Both China and Russia are arguing for a “double- 
freeze”, whereby North Korea would stopping testing weapons, and the 
US and South Korea would stop their military exercises. At the same time, 
China is cutely claiming that the North Korean problem is a problem 
between the US and North Korea, and does not involve China.
Some experts argue that a grand deal is the only hope—freeze or elimi-
nation of North Korea’s nuclear program in return for economic assis-
tance, a guarantee that the US would not seek to overthrow the regime 
and a formal peace treaty. But the level of distrust between the US and 
North Korea is so great that it is difficult to imagine such a grand deal 
being agreed. It also seems clear that the US will ultimately have to accept 
North Korea as a nuclear power, and live with that, as it did with China 
many decades ago. It will also have to accept that unification of the Korean 
peninsula under South Korea would never be accepted by China, and is 
not a realistic option.
Although China wants political stability on the Korean peninsula, it is 
also very keen that any resolution of the North Korean problem results in 
a weakening of the US position in Asia—such as by a reduction in the US 
commitment to defend South Korea through a cut or even removal of US 
troops from the South. Even though there is no love lost between China 
and North Korea, the North will have done China a great favor if it man-
ages to weaken the alliance between US and South Korea.
Trade is another factor which is working in China’s favor. South Korea 
is becoming increasingly dependent on the Chinese market. And, depend-
ing on the outcome, Donald Trump’s threat to renegotiate or even abol-
ish the US-Korea Free Trade Agreement could help tilt South Korea’s 
trade further toward China. The South China Sea is another area where 
China has stolen a march on the US and its partners, and will remain a 
strategic flashpoint for at least some time to come.
China SnaffleS the SoUth China Sea from itS 
SoUtheaSt aSian neighborS
Myriad countries surround the South China Sea, namely China, the 
Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia and Taiwan. It is thus not surpris-
ing that since time immemorial these same countries should have had 
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overlapping claims to these waters, their reefs, islands and atolls, including 
the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands and Scarborough Shoal. The South 
China Sea is a massive 1.4 square million miles, an area the size of Mexico 
and larger than the Mediterranean Sea.
In 1947, China issued a map of its claims, which encompassed about 
90% of the entire South China Sea. This claim has come to be known as 
the “nine-dash-line”, which reflects the pictorial representation of China’s 
claim. In 2009, China submitted a diplomatic note to the UN including 
the nine-dash-line on a map. This overlaps with claims by the Philippines, 
Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei. According to the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to which China is a signa-
tory, countries have special access to marine resources, including fisheries, 
oil and gas, in the area up to 200 nautical miles from their shores, called 
exclusive economic zones. Most of the South China Sea is very much fur-
ther from China than that distance.
In 2012, China forcibly seized control of the previously unoccupied 
Scarborough Shoal during a standoff with the Philippine Navy. The 
Scarborough Shoal is only 100 miles from the Philippines, but 500 miles 
from China. Under a 2012 deal mediated by the US, China and the 
Philippines promised to withdraw their forces from the shoal until a deal 
over its ownership could be reached. The Philippines complied with the 
agreement and withdrew. China, however, did not abide by the agreement 
and maintained its presence at the shoal, effectively militarizing it. Then 
Philippine President Benigno S. Aquino III later compared China’s behav-
ior to Nazi Germany’s annexation of Czechoslovakia.
With no other recourse, the Philippines took China to a UNCLOS 
tribunal. China boycotted the tribunal’s proceedings on the basis that it 
had indisputable sovereignty over its claimed area and that the tribunal did 
not have the authority to deal with this matter. Reflecting its indignation 
and contempt for the Philippine challenge, China embarked on massive 
construction exercise in the South China Sea, building or expanding at 
least seven artificial islands, some with airports on which military aircraft 
can land.
This was clearly a ploy to create “facts on the water”, which are irrevers-
ible. It is dubbed the great wall of sand by senior US officials. In 2014, 
China also deployed a deep-sea oil rig within Vietnam’s exclusive eco-
nomic zone, leading to a drawn out dispute. President Obama’s reluc-
tance to stand up to Beijing during the early stages of its blatant land 
reclamation activities in the South China Sea only emboldened Beijing to 
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continue with its buildup and militarization of artificial islands. And the 
US’ subsequent freedom of navigation exercises through the South China 
Sea are a case of “too little/too late”.
What is at stake in the South China Sea? According to the US 
Department of Energy, there would be 11 billion barrels of oil in the 
South China Sea, and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. It is also a very 
rich fishing ground, which is now most regrettably being depleted. Some 
$5.3 trillion worth of international trade passes through the South China 
Sea, about 30% of global maritime trade. And $1.2 trillion of this is US 
trade. Japan and Korea also rely heavily on the South China Sea for their 
supply of energy and other raw materials, and also as an export route. 
Some 60% of Australia’s trade passes through the South China Sea. Not 
surprisingly, non-claimants want the South China Sea to remain as inter-
national waters, rather than being privatized by China. Circumnavigating 
the South China Sea would drive up commercial shipping costs.
More fundamentally, the international rule of law is at stake. China is a 
country that has benefited from the multilateral system, but is now seen by 
most to be flagrantly flouting this very system. As former French Defense 
Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian said: “If the Law of the Sea is not respected 
today in the South China Sea, it will be threatened tomorrow in the Arctic, 
the Mediterranean or elsewhere.” Vladimir Putin and other authoritarians 
are watching.
The UNCLOS arbitration tribunal accepted 14 of the 15 claims by the 
Philippines. In particular, it ruled that there is no legal basis for any 
Chinese historic rights within the nine-dash line. The tribunal also ruled 
that none of the disputed maritime features in the Spratly Islands, includ-
ing Scarborough Shoal, Gaven Reef and Fiery Cross Reef, are islands 
under the law of the sea (they are instead “rocks”). Thus, they do not 
result in entitlements to a 200 mile exclusive economic zone or continen-
tal shelf. In other words, Scarborough Shoal—the scene of the standoff 
between the Philippine Navy and China—is within the Philippines’ mari-
time domain, rather than China’s. The tribunal also found that China’s 
land reclamation and island-building activities had caused irreparable 
damage to the coral reef ecosystem and breached the UNCLOS treaty. 
And in the case of Scarborough Shoal, China breached the treaty by 
undertaking land reclamation without the authorization of the Philippines.
China is legally bound by the UNCLOS decision, by virtue of being a 
signatory to the treaty. But there are no enforcement mechanisms, and 
China never had any intention of respecting the judgment. The Chinese 
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government lambasted the tribunal’s judgment, claiming that it is part of 
an American conspiracy. On the Philippine side, there were great public 
celebrations in this nation that is tired of being bullied by more powerful 
nations.
But the UNCLOS decision was delivered just a matter of days after 
Rodrigo Duterte assumed the presidency of the Philippines, following the 
six-year term of Benigno Aquino III. While Aquino’s foreign policy was 
closely aligned with the US, its treaty ally, Duterte has shifted course to an 
“independent” foreign policy. His firebrand and colorful personality was 
in evidence when he visited China in 2016 and said “I announce my sepa-
ration from the United States, both in military but economics also … 
America has lost it.” He announced the Philippines would align itself with 
China and Russia.
Duterte’s approach has been to seek cooperation rather than conflict 
with China over the South China Sea. Indeed, as he garnered $24 billion 
worth of investment and financing agreements from China, he has clearly 
sought to use the South China Sea as a bargaining chip with China. China 
has allowed Philippine fishermen to return to the Scarborough Shoal. 
Meanwhile, China has only accelerated its constructions and militarization 
of its artificial islands.
Perhaps realistically, Duterte said “We cannot stop China from doing 
its thing. Even the Americans were not able to stop them … So what do 
you want me to do? Declare war against China?” The Chinese govern-
ment is surely celebrating that this Scarborough Shoal incident has enabled 
it to drive a wedge between the Philippines and the US which had hitherto 
been the closest of allies. Malaysia, another important claimant to the 
South China Sea, has also been silent following another large signing of 
trade deals. The only Asian country left challenging China in the South 
China Sea seems to be Vietnam.
The new US administration of President Trump has made many feisty 
comments regarding China’s actions in the South China Sea. Secretary of 
State Rex Tillerson even said that US would prevent China from accessing 
its own artificial islands in the South China Sea. And even though this 
region is a long, long way from Washington, the US does have enduring 
interests in the dispute, namely, freedom of navigation and overflight, sup-
port for the rules-based international order and the peaceful resolution of 
disputes. But it seems hardly likely that President Trump will invest too 
much political capital in this dispute, when most of the claimants are no 
longer fighting for the issue, and when he has bigger fish to fry with China.
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In sum, China has achieved a stunning victory in the South China Sea 
over its Southeast Asian neighbors and weakened ASEAN in the process. 
And while the US may have kept its powder dry for possible future con-
flicts, its inaction seems to have only emboldened China and weakened the 
credibility of the US as a security partner in East Asia.
China fraCtUreS aSean
ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, represents Asia’s 
most successful effort at regional cooperation and integration. But it is 
now being increasingly fractured and dominated by China.
China was already on the minds of ASEAN’s founding fathers in 1967 
when the governments of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore 
and Thailand decided to join forces. Security was of paramount impor-
tance during this Cold War period, when ASEAN was concerned about 
the threat of communism coming from China and Vietnam. During the 
1960s, Mao Zedong supported communist insurgency movements in 
Southeast Asia. Over the years, ASEAN has gradually expanded with the 
membership of Brunei (1984), Vietnam (1995), Laos and Myanmar 
(1997) and Cambodia (1999).
Though huddling between Asia’s giants of China and India, with their 
billion-plus populations, ASEAN is an important regional player. Its popu-
lation of 622 million is almost double America’s 320 million and also 
more than the European Union’s (EU) 506 million. As a group, ASEAN 
is an economic powerhouse, being the world’s seventh biggest economy. 
And while ASEAN has not grown as quickly as China or India, the group 
has been one of the world’s fastest-growing markets with an annual aver-
age growth rate of 5.1% from 2000 to 2013. Indonesia, with a population 
of 260 million, accounts for almost 40% of ASEAN’s GDP.
With the end of the Cold War and the emerging globalization of the 
world economy, ASEAN was transformed into an important organization 
for economic cooperation, as well as political and social–cultural coopera-
tion. The ASEAN Free Trade Area was signed in 1992, and now includes 
all ten ASEAN members. Building on this, in 2015 the ASEAN Community 
came into force with economic, political–security and socio-cultural 
pillars.
With international squabbling, rather than cooperation, being the cur-
rency in Northeast and South Asia, ASEAN has become an effective meet-
ing ground and fulcrum for Asian cooperation. Six other regional 
 CAN ASIAN COUNTRIES LIVE TOGETHER IN PEACE AND HARMONY? 
302 
partners—China, Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India—have 
free trade agreements with ASEAN, and talks are under way to transform 
them into a single undertaking, the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP).
ASEAN takes a leading role in security dialogue in Asia through the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which was established in 1994, and now 
includes 27 members. The ARF is unique in that North Korea is a mem-
ber, and its 2017 meeting provided an important opportunity for discus-
sions with the North on its nuclear and missile programs. ASEAN is also 
in a leadership position of the East Asia Summit which is a regional lead-
ers’ forum for strategic dialogue and cooperation on key challenges facing 
the East Asian region.
While concern about the threat of Chinese communism was a key 
motivator for the creation of ASEAN, China has since become a lead-
ing partner of the ASEAN countries, in many cases now overtaking 
Japan, which had previously been the leading partner. China is 
ASEAN’s most important trading partner, with the least developed 
countries of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam being the most 
reliant on Chinese trade. China is the most important source of FDI in 
Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, and the second most important in 
Vietnam, even though it is not yet a major investor in ASEAN overall. 
China has also been investing heavily in infrastructure in ASEAN coun-
tries bordering China, namely Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. And 
Chinese tourists are now flooding ASEAN countries, bringing much-
appreciated revenues.
In short, China’s rise is exerting a powerful pull over ASEAN econo-
mies and politics, and the Chinese government now routinely tries to lord 
it over ASEAN in their regular meetings. China’s contempt for ASEAN 
was on full display in a 2010 meeting in Hanoi, Vietnam, when China’s 
then foreign minister Yang Jiechi famously said “China is a big country 
and you are small countries and that is a fact” (Yang was subsequently 
promoted to the Chinese State Council). Many cite this comment as the 
trigger for US President Obama’s pivot to Asia.
China’s divide-and-rule of ASEAN has been in full evidence as it suc-
ceeded in pressuring several ASEAN countries to refrain from supporting 
the decision of the arbitration tribunal of the UNCLOS in favor of the 
Philippines and against China. For the moment, China seems to have 
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bought off the claims of Malaysia and the Philippines with packages of 
trade, investment and assistance. Brunei is too small to stand up to China. 
Only Vietnam is seriously attempting to push China back.
Throughout this process, ASEAN has been totally ineffective at work-
ing as a group to counter China’s claims to the South China Sea. For 
example, Cambodia, Beijing’s most loyal stooge, has blocked or watered 
down mentions of the South China Sea dispute in ASEAN ministerial 
communiqués, which are agreed by consensus. Laos and Malaysia have 
also been weak on the South China Sea issue due to Chinese pressure. And 
Thailand has been moving into Beijing’s orbit as the US has criticized the 
role of the military in Thai politics and the deterioration in human rights, 
following the 2014 military coup.
A possible South China Sea code of conduct between ASEAN and 
China has been talked about since 2002, but China has always used stall-
ing tactics. Now that China has achieved its goal of seizing the South 
China Sea, discussions are now back under way, but are moving slowly, as 
China rushes ahead with its construction and militarization. And while the 
Philippines and Vietnam have pushed for a legally binding code, China is 
insisting on a non-binding code. China will not accept an independent 
dispute settlement mechanism. And above all, China prefers bilateral 
negotiations to resolve all disputes, so it can play the carrots and sticks 
game to submit smaller countries to its will.
As China seeks to create a sphere of influence in East Asia, ASEAN is 
becoming a casualty of China’s realpolitik.13 A strong and united ASEAN 
could protect the region’s interests in the South China Sea and elsewhere. 
But it is in China’s interest to have a weak and divided ASEAN, and China 
is succeeding famously in this regard.
The US has long had close relations with most ASEAN countries. But 
there was some fallout between the US and Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Thailand during the Obama administration. And Donald Trump paid no 
attention to Singapore’s warning about the importance of the Trans- 
Pacific Partnership (TPP). Overall, the general feeling in ASEAN is that 
the US’ interest in and commitment to the region is waning. While Japan 
is becoming more active and competing with China for regional influence, 
it has difficulty vying with China. In particular, China’s AIIB and the BRI 
are proving to be very important instruments for strengthening relations 
between Beijing and individual ASEAN countries.
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China’S leaderShip for aSian infraStrUCtUre
Massive investments in infrastructure have been a major element in China’s 
development strategy. They have also become the key instrument for 
China’s efforts to re-shape international cooperation in Asia and beyond.
Under Chinese leadership, AIIB opened for business in 2016. This ini-
tiative was motivated by the US Congress’ delays in approving an increase 
in the weight of China and other emerging economies in the IMF and 
World Bank. It was also inspired by China’s feeling that the multilateral 
international system was still too dominated by the West.
The Obama administration pressured all of its friends and allies not to 
join the AIIB. The US saw it as a competitor for the US-led World Bank 
and the Japan-led Asian Development Bank (ADB). But ultimately the 
UK broke ranks, and was then followed by virtually all other advanced and 
emerging economies. At last count the AIIB had 56 member countries. 
Japan and the US are the only major countries to have not signed up. And 
in acts of contrition, the World Bank and ADB are now cooperating very 
closely with the AIIB.
The new bank’s lending may be only slowly getting off the ground, but 
it already has more members than the ADB and its authorized lending 
limit is also higher than the ADB’s. The new competition from the AIIB 
has seen the ADB streamline its lending procedures and rush to approve 
new lending. Overall, the AIIB is seen as great success for Chinese leader-
ship in Asia and the multilateral system more generally. After all, Asia’s 
infrastructure needs are enormous, some $1700 billion a year in invest-
ments in power, transport, telecommunications and water through 2030, 
according to ADB estimates. For its part, the US is seen have egg on its 
face from its strategic blunder in opposing the AIIB. If the US really 
wanted China to become a responsible stakeholder in the international 
system, it should never have opposed China’s initiative to create the AIIB.
While the rivalry between the ADB and the AIIB is capturing interna-
tional attention, the biggest race to finance Asia’s infrastructure is between 
Japanese and Chinese national institutions. Lending by the Japan Bank for 
International Co-operation and the Japan International Co-operation 
Agency dwarfs that of the ADB, while the China Development Bank and 
the Export-Import Bank of China together lend many times what the 
AIIB will lend when it hits cruising speed.
“This funding race has many upsides,” says Robert Wihtol of the 
Manila-based Asian Institute of Management. “The competition is 
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 increasing the total financing available for Asian infrastructure. And hav-
ing numerous financial institutions increases the scope for joint financing, 
which can spread the risk inherent in large projects.”
Mr. Wihtol cautioned, however, that the race to finance Asia’s enor-
mous infrastructure also has its downsides. “Geopolitical rivalries can see 
projects of questionable value get rapidly approved, without proper prepa-
ration or cost-benefit analysis, thereby saddling borrowers with burden-
some debt, as we have seen in Sri Lanka,” he says. “And there are many 
examples of lenders not taking sufficient account of sovereign risk, most 
notably in the case of Venezuela. In this context, the advantage of multi-
lateral banks like ADB and AIIB is that they conduct thorough risk analy-
sis and due diligence.”14
belt and road initiative for a SinoCentriC aSia
The BRI is another Chinese initiative to improve infrastructure, notably 
across Eurasia. In the eyes of many, however, it is also an initiative that 
seeks to advance China’s hegemonic ambitions in Asia.
It was in 2013 that Chinese President Xi Jinping launched his BRI with 
the aim of connecting major Eurasian economies through infrastructure, 
trade and investment. This initiative is a key element in Xi’s “China 
Dream” for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and for China to 
become the paramount Asian country. Xi has invited BRI partners to join 
a “Community of Common Destiny”.
The BRI comprises two main elements—the Silk Road Economic Belt 
and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. The Silk Road Economic Belt 
will be a network of high-speed railways, roads, pipelines and utility grids 
which will provide improved connections between China and Central 
Asia, parts of South Asia, the Middle East and ultimately Europe. This will 
reduce China’s sense of vulnerability due to its reliance on Straits of 
Malacca and the South China Sea for its energy imports from the Middle 
East. The Maritime Silk Road will create ports and other infrastructure to 
better connect China with Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, 
East Africa and Europe (China already owns the Greek port of Piraeus).
Six major economic corridors are planned, including the New Eurasian 
Land Bridge, China–Mongolia–Russia, China–Central Asia–Western Asia, 
Indo-China Peninsula, China–Pakistan and Bangladesh–China–India–
Myanmar. Some 68 countries, representing 55% of world GDP and 70% 
of world population, have signed up to the BRI.15
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The financing needs of the BRI will be enormous. China’s total invest-
ment in the BRI over the next decade is expected to reach $1.6 trillion, 
according to preliminary estimates by the China International Capital 
Corporation. This exceeds by many times the capital of the ADB, the 
AIIB, the New Development Bank and China’s Silk Road Fund, which 
will only play small roles in the overall financing. Much of the funding will 
come through loans from the China Development Bank and other Chinese 
state-owned banks.
The BRI has a different model from other regional economic initia-
tives. For example, agreements like the RCEP and TPP mainly concern 
trade liberalization and policy reform, whereas the BRI focuses on improv-
ing infrastructure connectivity. Further, the BRI is not an organization 
like the EU or a multilateral agreement like the RCEP or TPP. It is a 
Sinocentric “hub-and-spoke” arrangement of bilateral agreements 
between China and each of the participating countries. And these are only 
political, not legal, agreements. This means that China, as the dominant 
partner in each of these agreements, will have a tremendous ability to set 
agendas and advance its own interests.
In this sense, the BRI is not only inspired by the legendary trade along 
the Silk Road, but as David Arase once remarked, it is a “backward look-
ing vision of the future” which seeks to recreate a Sinocentric regional 
order from the past.16 But the BRI is clearly the signature project of 
President Xi, and will remain a very high priority during his presidency, 
even if it is unwieldy and perhaps overly ambitious.
The BRI has generated mixed reactions. Many have welcomed China’s 
bold initiative, which promises to help address Asia’s massive infrastruc-
ture deficit, and which could provide a much needed boost to economic 
growth through the market integration it will foster. And through the BRI 
China is proving to be a more reliable partner than the US, which aban-
doned the TPP after several years of hard work by all the negotiating 
countries.
However, the ratings agency Fitch has also highlighted the risks for 
China’s banking sector emanating from the BRI (also known as OBOR, 
“one belt, one road”).17 “OBOR is driven primarily by China’s efforts to 
extend its global influence and relieve domestic overcapacity”, notes Fitch, 
and “there is a risk that projects … could fail to deliver expected returns.” 
Fitch has doubts that China’s banks can identify profitable projects—
“After all”, says Fitch, “Chinese banks do not have a track record of allo-
cating resources efficiently at home, especially in relation to infrastructure 
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projects.” “Meanwhile, local politicians have an incentive to associate 
themselves with marquee projects. This subjugation of market forces 
means there is a heightened risk of projects proving unprofitable.”
The asymmetries of size and power between China and the participat-
ing countries make the BRI unique and challenging. As countries like the 
Philippines, Vietnam and Japan have discovered in recent times, 
 disagreements with China can lead to punishment by the Chinese govern-
ment in the form of reduced market access and diplomatic exclusion. 
China will not accept the role of international tribunals to resolve disputes, 
such that international law will not play a role in BRI.18 And China’s asser-
tive behavior in the East and South China Seas has only made BRI part-
ners suspicious of its motives.
The benefits for partner countries can be questionable, as most BRI 
infrastructure projects will be financed by Chinese state-owned banks, and 
built by state-owned Chinese companies, using Chinese workers and sup-
pliers. Partner countries can be left with an enormous debt to the Chinese 
banks, sometimes for projects of dubious value.
On the ground, China has been running into opposition. The upgrade 
of Sri Lanka’s deep-sea port in Hambantota saw street protests and oppo-
sition by legislators because of the perceived generous concessions to 
China. As the port quickly became a loss-making white elephant, the gov-
ernment was forced to look for a way out, which eventually took the form 
of a debt-to-equity swap granting state-controlled China Merchant 
Holdings control of the port and a 99-year concession to develop its oper-
ations.19 There have also been reports of the Chinese People’s Liberation 
Army’s navy using this commercial port for visits of military 
submarines.20
What are the prospects for the BRI looking forward? According to Paul 
Keating, former Australian Prime Minister, and now advisor to the China 
Development Bank, “What we’re going to see is a reasonably obvious 
economic colonisation of the 50-odd states between the western border of 
China up to at least western Europe.”21
The BRI will no doubt encounter many hiccoughs along the way, and 
its full ambitions may never be fully met. But the attractiveness of Chinese 
money to finance Asia’s massive infrastructure deficit will be irresistible to 
many countries, even if it means becoming part of China’s sphere of politi-
cal influence.
One hiccough for China’s BRI has been the frictions that it has gener-
ated with India, Asia’s other behemoth.
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ChineSe and indian friCtionS
China has joined forces with India’s arch enemy, Pakistan, to build the 
China–Pakistan Economic Corridor. This initiative is a bold package of 
investment projects ($44½ billion or about 16% of Pakistan’s GDP), in 
energy and transport infrastructure, financed by Chinese loans and FDI. 
The Corridor is a “flagship project” which will link the Chinese city of 
Kashgar to the Pakistani port of Gwadar, thereby potentially connecting 
the Silk Road Economic Belt with the Maritime Silk Road, which would 
enable China’s energy imports from the Middle East to circumvent the 
Straits of Malacca.
The IMF has issued warnings about the project and its management. It 
noted that Pakistan’s current account deficit could widen during the 
investment phase, and that over the longer term, Pakistan will need to 
manage the repatriation of profits and loan repayments of Chinese inves-
tors. As the IMF also warns sharply, “There is a need to ensure sound 
project evaluation and prioritization mechanisms based on effective cost- 
benefit analysis … The procurement process should be transparent and 
competitive, and there is a need to ensure transparency and accountability 
in project management and monitoring.”22
India has several profound concerns about the Economic Corridor. 
During a 2015 visit to Beijing, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi 
reportedly told Chinese leaders that China–Pakistan Economic 
Corridor is “unacceptable” because it passes through Pakistan- occupied 
Kashmir, an area claimed by India. India fears that Pakistan’s port of 
Gwadar could become a Chinese naval base, rather than a commercial 
hub.
Beyond the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, India has many under-
standable concerns now that China’s quest for regional dominance seems 
to have extended to the Indian Ocean, after conquering the South China 
Sea. In particular, India fears being encircled in the Indian Ocean by 
Chinese-financed ports. China now has a majority stake in Sri Lanka’s 
Hambantota port, which straddles the world’s busiest east-west shipping 
route. Bangladesh has inked memorandums of understanding with two 
Chinese companies for the construction of components of the Payra deep- 
sea port. China is reportedly seeking an 85% stake in the strategically 
important deep-sea port of Kyauk Pyu in Myanmar on the Bay of Bengal. 




As India’s former Defense Minister, Pallam Raju, once remarked, there 
is a need for more information sharing regarding the BRI. “China is not 
necessarily a benign power, and it should be more transparent,” said Mr. 
Raju.23 So it was not entirely surprising that when China hosted a BRI 
Summit in May 2017, India should boycott this meeting which brought 
together leaders and officials of 130 countries, 68 of which had already 
signed on to the Initiative. The Indian government reiterated its objec-
tions, namely that it includes projects in land belonging to India, it could 
push smaller countries into crushing debt cycles, it could destroy the ecol-
ogy and disrupt local communities, and that China’s agenda was unclear, 
suggesting that the BRI was more about enhancing its political influence, 
not just its physical networks.
Concerns over the BRI come on top of seven decades of on-again, off- 
again frictions between China and India. There are several border disputes 
along their shared 3500 km border, and China claims the Indian state of 
Arunachal Pradesh as its own. The two nations fought a war in 1962, 
which China won decisively, and there have been several other conflicts 
and skirmishes. The most recent dispute occurred in mid-2017, when 
India responded to Bhutan’s cry for help as China was found to be build-
ing a road in an area disputed by Bhutan and China. The two great powers 
then spent over two months facing each other in a military standoff.
There have been many other factors driving frictions between Asia’s 
two great powers. India sees China as a source of regional instability 
through its support for Pakistan, and in particular its nuclear weapons 
program. India was never happy about China’s annexation of Tibet, which 
it had considered an important strategic buffer. For its part, China is not 
happy that its nemesis, the Dalai Lama, lives in India, where he has set up 
a Tibetan government in exile in the city of Dharamshala. In more recent 
years, trade and investment ties between China and India have boomed, 
and China has become India’s largest trading partner. But the balance has 
been heavily in China’s favor. More generally, Chinese media and com-
mentators often have a condescending attitude toward India, and the per-
ceived inefficiencies of its chaotic democracy.
It is not surprising that in recent years India has pivoted its foreign 
policy toward forging partnerships with the US, Japan and Southeast Asia. 
For example, the navies of India, Japan and the US undertake a joint 
annual exercise, “Exercise Malabar”. And India’s Look East policy seeks 
to cultivate relations with Southeast Asia as a counterweight to the strate-
gic influence of China.
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As we have argued, India’s economic size will progressively challenge 
China’s over the course of the twenty-first century and will likely result in 
an intensification of frictions between these two great Asian powers. And 
the Indian Ocean could well become a theater for future conflict.
China’s growing assertiveness in East Asia instigated US President 
Barack Obama’s “pivot” to Asia.
obama’S pivot to aSia
The election of Barack Obama promised a new phase in America’s rela-
tionship with Asia, following George Bush’s costly decade of Middle East 
wars. In a speech in Tokyo in 2009, the first year of his presidency, he 
billed himself as “America’s first Pacific president” (he was born in Hawaii), 
promising the nations of Asia “a new era of engagement with the world 
based on mutual interests and mutual respect”.
Obama was very right to focus on Asia. With some 60% of US trade 
being with the Pacific region, Asian maritime and regional security are 
vital US interests. Japan and China are the biggest foreign holders of US 
Treasury Securities, with Hong Kong, Taiwan and India also being impor-
tant investors. And the US has long-standing security ties with Japan, 
Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan and Singapore, with a combined 
80,000 troops stationed in Japan and Korea.
Asian Americans, which now make up 6% of the nation’s population, 
are also America’s fastest-growing and most successful migrant group—
their average household income is some 30% higher than Americans over-
all. China, India and Korea account for over half the foreign students in 
the US, with Vietnam, Taiwan and Japan also being in the top 10. Japan, 
China and Korea are among the top 10 source countries for foreign tour-
ists in America. All these factors generate deep human and emotional con-
nections between the US and Asia.
It was perhaps not surprising that in 2011 President Obama should 
decide to deepen his engagement through his “pivot” to Asia. The US 
pivot was an attempt at a longer term strengthening of America’s already 
deep engagement with the Asia-Pacific region, in light of the region’s 
growing importance, and also in light of the reverberations from the rise 
of China. On the military side, it was planned that by 2020, the US navy 
would reposture its forces from today’s roughly 50–50% split between the 
Pacific and the Atlantic to about a 60–40 split between those oceans. In 
the economic area, the TPP was the key piece. Obama’s defense secretary 
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Ashton Carter once said that the “TPP is as important to me as another 
aircraft carrier.”
President Obama’s pivot to Asia was subject to much criticism. Its ini-
tial emphasis was on the military dimension. Some argued that Obama’s 
pivot reflected the US desire to “contain” China, and that by exacerbating 
strategic rivalry, the US actually provoked China’s subsequent assertive 
behavior, notably in the South China Sea. Others argue that it was all talk 
and no action, with very few substantive results.
US bilateral relations with other Asian countries were a mixture of 
sweet and sour through the Obama administration. President Obama had 
bromances with Manmohan Singh and especially Narendra Modi, the two 
Indian prime ministers who overlapped with his presidency. They had a lot 
in common, coming from the world’s two largest democracies, and shar-
ing a concern about China’s assertive behavior. Economic and military 
cooperation also strengthened greatly Vietnam, a member of the TPP. 
Washington also lifted its decades-long embargo on selling lethal arms to 
Vietnam, despite the war history between the two countries. The Obama 
administration fostered a warm relationship with Myanmar and its de facto 
leader Aung San Suu Kyi, even though there were great concerns about 
the country’s appalling treatment of its Rohingya minority.
At the same time, Obama oversaw a cooling of relations with a number 
of countries. In the case of Thailand, the 2014 coup and the failure of the 
military to restore democracy, together with growing human rights abuses, 
led to strained relations with one of America’s closest friends in Asia. 
Thailand’s military government has since moved closer to China. Obama 
had made great efforts to foster warm relations with Malaysia, a moderate 
Muslim country, for its help in fighting radical Islamic terrorism. In 2014, 
he even played golf with Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak in Hawaii. 
But the US Justice Department’s lawsuit concerning Malaysia’s corrupt 
sovereign wealth fund, 1MDB, saw a fading of the friendship.
After a strengthening in US–Philippines military cooperation under 
President Aquino, the new Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte dis-
tanced his country from the US, following its criticism of human rights 
abuses in the country’s murderous war against drugs. In the case of both 
Malaysia and the Philippines, Beijing has been able to step into the gap left 
the US and assuage objections to its military buildup in the South China 
Sea by through generous trade, investment and aid packages. Despite 
America’s infatuation with Myanmar’s Aung San Suu Kyi, she is also culti-
vating close links with China. And like his predecessors, Obama was unable 
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to put a halt to North Korea’s missile and nuclear arm development. And 
lastly, Obama’s Asian diplomacy was guilty of one really big blunder, its 
opposition to the Chinese-led AIIB.
Despite the great promise of America’s first Pacific president, and his 
pivot to Asia, America’s footprint in the region weakened during the 
Obama presidency. Competing with China for Asian friendships is increas-
ingly difficult for the US.  Short-term imperatives in the Middle East, 
Russia and Washington will also always draw US attentions away from the 
longer term strategic importance of Asia. The Chinese provide lots of 
financial and infrastructure to buy friendships, which the US does not do. 
China also uses trade as an extension of their foreign policy, and is not 
concerned about ethical issues like corruption and human rights.
Ever since Nixon’s trip to China in 1972, American policy elites had 
believed that encouraging China’s participation in the global economy 
and global governance would result in China becoming a responsible 
stakeholder in the post-war multilateral system, and becoming “more like 
us”. In this context, the Obama administration was also the time when 
America discovered that democracy, rule of law and human rights were 
not coming to China any time soon, as the Chinese Communist Party 
under President Xi Jinping was tightening its grip on power. Moreover, 
even though China had been a great beneficiary of the post-war order, in 
tandem with its rise in power, China is intent on challenging the post-war 
order, and pushing America out of Asia.
A deterioration in US–China relations under the Obama administration 
set the stage for China to become the whipping boy of Donald Trump’s 
presidential election campaign.
trUmp’S potShotS at aSia
During the election campaign and before his inauguration, Donald Trump 
had much to say about Asia and China in particular. As we have discussed 
above, Trump was very critical of trade relations with China, the TPP, 
China’s military island-building program in the South China Sea and its 
lack of help to contain North Korea. Trump also threatened to make Japan 
and Korea pay more for the US military troops and assets that are defend-
ing them, and suggested that they could acquire nuclear weapons so that 
they could assure their own defense. Trump also questioned the “One- 




The Trump administration moved quickly into action on the Asian 
front, as it withdrew the US from the TPP. At the same time, Trump’s 
rhetoric on trade policy has been evolving and softening, as he is now 
arguing for both free and fair trade. He is concerned about the lack of reci-
procity in trading relations, and would now like US trade policy to focus 
on bilateral, rather than multilateral deals, to secure better market access. 
Despite the softening in Trump’s trade rhetoric, there remains a strongly 
protectionist undercurrent, as Trump’s overriding trade policy goals are 
reducing the US’ bilateral trade deficits (notably with China, Japan and 
Korea), and bringing back manufacturing jobs to America.
To the great disappointment of China and the rest of the international 
community, President Trump has also withdrawn the US from the Paris 
Climate Change Agreement, which relied on strong US–China coopera-
tion. China and the EU are now positioning themselves as global leaders 
in the fight against climate change, despite China’s appalling domestic 
environment, and the poor environmental performance of China’s invest-
ments in Africa and Latin America.
Trump officials reaffirmed the US commitment to its alliances with 
Japan and Korea, while Trump himself indicated his support for the “One- 
China Policy” in a telephone conversation with Chinese President Xi 
Jinping. This is seen to have been a big back down for Trump, as Xi 
reportedly refused to talk with him until Trump honored the One-China 
Policy.
Trump had a successful first summit with President Xi Jinping in April 
2017, and seemed to have enlisted his support to help control North 
Korea. However, it only took a couple of months for Trump to realize that 
China is reluctant to seriously tackle North Korea for fear of destabilizing 
the regime. The XI-Trump honeymoon was then over, almost as quickly 
as it started, when the Trump administration announced sanctions against 
Chinese entities for their dealings with North Korea, also announced 
actions against China’s alleged dumping of steel exports, gave a green 
light for a $1 billion arms sale to Taiwan, and sailed a US destroyer through 
the Chinese-occupied South China Sea. And Trump’s launching in August 
2017 of an investigation into China’s alleged theft of US intellectual prop-
erty has deeply troubled the Chinese government, and raised the specter 
of a possible trade war between China and the US.
It also seems that Donald Trump’s administration is planning to defy 
Winston Churchill’s advice that “to jaw-jaw is always better than to war- 
war”. His 2017 budget proposal involves increasing funding to the US 
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military by 9%, while cutting the State Department’s diplomacy and for-
eign aid by a combined 28%, and also the Environment Protection Agency 
by 31%. “There is no question that this is a hard-power budget; it is not a 
soft-power budget,” said Mick Mulvaney, the director of the Office of 
Management and Budget. While the US Congress is seeking to restore 
funding for these agencies, Trump’s budget proposals certainly set the 
tone for his administration’s approach to international relations. Trump’s 
hard-power approach to international relations was soon evident in its 
approach to North Korea. Indeed, North Korea has been virtually the sole 
focus of Trump’s Asia policy.
Countries like China, India and the Philippines which rely heavily on 
migrants’ remittances could suffer from President Trump’s tightening of 
migration policies. These three countries account for almost all of 
America’s 1.5 million illegal migrants coming from Asia, and 13% of all 
illegal migrants. Asia could also be hit by a tightening up of H1-B visas, of 
which India is the principal beneficiary.
President Donald Trump’s working assumption is that Asia has been 
“ripping off” America in different ways. For their part, many Asian coun-
tries also have concerns about the US. The big policy switch-around from 
one administration to another can undermine the reliability of the US as a 
partner. For example, in an interview before the US elections, Singapore’s 
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said that a failure to ratify the TPP 
“would be a very big setback for America”. “Your standing goes down 
with many countries around the world,” Lee said. “After you have gotten 
Vietnam to join, after you have gotten Japan to join, after Japanese Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe has made very difficult arrangements on agriculture, 
cars, sugar, and dairy. Now you say, ‘I walk away, that I do not believe in 
this deal.’ How can anybody believe in you anymore?”24
In Australia, arguably the US’ most loyal ally, commentators are calling 
for a rethink of the country’s historic relations with the US. For example, 
Australia’s former foreign minister Gareth Evans has said that Trump is 
“manifestly the most ill-informed, under-prepared, ethically challenged 
and psychologically ill-equipped president in US history” and that 
Australia should reduce its dependence on the US alliance and accept 
China as a legitimate “global rule maker”. And as former Washington Post 
reporter, Paul Blustein, has remarked, it is certainly clear that “this admin-
istration has no respect for international institutions.”
Overall, following the election of Donald Trump, Asia is now faced 
with a likely deterioration in key factors that have driven its 
J. WEST
 315
development—an open US market, a relatively benign security envi-
ronment and a stable global economic system. More generally, the US 
election campaign and the turmoil of the Trump administration have 
greatly undermined the credibility of the US as an indispensable strate-
gic power in Asia. Its moral ascendancy and soft power have been 
greatly diminished. At the same time, China is now the most important 
economic partner of most Asian countries, is providing much assistance 
and financing infrastructure without any policy conditionality and 
seems like a steadier, more reliable partner.
the fUtUre of peaCe and harmony in aSia
The relative peace that Asia has enjoyed these past seven decades has been 
key to the region’s economic renaissance. But the future of peace in Asia 
cannot be taken for granted. Asia is in the midst of a great power transi-
tion, as China is becoming the region’s dominant power, and the US is 
receding. But this transition may not be smooth, as it involves a power 
struggle between these two giants, which are both burdened by immense 
domestic fragilities and weaknesses while they try to assert their regional 
and international leadership at the same time.
The great power transition under way is of historic proportions. As 
Singapore’s founding father and intellectual giant Lee Kuan Yew once 
cautioned, “the size of China’s displacement of the world balance is such 
that the world must find a new balance. It is not possible to pretend that 
this is just another big player. This is the biggest player in the history of 
the world.25” And yet, for the first three decades of its high growth period, 
China kept a relatively low profile in international politics. Chinese leaders 
heeded the caution of great leader Deng Xiaoping that China should 
“observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our 
capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and 
never claim leadership”. This is widely known as the “hide and bide” 
strategy.
But following the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008, and 
especially since the ascension of Xi Jinping to Chinese leadership in 
2012–2013, China has been doing much less hiding and biding. Its new 
assertive posture is evident in its aggressive behavior toward Japan, its 
annexation of the South China Sea, its divide-and-rule tactics vis-à-vis 
ASEAN, its economic sanctions against countries like Korea and the 
Philippines, its interference in Hong Kong affairs and its disrespect for the 
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political choices of Taiwan’s citizens. Its new leadership has also been 
manifest in initiatives like the AIIB and the BRI.
The new assertive China is most evident in its posture vis-à-vis the 
US. Chinese President Xi has been overtly trying to push the US out of 
East Asia and position China as the region’s paramount power. In arguing 
for “a new security cooperation architecture”, Xi quite pointedly expressed 
his view on the role of the US in Asia when he said that “strengthening 
military alliances with a third party does not benefit the maintenance of 
regional security … it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, 
solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia. The people of 
Asia have the capability and wisdom to achieve peace and stability in the 
region through enhanced cooperation.”26
These developments have led some analysts to argue that the great 
power struggle between the US and China is pushing them to war. As 
Graham Allison has recalled, more than 2400 years ago, the Athenian his-
torian Thucydides offered a powerful insight: “It was the rise of Athens, 
and the fear that this inspired in Sparta, that made war inevitable.”27 
According to Allison, when a rising power rivals a ruling power, like 
Athens and Sparta, and Germany and Britain a century ago, the contests 
often end badly. Indeed, in 12 of 16 cases over the past 500 years, the 
result was war. “When the parties avoided war, it required huge, painful 
adjustments in attitudes and actions on the part not just of the challenger 
but also the challenged,” wrote Allison.
Quite predictably, there has been much debate about the prospects for 
war between China and the US. Some argue that the dense trade, invest-
ment, finance and people-to-people relations between the two countries 
mean that war between the two countries would be too costly for both 
sides. But similarly close relations did not stop Germany and Britain from 
going to war a century ago. Another line of argument is that today China 
is so militarily inferior to the US. But if China’s Communist Party were 
faced with an existential threat, such as over Taiwan or in the future even 
the South China Sea, it may fight for its life. And looking ahead, the bal-
ance of power between the Chinese and American militaries will narrow 
quickly over the coming decades, and the US military will likely remain 
more thinly spread across the globe, while China’s remains more concen-
trated in East Asia.
Would China and the US be willing to make the huge, painful adjust-
ments in attitudes and actions in order to avoid war? For his part, Chinese 
President Xi Jinping seemed rather stubborn when he argued “There is no 
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such thing as the so-called Thucydides Trap in the world. But should 
major countries time and again make the mistakes of strategic miscalcula-
tion, they might create such traps for themselves.28”
There are however reasons to believe that the possibility of traditional 
military war between the US and China is highly unlikely. Both sides are 
well aware that there would be no winners. Indeed, the potential for 
mutually assured destruction between two nuclear powers virtually rules 
out a full-blown military war.
The progressive fading of the US’ influence in Asia could also reduce 
the possibility of conflict between China and the US. Over time, issues like 
the South China Sea and even Japan’s Senkaku Islands could seem less and 
less important. They are, after all, just bunches of rocks, reefs, shoals and 
islets in seas which are an awfully long way from Washington.
Against that, there is always the risk of accidental conflicts spiraling out 
of control. Several naval accidents involving the US Navy in 2017, which 
fortunately did not involve Chinese ships, highlight how easily accidents 
can occur in Asia’s highly congested shipping lanes. And possible eco-
nomic stagnation could see the Chinese government promote nationalism 
more aggressively, and resort to military adventurism as a diversionary 
tactic.
All things considered, the US and China seem destined to remain 
“frenemies”, that is, both friends and rivals. In addition to the dense trade, 
investment, finance and people-to-people relations that bind the US and 
China together, the US needs China’s cooperation on issues like North 
Korea, counter-terrorism, cyber-security, Iran and, depending on the 
administration, climate change. But as in recent times, rather than tradi-
tional military conflicts, we should expect conflicts in the areas of trade, 
intellectual property, international rule of law and cyber to be constantly 
bubbling, with even greater explosions from time to time. The likely 
inability to put an end to such conflicts will undermine the prospects for 
an Asian Century.
As China progressively displaces the US as Asia’s hegemon, it will 
become ever more necessary for Asian countries to cooperate better 
together. The US has operated like a boxing referee who holds old ene-
mies apart. However, as we have discussed in this chapter, Asia is bristling 
with tensions involving China on the one hand, and Japan, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, North Korea, the South China Sea, ASEAN and India. And Chinese 
initiatives like the AIIB and the BRI are not seen with a friendly eye by all 
regional players.
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The most likely source of conflict in Asia could be between China and 
India or Japan, two countries that are unlikely to buckle under China’s 
ambitious regional designs. Indeed, while Asian Century hype has focused 
substantially on the rise of China, India’s population will surpass China’s 
as early as 2022, and could be some 50% higher than China’s by 2100. 
And if current trends continue, India’s economic size could overtake 
China’s sometime in the second half of this century. Such a power shift 
could foster political instability in Asia, especially since India has more 
friends in Asia than does China.
Avoiding conflict for Japan may ultimately require political reconcilia-
tion with former adversaries. This is no easy task as the Chinese and Korean 
governments have invested so much in anti-Japanese nationalism, rather 
than looking to the future and fostering reconciliation.
Possible conflicts between Asian countries could do much to derail the 
prospects for an Asian Century. And the great risk for the US is being 
dragged into these conflicts between Asian countries, more than a straight 
head-on conflict with China.
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CHAPTER 11
What Next for the Asian Century?
In this book, we have argued that Asia is suffering from stunted economic 
development, despite the rapid growth in recent decades. No major Asian 
economy has managed to achieve full catch-up to world leaders like the 
US and Germany in terms of GDP per capita, or economic, business and 
technological sophistication.
Asia is also suffering from stunted social development. Half of Asia’s 
population is stranded between poverty and the middle class, living in a 
zone of vulnerability and precarity. Middle-class Asia remains a myth, even 
if Asian lives have improved immeasurably in tandem with rapid economic 
development. And the middle class is receding in advanced countries like 
Japan and Korea along with rising inequality and poverty.
Asia may have become a powerful force in the global economy and 
politics. But this is mainly thanks to the enormous populations of coun-
tries like China, India and Indonesia, not because of economic, business 
and technological sophistication. Large populations have given these 
countries economic, market and financial weight, which has been trans-
formed into economic, political and military power. These countries 
remain, however, fragile superpowers.
To some extent, Asia’s current predicament of stunted economic and 
social development is not surprising. As countries like even Bangladesh 
have demonstrated, you only have to get a few things right to break out of 
low-income status and to reduce extreme poverty. But to realize a nation’s 
full economic and social potential, and become a high-income economy 
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with a middle-class society, requires addressing a more complex set of 
challenges.
Can asia Rise to the Challenge?
The prospects for an Asian Century will depend on how Asia responds to 
the seven challenges identified in this book: (1) getting better value out of 
global value chains, (2) making the most of urbanization’s potential, (3) 
giving all Asians a chance, (4) solving Asia’s demographic dilemmas, (5) 
fixing Asia’s flawed politics, (6) combating Asia’s economic crime and (7) 
living together in peace and harmony.
If Asia were able to successfully tackle our seven challenges for an Asian 
Century, over time it would be able to achieve advanced economies and 
middle-class societies. Indeed, many have projected massive benefits from 
such a “Goldilocks scenario”. For example, the Asian Development Bank 
once projected that an additional 3 billion Asians could enjoy living stan-
dards similar to those in Europe today, and the region could account for 
over half of global output by the middle of this century.1 But in the six 
years since the ADB painted this rosy picture, very few of the policy 
reforms necessary for realizing an Asian Century have been implemented. 
And as Asia’s economy and politics have become more fragile and uncer-
tain, there is little prospect of dramatic reforms being implemented.
Indeed, our overall assessment is that Asian governments are unlikely to 
have either the political courage or wisdom to tackle the above seven chal-
lenges with great vigor. The case of Japan, which has postponed necessary 
reforms for over two decades, is salutary. Its latest reform program, dubbed 
Abenomics, has left the whole international community underwhelmed. 
Even the polite and diplomatic IMF called for Abenomics to be “reloaded”, 
some four years after it was launched.2
In a similar context, Korean big business has a stranglehold over the 
nation’s politics, and is resisting a crucial opening of the economy to more 
market forces. Shamefully, Korea’s corporate governance lags behind 
countries like Thailand, Malaysia and India, countries which are much less 
advanced, as well as Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan and Taiwan. And cor-
ruption in business and politics is deep and endemic, as evident in the 
corruption scandal that engulfed the now-impeached President Park 
Geun-hye and Samsung in 2016–2017.
China, which proudly aspires to Asian leadership, seems afraid of the 
possible disruptive effects of reform, and has postponed its promise of 
allowing market forces to play a “decisive role” in the economy. Instead, 
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for some time now, China has resorted to unsustainable debt-financing to 
intoxicate the economy. This will not drive China’s productivity and inno-
vation capacities up the development ladder.
the DonalD tRump Collision
Colliding with our seven challenges for an Asian Century is the arrival of 
Donald Trump to the leadership of the US. Trump’s America will also 
shape the contours of a possible Asian Century. We are now seeing a dete-
rioration in some key factors that have driven Asia development—an open 
US market, a relatively benign security environment, and a stable global 
economic system.
Many observers speculate that Trump will not survive a year or two or 
beyond his first term. This is far from certain. His rise to the presidency 
was equally improbable. But even post-Trump, we should not assume a 
return to the US as a promoter of open markets and globalization, and a 
friend of democratic partners and the liberal international system. America 
has been struck by a wave of populism, and in particular nationalism (make 
America great again), nativism (secure our borders) and protectionism 
(protect American workers),3 which is unlikely to go away anytime soon.
American society has become polarized by inequality, a product of glo-
balization and rapid technological change. And support for multilateral 
free trade is now withering on the vine. There is very little chance that the 
US would sign up again to the TPP in the foreseeable future. Further, 
nationalism and military fatigue from more than 15 years of war mean that 
US has much less enthusiasm for maintaining his system of alliances and 
partnerships. And the US government seems more distracted than ever by 
the Middle East and Vladimir Putin’s designs on Europe, and is paralyzed 
by Washington’s shenanigans.
The US’ influence in Asia is declining, in the context of the great power 
struggle between China and the US, and this decline will likely accelerate 
under Trump’s administration. The US is losing ground to China, 
 especially in Southeast Asia which is increasingly becoming a Chinese 
sphere of influence. And China is increasingly asserting its military power 
in the East and South China Seas, and the Indian Ocean, and through 
initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative, and the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank. But China is not a promoter of open markets, good 
governance and international rule of law, key elements that are necessary 
for realizing an Asian Century. Rather, state capitalism, authoritarian gov-
ernance and Sinocentric bilateralism are China’s currency.
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This power shift is epochal. Following the end of World War 2, the US 
became Asia’s leading power as it provided assistance to rebuild war-torn 
countries, open markets that enabled export-oriented growth, an interna-
tional system that facilitated development and a security blanket to its 
allies. The US also remade Japan from an expansionist, militaristic nation 
into a pacifist democracy, encouraged successful democratization in Korea 
and Taiwan and promoted open market economics, human rights and the 
rule of law. The waning of America’s positive influence will have profound 
effects on Asia.
a WoRlD With inCReasingly DiveRgent inteRests
Even if Asia continues to muddle through, in some decades time, the 
region could account for around half the world economy, far outstripping 
the West in total economic weight, thanks mainly to its enormous popula-
tion, as organizations like the Asian Development Bank, OECD and PWC 
have projected. After all, Asia accounts for some 55% of the world’s popu-
lation, while the West (as represented by members of the OECD) only 
accounts for 18%. Three of the world’s four biggest economies could be 
Asian—China, India and Indonesia—with the West only represented by 
the US at third place.
Even in these circumstances, no major Asian economy would have 
approached world leaders like the US and Germany in terms of GDP per 
capita, or economic, business and technological sophistication. For exam-
ple, in one report PWC projects that in 2050 US GDP per capita would still 
be double that of China (compared with four times in 2016) and would be 
triple that of India (compared with nine times in 2016).4 Moreover, Asia 
could remain a democratic desert, with not one full democracy, and with 
continuing widespread human rights abuses and restrictions on personal 
freedoms. In other words, Asia would have the world’s greatest economic 
weight and be a leading economic and political power, but would remain a 
pygmy in terms of economic, social and political development.
Needless to say, the incongruities of such a scenario could generate 
even greater geopolitical tensions than we see today.
These incongruities would test the capacity of the international com-
munity to cooperate on issues like open trade and investment, democracy 
and human rights, climate change, protection of intellectual property 
rights, economic crime, international rule of law, law of the sea and natural 
disasters. Why? Because forging consensus and working together requires 
shared interest and values, and a culture of cooperation and trust. As the 
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UN Security Council has proved time and again, when great powers have 
fundamentally divergent interests, it is very difficult to achieve anything. 
In fact, a world with even larger emerging economies, together with rela-
tively smaller highly developed countries, could be a recipe for interna-
tional instability.
Risks of ConfliCt anD CRisis
Beyond these incongruities, there are endless possibilities of economic, 
social, political and military crises in Asia—mostly due to the likely failure 
to deal with our seven challenges for an Asian Century.
We have argued that the US and China are unlikely to engage in a tradi-
tional military conflict, although the naval collisions involving the US Navy 
in 2017 show how easily accidents can occur, and possibly spiral out of 
control. They seem destined to remain “frenemies”, that is both friends 
and rivals, with conflicts taking place in the areas of trade, intellectual prop-
erty, international rule of law, and cyber, rather than on the battlefield.
As China progressively displaces the US as Asia’s hegemon, it will 
become ever more necessary for Asian countries to cooperate better 
together. However, Asia is bristling with tensions involving China on the 
one hand, and Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, North Korea, the South China 
Sea, ASEAN and India on the other. The most likely source of conflict in 
Asia could be between China and India or Japan.
While Asian Century hype has focused substantially on the rise of China, 
India’s population will surpass China’s as early as 2022, and could be some 
50% higher than China’s by 2100. And if current trends continue, India’s 
economic size could overtake China’s sometime in the second half of this 
century. Such a power shift could foster political instability in Asia, especially 
since India has more friends in Asia than does China. And avoiding conflict for 
Japan will ultimately require political reconciliation with former adversaries, 
China and South Korea, something which is not on the cards any time soon.
Any such conflicts between Asian countries could do much to derail the 
prospects for an Asian Century. And the great risk for the US is being 
dragged into these conflicts between Asian countries, more than a straight 
head-on conflict with China.
Economic crisis is also stalking several Asian countries, most notably 
Japan and China with their massive debt problems. And anti-globalization 
populism could break the most important driver of Asia’s rapid develop-
ment, open trade and investment. Social crisis could happen in India, 
Indonesia and the Philippines with their bulging youth populations, if they 
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are unable to find decent jobs. Multi-ethnic countries like India and Indonesia 
could easily descend into violence as groups suffering from discrimination, 
prejudice and persecution mobilize themselves against dominant elites. And 
as natural disasters and environmental problems increasingly hit Asia’s over-
crowded and badly planned cities, social crises will also accelerate.
Continued authoritarian politics and social repression in China, North 
Korea and Vietnam could provoke political crises as citizens demand 
cleaner and democratic government. Social unrest is already rampant in 
China, and North Korea has thousands of regime opponents locked away 
in secret gulags. Further, the corruption crisis that engulfed former South 
Korean President Park Geun-hye shows how fragile even Asia’s most 
advanced countries can be.
Today, Asia is sitting on a knife edge. The potential of the region to 
generate good and happy lives for its citizens is enormous. But the require-
ments of success and the risks of failure are equally enormous. We cannot 
be sure of “what’s next for the Asian Century”. Indeed, anything could 
happen, and complacency of the region’s elites  could be the Asian 
Century’s greatest enemy.
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In page 1, paragraph 1, line 1 has been changed as “Asia, the continent 
just across the Pacific Ocean from the US, has been pushed into uncharted 
waters with the election of Donald Trump to the presidency of the US.”
In page 8, paragraph 1, line 5 has been changed as “But despite the hype 
of Asia’s economic miracle, the harsh reality of our assessment in Chap. 2 
is that Asia is suffering from stunted economic development.”
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